

Confidential.

M 577

AN ACCOUNT  
OF THE  
BRITISH WARS WITH PERSIA

FROM THE  
OCCUPATION OF KHARAJ IN 1838,

TOGETHER WITH A  
PRÉCIS OF CONTEMPORANEOUS EVENTS AND ABSTRACTS  
OF IMPORTANT CORRESPONDENCE

CONNECTED WITH  
THE WAR OF 1856-57.

PREPARED IN THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH OF THE QUARTER  
MASTER GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT IN INDIA

BY  
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N.B.—Refer to the Military Report on South-West Persia, published by the Intelligence Branch of the Quarter Master General's Department in India.



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# AN ACCOUNT OF THE BRITISH WARS WITH PERSIA.

## CHAPTER I.

RELATIONS WITH PERSIA FROM THE TIME OF FATAH ALÍ SHÁH TO THE  
WAR OF 1856-57, AND CONTEMPORANEOUS HISTORY OF HERÁT AFFAIRS.

Persia\* may be regarded as one barrier of our East Indian dominions (*see South-West Persia*); and the rulers of Russia, aware of this fact, have availed themselves of every opportunity for creating a difficulty between the two states. Her settled policy has been to seek by all possible means to induce the Persian monarch to pursue an unbecoming and offensive course in his dealings with England; and whether the treatment of the British representatives in Persia or the occupation of Herát was the point in debate, Russian diplomatists have invariably sought to aggravate the case and render an accommodation impossible.

During the reign of Fatah Alí Sháh, the community of interests between Great Britain and Persia united them, not more by formal engagements than by a sense of common danger, in an intimate alliance for their mutual defence. But Sháh Muhammad, after mounting the throne (in October 1834) had removed all experienced and wise councillors from around him, and had placed the affairs of his empire entirely in the hands of persons who shared in the love of conquest by which he was himself actuated. To enable him to prosecute these schemes, it was necessary that he should so cultivate intimate relations with Russia as to relieve him from all apprehension that, while he was engaged on distant expeditions, Russia would profit by his absence to disturb or dismember his kingdom; and he was taught to believe that, if he could insure the support of Russia, England would not venture to oppose him. In furtherance of concerted plans with Russia, an envoy was sent by the Sháh to Kandahár and Kábul, charged with presents and communications not only from his Persian Majesty, but also from the Russian Minister of the Persian Court.

At a very early stage after Muhammad Sháh's accession to the throne of Persia, he appears to have conceived that his rights of sovereignty should extend not only to Herát and Kandahár but to Ghazní, although warned by Sir Henry Ellis, our Special Envoy, that such pretensions could not be recognized by the British Government. As a prelude, therefore, to his extensive designs upon Afghánistán, an expedition against Herát was planned.

Expedition against Herát  
planned.

\* Hunt's Persian Campaign.

| † Hunt's Persian War.

Herát was then an independent province governed by Prince Kámrán, who by his non-fulfilment of treaties had given a certain amount of pretext for the aggressive action of the Persian monarch; but he offered to make reparation, and the English Minister tried to mediate and bring matters to an issue by peaceable negotiation. It was, however, soon evident from the exorbitant demands of Muhammad Sháh that he was not to be induced to abandon his projects of Eastern conquest, and that all that had been gained was the postponement of the expedition.

In a despatch to Lord Palmerston, dated 30th December 1835, Mr. Ellis, who had been sent on a mission of condolence and congratulation to the young Sháh, stated the case in these words: "Herát and some neighbouring districts are under the immediate authority of Kámrán Mirzá, whose father, Muhammad Sháh, was for a short time King of Kábul. Kámrán Mirzá, without distinctly acknowledging the sovereignty of Persia, has been in the habit of paying annually a sum of money to the Sháh of Persia whenever the Governor of Khúrásán, the province of Persia adjacent to Herát, was in a condition to threaten an attack upon Kámrán Mirzá's principality. The successes of Abbás Mirzá in his Khúrásán campaigns led to the contracting of certain engagements on the part of Kámrán Mirzá, the principal of which were the razing of the fort of Ghoríán, the return of certain families to their domicile in Persia, and the payment of a sum of 10,000 tománs to the Sháh. The Herát prince has failed in his performance of all, and the Sháh has consequently a right to obtain redress by force of arms. Under such circumstances, even if the British Government was not restrained by the ninth article\* of the existing treaty from interfering between the Persians and Afgháns, it would be difficult to oppose an attack on Herát, or to define the exact limit to which hostilities were to be carried against Kámrán Mirzá; but an attempt to annex Kandahár and Ghazní to the Persian dominions upon pretensions derived from the time of Nádír Sháh has no such justification, and could not be looked upon with indifference by the British Government."

During the negotiations which ensued, the spring of 1836 and 1837 passed by; but in November of the latter year, the Persian army invaded Herát, accompanied by the Sháh in person and by the Russian Envoy, Count Simonich, and on the 22nd of that month the siege of Herát began.

The Parliamentary Papers† in which these transactions are related contain some very important disclosures with reference to the Russian deceptive policy. The real character of Russian diplomacy, and show that the same pernicious system of deception propounded by the Czar Nicholas to Sir G. H. Seymour at St. Petersburg is carried out in every branch of the diplomatic service of that State. The policy advocated by Count Simonich was so much at variance with the professed principles and the declared system of the Russian Government, that Lord Palmerston in 1837 wrote to the Earl of Durham, at that time Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to bring the matter to the attention of the Russian Government. This was done, and Count Nesselrode replied that our Minister must have been misinformed, as Count Simonich had been distinctly ordered to dissuade the Sháh from prosecuting the war at any time and in any circumstances. But it was

\* Treaty of 25th November 1814, Article IX: If war should be declared between the Afgháns and Persians, the English Government shall not interfere with either party, unless their mediation to effect a peace shall be solicited by both parties.

† Hunt's Persian Campaign.



a well-known fact that Count Simonich not only urged the advance of the Persians against Herát, but actually offered his services to the Sháh in a military capacity. So much for the truthfulness of Russian diplomacy.

The siege lasted ten months, and the defence is among the more memorable ones of history. The determination with which the place held out is ascribed to the presence with the Afghán forces of an English officer, Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, of the Bombay Artillery. Colonel Stoddart was in the Persian camp, and Mr. McNeill arrived in the spring of 1838. The Russian Minister, Count Simonich, was also present, and assumed a personal superintendence of the military operations; and a Russian detachment, called "deserters," under General Sanson, took part in the siege.

Mr. McNeill wrote on the 23rd February 1838: "The defence which Herát has made is very creditable to its inhabitants; and, considering the amount of the means which the Sháh succeeded in collecting before it (nearly 40,000 men and 80 guns), the want of artillery in the town, the facility with which His Majesty has obtained supplies, the depressing effect upon the Herátis of the fall of Ghoríán (it fell after a siege of 10 days), the failure of all their allies to afford them efficient succour, and the unusual mildness of the season so favourable to the operations of a siege, I confess the value of Herát has been greatly enhanced in my estimation; and, although I have always regarded it as a most important position with reference to the security and tranquillity of India, I was not prepared to look upon it as so strong and defensible a place, or as one so capable of being made a barrier to the advance of any hostile power; and I feel that, if Herát should fall into the hands of any such power, it would be an evil even greater than I had hitherto believed it would be." These considerations induced Mr. McNeill to advise the English Government to interfere for the preservation of the independence of this important fortress.

Mr. McNeill was active in his remonstrances with the Sháh, but without avail; and on the 7th June he left the camp under circumstances which amounted to a diplomatic rupture between Persia and Great Britain.

In the meantime the siege was vigorously pressed, and in an assault on the 24th June the place was nearly lost by the Afgháns, and would have been, it is said, had it not been for the personal gallantry of Lieutenant Pottinger.

The garrison, however, was nearly worn out, their sufferings from famine were extreme, and the siege operations began to assume the character of a blockade.

The energetic prosecution of the siege of Herát by the Persian Government had produced an estrangement aggravated by several indignities offered to British subjects.

In the meantime the events in progress at Herát had aroused the attention of the Indian Government, and in the spring of 1838 Lord Auckland despatched a small expedition to the Persian Gulf to be ready for any service Mr. McNeill might call upon it to undertake. This force (of under 500 men) was landed on the island of Kháraj in the Persian Gulf near Bushire, and exaggerated accounts of its dimensions reached Herát, and produced some alarm in the Persian camp. It happened also that Mr. McNeill, at the same time that he heard of the arrival of the British expedition in the Persian Gulf, received instructions from the Foreign Office (in anticipation of the refusal of the Persian monarch to desist from the siege of Herát), which induced him

Pottinger conducts the defence.

Value of Herát to India.

Rupture between England and Persia.

British expedition to the Persian Gulf, 1838.

to seize the opportunity of making an effort to regain the ascendancy of English counsels at the Persian Court.

In accordance with these instructions, he despatched Colonel Stoddart to the Sháh's camp with a decided message, to the effect that, if the siege of Herát were not raised, the British would proceed to hostilities; and Colonel Stoddart reached the Persian headquarters before Herát with this information on the 11th August.

Without going into details of what then took place, and of the vain intrigues of Russia carried on through M. Goutte, an officer of the mission (having for their object to induce Prince Kámran to make some sign of vassalage to the Sháh, such as coming out to visit him in order to give a semblance of success to the Persian Expedition), it will be sufficient to say that Colonel Stoddart's mission was successful, and that the Sháh began his retreat to Tihrán on the 9th September.

It should be observed here that simultaneously with these events other intrigues were being carried on in Afghánistán by a Russian agent, Captain Vicovitch, at Kandahár and Kábul, whose instructions were to exaggerate the power of Persia and the support being accorded to her by Russia, with the object of inducing the rulers of those places, Dost Muhammad and Kóhandil Khán, to throw in their interest with Persia and Russia rather than with England.

When the Persian army retreated from Herát on 9th September 1838, it was evident that the Russian plans had sustained a temporary check; and accordingly, when the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg remonstrated on the subject of the intrigues just mentioned, the Russian Government disavowed its agents.

Count Simonich was superseded in 1839 by Count Meden, and Captain Vicovitch, being ignored altogether, committed suicide.

When the siege of Herát was raised, the state of the population from famine was serious, and every effort was made by Colonel Stoddart and Lieutenant Pottinger to save the people from starving; and a sum of money was paid by Lord Auckland for the support of Prince Kámran and his chiefs, and for the restoration of the defences of Herát.

At the same time an English mission was despatched to Herát, and the independence of the district was to be guaranteed by treaty on condition of the abolition of the slave trade.

The head of this mission was Major Todd, of the Bengal Artillery, and its members were Lieutenant R. Shakespear, Captain Sanders, Lieutenant Abbott, Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart, Lieutenants Connolly and North, and Surgeon Login.

This mission had great difficulties to contend with, owing to the avarice and treachery of Prince Kámran's Minister, Yár Muhammad, who had also previously been a source of great trouble to Eldred Pottinger.

This man continued to intrigue both with Persia and Afghánistán all the time that he was in the receipt of a subsidy from the Anglo-Indian Government; and eventually Major Todd withdrew his mission in September 1840, Pottinger having left in August 1839. He had been appointed Political Agent at Herát from the 9th September in the previous year, the date of the raising of the siege.

His exertions\* at Kandahár were crowned with such success that the following draft of a treaty between its chief and the Persian monarch was drawn up under the sealed guarantee of the Russian Ambassador at Tihrán:

\* Hunt's Persian Campaign.

"I, as Minister Plenipotentiary of the Russian Government at the Court of Persia, guarantee the fulfilment of the following conditions of treaty between His Majesty Muhammad Sháh and the Sirdár of Kandahár:

1. The principality of Herát to be bestowed on the rulers of Kandahár.
2. The Kandahár territories and tribes to be preserved to it.
3. All Afghán tribes to remain free of Persia, and to be administered by the rulers of Kandahár.
4. Prince Kámrán and his Wazír, Yár Muhammad, to be excluded from all participation in the councils of Persia.
5. The Sháh to aid the Kandahár Sirdárs against the Amír of Kábul or the English.
6. A son of Kóhandil Khán to be given as a hostage to the Sháh.
7. A Kandahári contingent of 12,000 men to garrison Herát and to assist the Sháh on occasion of service.
8. On the arrival of the treaty duly ratified at Kandahár, Muhammad Umar Khán to repair to the royal presence.

9. After the presentation of this prince, the necessary money for the outfit of the horse and artillery to be made over by the Persian Government to the Sirdárs of Kandahár; Sirdár Mihrdil Khán to be then sent with 1,000 horse to the royal camp; \* \* \*, no other demand to be made upon the Kandaháris by the Persian Government than that of military service."

*"Should Muhammad Sháh, i.e., the Sháh of Persia, fail to fulfil any of these several conditions, or depart in any way from the stipulations, I, as Minister Plenipotentiary of the Russian Government, becoming myself responsible, will oblige him in whatever way may be necessary to act fully up to the terms and conditions of the treaty."*

In communicating this remarkable document to the chief authorities, Mr. McNeill stated with great force:

"The question of Herát seems, therefore, to be the question of all Afghánistán; and if the place should fall without any attempt having been made to save it, I feel convinced that the moral influence of that event would have a most prejudicial effect on our national reputation in all these countries; for it is no secret to any one that the British Government have been desirous to prevent its fall, and that Russia, on the contrary, has been solicitous to see it in the hands of Persia. All Central Asia will regard it as a question between the greater powers, whose views are so publicly spoken of, that I did not converse with a villager between Isfahán and this place who did not ask me whether the Russians did not favour, and the English oppose, the Sháh's enterprise against Herát."

In the same despatch Mr. McNeill pointed out to Lord Auckland the beneficial effect the advance of a British force in that direction would have, not only upon the Sháh of Persia, but upon all the rulers of Central Asia. Mr. McNeill declared Herát to be the key of Afghánistán. "The country," he stated, "between the frontiers of Persia and India is far more productive than I had imagined it to be; and there is no impediment, either from the physical features of the country, or from the deficiency of supplies, to the march of a large army from the frontiers of Georgia to Kandahár, or, as I believe, to the Indus. Count Simonich drove his carriage from Tihrán to Herát, and could drive it to Kandahár; and the Sháh's army has now for nearly seven months subsisted almost exclusively on the supplies of the country immediately around Herát and Ghoríán, leaving the still more productive



districts of Sabzwár and Farah untouched. In short, I can state from personal observation that there is absolutely no impediment to the march of an army to Herát; and that from the information I have received, the country between that city and Kandahár presents no difficulties, but affords remarkable facilities for the passage of armies. There is, therefore, no security for India in the nature of the country through which an enemy would have to pass to invade it from this side. On the contrary, the whole line is peculiarly favourable for such an enterprise, and I am the more anxious to state this opinion clearly, because it is at variance with my previous belief, and with statements which I may have previously hazarded, relying on more imperfect information. Under such circumstances, it seems to me that it would be a most hazardous policy to allow Persia to act as the pioneer of Russia, and, under protection of the article of the treaty, to break down the main defence of Afghánistán, and thereby make the country untenable to us, at a moment when the concert between Persia and Russia in these operations is avowed. I shall therefore urge Lord Auckland, by every argument I can call to mind, to take a decided course, and to save Herát, &c., &c."

Mr. Kaye, in his "History of the War in Afghánistán," thus describes Herát:

"Situated at that point of the great range of mountains bounding the whole of our (Indian) northern frontier, even to Assam, which alone presents facilities to the transport of a train of heavy artillery, Herát has, with no exaggeration, been described as the gate of India. Within the limits of the Herát territory, all the great roads leading on India converge. At other points, between Herát and Kábul, a body of troops unencumbered with guns, or having only a light field artillery, might make good its passage, if not actively opposed, across the stupendous mountain ranges of the Hindu Kush; but it is only by the Herát route that a really formidable, well-equipped army could make its way upon the Indian frontier from the regions on the north-west. Both the nature and the resources of the country are such as to favour the success of the invader. All the materials necessary for the organization of a large army and the formation of its depôts are to be found in the neighbourhood of Herát. Its mines supply lead, iron, and sulphur; the surface in almost every direction is laden with saltpetre: the willow and the poplar trees, which furnish the best charcoal, flourish in all parts; whilst from the population might, at any time, be drawn hardy and docile soldiers to recruit the ranks of the invading army. Upon the possession of such a country would depend, in no small measure, the success of operations undertaken for the invasion or the defence of Hindustán."

This same year, 1842, the differences between England and Persia, which had reached their climax when Mr. McNeill left the Sháh's camp at Herát on the 7th June 1838, were amicably adjusted; and in the month of March the small British contingent was withdrawn from the island of Kháraj, in the Persian Gulf. This result was brought about by the mediation of Russia, at whose dictation Persia made the reparation claimed from her for the affront which had led to the rupture. She also guaranteed a commercial treaty.

In 1844 Prince Kámrán was murdered by his Wazír, Yár Muhammad, who seized upon the supreme power at Herát for himself, and retained it till his death in 1851. Yár Muhammad banished all the Sádózai Princes, Kámrán's relations, from Herát, and secured his possession of power by paying assiduous

Adjustment of the differences between England and Persia through Russian mediation.

court to the Persian Government; and after his death his son and successor, Sayyid Muhammad Khán, acknowledged himself a subject of Persia, and that he held his appointment as Governor of Herát from the Sháh. He was a weak Prince, and was driven to this course by his desire for Persian support against the Herát chieftains, whose opposition he began to encounter soon after his accession.

The Persian Court had never lost sight of the subject of Herát, and the present was deemed a good opportunity to take possession of the city. Accordingly a Persian force was organized under Murád Mirzá, Governor of Khúrásán, but not nominally for the occupation of Herát.

The pretext for armed action was to repel the advance of a Bárakzái Chief of Kandahár on Farah; but in the operations which ensued, the citadel of Herát was occupied by a strong Persian force. Upon this, the British Minister, Colonel Sheil, remonstrated with such effect, that on the 25th January 1853 an engagement was contracted by the Persian Government not to interfere in Herát affairs.

Renewed Persian expedition against Herát.  
Success of British remonstrances.

The next event concerning British relations with Persia was a misunderstanding which seems to have arisen from the appointment by Mr. Taylour Thompson of a Persian Secretary to the Mission, who was disapproved of by the Sháh. The dispute which arose about this matter was in progress when Mr. Murray assumed charge of the Legation in April 1855, and seems to have lasted until December of that year, when the attitude of the Persian Government towards the British Legation necessitated the breaking off of diplomatic relations on the part of Great Britain, and Mr. Murray retired to Baghdád.

Rupture of diplomatic relations.

It would seem that the Sháh was much annoyed by the convention of 1853; he showed this plainly by his attitude during the Crimean war.

Changes at Herát in 1855.

In 1855 a change of some importance had taken place in the government of Herát. In September of that year the chief power was seized by Muhammad Yúsuf, a Sádózái Prince, grandson of a former ruler of Herát, and one of the numerous Sádózái nobles whom Yár Muhammad had expelled when he murdered Prince Kámrán.

Yúsuf now, who was a relation of Prince Kámrán, inaugurated his success by murdering Yár Muhammad's son, Sayyid Muhammad, and some others, on the plea that they were accomplices in Kámrán's murder.

Accession of Muhammad Yúsuf.

The Persian Government is said to have approved of Muhammad Yúsuf's accession to power in Herát, as they saw in it a means of renewing their own designs on that place, and were less apprehensive than formerly of British interference, as this country was engaged in the Crimean war.

Decline of British influence at Tíhrán.

The successes of the Russians at Kars in November 1855 are also believed to have encouraged Persia in the aggressive measures to which she now resorted.

In the autumn of 1855, Muhammad Yúsuf applied to Persia for aid against Afghánistán, declaring that Dost Muhammad (who, on the death of his brother Kóhandil Khán, ruler of Kandahár, had marched there, and annexed it to his dominions) intended to invade Herát.

Muhammad Yúsuf applies to Persia for aid against the Afgháns.



Accordingly, in the spring of 1856, Prince Múrád Mirzá was ordered to advance with a Persian army and occupy the city.

The accession of Muhammad Yúsuf was regarded by Dost Muhammad, who had concluded a treaty with us on the 30th March 1855, as almost tantamount to a Persian annexation

Treaty of Pesháwar.

of Herát.

It was the aggressive attitude of the Tihrán Court which induced Dost Muhammad to enter into this alliance with us.

Counter-alliance between England and Afghánistán.

The proceedings of Persia with reference to Herát took place in spite of the remonstrances of the British Minister, Mr. Murray, to which the Wazír, bent on flattering the Sháh's vanity, turned a deaf ear; and it is added that from this time the members of our Legation and everybody under British protection were subjected to perpetual annoyances and insults, for which no redress could be obtained. It is probable that the misunderstanding respecting a Persian Secretary, already referred to, was merely one item among the details of this persecution.

Early in 1856 the Persian troops advanced on Herát; but when Prince Múrád Mirzá reached Turbat, he was informed that his advanced guard had been refused admission to the city, and that the Herátis were bent on resisting his approach.

A Persian force under Prince Múrád Mirzá advances on Herát.  
Capture of Ghoríán.

Prince Múrád, then acting under stringent orders from Tihrán, attacked the Herát forces near Ghoríán, inflicting on them a signal defeat, and taking their General and several hundred men prisoners. He then laid siege to Ghoríán, which after twenty days succumbed, and, leaving a garrison there, he advanced to Herát.

The resistance of the Herátis to the Persian claims is said to have been due to Muhammad Yúsuf's Wazír, I'sá Khán, an energetic chieftain belonging to an Afghán tribe. In the earlier days of the siege, these two men worked amicably together; but soon the Prince became jealous of the rising power of the Wazír, and the latter, anticipating the intention of the former towards himself, made a prisoner of his master, and sent him into the Persian camp.

Thence Prince Múrád sent him to Tihrán, where he was treated as a rebel by the Sháh.

This was at the end of April 1856, and the siege lasted till the 26th October, when the place succumbed to famine, and the Persians took possession of Herát.

Siege and fall of Herát.

Múrád Mirzá had a besieging force of 30,000 men, and the operations were conducted by a Frenchman named Bühler. Their loss during the siege was 1,800 men; that of the Herátis, 1,500. I'sá Khán was murdered after the surrender.

The Persian monarch demanded that for the future money should be coined in his name; the *khálbah*, or prayer for the sovereign, be read in the mosques on Friday, and a certain amount of tribute paid yearly. Our Ambassador had before this quitted Tihrán owing to an insult offered to him by the Prime Minister; but this was a temporary and personal difference, which would probably have been smoothed over had not the Persian Court been well aware that their proceedings regarding Herát must bring on a rupture at any rate (*Blackwood's Magazine*).

In the meantime the English Government had not been idle. Negotiations were first opened at Constantinople between England declares war Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Farúk Khán, an against Persia. envoy from Persia on his way to Paris; but these had no result. Accordingly the English Government sent orders by the mail of the 20th September to the Governor-General of India to make warlike preparations, and on the 1st November the Viceroy declared war against Persia. On the 6th of the same month, the occupation of Herát by Persia was publicly notified at Tihrán.

On the 4th December the island of Kháraj was re-occupied without opposition by a British force, and on the 7th the troops were landed at Halílá Bay, near Bushire. On the 9th Occupation of Kháraj. Capture of Rashír. they captured the fort of Rashír near the sea and bombarded the town, capturing a quantity of guns and small arms and stores of ammunition. The town surrendered on the 10th.

These successes were achieved by an advanced detachment of the army under General Stalker.

The head-quarters of the expedition, under General Sir James Outram, sailed from Bombay on the 16th January 1857, and arrived at Bushire on the 27th. The force was divided Concentration of the main force under General Sir James Outram at Bushire. into two divisions, under Generals Stalker and Havelock, and the whole of it was concentrated at Bushire by the end of the month.

On the 3rd February General Outram moved forward against a Persian force occupying an entrenched camp at the village of Borasján, 48 miles from Bushire, and 12 from the foot of the mountains which separate the sandy coast from the table-land of Persia.

On the 5th, after a trivial skirmish, this position was occupied, and a quantity of ordnance stores and camp equipage fell Battle of Khúsháb. into our hands. On the 7th General Outram moved back to Bushire, followed by the Persian army, 7,000 strong, to which he gave battle on the 8th near the village of Khúsháb.

In this engagement the Persians were utterly routed, and they fled in disorder, leaving behind them 700 dead and two guns.

The safety of Bushire being now secured, General Outram left on the 18th of March with 4,800 men and 12 guns by sea, Expedition to Muhammarah. accompanied by four armed steamers and two war sloops for Muhammarah, at the confluence of the Kárún river with the Shatt-ul-Aráb, where a Persian army of 13,000 men and 30 guns was encamped under Prince Khalai Mirzá. The mouth of the Kárún had also been strongly fortified.

This position was attacked by Sir James Outram on the 26th March, and captured with but few casualties. The Persian losses Battle at the confluence of the Shatt-ul-Aráb and the Kárún. were severe, and in their headlong flight they abandoned 16 guns, besides quantities of tents, baggage, and miscellaneous stores.

On the 29th the fugitive force was followed by a naval expedition under Commander Rennie, of the Indian Navy, which sailed up the Kárún as far as the town of Ahwáz, about 100 miles from the mouth of the river, and midway between Muhammarah and Shustar. The ships reached Ahwáz on the 1st April, and about 300 men landed to attack the Persian army, which was posted on the right bank.

The Persian force, which could not have numbered less than 10,000 men, was so demoralised by the experience it had already had of British troops that it fled in confusion. The Persians left great stores of grain behind them, and suffered much in consequence from destitution during their retreat on Shustar.

On the 4th April, the English expedition returned to Muhammarah, where,

Conclusion of peace. on the following day, General Outram received news of peace having been concluded at Paris on the 4th of the preceding month as the result of negotiations between Lord Cowley and Farúkh Khán (the Persian Ambassador already mentioned as having before the war been engaged in futile negotiations with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe at Constantinople).

The details of this last war are given in Chapter III.

The ratification of this treaty, by which the independence of Herát was Herát recognized independent. recognized, and in which Persia engaged to abstain from all interference in the internal affairs of Afghánistán, was completed at Baghdád on the 2nd May 1857, Mr. Murray being the representative of Great Britain.

The treaty of 1855 (Treaty of Pesháwar) with Dost Muhammad and Persia pledges herself not to interfere in Afghánistán. another ("Articles of Agreement") in 1857 with the same potentate had their origin in our relations with Persia. By the latter the Amír of Kabúl was subsidized as our ally in the Persian war, but the contest was at an end before he was called upon to give aid.

As these treaties have little practical bearing on actual events, no more need be said about them.

The VIIIth clause of the Treaty of Paris contained a stipulation that all prisoners taken in the recent war in Afghánistán were to be surrendered by the Persian Government; but on the 17th April, after the signature of the treaty, but before its ratification, the Sháh caused Prince Muhammad Yúsuf to be given to the relations of Sayyid Muhammad, whom he had put to death on assuming the government of Herát.

They now avenged their relation's death by murdering Muhammad Yúsuf within the precincts of the palace at Tihrán, hacking him to pieces.

As regards Herát itself, its defences had been dismantled during the war Persians renew their influence at Herát. by order of Múrád Mirzá, the Persian Governor of Khúrásan; and after the war the new ruler, Sultán Ján, son-in-law and nephew of Dost Muhammad of Kábul, who had quarrelled with his uncle (and nephew also of Kóhandil Khán, late ruler of Kandahár), was persuaded to receive as his Wazír a creature of the Sháh, so as to keep alive the influence of the Court of Tihrán at Herát, which was now evacuated by Múrád Mirzá and the Persian troops; and for the next five years, though the Treaty of Paris was not violated, Herát was administered almost as a dependency of the Persian Crown.

When the conclusion of peace was known, the British force at Muhammarah was broken up. The orders for this were issued on the 9th May, and on the 15th the troops embarked to return to India. A detachment, however, under General Honner, remained on the island of Kháraj till February 1858, as the Persians delayed the evacuation of Lásh and Júáin on the Sístán frontier.

Amicable relations between Persia and Great Britain were now resumed, and on the 18th July 1857 Mr. Murray returned to Tihrán, when certain



cereemonies and apologies prescribed by the Treaty of Paris were duly gone through.

During the absence of Mr. Murray from Tihrán before the war, up to November 1856, Great Britain had been represented at the Persian Court by Mr. (Consul) Stevens.

After the restoration of peace, an English Envoy was sent to Herát to ascertain that the provisions of the treaty had been faithfully fulfilled. This officer, Colonel Taylor, accompanied by Captain Claud Clerk, started for Herát in August 1857, and left Herat on the completion of his mission in March 1858.

It may be as well here to embody in a few words what remains to be said of Herát before dismissing the subject for the remainder of the chapter.

At the period to which the narrative has now come, the Indian Mutiny was in progress, giving an opportunity to the Sháh of renewing his designs on that city; but so much impressed was he by the lesson administered to him by Sir James Outram, that he could not be induced to venture again on a rupture with the English Government. Afterwards,

The Tekeh Turkmán's defeat the Governor of Khúrásán. in July 1860, the Persian Governor of Khúrásán, Hamzah Mirzá, successor of Múrád Mirzá, sustained a crushing defeat at the hands of the Tekeh Turkmán's, losing the greater part of his army, and several of his guns, so that Nasr-'ud-Dín was not in a position to undertake any aggressive movement on a large scale.

The new ruler of Herát, Sultán Ján, also known as Ahmad Khán, was anxious to succeed to the dignity of Chief of the Bárákzáis, and with this object he prepared to invade the territory of Dost Muhammad.

Having gained possession of Farah by treachery, he was met by Dost Muhammad, who marched against him in 1862, and in the month of May drove him back into Herát, and laid siege to the town.

The Sháh of Persia was desirous of aiding Ahmad, and a force hovered about the frontier; but the British Minister at Tihrán insisted on the provisions of the Treaty of Paris being respected.

His overtures also for English aid against Dost Muhammad, made both through his Ambassador in London and through our Minister at Tihrán, were discouraged.

In the spring of the following year Ahmad died, and was succeeded by his eldest son, whose reign was, however, short, as the siege and capture of Herát by Dost Muhammad. terminated in the surrender of Herát to Dost Muhammad at the end of May 1863.

Almost immediately afterwards Dost Muhammad died also, and it is considered that the nearly simultaneous death of these two hostile leaders occurred at an opportune moment, and averted a renewal of complications in connection with Herát.

In 1865 the Government of Herát was conferred on Dost Muhammad's grandson, Sirdár Muhammad Yákúb Khán, a lad of sixteen, son of Shér Alí Khán, the late Amír of Kábul whom the latter again made Governor of Herát, when he had made good his accession; and he retained that post until his quarrel with his father about the year 1872, when he was deposed and imprisoned.

## CHAPTER II.

### PRECIS OF THE OPERATIONS CONNECTED WITH THE PERSIAN WAR OF 1856-57.

Extract from a Paper on Persia, compiled by Captain (now Colonel) E. F. Chapman, R.A.

In 1854 Mr. Thomson, in charge of British Affairs at Tihrán, appointed Mírzá Háshim to be first Persian Secretary of the Mission--an appointment so obnoxious to the Sháh that the Persian Government declined to receive the Mírzá, and, on his destination being changed to Shíráz, notified to Mr. Murray, who was now the British Minister, that should the Mírzá set out for his post, he would be seized and forcibly detained. This notice was given on the 6th of November 1855, and immediately afterwards the Mírzá's wife was seized by order of the Persian Minister. On the 17th Mr. Murray officially intimated that, unless the lady was released, the flag of the mission would be hauled down, and friendly relations would cease; and as his menace produced no effect, the flag was struck on the 20th of November, and on the 5th of December the mission withdrew from Tihrán. The Persian Government then published a justification of its conduct, which set forth that Mr. Murray was carrying on an intrigue with the wife of Mírzá Háshim; and in an autograph note to his Prime Minister, the Sháh indulged in the most intemperate language against Mr. Murray, charging him with insolence, and speaking of him as "stupid, ignorant, and insane." In the same month of December Prince Sultán Múrád Mírzá put himself at the head of 9,000 men intended to act against Herát. It must be admitted that there was some colour for this expedition, as a tribute had been guaranteed to the Sháh from the city; and further, Prince Muhammad Yúsuf, the son of Kámrán, who, after putting Sayyid Muhammad to death, had recovered his heritage, had applied to Persia for aid, alleging that he was threatened with an attack by Dost Muhammad of Kábul. On the 27th of February 1856, the Persian Government, doubtless encouraged by the Russian successes at Kárs in November of the preceding year, published their reason for this offensive movement. After futile negotiations between the Persian Envoy at Constantinople and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, instructions were sent out by the mail of the 20th September 1856 by Lord Clarendon to the Governor-General of India to prepare a force at Bombay for the occupation of Kháraj. In the meantime the Persian army under Sultán Múrád had defeated the Herát forces near Ghoríán, taking their General, Ahmad Khán, and several hundred men prisoners; and, having captured and garrisoned Ghoríán after a twenty days' siege, were closely besieging Herát itself. On the 29th of April 1856, Prince Muhammad Yúsuf was sent as a prisoner into the Persian camp by his Wazír, I'sá Khán. On the 26th of October 1856 Herát was surrendered to the Persians, and its occupation was publicly notified at Tihrán on the 6th of November. On the first of the same month the Governor-General of India issued a proclamation declaring war against Persia. On the 11th several ships sailed with troops from Bombay to the



Persian Gulf; and on the 13th, Sir H. Leeke, commanding the naval forces, embarked for the same destination. On the 26th the whole fleet, consisting of thirty-four sail, assembled at Kishm; on the 3rd of December the island of Kháraj was re-occupied; and on the 7th, the army, consisting of two brigades, the first under Brigadier Stopford, c.b., and the second under Colonel Honner, disembarked at Halilá Bay, 12 miles south-east of Abú-shahar (Bushire), the 20th Bombay Native Infantry and the 4th Bombay Rifles being the first regiments on shore. On the 9th the troops advanced to dislodge the enemy from their position near the fort of Rashahar (Rashír). A body of Arabs made a most determined resistance at an earth-work, and the action was not gained without loss. Brigadier Stopford, Colonel Malet of the 3rd Cavalry, and Lieutenants Utterson and Warren of the 20th Bombay Native Infantry were killed, and Captain Wood of that regiment was wounded, and thirty-five inferior officers and men were killed or wounded. On the 10th, after a sharp cannonade of three hours, Abú-shahar surrendered, and the British flag was hoisted on its walls at 5 p.m. of that day. Fifty-eight guns were taken, and several Persian officers of high rank were made prisoners. In the meantime, a reserve force, consisting of the 14th Light Dragoons, the 1st Sind Horse, the 4th Troop of Royal Horse Artillery, the 1st Company of the 2nd Battalion of Foot Artillery, the 78th Highlanders, the 23rd and 26th Regiments Bombay Native Infantry, and a light battalion of ten companies drawn from regiments not serving with the force, had been assembled at Bombay under General Outram, to whom the command of the whole army was given. The General and his staff sailed from Bombay on the morning of the 16th January 1857, and the army was now formed into two divisions, of which General Stalker commanded the first, and Brigadier Havelock the second. The reserve reached Abú-shahar in the end of January, and on the 3rd of February General Outram, with the 2nd European Light Infantry, the 64th, and 78th Highlanders, the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, the Púnah Horse, the 4th Bombay Rifles, the 20th Native Infantry, the 2nd Bilúch Battalion, and some guns, marched to dislodge the enemy from an intrenched camp at Borasján, 48 miles from Abú-shahar. On the 5th this position was occupied after a slight outpost affair, in which Cornet Spens of the Cavalry and a few troopers were wounded. A vast quantity of stores and ammunition were taken in the camp. On the night of the 7th, General Outram commenced his return, after having first exploded 30,000 pounds of the enemy's powder, to ignite which the rifles with shell bullets invented by General Jacob were used. During the darkness of the night, the enemy made a sharp attack on the English column while on the march, in which Captain Mockler and Lieutenant Greentree of the 64th were wounded, and a few men killed and wounded. General Outram met with a severe accident, his horse falling with him, and rolling over him. At daylight on the morning of the 8th the enemy were seen drawn up in order of battle, with their right resting on the village of Khúsháb, numbering 6,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, with about 15 guns, under Shujá-ul-Mulk, reputed the best officer in the Persian army. After a short but sharp action this force was completely routed, and fled, leaving 700 men dead on the field, and two guns in the hands of the English. A regiment of Persian infantry was in this battle ridden over and cut to pieces by the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, whose commanding officer, Captain Forbes, was severely wounded. The English loss altogether was one officer and eighteen men killed, and four officers and sixty men wounded. General Outram regained his quarters at Abú-shahar by midnight on the 9th. On the

26th March the General, having organized a force for the capture of Muhammarah, a town at the confluence of the Kárún with the Shatt-ul-Aráb, where the Persians had thrown up strong batteries, and had stationed an army of 15,000 men, attacked the place, and captured it, with the loss of ten men killed, and one officer and thirty men wounded. The loss of the enemy was very severe. On the 29th March, General Outram despatched a light force to pursue the enemy to Ahwáz, a town about 100 miles distant up the Kárún. This force proceeded in the *Comet*, *Planet*, and *Assyrian* steamers under Commander Rennie. On the 1st of April, the expedition came within sight of the Persian army near Ahwáz, but on the right bank of the river, the town being on the left. Although the Persians amounted to at least 10,000 men, and the English troops did not exceed 300, such was the terror General Outram's victories had inspired, that the instant the English advanced on Ahwáz the Persians deserted the place, and not long after, a shell falling near the General's tent, the whole army likewise took to flight. Then was seen the astonishing spectacle of five heavy masses of infantry, well supplied with artillery, and 2,000 horse, among which were the picked men of the Bakhtiári tribes, reputed the best cavalry in Persia—a complete army, in short—retiring before a handful of Englishmen less numerous than the wing of a single regiment.

The vast stores of the Persians were destroyed or thrown open to the plundering Arabs, and the retreating enemy suffered dreadful distress ere they reached Shustar, 100 miles distant, where was their nearest depôt.

The Persian army was thoroughly disorganized, and in a few days Outram might easily have conquered the whole province of Arábistán. The treaty of peace, which suddenly put a stop to these successful operations, had been negotiated between Lord Cowley and Farúkh Khán at Paris, and was signed on 4th March 1857.

By this treaty the Sháh engaged to withdraw the troops from Herát, to relinquish all claims to sovereignty over it, and never to demand any marks of obedience, such as the coinage, or *khútbah*, from the chiefs. He further agreed to abstain from all interference with the internal affairs of Afghánistán, and to recognize the independence of Herát. All prisoners taken at Herát were to be set at liberty without ransom. The British mission was to be received at Tihrán with apologies. The slave trade was to be suppressed in the Persian Gulf. Finally, apologies were to be made to Mr. Murray for the insolent conduct of the Sháh and his Minister. The ratifications of the treaty were exchanged at Baghdád between Mr. Murray and a Persian officer on 2nd May 1857.

During the war the Persian Governor of Khúrásán, Prince Múrád Mírzá, had dismantled the defences of Herát; and Sultán Ahmad Khán, or Sultán Ján, a nephew of Kóbándil Khán, the late ruler of Kandahár, and son of Sirdár Muhammad Azím Khán (brother of Dost Muhammad), was sent by the Persians to assume the government of the city and territory of Herát (27th July 1857). He was bribed to receive a creature of Persia named Sayyid Abbúl Hásan Sháh as his Wazír, and to make other concessions.

On April 17th, after the signature of the treaty, and in open violation of one of the articles, the Sháh caused an atrocious murder to be perpetrated on the unfortunate Prince Muhammad Yúsuf, late ruler of Herát. He was given up to the relations of Sayyid Muhammad within the precincts of the palace at Tihrán, and literally hacked to pieces, having received seventeen wounds before his sufferings were over.

Mr. Murray returned to Tihrán on 18th July 1857, and the stipulated ceremonies and apologies from the Sadr-i-Azam having been duly gone through, friendly relations were resumed between Persia and England. Múrád Mírzá and all the Persian troops evacuated Herát; the English forces at Bushire and Kháraj, under General Jacob, were ordered to return to Bombay; and Colonel Taylor, accompanied by Captain Claud Clerk, was sent on an embassy to Sultán Ahmad Khán, the new ruler of Herát, in August 1857, to ascertain that the provisions of the treaty had been faithfully fulfilled. He was received with all due respect and cordiality by the new ruler in December. Colonel Taylor left Herát on 1st March 1858.

Thus ended the Persian war, and so severe was the lesson taught during General Outram's brief campaign that not even the disasters of the Indian revolt could induce the Sháh to venture once more on a rupture with the English Government. It is possible that a movement might have again taken place in the direction of Herát; but in May 1858 the Sháhzádah commanding in that quarter suffered a severe defeat from the Turkmán hordes, the greater part of his army being destroyed, and several of his guns taken.



### CHAPTER III.

#### DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE PERSIAN WAR OF 1856-57.

From the preceding chapter, it will be apparent that the cause of all the differences which have occurred between England and Persia—two powers whose interests are so identical—may be comprised in the one word, Herát.

"This principality"—the writer of the Persian War of 1856-57 in *Blackwood's Magazine* for September 1861 writes,—"it does not aspire to the dignity of a kingdom—lies in the very centre of Asia, and its fortunes might be supposed little entwined with those of the mistress of the seas. There are indeed several links in the chain. Herát is situated between Russia and India. It does not adjoin Russia, for Persia comes between them. It does not adjoin India, for Afghánistán comes between. Still Persia might

Herát the cause of the Persian war.

act on Herát, Herát on Afghánistán, and Russia, that mysterious power which ever and anon haunts the reveries of our Indian statesmen, might act through all three on India. This is the pith of the train of reasoning which has induced us to spend many millions of treasure, and many valuable lives, in Afghán and Persian wars. Herát, in one of those dangerous epigrammatic phrases, has been called the key of India. It is no more the key of India than the gateway of a nobleman's deer-park is the key of his castle. An army advancing from the westward toward India must certainly occupy it. But if Herát refused to throw open her gates, the capture of a central Asian city ought not to present many difficulties to a general who aspires to measure swords with the British in their own dominions. Herát occupied, the invader, so far from having found the key to success, has all his difficulties before him. 'Deserts,' said Napoleon, 'are the most formidable frontiers for a state, mountains the next, and rivers the least of all.' But India has a river, desert, and a range of mountains on her north-west frontier; and five hundred miles of badly-watered, thinly-populated Afghán territory lies between this triple barrier and Herát. There may be many a purling brook and many an oasis among its hills and sandy plains; but the country is generally barren, and our own army, during the Afghán war, was constantly in great want of supplies, and we never concentrated a tenth of the force which would be assembled for an invasion of India. England, however, objects to Herát becoming a Persian province, lest Persia should give Russia a free passage through its territories. We may, however, be sure that the very last people, the English not excepted, whom the Persians would desire to see in Herát, if it was her own, would be the Russians; but if Herát is independent, the natural bribe which Russia would offer Persia for a free passage through Persia proper would be to put her in possession of this coveted dependency. If Russia ever attempt that tremendous march from the Caspian to the Indus, she may bribe and overawe the Persians, Turkmáns, Herátis, and Afgháns, or pit them against one another at first; but she will find that Nicol Jarvis's description of the Highlanders might well

be applied to the Central Asian tribes: 'They may quarrel among themselves and gie ilk ither ill names, or may be a clash wi' a claymore; but they are sure to join in the long run against a' civilised folk that wear breeks on their hinder ends, and hae purses in their pouches.' If Eastern diplomatists—those at least who desire their country's good, and not to find work for themselves—would sometimes reflect on this inevitable conclusion to their well-woven schemes and elaborate treaties, what trouble and difficulties they would avoid!

Two modes of operation were open to the British Government to compel the Persians to evacuate Herát after it fell to them in October 1856. One was to march an army across Afghánistán, and expel the Persians from Herát. The difficulty and expense attending such an expedition (which was, however, seriously proposed) would have been enormous. It would have irritated the Afgháns, and probably brought on another Afghán war. In fact, it would have been braving all those difficulties of climate and country which we have just alluded to as being the real safeguard of our Indian frontier. The other plan was to send an expedition by sea to the head of the Persian Gulf, and seize Bushire, the maritime capital (such as it is) of Persia; from thence operations might be directed against the interior; and a march from Bushire to Tihrán, the capital of Persia, would not be more difficult than a march from our Indian frontier to Herát.

That part of the northern shores of the Indian Ocean which lies west of the Indies, as well as the shores of the Sea of Oman and Straits of Ormuz, are of a most desolate character. Sandy plains alternate with low rocky ranges, entirely destitute of verdure, save when a few date trees cluster round brackish wells. Rain seldom falls, as if the clouds declined to waste their fertilising treasures on such a thankless soil. Two thousand years ago Alexander the Great returned from his Indian expedition across this miserable country. His generals in vain remonstrated with him on the difficulties he would encounter; they only stimulated his desire to achieve what was reckoned impossible by ordinary mortals. He placed part of the army on board a fleet under the orders of his favourite Nearchus, and despatched them from the Indus, with orders to sail for the Euphrates, and to collect all the information which could be obtained regarding the coast. Part of the journal of this voyage has been preserved, and is extremely interesting. At some of the villages on the coast the inhabitants lived on nothing but fish. Fresh or salt fish served them for animal food, and cakes made of flour ground from dried fish was their substitute for bread. The jaw bones of whales were considered a valuable building material, and their cattle fed from mangers, filled with fish instead of hay or corn. The sailors were greatly terrified by the whales which sported around them. We are told that 'on one occasion the whales appeared so formidable, that the mariners suffered the oars to fall from their hands. However, the Admiral encouraged them, and ordered them, whenever they saw any of these monstrous fish approach, to direct the beaks of their ships exactly towards them, as if they were to engage an enemy in a sea-fight; as also to row stoutly, and to make as great a noise as they could, as well with their voices as their oars. The mariners thus instructed recovered from their fright, and upon a given signal plied their oars manfully; and when they came near the fish, not only shouted as loud as possible, but sounded their trumpets, and beat the sea vehemently with their oars, whereupon the whales, who were now just under the beaks of their ships, terrified with the strangeness of the sound, sunk down to the bottom of the deep. The



sailors rejoiced exceedingly at the unexpected deliverance, and with one voice applauded the wisdom and courage of the Admiral.' Nearchus brought his fleet to the head of the Persian Gulf with less damage and difficulty than Alexander accomplished his land journey; many of the army perished miserably in the desert, or by the hands of the barbarous tribes whose country they traversed.

It was by the same tract which Nearchus followed that the British expedition sailed for the Persian Gulf.\*

The main rendezvous for a force intended to invade Persia from India in this manner would (1856) be Bombay, where there is an ample harbour, and abundance of all kinds of military stores. From Bombay to the Straits of Ormuz, at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, is 1,300 miles, and from Ormuz to Bushire, 600 miles. The sea is generally calm, except during the south-west monsoon, which blows from the beginning of June till September. Even this rarely rises to a gale, and it is only the timid crews of the native craft who are afraid to navigate those seas at all times of the year.\*

The immediate arrangements for organizing the expedition were necessarily intrusted to Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, a nobleman whose capacity for administration had been developed by ten years' experience at the head of an Indian Government. Final instructions for the despatch of the expedition reached Bombay on the 9th November. The expedition got under weigh on the 12th and 13th November, embarking from four points, *i.e.*, Bombay, Karáchi, and two smaller ports. Most of the soldiers were on board sailing transports, but they were taken in tow by vessels belonging to the Indian Navy, or hired steamers. The force comprised Her Majesty 64th Regiment, the 2nd Bombay Europeans, 4th and 20th Native Infantry; two squadrons 3rd Native Cavalry, and one squadron Púnah Horse; 3rd Troop Horse Artillery; 3rd and 5th Light Field Batteries; two companies Bombay Sappers and Miners, with a staff of Engineer officers and an Engineer Park. The entire number of fighting men was 5,670, of which 2,270 were Europeans, with 3,750 followers, 1,150 horses, and 430 bullocks. There were eight Indian Navy steamers, seven steam and thirty sailing transports of the largest size under Rear-Admiral Sir H. Leake, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy. Major-General Stalker, of the Bombay Army, commanded the expedition.

"On the 21st, head-quarters reached the Straits of Ormuz, and waited four days at anchor to reassemble the transports, and make a fresh departure for Bushire."

Whilst the transports were anchored off Kishm, much inconvenience was felt from the want of boats. Plans for effecting a landing in the neighbourhood of Bushire were discussed. The plans put forward were to land at Halílá

Rendezvous off Kishm. or Rashír. In favour of the former plan were—(1) the water there was known to be good; (2) the landing was said to be easy; (3) it might be expected that the Persians would not leave their works to oppose a force in the open. The difficulties of the coast about Rashír were considered by Commodore Ethersey to be considerable. Finally, it was resolved to rendezvous the fleet 20 miles below the town of Bushire, and to reconnoitre the coast.

At Kishm it was discovered that doolies and dooly-bearers had been left behind, and the opportunity was seized during the halt of making up stretchers.

\* See *South-West Persia*.

From Kishm several of the transports were ordered to sail to the Bushire rendezvous. This gave rise to no little confusion, and the end of it was that all the engineer officers, half of one of the artillery batteries, and two of the cavalry transports were lost sight of for days; in fact, one half battery of artillery and one of the cavalry ships did not arrive until after Bushire had fallen, and the engineers only came in time for the landing. During the passage strong north-west breezes were experienced, which retarded the steamers tugging the transports. The transports anchored in Kishm roads without system; infantry and cavalry ships, store ships, coal ships, &c., &c., were huddled together indiscriminately; so that a Brigadier or regimental commanding officer found the greatest difficulty in communicating with his command. This induced General Stalker to officially request the Commodore to so arrange at the next rendezvous that the fleet might be anchored in divisions—one of cavalry; a second of artillery; a third, the 1st Infantry Brigade; a fourth, the 2nd Infantry Brigade, with a naval officer in charge of each division. The plan was never adopted, for both in the Bushire roads, and again in Halílá Bay, there was the want of arrangement that had been so apparent at Kishm.—(*Wray*.)

The flag-ship, the *Assaye*, with head-quarters, brought up the rear, leaving Kishm on the 28th November.

Arrived off Bushire on the 30th November; the fleet rendezvoused in full view of the town, in Bushire roads, instead of 20 miles down the coast. (*For description of Bushire, see South-West Persia.*)

The coast below Bushire was reconnoitred for several miles; in places it was guarded; generally it was found that a reef of rocks at 200 yards from the shore ran along the whole way, with small openings here and there. The coast off Rashír was reconnoitred with like unsatisfactory results, the seam of rocks being found still running parallel to the shore.

There being a fine low sandy beach immediately south of the Bushire batteries, about half a mile in length, where troops could land easily, but under considerable fire and without much protection from our own ships, which could not lie nearer in than 1,200 yards, the Commodore proposed that the force should land here, the ships first destroying the batteries. The objections to this plan were that the landing to be openly forced under the fire of the batteries and town walls must result in a certain loss; that without boats it was impossible to land more than a portion of the force in one day; that the flanks of the landing party would be exposed, and the force between two bodies of the enemy; whereas in favour of landing at Halílá, it might be expected that no opposition would be encountered. Halílá Bay lies a few miles down the coast from Bushire. A reconnaissance of Halílá Bay was next carried out, and it proved to be well suited for the purpose. The bay has a fine, sloping, hard,

Halílá Bay. sandy beach, the landing place between the two ends of the reef about 800 yards in length. At high water the tide comes up to within about 30 yards of a hard sandy ridge, which, if defended, would form excellent cover for matchlockmen. Beyond having to wade through water for 40 yards, the landing presented no difficulties. The small steamers approached the shore to within 200 yards. The water is good and plentiful from small wells close to the beach.

As the declaration of war was made at Calcutta on the 1st November,\* it had not reached Bushire before the arrival of General Stalker. The Persian

\* Vide *Calcutta Gazette*, 1st November 1856.

Governor of Bushire, whose sway extends all along the coast, is styled Daryá Beg, or Lord of the Seas. He expressed a natural surprise at the appearance of a hostile fleet in Bushire roadstead.

The Indian Government, although it gave the Persians very slender warning of when it was going to begin, made all its own preparations with a praiseworthy deliberation. Besides the collecting of troops and warlike stores at Bombay, Captain Wray, Assistant Quarter Master General, and a Commissariat officer, had been despatched to the Persian Gulf in October to spy out the land. Amongst other places Captain Wray visited Bushire, provided with compasses, measuring chains, and all the necessary implements for taking a survey. This cool attempt to map out the fortifications of a town for whose capture a siege train had been already embarked was more than the Resident's sense of propriety could permit. The appearance of these military strangers, moreover, created considerable excitement both among the authorities and population of Bushire. Captain Jones was not sorry when he had them safely re-embarked after a few hours' sojourn ashore. He himself remained at his official residence until the expeditionary force arrived, removing his office on board one of the men-of-war on the 5th December, just five weeks subsequent to the declaration of war, and three days previous to the bombardment of Bushire. But no insult was offered to him, and the Governor politely escorted him to the pier (*see Appendices*). Very much useful and valuable information and intelligence were received through the medium of Captain Jones and the staff of his office.

On the 5th December, Major Hill, Chief Engineer, and the Engineer officers joined the force. It was now finally arranged that the fleet should drop down to Halílá Bay on the 6th, and the force be landed on the morning of the 7th. A committee of officers, composed of Commodore Ethersey, Major

Orders for landing.

Hill, Colonel Younghusband, and Captain Wray, assembled to draw up orders for and to arrange the plan of landing. The following gives the chief points of the order published :

I.—The force is to land in Halílá Bay, about 2 miles east of the village; the landing to commence at daybreak on the 7th, and in the following order :

2nd Brigade in men-of-war boats.	{ Punjab	. . .	3 boats, 90 men	} 2nd European Light Infantry.
	{ Victoria	. . .	6 " 60 "	
	{ Chusan	. . .	2 " 25 "	
	{ Assaye	. . .	5 " 185 "	
	{ Feroze	. . .	3 " 100 "	
1st Brigade in men-of-war boats.	{ Ajdaha	. . .	4 " 80 men	} Her Majesty's 64th Regiment.
	{ Berenice	. . .	5 " 70 "	
	{ Semiramis	. . .	2 " 50 "	
			from Pottinger	
			from Precursor	
30 boats, 600 men.				

The *Assyria* steamer with 150 Sappers and Miners.

The *Flut* with 300 men, 2nd Brigade.

The *Lady Falkland* with 200 men, 1st Brigade.

The *Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy* with 250 men, 1st Brigade.

The *Bombay* with 300 men, 2nd Brigade.

The above thirty boats and the flats will be towed as near shore as possible by the three first named steamers, and they will be cast off and pulled in shore when the steamers can take them no further. Having landed the men, the boats will immediately return to the small steamers, and land as many more men as possible.



The four gunboats to cover the landing will be also taken in tow by the above steamers. On nearing the shore, the gun-boats will take up positions, two on each flank of the landing-place; the other boats not to pull in until the gun-boats are prepared for action.

In the meanwhile, four gunboats and one sponson boat, each from the *Punjab* and *Assaye*, the two paddle box boats of the *Ajdaha*, and the two large boats belonging to the *Raja of Cochin* and *Melbourne* will be employed in landing a battery of artillery. These boats will be towed by the *Bombay*. After landing their cargo, the boats to be pulled back to the *Bombay*, and the whole towed back by her for the horse artillery.

The boats belonging to artillery ships to be sent at daylight to head-quarters 2nd Brigade, and cavalry ships' boats to be sent to head-quarters 1st Brigade, to assist in landing infantry.

After the first line of boats has left the ships, these boats will be filled with infantry, also the boats of the *Precursor*, *Result*, and *Marin Gray*.

The small steamers when cleared will put back to assist in towing up boats.

The *Result* is appointed hospital ship, and the *Melbourne* store ship.

The *Assyria* will go in the morning to the *Arthur the Great* and *Thames City* for the Sappers, having left the flat alongside the *Feroze*. She will afterwards return to the *Feroze* for the flat, and take her in tow, together with boats of *Assaye*, *Feroze*, and *Chusun*.

The *Bombay* will go to the *Feroze* for orders about infantry; then back to the *Melbourne* to take the artillery boats in tow, together with the boats of the *Assaye*.

The *Lady Falkland* will go to the head-quarters 1st Brigade in the *Pottinger* for orders. She will then take in tow the boats of the *Ajdaha*, *Berenice*, and one of the *Semiramis*.

The *Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy* will also go to the head-quarters 1st Brigade, and afterwards tow in one boat of the *Semiramis* and six boats of the *Victoria*, and three of the *Punjab*.

By 8 P.M., 6th, every officer, military and naval, who had any leading part to play, had their orders in detail for the morning. The Fleet Captains understood the whole thing directly. Each man took down his order in a few minutes in the Flag Captain's office, and well they carried them out. Everything prospered, and by 7 next morning the first boats were full and ready to shove off; everything went well, and all was well done, owing to the exertions of all concerned and good management.

At about 7-30 A.M., on the 7th, the boats shoved off, pulling in line, the gun-

Landing operations. boats in advance clearing a date grove of the enemy by their fire. The first party to land numbered 600 infantry and a few guns; in two hours nine guns, with four horses each, and their wagons, had been landed, whereupon an advance was made to the date groves, 2 miles inland.

At 4 P.M. the force advanced to the neighbourhood of the Halilá village, where is a camping ground, with wells of good water, and bivouacked there. During the night the head-quarters of the 3rd Cavalry reached the camp. The night was fine, but cold.

During the 8th landing operations were continued throughout the day, and by evening had sufficiently advanced to allow of plans being formed for the operations of the 9th. These were to the effect that Captain Jones, Political Officer, should call upon the Governor of Bushire to surrender the town. To



effect its surrender, it was arranged that gunboats should force the creek to the north-east of the town, so as to cut off the retreat; that the land forces should assault the town from the south and south-east, the fleet opening the bombardment when they, the troops, had arrived at a distance of 2 miles from the town walls. These arrangements were not carried out; no attempt was made to force the creek, and the bombardment commenced when the land forces were 6 miles from the town walls, and the garrison escaped.

At 8 A.M., on the 9th, the advance guard, composed of 2 companies of the 2nd European Light Infantry under Captain H. Wilmoughby; 2 troops, 3rd Light Cavalry, under Captain

Forbes; 2 guns, 3rd Troop Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant Gibbard, accompanied by Captain Wray, Assistant Quarter Master General, and Lieutenant Johnson, interpreter, marched in the direction of Bushire. Up to this time the troops were unaware that the fort of Rashir was held in force, and had only heard rumours of its existence. At 9-30 A.M. the village of Imámzadá was reached. The villagers professed friendship, but on the left was seen the old Dutch fort of Rashir strongly occupied. This fort, or rather earthen redoubt,

is rectangular in plan, with sides approximately 200 yards and 300 yards in length; its parapet of some height, proof against field artillery; its interior well defiladed; its ditch deep for a field redoubt, from 50' to 100' wide at the ground level, with slopes that were once steep and inaccessible, but which from neglect were passable at several points. It was garrisoned by from 400 to 500 Tangastánis and other tribesmen living in the vicinity of Bushire under the Tangastáni Chief, Baukar Khán. The ground inside the fort was much broken, and that in its front is a succession of hard ridges. Soil, sand and rock. The rear face of the fort rests on the cliffs, here high, perpendicular, and inaccessible. The advanced guard took up a position on broken ground about 400 yards from the fort; the infantry extended, with their left resting on the outskirts of the village of Rashir.

Cavalry were posted on the right so as to cut off all retreat to Bushire, and the guns unlimbered; and in this position the advent of the main body was awaited. The enemy becoming bold by the delay, occupied in force the ruins outside the fort.

To drive them back into the fort, the artillery opened upon them with case, whereupon a close fire of musketry from the fort was commenced with such good effect that our forces retired 200 yards, followed by the Tangastánis, who skirmished in an admirable manner.

The arrival of the main body at this time caused the Persians to retreat into the fort. Both brigades deployed and opened fire, the 4th Rifles (Bombay) occupying the village of Rashir, and touching the coast; the 2nd Brigade storming the left breach, the Bilúchís being on the extreme left. Both the field artillery and the men-of-war now opened fire upon the fort. The fort was at once assaulted, and its defenders either killed or driven out. The General formed his force so as to encircle the redoubt as much as possible and prevent escape; while two columns, one of the 2nd Bombay Europeans, and the other of the 64th Regiment and 25th Native Infantry, were to give the assault,—the former at the north-east angle, the latter on the east or landward side.

The cavalry were placed on the right close to the sea.

Had the fort been in repair and properly defended, its capture would have been most difficult to a force, except by escalade. The Tangastánis had contented themselves with digging rifle pits on the top of the parapet. These

they defended resolutely, fighting to the last. Giving quarter was not understood, and many were shot in flight.

Brigadier-General Stopford was killed leading the assault at the head of the 1st Brigade (64th and 20th), and Lieutenants Warren and Utterson, 20th Native Infantry, were shot within the fort, and Captain Wood, 20th Native Infantry, wounded. The cavalry cut up the fugitives escaping along the beach, and here Colonel Malet was treacherously killed by a man to whom he had given quarter.

The men-of-war shelled the fort from about a mile off shore, but it is questionable whether their fire was of any effect. Most of the killed fell by the musket or bayonet.

Amongst the slain were the son and nephew of Baukar Khán. About half of the tribe was killed; and, when later on he was called upon to take the field, he replied that they had better first send husbands for all the wives in his clan. The fate of these men did not offer much encouragement to the surrounding population to take up arms against the British. They were regarded with much justice as having been recklessly sacrificed by the Governor of Bushire, who threw these undisciplined levies, with a few rounds of ammunition for their matchlocks and a few bags of dates for food, into an isolated post, where they were easily cut off, and which there was really very little use of occupying at all. Some of the neighbours went so far as to say that the Governor, being a pure Persian, looked upon the slaughter of two or three hundred Tangastánis, who were half Persians, half Arabs, as no great loss to the Persian empire.

After the occupation of Bushire, Baukar Khán, the chief of the Tangastánis, secretly favoured the British, and gave much valuable intelligence as to the movements of the enemy.

A store of dates was found in the fort.

Leaving the Bilúch regiment to hold the fort, the force quitted it and bivouacked outside, facing Bushire, the right resting on the village of Imám-zádá, the left towards the fort. The village was held by three companies of the 64th.

During the night the Commissariat landed provisions and ammunition from the *Melbourne*, and the sick and wounded were removed to the *Result*, hospital ship. These vessels had accompanied the force on its march, keeping parallel with it, and were now anchored off Rashír.

The best water is obtained from wells about a mile from the fort on the Bushire road.

(For despatch in full, see "*Calcutta Gazette*" of 7th January 1857.)

At 8 A.M., on the 10th, the column resumed its march towards Bushire; the

Advance on Bushire. advance party, 500 yards in front, consisting of the Púnah Horse, 2 guns Horse Artillery, and 4 companies of the 64th Regiment. The main body advanced in mass of columns, right in front, a detachment of the 3rd Cavalry forming the rear-guard.

Before the columns started, the bombardment of Bushire by the fleet commenced, contrary to the pre-arranged programme. No enemy was seen until the tower recently built at about 1 mile from the town to protect the wells was reached. The General now deployed the 1st Brigade, the 2nd following in contiguous columns, with artillery on either flank.

Without waiting for the near approach of the troops, the Persians abandoned the tower and beach batteries outside the walls. The tower was of masonry, of recent construction, a solid foundation enclosed at the top by a masonry parapet pierced for guns. A steep ramp lead up to the gateway, on

each side of which was a small guard-room. Halting for a few minutes at the tower, 4 companies of the 2nd European Light Infantry, No. 3 Light Field Battery, and the Sappers were sent off to the left to occupy the deserted beach batteries, and to establish a lodgment there prior to breaching the town walls.

The men-of-war now ceased to fire, and the troops advanced to within 500 yards of the walls, the 1st Brigade in line, with No. 5 Light Field Battery to the right; the 2nd Brigade in second line, in contiguous columns, finally joined the first line. The horse artillery and cavalry halted on the right front near the creek to intercept the enemy's flight, who, in the absence of any gunboats in the creek, were crossing in boats.

Without further operations the town capitulated, the garrison, about 2,000 regular troops, marching out and delivering up their arms. The next day they were dismissed. Their muskets were all stamped with the Tower-mark, and had been presented by the English to the Persian Government in former days, when we wished to strengthen Persia as a barrier against Russia.

Russian intrigue and Persian acquiescence in it were compelling us in fact to pull down what it had been the policy of previous generations to build up at no small cost of trouble and expense.

The force returned to their previous bivouac at the wells. The party of Sappers threw up a battery in the deserted beach batteries. Had the town held out, it would have been occupied by the 9-pr. battery, and the town walls battered at a range of from 200 to 300 yards. The ships' fire had done little damage to the town walls and batteries, and very few of its defenders were killed. The work on the height outside the town was a formidable and high mound of stiff earth with raised batteries on it; the embrasures were strengthened by date stumps firmly driven into the ground; the front and cheeks were further strengthened by sugar baskets filled with sand, gabions, &c. There was a masked battery inside the town near the Residency, also very strong and similarly constructed.

The town itself was defended by a wall of no military importance, with round towers, at about musket range intervals, for flank defence, and has no ditch. Situated on a sandy spot, the sea washes two faces, and a swampy creek the third; at times, at high tide, the sandy plain to the south is covered to a depth of a few inches.

The large guns had been collected together and ranged, all loaded to the muzzle, just inside the town gate, ready for our storming party. There was a similar row near the Governor's house. Those in the towers were full of shot: one contained three 12-pr. shot and one 6-pr. shot, with a cartridge about half a yard long. Some of the cannons were good and serviceable (of English and Tihlán manufacture); but they were uncared for, and their carriages in very bad order. The magazine close to the Sudder Bazár caused the inhabitants to fear a bombardment, for the effects of a shell landing in it would have been fatal to the town; for it was lying in the utmost confusion—loose powder, cases of musket balls, shot and shell, grape and canister.

The sanitary state of the town was very bad. Many of the inhabitants had fled. In a few days they returned, and the place began then to be well supplied with provisions.

On 11th December the head-quarters were established at the Kelát tower, where the Darya Beg and Commander-in-Chief were kept prisoners until they could be removed to the *Assaye* for passage to Bombay.

The want of boats to land stores was great, and much confusion resulted at the beach.






No. 1.

COUNTRY  
IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF  
BUSHIRE.

Approximate Scale 1 Inch = 1 Mile.



Line of coast very irregular and indented with Bays. There are several small villages 12 or 13 miles scattered over the table land of Bushire.

L.B. OCT 1882.  
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About the 14th matters began to improve; 15th, the camp shifted. Posts of cavalry were established 2 miles to the front. Reports

Events.

were to the effect that the enemy were moving down

upon Bushire. They were supposed to be at Farráshband, above the Haft Múlá pass, and on this side of Firúzábád. The camp was entrenched (*see page 28*). On the 20th an armed reconnaissance was pushed to Tihsiya, about 18 miles from Bushire. The party was composed of 2 troops 3rd Cavalry, the Púnah Horse, and 2 guns Horse Artillery, accompanied by Lieutenant Ballard, Intelligence Officer, Captain Wray, Assistant Quarter Master General, and Major Hill, R.E., Commanding Royal Engineer, &c., &c. Starting at 6 A.M., Cháhghádak, 14 miles distant over the barren flat, was reached at 10.30 A.M., and Tihsiya at 1.30 P.M. Returning at 2.30 P.M., camp was reached before dark after a march of 36 miles. The objects of the expedition were to bring to view our troops and guns, and to warn the villagers to bring in supplies and information on pain of fire and sword. The road to Cháhghádak lies across the great, hard, mud flat, the Marshíla; beyond, the level is covered with camel-thorn. A good deal of the land is cultivated, but the villagers had deserted their holdings. Its mud fort with corner bastions, not constructed for guns, is not of importance. From it Ahram, another mud fort near the fort of the Tang-i-Bawash pass, the head-quarters of Baukar Khán, Chief of the Tangastánis, was visible. On December 25th the enemy were reported to have reached Kalima, above the Haft Múlá pass.

The north-eastern shore of the Persian Gulf is very flat for about 30 miles from the sea, when a range of hills rises very abruptly from the plain. Through these some difficult passes lead to the central plateau, which composes the greatest portion of the Persian dominions. Wheeled vehicles are never used for the purpose of carrying merchandise across these hills. The steep narrow paths on the direct routes are sometimes barely practicable for a laden mule; but there are more circuitous routes by which artillery can be taken, as the Persians themselves brought a considerable train from Shíráz to the low country during this war. The country both above and below the passes is barren, not always from the want of natural fertility, but from the absence of population; for there are large districts which in former days were thickly inhabited, but now are almost perfect deserts. There has been a process of decay going on in these regions (including the valley of the Euphrates and Tigris, of which the Persian Gulf is a continuation), not altogether to be accounted for by the evils of misgovernment; for we have no proof that the government has deteriorated, or at any rate deteriorated in the proportion in which the population has died out. Nineveh and Babylon have long been buried beneath the earth, save when some descendant of savage tribes, whom Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus never heard of, has scraped away the dust from above their palaces. Persepolis, situated between Bushire and Shíráz, has never so entirely lost her ancient glory as to have required a foreign hand to bring her faded relics to the light of day; but total silence reigns amid the ruins of the city from which Alexander the Great took 25,000 muleloads of plunder. Shustar, a small town at the confluence of the Kárún and Dizfúl, stands on the site of Shusan, the palace whence King Ahasuerus wrote orders to the rulers of a hundred and twenty-seven provinces, to every province according to the writing thereof, and laid a tribute upon the land and upon the isles of the sea. Within the present century the population of the town of Bassorah, situated about 40 miles below the junction of the Tigris and

Euphrates, has dwindled from 100,000 to 30,000 inhabitants. A small village called Korna, situated at the junction of these two rivers, occupies the site of the Garden of Eden; but the spot is now much more like the Eden of Martin Chuzzlewit than the Eden of the Bible. On the spot where there flourished every tree that is pleasant to the eye and good for food, a few tall dates and yellow reeds alone remain; while of all the beasts which Adam named, pigs and mosquitoes alone seem to linger in the cradle of their race. The staple article of food along the upper shores of the gulf and banks of the lower Tigris is dates. These are consumed in great quantities, both by man and beast. Horses, dogs, and camels all enjoy this nutritious food; and the little foxes, as they wander of a morning among the date groves, instead of attempting to reach the clusters hanging high above their heads, or in their disappointment pronouncing them sour, wait patiently till a breeze of wind rustles among the fan-like branches, and shakes the ripened fruit. The dates for general use are not preserved separately like those which usually find their way to this country, but are thrust into bags made of mats, and soon adhere to one another, forming a sticky paste.

With the exception of a regiment of native infantry, the British force was not quartered in Bushire itself, but in an intrenched camp which they constructed about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the walls. This was a more healthy locality, and more convenient for obtaining a good supply of water, as all the water used in the town has to be brought a distance of 2 miles. The water-carriers are usually women, who thus become capable of undergoing great bodily fatigue. This accomplishment was much prized by our Bīlūch soldiers, who are accustomed to leave all the hard work at home to be done by their better halves. Several matrimonial alliances were entered into by them, as they considered that any one who had the good fortune to obtain the hand of a Bushire beauty became possessed both of a wife to solace his cares and a donkey to carry his burdens.

The liberated garrison of Bushire took the road to Shiráz, which is situated above the passes, about 150 miles from Bushire. Being unarmed, they kept well together, for the Persian soldier is not on very good terms with his countrymen. The blame does not entirely rest with the poor soldier, for he must live; and his superiors do not always give him a sufficiency of the staff of life, so he occasionally helps himself to what should be provided in a regular way. The soldiers are also sometimes called in to assist in collecting taxes, which are not more willingly paid in Persia than elsewhere, especially if the governor of a district, in addition to the King's taxes, wishes to levy a small rate for his own private expenses. The liberated prisoners, therefore, did not altogether expect to be received by their countrymen as gallant, but unfortunate, defenders of their country. They had only got out of the fire into the frying-pan, and the unarmed party from Bushire kept together to Shiráz, where they were again reorganized and furnished with arms sent from Tihrán.

We have already stated that the Persian Government, although they heard of the capture of Bushire before receiving the absolute declaration of war, had still been not altogether ignorant that some such operation was contemplated by the British. They had been informed by the officials on the coast of the constant passing to and fro of our steamers, and straws of that kind gave an indication of the wind which was likely to blow. About five regiments (or 4,000 men) had been collected at Shiráz under an officer called the Shújá-ul-Mulk, and the



feudal chiefs, especially the Ilkhání, or chief of the "Ils," or wandering tribes, had been summoned to his standard. These "Ils" form a nomad population in the midst of the regular settled inhabitants. The term "Il" denotes a nomad tribe; "Ilíyáts," a man belonging to an "Il." The Ilíyáts pass the summer in the high ranges of hills, where there is plenty of food for their cattle. As winter and its snows approach, they sow some patches of grain, and then descend to the low country, where they remain until the spring is well advanced, and the pastures and corn are springing up luxuriantly from ground well moistened by the melting snow.

The Government had also collected some supplies of flour and ammunition at the villages of Borasján and Cháhkúta in the low country—the former 45, the latter 20 miles from Bushire. The amount of ammunition would not be considered as indicating a very provident spirit on the part of any other Government than that of Persia, for there were not above one thousand rounds of cannon shot, and some fifteen or twenty tons of gunpowder; but as all this had to be brought on the back of mules by difficult roads for 300 miles, it was of considerable value. General Stalker resolved to send out a party to destroy the stores at Cháhkúta, which were lodged in a small fort. The magazine at Borasján was in a larger fort, which a few men might hold for

two or three days against any force not provided with siege artillery; and as there was no transport with the British force, it was impossible to undertake anything where a large supply of ammunition and a few days' provision would require to be carried for some distance (*Blackwood*).

The enemy's intention was stated to be to march on Bushire *via* Borasján, Cháhkúta, and Cháhgáda. The General proposed to march on Borasján and destroy the depôts, but desisted from doing so, not being sure of the sincerity of professed good intentions of the informant, Baukar Khán, Chief of the Tangastánis.

To destroy the Cháhkúta depôt, on the 1st January 1857, a party of the strength below were detailed:

3rd Cavalry under Captain Forbes; the Púnah Horse under Colonel Tapp; 3 guns, Horse Artillery, Captain Blake, with Lieutenant Ballard, Intelligence Officer, Captain Wray, Assistant Quarter Master General, and Captains Hancock and Goodfellow.

Leaving camp at 3 A.M., Cháhgáda was reached at 7-30 A.M., and Cháhkúta at 10-32 A.M. The country between the two latter places is an open plain covered with camel-thorn. There is a deep muddy nála 2 miles from Cháhkúta, difficult during this, the rainy season, but dry in the summer.

Stores of ammunition, barley, wheat, and flour were found; 30,000 lbs. of powder were blown up. The attempt to destroy the grain was but partially successful. Leaving at 5 P.M., camp was reached at 11 P.M., the party having marched a distance of 44 miles.

The following account of this expedition is taken from *Blackwood's Magazine*: "The inhabitants of Cháhkúta and most villages near Bushire are Arabs by descent and language, and have little sympathy with their Persian sovereign or fellow-subject. The chief, or 'Shaikh,' Hussain by name, would no doubt have made us very welcome to the stores (supposing he had no chance of being able to appropriate them himself); but there was a Persian commissary in charge, before whom he considered it necessary to make some show of attempting to save the property committed to his care. Accordingly, when Colonel Tapp, after the usual complimentary inquiries, proceeded to

business, the Shaikh listened with well-feigned astonishment to his questions regarding the whereabouts of the ammunition. 'What could have put such an idea into the head of General Stalker as to suppose that there was any magazine in the wretched little fort of Cháhkúta? The Colonel might look round and see,' &c., &c. When at last he was told we would look round and burn the whole fort if we did not find a magazine, the Shaikh gave the commissary a look, which implied, 'I have done all I could, and you see it is no use,' and slowly moved towards the magazine. Lieutenant Goodfellow of the Engineers made arrangements for destroying it; but to avoid injuring the fort, or rather the Shaikh's apartments, which were in it, and the village generally, a quantity of the ammunition boxes were carried out to the open plain, the villagers being called on to assist in transporting them, which they did willingly enough, when the object was explained to them. They still more willingly availed themselves of permission to carry away as much grain and flour as they could before it was burned, or attempted to be burned; for grain is not easily destroyed when collected in large quantities. The explosion which took place on the ignition of several tons of gunpowder was very fine. The troops returned to Bushire before 9 o'clock that evening. The guide who accompanied them, a man of 12 or 14 stone weight, rode all the distance, upwards of 40 miles, on a small donkey; yet such is the endurance of these little beasts, that it seemed quite fresh to the last. They are the usual baggage animals attached to Persian regiments, and answer the purpose well, as one man can look after fifteen or twenty of them on a march.

Between the 1st and 15th January, Shíff to the north-north-east of Bushire was visited, and the creek behind Shaikh Sa'ad explored. Shíff is a good landing place at high water (see Military Report on South-West Persia). There is no water there or along the line Shíff-Borasján.

On January 20th the enemy were reported to have descended the pass to Nanizak and Borasján in numbers estimated at 8,000 to 10,000 men, with 11 to 15 guns, with the intention of advancing on Bushire. The liberated garrison of Bushire, allowed to go where they pleased, had taken the road to Shiráz, where they were reorganized and reequipped. These men formed part of this force.

The Bushire camp was well entrenched with ten 12-pr. and four large siege guns in position.

The entrenchment consisted of a simple ditch about 3' deep and 6' in width, with a parapet composed of the excavated earth. The camp itself, situated rather more than a mile to the south of the town, stretched across the isthmus, and faced Bushire. A cavalry picket, about 2 miles towards the hills, was the only outpost necessary to its security.

On 20th January Sir James Outram, with his staff, arrived in the *Semiramis*, and assumed chief command. On the 30th and 31st the 78th Highlanders and 26th Native Infantry arrived.

Supplies of all descriptions were plentiful and good in camp, and the inhabitants, both of the town and neighbourhood, were evidently pleased at the British occupation. The kind treatment and ready money payments received from the British troops contrasted most favourably with the exactions levied by the previous Persian garrison.

On the arrival of Sir James Outram, K.C.B., of the Bombay Army, in Bombay (22nd December), armed with full diplomatic powers (General Stalker had no diplomatic powers, and had been instructed to refer to Calcutta in case of

necessity), the following troops were placed at his disposal by the Government as reinforcements, and to form the 2nd Division of the army in Persia, *viz.*—

14th King's Light Dragoons.  
1,000 Sind Horse (Jacob's).

78th Highlanders.  
23rd Native Light Infantry.

26th Native Infantry,

and a light battalion composed of ten light companies of different native regiments not employed with the field force. Major-General Stalker, C.B., remained in command of the 1st Division at Bushire, with Brigadiers Wilson, 64th, and Honner, 4th Bombay Rifles, under his orders as Infantry brigadiers; Brigadier Tapp in command of Cavalry, and Brigadier Trevelyan of Artillery.

The 1st Division consisted of Her Majesty's 64th Regiment, 2nd Bombay European Regiment, 4th and 20th Regiments of Native Infantry, the 2nd Biluch Battalion, the head-quarters and 2 squadrons 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry, and 2 troops Pūnah Irregular Horse, a troop of Horse Artillery, 2 companies of European Field Artillery and Reserve Artillery, with the head-quarters and 2 companies of Bombay Sappers and Miners.

Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., Deputy Adjutant-General, Her Majesty's Forces in India, was appointed to command the 2nd Division, with Brigadier Hamilton, 78th Highlanders, and Brigadier Hale, Bombay Army, for its two brigades, composed as follows:

1st Brigade—

78th Highlanders.

26th Native Infantry.

2nd Brigade—

23rd Native Light Infantry.

The Light Battalion.

Brigadier of Cavalry—Colonel Steuart, 14th Light Dragoons:

14th King's Light Dragoons.

3rd Regiment Sind Horse.

Brigadier of Artillery—Brigadier Hill:

One troop of horse artillery.

Two field batteries.

Brigadier-General Jacob, C.B., Sind Horse, commanded the cavalry of both divisions; all under the command of Lieutenant-General (temporary rank) Sir James Outram, K.C.B.

The transports having on board the 78th Highlanders and 26th Native Infantry in tow of steamers, also carrying troops, leaving Bombay on the afternoon of the 19th January, were off Bassadore, at the entrance to the Gulf, on the 25th, and anchored off Bushire on the evening of the 30th. The troops landed on the 31st with no baggage except their bedding.

*Proposed plan of operations (by Sir James Outram).*

The force already despatched to Persia was as follows:

*1st Brigade of Infantry.*

One European regiment.

One Native regiment.

*2nd Brigade of Infantry.*

One European regiment.

Two Native regiments.



*Brigade of Artillery.*

One troop of Horse Artillery.

One company of Foot Artillery.

One battalion of Reserve Artillery.

*Engineer Department*, including two companies of Sappers.

*Brigade of Cavalry.*

Two squadrons of Regular Cavalry.

One squadron of Irregular Cavalry.

The 2nd Brigade of Infantry, the Brigade of Cavalry, and all the Artillery, except the Horse Troop and portion of sappers, to occupy Bushire, affording detachments for Kháraj and other Commissariat depôts.

The 1st Brigade of Infantry, troop of Horse Artillery, and portion of Sappers to be re-embarked, and proceed with the war steamers to occupy Muhammarah on the Kárún river, where no opposition can be offered which would not be put down by the fire from the shipping.

The troops at Bushire to be reinforced by two regiments of Native Infantry from India.

Those at Muhammarah to be reinforced by one regiment of Sind Horse, two squadrons of Dragoons, and one regiment of Native Infantry, two companies of Foot Artillery, with detail of mountain guns in addition, to be shipped from India direct.

Pending the arrival of these reinforcements, competent officers to be detached under cavalry escort to survey the roads from Bushire towards Shíráz, and others to ascend the Kárún river in steamers guarded by infantry to survey the country towards Shustar, while carriage, cattle, supplies, &c., were to be prepared for the coming reinforcements. When all were assembled at their respective camps at Bushire and Muhammarah, the European regiment, one regiment of Native Infantry, and the two squadrons of the 3rd Regiment of Cavalry, with some mountain artillery, to advance from Bushire to Khisht, about 55 miles on the Shíráz road—a position well calculated for an army during the hot months, being a flat plateau elevated 2,000 feet above the sea, with water and wood in abundance.

With reference to the expedition to Khisht, Sir James Outram wrote to General Stalker: "I hope you will think the move on Khisht advisable. Being so elevated, it ought to be more healthy than Bushire for the Europeans, and the detachment there would be regarded at Tihrán as the advanced guard of the great army they will hear is coming from India.

"In the meanwhile pray contrive to make it be believed that our sole object for the present is the seizure of Shíráz, and that you are only waiting the reinforcements from India to advance.

"I hope that you will be able to effect a survey as far as Khisht," &c., &c.

From Muhammarah the 1st Brigade and all the cavalry, horse artillery, and mountain guns to march up the Kárún river to Shustar, supplied on the march by the Commissariat in the steamers.

The additional native regiment and proportion of foot artillery to occupy Muhammarah, and to furnish guards to the several fuel stations to be established on the river as the army ascends it. The positions of Shustar and Khisht to be occupied during the hot season while preparations are made for the additional forces to be supplied before October next, when operations in the interior would commence.



In this interval Colonel Jacob would be occupied at Shustar in the organization of Turkish Arabian levies, formed on the nucleus of the regiment of Sind Horse, to aid him in which duty, well qualified officers would be placed under him.

During the hot season, moreover, strong cavalry patrols would escort the Quarter Master General's Department in surveying the roads in advance.

The advantage of holding both the advanced positions of Shustar and Khisht, besides affording healthy and easily supplied sites for the European troops during the hot season, was that it would cause the Persian Government to apprehend invasion from both points, and compel defensive preparations on both routes, between which, communication is so difficult, as to preclude the possibility of their armies uniting on either line in time to oppose the advance of the English army, choosing, as they could do, whichever line of advance they should find most feasible, and rapidly withdrawing the troops from either quarter, and assembling the whole army on the other base of operations, ready to advance before the enemy could be capable of effecting a corresponding junction of its army on the threatened line of advance; this rapid change of formation being easily effected by the aid of the steamers, and previously provided means of carriage.

The effect of menacing invasion from two different quarters, threatening Isfahán on the one side and Shíráz on the other, the active preparations for which, during the hot season, would doubtless be greatly exaggerated at Tihrán, would possibly be to terrify the Sháh into submission, whilst at the same time the army would be most advantageously placed for carrying on the war, should such be necessary.

The views of General John Jacob, C.B., with regard to the plan for operating in Persia are given in the following extracts of a letter to Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, dated Karáchí, 1st March 1837:


"My own opinion with regard to the plan of proceeding is not at all in favour of making a rush through the hills into the interior of Persia in the hope of frightening the Sháh into submission.

"Russia would not fail at once to see and inform the Persian Government of our faulty position, with the sea for our base, barren countries all round the isolated valley in which we are operating, immense ranges of mountains across our communications with the sea, and across the line of our further advance.

"Under such circumstances, the wisest advice which Russia could give as our enemy and to our enemy would be—'Induce them to advance into the interior as far as you can; every step they take must render ultimate success less and less possible for them.' I would not advise any such course, but would occupy the whole maritime provinces between the mountains and the sea, from the Euphrates to Bandar Abbás. This would give us, either in our own possession or in that of perfectly friendly allies, the whole line of land communication between the Mediterranean and India, and render us independent of Egypt and of French influence there.

"I would inform the Sháh that, he not having afforded us the satisfaction which we required, and which we had a right to require, we intended to keep this country permanently, and to annex it for ever to the British Empire.

"Khúzistán would undoubtedly prove a most valuable possession to us, while the ancient wealth and ancient history of Ormuz seem to me to prove that Bandar Abbás is the natural outlet for the whole commerce of Persia by sea. The interior of the country must undoubtedly be more accessible from that port than from any other.



ROUGH SKETCH  
OF THE  
ATTACK ON THE BATTERIES  
OF  
**MUHAMMARAH,**  
By the combined Naval and Military Forces  
under command of Lieutenant-General  
Sir James Outram, K.C.B.,  
26th March 1857.

Scale 1 Inch = 400 Yards.  
YARDS 400 300 200 0 400 YARDS

NOTE.—This was compiled chiefly from a sketch of the ground by Captain Holland, Quarter Master General's Department.

(Sd.) J. WRAY, Captain,  
Dy. Qr. Mr. Genl., P.E.F.

"In establishing ourselves in these provinces, the mountains now presenting such formidable difficulties in our way would prove rather an advantage to us as forming a wall of defence to us on the north.

"We might proceed steadily to organize the whole country we had taken, and might probably restore the district of Khúzistán to its pristine fertility and importance; while the whole of the war-like and manly tribes of Kurds, as well as the Arabs, would be ready to serve us against all the world *for money*.

"In possession of this line of country, opening on the valley of the Euphrates, taking three maritime provinces, especially the valley of the Kárún as our base, with full arsenals, magazines, and supplies of all kinds ready there, instead of being immediately dependent on distant support from Bombay and Sind, we should be in a position, in case of renewed war with Russia, to march an Anglo-Turkish army into Georgia, and there, co-operating with other forces, sent, if necessary *via* Trebizonde, to drive the Russians behind the Caucasus, and to keep them there.

"With complete command of the Black Sea, and being paramount on the ocean generally, England then could not be in a better position for engaging in a war single-handed with Russia.

"We should be independent of the French alliance in a great measure, and have the most direct route to India in our own hands, or securely open to us; while, without first taking Constantinople, no other power could interfere with us on the battle field, or even approach the seat of war.

"Russia must see all the consequences of our permanently settling ourselves in possession of Khúzistán, and unless now prepared to fight with us *à l'outrance*, and to throw her full strength on India (which she undoubtedly is not), would assuredly be inclined, on perceiving symptoms of such intentions on our part, to advise the Sháh to accede to any terms whatever rather than risk placing us in such a favourable position for offensive measures against herself. All this seems worthy of consideration, and perhaps your Lordship might wish to know any thoughts on the subject."

The above remarks by General Jacob are still pregnant with advice for us, and should not be lost sight of; for a study of the topography of the Zagros hills to the north of the maritime provinces from Bushire to the Euphrates points to their great value to us as a base against the Caspian region and the Caucasus.—(*M.S.B.*)

On the arrival of reinforcements mentioned on page 29 on the 3rd February, the General decided to attack the Persians in their position at Borasján, and to destroy their magazines. The expedition to Borasján was undertaken under the impression that the enemy were becoming so strong that it was their intention to attempt the recapture of Bushire. The reports furnished to the Intelligence Department put the force at 8,450 regular infantry, 17 guns, and 1 mortar. Reinforcements were rapidly being received by it. Twelve regiments of regular infantry, with 35 guns, were stated to be moving to join it, and that arrangements had been made to assemble 4,000 of the Ilíyát (nomad) tribes within 24 hours. Their advanced parties of horse began to check the supply of provisions to Bushire, and to cause apprehension to prevail in the town.

It became imperatively necessary to strike a blow in the threatening quarter before extending operations elsewhere.

In the evening of 3rd February, the following detail marched from camp in two lines of contiguous quarter distance columns, *viz.*:

3rd Light Cavalry	:	:	:	No.	} Brigadier Tapp.
Púnah Horse	:	:	:	243	
	:	:	:	176 ...	

3rd Troop Horse Artillery ( <i>Blake's</i> )	. . . . .	6 guns	} Colonel Trevelyan.
No. 3 Light Field Battery	. . . . .	6 "	
No. 5 Light Field Battery	. . . . .	6 "	
Sappers and Miners	. . . . .	118	} Captain Dickinson.
1st Brigade, 1st Division.	{ Her Majesty's 64th Regiment . . . . .	780	
	{ 20th Native Infantry . . . . .	442 ...	} Brigadier Wilson.
1st Brigade, 2nd Division.	{ Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders . . . . .	739	
	{ 26th Native Infantry . . . . .	479 ...	} Brigadier Stisted.
2nd Brigade, 1st Division, and rear-guard.	{ 2nd European Light Infantry . . . . .	693	
	{ 2nd Bilúch Battalion . . . . .	460 ...	} Brigadier Honner.
	{ 4th Rifles . . . . .	523	

*i.e.*, 419 cavalry, 18 guns, 118 sappers, 4,116 infantry: the infantry in first line, and cavalry and artillery in second line.

The advance guard under Colonel Tapp, Púnah Horse, was composed of one troop 3rd Light Cavalry, two guns Horse Artillery, 2 companies Her Majesty's 61th Regiment, 2 companies 20th Native Infantry; and the rear-guard under Major Hough (2nd Bilúch Battalion) of the 2nd Bilúch Battalion, and one troop of Púnah Horse.

A guard under Lieutenant-Colonel Shepherd was left of sufficient strength to hold the camp, *i.e.*, 378 Europeans, 1,466 Native Infantry, 1 company European Artillery, and 14 guns, to assist which a party of seamen from the ships of war were landed to serve as artillerymen.

No tents were taken. The men took their great-coats and blankets and two days' cooked provisions, and the officers what a spare horse could carry in their saddle bags. The commissariat in addition carried three days' provisions for the force.

At midnight Cháhghádak was reached. At 5 A.M., on the 4th, the muddy creek was crossed with difficulty, and at 6-30 A.M. Cháhkúta was reached. Here the troops halted for the day on a fine open plain, the different regiments piling arms in column in the same order as they had marched, and the men lying by them. The road traversed had been round the head of the Bushire creek, and was alternately hard and loose sand and reedy swamp; a small fortified tower near some wells and few scattered date trees being the only objects of interest passed upon the march. Two good wells, west of the village, furnished an abundance of water.

A severe duststorm lasted all day. At 4 P.M. the troops started again, taking a north-east direction. At 6 P.M. a nála, dry, but with steep banks, was crossed, the road thus far being still over a fine open plain. At 6-30 P.M., at 5 miles from Cháhkúta, a halt of half an hour was made at two wells of good water called Cháh Arábí. At 7 miles the small walled village of Ishafundi was reached, five or six Persian horsemen galloping out of it at the same time. At 9 miles a well and canal of good water were passed, and at 10 miles a halt in the order of march was made for the night on the rising ground close to the village of Khúsháb. At 10 P.M. a violent thunderstorm of hail and rain, lasting till 2 A.M., drenched the force in their bivouac. The force had marched 30 miles with but a few hours' rest, and was much fatigued, and the exposure to the piercing cold wind was very trying. At 7 A.M., on the 5th, the march was resumed over a fine plain. One troop Púnah Horse, 2 guns 3rd Troop Royal Artillery, and 3 companies Rifles formed the advanced guard. The remainder of the force followed in mass of columns; the cavalry and artillery, in second line, on the reverse flank. The country, a desert flat, was very muddy and heavy in places, especially near Borasján. At 2 miles Khúsháb, 4 miles



from Borasján, was passed; the latter place was concealed from view by a succession of date groves with openings between them, the main road to the town being between the left and centre date groves. The grove on the extreme right contained wells of good water. The General gained this grove with the intention of attacking the town from the south-east. The groves were found unoccupied. Gaining the heights (14' to 50' high) overlooking the town, the enemy were seen to be deserting their camp on the gentle slope to the north-east of it, and to be moving towards the Haft Múlá pass and the hills 3 miles distant. The Horse Artillery and Cavalry Brigade moved in pursuit of several large columns moving to the south-east along the foot of the hills, but desisted. During the retirement, the enemy's cavalry covering the retreat, well mounted on Persian and Arab horses, were emboldened to advance and open a sharp skirmish with our cavalry, dashing by and discharging their muskets at full gallop, wounding Cornet Spens of the 3rd Cavalry and two troopers. The ground was very stony and interspersed with konar trees, unsuitable to our cavalry, and becoming worse as the hills were approached. Nevertheless the Persians galloped over it without hindrance. A few shots from the rear-guard drove them off.

The troops were those of the Ilkhání of the Kashgai irregulars, esteemed the stoutest of the Persian forces. The regular troops and guns under the Sújá-ul-Mulk had retired to Dálíkí.

A large quantity of stores and ammunition was captured. The camp was badly entrenched, and commanded from the direction of the town.

The village might have been readily converted into a formidable post. It was surrounded by a wall with tower bastions at intervals, detached square towers within overlooking all. A ditch, 15' deep, surrounded it, beyond which were gardens with high thorn and cactus fences.

The Ilkhání's cavalry hovered around the rear-guard, and succeeded in decapitating two dooly-bearers. The force bivouacked in the enemy's camp.

Some treasure, many horses, and baggage cattle were secured. The Persians had thrown several guns down wells, the carriages of which were discovered and burnt.

An alarm on the night of the 6th caused the troops to stand to their arms. The enemy felt up to the outposts, but finding the troops prepared, and it being a bright moonlight night, they attempted nothing. Many spies were doubtless in the camp, and all movements well reported. Intercourse between the villagers and camp was encouraged, and such strict precautions enforced that they should not be pillaged or ill-treated, that they were civil, and if not friendly, at any rate gave no trouble.

It being reported that the enemy, 5,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, and 6 guns, had retired upon Dálíkí, at daybreak a party of cavalry under Captain Graves, accompanied by the Intel-

Reconnaissance. ligence Officer and Captain Wray, were sent out to reconnoitre the Dálíkí road. The track of the gun wheels was followed over a bad and stony road, crossing hillocks, and through the deep and difficult dry beds of torrents. At 6 miles the hillocks ceased, and the road descended into a fine plain, across which Dálíkí was seen, with the enemy's camp between it and the hills. During the reconnaissance, parties of villagers, apparently gathering sticks, were seen, who, by a peculiar cry, passed on intelligence to the front.

The village of Dálíkí lies close to the hills, and is covered to the westward by a date grove; to the south of it runs a stream. The party returned to its bivouac by 10 A.M.

Dálíkí.

At 4 A.M., on the 7th February, a party paraded to proceed to Gisikund to report upon it as a sanitarium, but did not start, no guide being procurable.

The General hearing that the enemy was moving with his artillery into the Múlá pass, the cavalry moving into the Haft Múlá pass, and provisions beginning to fail, abandoned the idea of following them up, and issued orders for the return of the force to Bushire.

At 8 p.m., on the 7th, the return march commenced.

The advanced guard, under Colonel Tapp, consisted of—

Pánah Horse.		Sappers and Miners.
2 Horse Artillery guns.		2 companies Her Majesty's 64th.

*Main body.*

Her Majesty's 64th Regiment	: : :	} In open column of sub-divisions right in front.
20th Regiment Native Infantry	: : :	
2 Horse Artillery guns.		
No. 3 Light Field Battery.		
78th Highlanders	: : :	} In open column of sub-divisions right in front.
26th Regiment Native Infantry	: : :	
No. 5 Light Field Battery.		
2nd European Light Infantry	: : :	} In open column of sub-divisions right in front.
Bilúch Battalion	: : :	

*Rear-guard (Brigadier-General Honner).*

3rd Cavalry.		2 Horse Artillery guns.
		4th Rifles.

Baggage on the reverse flank.

After leaving camp, the enemy's stock of powder (40,000 lbs.), with shells and combustibles of all kinds, were exploded, the train being fired by a Jacob's rifle shell fired at a range of 150 yards.

Great delay was occasioned by the difficult nálás that cut up the country for 3 miles. At 11-30 p.m. the column passed Khúsháb and halted. News was here received that the rear-guard was attacked, and firing in its direction was heard. The General and staff galloped back. The horse of the former falling, he received considerable injury, when the conduct of further operations fell on Major-General Stalker, aided by Colonel Lugard,\* Chief of the Staff. The rear closed on the front, aided by the two batteries sent back to their assistance, and the whole moved towards the water, 3 miles past Khúsháb. The guide losing his way, the column halted, surrounded by the enemy, who kept up a constant fusillade. The night was intensely dark.

The enemy's horse showed great boldness, dashing close up to the line, and firing. The troops behaved with great steadiness, the regiments manœuvring and taking up their positions in the dark as methodically as if on parade. The formation adopted was an oblong, a brigade protecting each flank, and a demi-brigade the front and rear; field battery guns at intervals, and a thick line of skirmishers connecting and covering all; the horse artillery and cavalry

\* Writing to the Governor-General, he expressed his apprehension that he had not done sufficient justice in his despatch to the services of Colonel Lugard, who had been invaluable to him in supplying his place during the two or three hours he was disabled at the most exciting crisis before the break of day.

on the flank of the face fronting the original line of march; front and flanks of the oblong facing outwards; the baggage and followers in the centre. Thus formed, the troops lay down, waiting for daylight in perfect silence and darkness.

At 4-30 A.M., on the 8th, the enemy's artillery opened on the force with effect. Our guns replied, but with what effect is unknown. After half an hour the enemy's guns ceased firing, and moved to another position.

Our losses during the night were two officers (64th) and about half-a-dozen men wounded, one man (64th) killed; several camp-followers and baggage animals killed.

At daybreak the enemy were discovered to the left rear, north-east of the line of march, drawn up by wings in line, the centre on a rising ground, with guns on both flanks and in the centre; the infantry wings, half a mile apart; and cavalry, on their left flank chiefly, formed a third body, a mile from the infantry.

Their right flank rested on the walled village of Khúsháb and a date grove; their left on a hamlet, with round towers at intervals; deep nálas, thickly lined with skirmishers, protected the right front and flank. They numbered some 6,000 infantry and 2,000 horse. Shújá-ul-Mulk commanded in chief, the Ilkháni of the Kashgai commanding the cavalry, his tribal levies, in person.

Our guns took position to the front and opened fire; the cavalry, in column of troops, swept round the base of the hill, and charged the Persian cavalry and the left of their line. They were allowed to advance a little too soon, or else anticipated their orders, for they had charged before the infantry was within musket range.

Without waiting for the shock, the enemy's cavalry moved off towards the Haft Múlá pass. The charge and artillery fire shook the infantry considerably.

In the meanwhile our infantry deployed, the 78th Highlanders and 26th Native Infantry in front line, the 64th and 20th in second line, the 2nd Brigade and baggage in third line; skirmishers covered the front, flank, and rear, aided by cavalry.

The enemy's guns played upon the advancing infantry and our artillery, their round shot passing over the second line; their grape shot, however, striking the second line and artillery.

Without waiting for the infantry attack, the Persian line, already shaken, broke and fled to the rear, casting away their arms and accoutrements, and even their clothing, followed by our artillery, the cavalry re-forming for another charge. The two field batteries and the infantry soon gave up the pursuit. The cavalry again charged, the two or three battalions of regular infantry alone preserving any semblance of order, and, accompanied by the 3rd Troop Horse Artillery, continued the pursuit for 3 miles, until fairly exhausted, returning to camp at 10 A.M.

The 3rd Cavalry were seen to charge through, and back again, one of these battalions. Captain Forbes, who commanded the squadron, was severely wounded, and Captain Moore and his brother both had their horses killed. The Púnah Horse were by no means behind in gallantry.

The enemy's horse displayed no courage. They showed in considerable numbers in parts of the field, but courted no engagement. The Persians left seven hundred dead on the field. These brilliant results were obtained by the loss on the British side of Lieutenant Frankland, 2nd European Light Infantry,



Brigade-Major of Cavalry, 1 officer and 18 men killed, and 4 officers and 60 men wounded.

The enemy abandoned two 9-pr. brass guns, and had our force been able to pursue further, two more would have been captured. The rout was now complete; many of the enemy were cut up during the flight. Nothing but the paucity of our cavalry prevented their total destruction and the capture of the remaining guns.

(For despatch in full, see "*Calcutta Gazette*" of 12th March 1857.)

Captain Wray, in his diary, remarks:

"The Sarbáz are magnificent men; some of them very handsome; all large-limbed and stout; mostly very fair; their uniform consists of red or blue coats, with chevrons like our non-commissioned officers, boots, &c.; they are armed with flintlock muskets and bayonets; white belts; good pouches filled with ammunition; arms very dirty and badly kept.

"The Persian infantry had not sufficient discipline to rally when broken, but sufficient to keep them together in masses for our artillery to play on with fearful effect. It was the terrible fire of our 18 guns rather than the cavalry charge which disorganized them. No troops could have stood it long. The only course open to them was to assume the offensive, or retire to some piece of ground where they could await our attack less exposed to artillery fire. But it was quite clear that the Persian officers, although they might understand their drill on parade, had not so far completed their education as to have an idea of manœuvring on the battle-field; and, once the retreat was commenced, they soon became mingled with the common herd of fugitives. The action was one of artillery and cavalry alone, so far as the British were concerned, the infantry merely looking on.

"Some of the wounded Persians fired on our troops after their lives had been spared, which so exasperated them that no quarter was given; one batch of about 40, who collected on a small hillock and made signs of wishing to surrender, were cut down to a man."—(*Blackwood*.)

The force bivouacked at midday near the field of action close to the village of Chahár Khaná, a poor place, with a bad water-supply.

Rain commenced to fall, and continued incessantly for several days, accompanied by a cold wind.

The force, carrying with it its killed and wounded, commenced its return march at 8 p.m. The country was now a swamp,

The return march.

ankle deep in mud. About midnight a broad stream was crossed which caused some confusion; and at 1 a.m., on the 9th, Ahmadi, a miserable village, without water, was passed. At 5-30 a.m. Cháhghádak was neared; but the guide losing the way, a halt was made till daylight. Cháhghádak was reached at 7 a.m. The artillery, cavalry, the Bilúch and Rifle Battalions halted here; the European Corps, 20th and 26th Native Infantry resumed the march at 2 p.m. in the midst of heavy rain, reaching Bushire at 9 p.m. tired out and fagged, but with spirits undiminished; the remainder of the force reached camp on the morning of the 10th February. Not a single man fell into the enemy's hands during this trying march.

The whole division was in a deplorable condition. The boots were dragged from the feet by the mud, so that half at least of the 78th returned barefooted.

Next day a new pair of boots was issued to each soldier gratis.

The following complimentary order was published to the troops:

Field Force Order, dated Camp near Bushire, 10th February 1857.

"In offering to the troops composing the field force his hearty congratulations upon the successful issue of the operations against the enemy, and



especially upon the decisive victory gained over the Persian army under their Commander-in-Chief Shújá-ul-Mulk on the 8th instant at Khúsháb, the Lieutenant-General desires to return his sincere thanks to all under his command for their steadiness and gallantry in the field, their extraordinary exertions on the march, and their cheerful endurance of fatigue and privation under circumstances of peculiar hardship, rendered doubly severe by the inclemency of the weather, to which they were exposed without shelter of any kind. The troops marched from their camp on the evening of the 3rd instant without tents or extra clothing of any kind; each man carried his greatcoat, blanket, and two days' cooked provisions. After a march of 46 miles in forty-one hours, during which they were exposed to the worst of weather, cold winds, and deluging rains, they reached the enemy's irregular infantry, cavalry, and eighteen guns in an intrenched position on the morning of the 5th, but found it abandoned.

"The enemy, on hearing of our approach, had evacuated their intrenchment so precipitately that their tents and camp-equipage and ordnance magazines were abandoned; the former were being rapidly carried off by village plunderers operating for some hours before we arrived. Every exertion was made to intercept the retreat of some bodies of the enemy's cavalry; and some little skirmishing with a few horsemen took place, but eventually they all made off. After occupying for two days the position the enemy had abandoned, and learning that they had succeeded in getting the guns which they had carried away into the difficult pass of Maak, the troops commenced their return march on the night of the 7th instant, carrying away the large stores of flour, rice, and grain which the Persian Government had collected for their army, and, destroying their magazine, found to contain about 36,000 lbs. of powder, with small arm ammunition and a vast quantity of shot and shell, and thereby crippling the future operations of their army. Some of the guns are supposed to have been cast into wells, and, as their wheels and carriages fell into our hands, cannot again be used. At midnight an attack was made upon the rear-guard by the enemy's horse, and parties threatened the line of march on every side. The troops were halted, and so formed as to protect the baggage and resist the horsemen in whatever direction they might attempt to charge. Before this was quite completed, four of the enemy's guns, of heavy metal, were opened upon the forces, but the darkness of the night prevented any steps being taken to capture them. At break of day the Persian force, amounting to between 5,000 or 6,000 infantry, 2,050 cavalry, and 5 guns, was discovered on our left rear, north-east of our line of march.

"The cavalry and artillery immediately moved rapidly to the attack, supported by two lines of infantry, a third protecting the baggage and rear. The firing of the artillery was most excellent, and did great execution. The cavalry also charged twice with great gallantry and success; indeed, upon these two arms fell the brunt of the action, as the infantry moved away too rapidly to overtake them. By 10 o'clock the defeat of the Persians was complete, and two guns were captured. The gun ammunition, laden on mules, fell into our hands, and at least seven hundred men lay dead on the field; the wounded, the number of which must have been considerable, were carried away; the remainder fled in a disorganized state, generally throwing away their arms, which strewed the field in vast numbers; and nothing but the paucity of our cavalry prevented their total destruction, and the capture of their remaining guns.

"The troops bivouacked for the day close to the battle-field, and at night accomplished a march of 20 miles over a country rendered almost impassable by the heavy rain which fell incessantly.

"After a rest of six hours, the greater portion of the infantry continued their march to Bushire, which they reached before midnight on the 9th instant, thus performing another harassing march of 41 miles under incessant rain, besides fighting and defeating the enemy during the progress within the short period of thirty hours. The cavalry and artillery, with an infantry escort, reached camp this morning. The result is most satisfactory, and will, the Lieutenant-General trusts, have a very beneficial effect on our future operations in Persia. The Lieutenant-General therefore feels that he cannot too strongly express the obligation he is under to Major-General Stalker and the officers and men of all arms for the almost incredible exertion they have undergone, and the gallantry they have displayed on the occasion."

By command,

(Sd.) E. LUGARD, Colonel,

Chief of the Staff.

The following account of the battle is compiled from information given by wounded Persian soldiers and the Intelligence Department:

The first information regarding the advance of the English army was received by the Shújá-ul-Mulk at Borasján on the morning of the 4th February, or the day after the force marched. Preparations were immediately made for abandoning the camp, and by 8 P.M. the whole force of infantry and guns, as

Regiment of Guards	. . .	800
2 Karagúslú regiments	. . .	1,200
Shíráz Regiment	. . .	200
4th Regiment of Tabriz	. . .	800
Arab regiment	. . .	900
Kashkái regiment	. . .	800
Regulares	. . .	4,700
Cavalry of Shíráz	. . .	300
Ditto Ilkhání	. . .	500
Total Cavalry	. . .	800
Irregular Infantry	. . .	500
Total about	. . .	6,000
Besides artillery, with 14 guns.		

per margin, were *en route* for the village of Dálíkí, 12 miles from Borasján, in the direct line to Shíráz.

The Ilkhání with his cavalry remained during the night there, and only retired up the Haft Múlá pass on the appearance of our troops at the date groves of Borasján.

The Shújá-ul-Mulk had with him 2,000 mules and camels laden with provisions, which he issued sparingly to his troops. On the 7th it was determined by the Shújá-ul-Mulk, who had no information of our intentions to return to

Bushire, to make a combined movement for the purpose of attacking the camp at Borasján by night. Accordingly at 5 P.M., on the 7th, he marched with his whole force towards Borasján, while the Ilkhání descended the Haft Múlá pass.

The Shújá had arrived within a mile of Borasján when the ammunition was blown up by the British rear-guard at  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 8 P.M.

This caused the Persians a few minutes' delay; but villagers from Borasján soon made known the British retirement. The Shújá determined to follow up, despatched a messenger with orders to that effect to the Ilkhání, and, leaving Borasján on his left, marched directly towards the village of Ishafundi, thus gaining 2 miles on the British force, who made the circuit by Khúsháb to secure a better road.

The Ilkhání, having put himself in communication with the Persian headquarters, commenced the action by surrounding the English with his cavalry. This was at about 1 A.M. The main body marched along our left flank, and took up a position there when we halted, sending four guns to the front to fire

upon our troops. Before daybreak the Shújá drew up his forces, having three regiments in line of contiguous columns on his right and four others in the same formation, 500 yards distant, and slightly thrown back, on his left.

At daylight, February 8th, when the position of the two armies became apparent, he made the left wing take ground still more to its left, supported by its cavalry, apparently with the view of intercepting our return to Bushire. He then deployed it into line, with a regiment in rear in reserve, and advanced with skirmishers and guns in front towards our right. It was this body that our cavalry first encountered.

The Persian cavalry, either from disaffection or pusillanimity, retired from the field at the very commencement, and made straight for the Haft Múlá pass. On the Púnah Horse charging and dispersing the infantry, the Kashkái regiment took the same direction, while the others retreated in rear of the right wing towards Borasján. The standard of the latter regiment was taken.

The right wing remained stationary in line of contiguous columns, suffering severely from the fire of our artillery, which was chiefly concentrated on them, and to which their guns replied briskly with grape and round shot. At about  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 7. they commenced slowly retiring, the guns still firing. On the approach of the 3rd Cavalry, the regiment of guards precipitately retired; but the remaining two formed square, and were terribly cut up. After this there was no further organized attempt to continue the action. The officers, who are mounted in the Persian army, disgracefully abandoned their men; while the latter were hotly pursued by our cavalry and horse artillery to within 4 miles of Borasján, leaving the line of retreat for a distance of nearly 5 miles strewn with killed and wounded.

It is reported that Sohráb Khán, nephew of the Ilkhání and commanding his cavalry, was killed; but this is mere rumour. We have no account of the officers of rank lost by the enemy, but it is probable there were many.

The Sháh-in-Sháh's account of the battle, taken from the Tíhrán Gazette Extraordinary, is given below:

The Sháh's account of the battle.

"According to an express sent by Shújá-ul-Mulk, it appears that the English army, consisting of 5 regiments and 10 guns, marched on the 3rd February 1857 to Cháhkúta, 4 farsakhs from Bushire, intending to work some injury to the army under Shújá-ul-Mulk before it could join the other Moslem troops. The Shújá-ul-Mulk, with 3,000 infantry, 300 cavalry, and 12 guns, on the 4th contemplated a night attack on the enemy.\* When he had proceeded 4 miles from Borasján, the rain began to fall heavily. The English advanced about 4 miles from Cháhkúta, where they entered holes, and went behind irregularities in the ground. The Moslem troops having no shelter from the rain, and finding their own encampment nearer than that of the enemy, went back, proposing to return to the battle. As the English army were under cover, they reached Borasján the next morning. On the night of the 7th, the Shújá-ul-Mulk, at the head of 3,000 picked infantry and 8 guns, attacked the English, whose advanced guard, becoming aware of the movement, fired a signal gun. The British, being

\* NOTE.—We found that the Shújá actually did leave his camp with some infantry and guns with the intention of attacking us in our bivouac on the night of the 4th; so this part of his account is true. Why he went back has been before stated.

This despatch got Shújá-ul-Mulk a dress of honor from the Sháh in honor of the victory. The Shújá required it too, for he ran away from the field, they say, with nothing on but a piece of cloth over his head.



unable to remove the enormous quantity of their ammunition owing to the mud, blew it up, and retired to Bushire. The victorious Persian army pursued the English to within  $3\frac{1}{2}$  farsakhs (10 miles) off Bushire, when reinforcements, consisting of 2 regiments, 400 cavalry, and 10 guns, came out to their relief. On this they turned back again, and wanted to fight. Though the strength of the victorious Persian army did not exceed 3,000 men and 8 guns, still they heeded not the overpowering number of the enemy, but eagerly rushed forward to the slaughter. They fought heroically for four hours, beginning at daylight, twice breaking into the English squares, entered their lines, and strove vigorously. It is also reported that General Stalker, who first arrived in Bushire, was killed in that action; but it requires confirmation. Among the Persian officers, Muhammad Kuli Khán, Sartíp, was wounded with a grape shot, and Alí Khán, Sartíp, of the Karagúslú regiment, received a sword wound when he penetrated into the English ranks; but, thank God, neither of them have come to harm. Owing to the intensity of the rain, each party was obliged to desist from further warfare, and returned to its own camp, leaving on both sides sundry guns sticking in the mud. An accurate account of the killed and wounded could not be obtained in consequence of the inclemency of the weather; but the killed on the side of the English must have been from 700 or 800 to 1,000, and on the part of the Persians from 600 or 500 to 300. The Sarashkarbáshi, who has proceeded to the field of battle, will shortly write a true account of the affair, and it shall be published in the next number of the Gazette."

Preparations now began to be pushed forward for the expedition to Muhammarah. Materials for the barracks of one European regiment were provided at Bushire. Hospitals were prepared at Kháraj, which place was found remarkably healthy when we held it formerly. These were to receive the sick both of the 1st and 2nd Divisions.

The remainder of the month of February was one of no importance in the general conduct of the campaign, and passed in comparative idleness by all but the Transport Service and Quarter Master General's Department, awaiting the arrival of the 2nd Division, delayed by heavy weather. The Sind Horse were still beating up the Gulf to Bushire in sailing vessels unaided by steam. By the end of February, 5 companies of the Light Battalion, No. 2 Light Field Battery, a company of Golundauze, the Aden troop of Sind Horse, and other details had arrived. Strong north-west winds also delayed the embarkation of the expedition.

Brigadier-General Havelock on arrival took over the command of the 2nd Division, and Brigadier Hamilton that of its first brigade, which had been held, in the action of the 8th, by Colonel Stisted. The supplies brought in decreased after the action of the 8th, and forage in particular became scarce. Every regiment furnished daily 300 men as a working party. This duty had a most beneficial effect on the health of the men. Five strong redoubts were built, four in front sweeping the width of the isthmus, that in rear securing the communication with the town; all were armed with position guns, one with two 68-pounders.

The prevailing high winds caused the greatest annoyance from the drifting sand; these nor'-westers, commencing about 9 A.M., lasted till sundown.

By the 1st March, the 3rd Troop Horse Artillery was embarked, notwithstanding the bad weather, in three days; on the 5th and 6th, the 64th



Regiment and a detachment of the 78th Highlanders sailed for the rendezvous off Muhammarah. A troop of the 14th Dragoons, arriving unexpectedly, was also directed to proceed with the expedition. The horse artillery transport was provided with bullock fittings only; they stood together, eight in a division, and fared well enough, as no bad weather was experienced during the 30 hours' sail.

On the 9th March, a wing of the 26th Native Infantry embarked, when again heavy weather delayed the operation.

On the 6th March, three additional companies of the Light Battalion arrived off Bushire, and shortly after the 4th Troop Horse Artillery, one troop 3rd Cavalry, and the remaining company of the Light Battalion, and all passed on to the Muhammarah rendezvous.

The difficulty of embarking troops and stores in an exposed and shallow roadstead and the poverty of steam power were much felt.

The Turks remonstrated against the movement on Muhammarah, as it necessitated the navigation of the Shatt-ul-Arab, the right bank of which stream is Turkish territory. They also advanced a claim to the town, and the question arose whether it should be made over to the Pasha of Baghdád when captured. The local tribes objecting to Turkish rule, the claim was kept in abeyance; but the circumstance was considered to be of no moment.

On the 14th March, General Stalker, C.B., whom it was proposed to leave in command at Bushire, in a moment of mental derangement shot himself. He was an officer who had gained distinction in the field, and whose kind heart and gentlemanly manners won the regard of all.

Major-General Stalker was by service senior to Sir James Outram; and with reference to this, the latter wrote:

"Should Bushire, contrary to expectation, hold out, and not yet be in our possession when I join the army, and should General Stalker then be conducting operations against the town, it would be the wish of His Lordship, I presume (as it would be my own), that he should not be deprived of the credit of taking the place; and in that case I would, with His Lordship's permission, defer assuming the command until after it had fallen. I know not whether General Stalker would wish to continue with the army after I have taken command; but should he choose to do so, I might place him in command at Bushire, while I myself take the advanced division to Muhammarah and Shustar. Serving under me would be the less galling, I hope, to Stalker, inasmuch as we have been intimate friends ever since we entered the service together, on the same day, 37 years ago."

As regards the separate command, he wrote much to the same effect to General Stalker direct, adding: "I can only say it will be a source of great gratification to me to be associated with you in the field, and I can assure you we should get on well together."

General Jacob (lately arrived) was placed in command at Bushire. The Persian forces under the Commander-in-Chief (Sarashkarbáshi), with 16,000 men and 30 guns, was reported to have arrived at Nanizak with authority either to fight or to treat for terms of peace: overtures indirectly made by him were discouraged. On the 17th March, Commodore Ethersey shot himself; memoranda in his note book showed that his mind was affected.

The 4th Troop Horse Artillery returned to Bushire from Muhammarah on the 19th March. The Persian attempts to strengthen Muhammarah were reported to have been very successful. On this day the head-quarters

of the Muhammarah expeditionary force left Bushire; the force comprised—

No. 2 Light Field Battery, 6 guns . . . . .	176 men.
No. 3 Troop Horse Artillery, 6 guns . . . . .	166 „
14th Dragoons (troop) . . . . .	89 „
Sind Horse (part of) . . . . .	303 „
64th Regiment . . . . .	704 „
78th Highlanders . . . . .	830 „
Light Battalion . . . . .	920 „
26th Regiment Native Infantry . . . . .	716 „
23rd Regiment Native Infantry . . . . .	749 „
Madras Sappers and Miners . . . . .	124 „
Bombay Sappers and Miners . . . . .	109 „
Reserve Artillery . . . . .	...

*i. e.*, 392 horse, 1,534 European and 2,385 Native Infantry, 342 artillery, and 12 guns—total 4,886 men—with 4 armed steamers and 2 sloops of war.

There remained at Bushire Brigadier-General Jacob, C.B., in command, with Brigadiers Wilson, Honner, and Tapp; 2 field batteries and the mountain train, the entire cavalry of the 1st Division, 3 companies each of Her Majesty's 64th, the 4th Rifles, 20th Native Infantry, and the Bilúch Battalion.

Sir James Outram thus discussed the advantages of an advance on Shustar over that on Shíráz:

“Should the enemy really be mustering in advance of Shíráz in force, it is next to certain their object is to oppose our advance on Shíráz; for they would hardly have the temerity to attack our entrenched position in front of Bushire. In that case the passes below Khisht would afford positions so naturally strong, and which they would not fail to improve by art, that we may be exposed to severe loss ere we make our footing sure at Khisht. And then it might require our whole means, thus weakened by battle, to maintain our position there; for the neighbouring tribes are not to be depended on, being Shíahs and more subservient to the Sháh's Government than are the half Arab ‘Súnní’ tribes who intervene between Shustar and Muhammarah.

Our advance from Muhammarah to Shustar, on the other hand, though liable to be opposed by the army of the Viceroy of Khúzistán, represented at from 3,000 to 8,000 men, has no great physical difficulties to contend against,—no passes to surmount; and our army there would possess the advantage of water carriage for its supplies, and a better provision of land carriage than can be obtained at Bushire.

The neighbourhood of Shustar, moreover, is described as abounding in forage, fuel, and water; and the population being ‘Súnnís’, with strong ties of connection with the Turko-Arabian tribes in the vicinity, are generally, it is said, bitterly inimical to their Shíah rulers, and would, it may be hoped, readily be induced to favour our cause. Our vicinity to the Turkish frontier would besides facilitate the organization of the Turko-Arabian levies.”

He showed cause for preferring Shustar to Khisht on military, sanitary, and political considerations: and, if the menace to Shíráz was a strong argument in favour of the latter position, he recognized a show of impending danger to Isfahán in our maintenance of the former. He wrote:

‘Shustar, being further from Muhammarah than Khisht from Bushire, might be more difficult to support were the intervening tribes hostile, and were it not that we have the river Kárún to aid us, navigable to our armed steamers. But there not merely are the people likely to be with us, but

we shall soon have more ample means for controlling the intermediate country in our Arab levies than we could have at Khisht, where we should be too far from the Turkish frontier to obtain the services of the tribes we wish to employ. And the increasing strength of our lines would, I hope, prevent the necessity for further reinforcements until the season for active operations in October next.

Should I find, therefore, that it is impracticable to maintain both Khisht and Shustar, I may probably confine our operations to the latter quarter. In which case it may be advisable to borrow one of General Stalker's European regiments and some of his European artillery, with the double view of adding to our strength on the Kárún, and securing a better climate for the Europeans; and General Stalker's attention would be confined for the present to the defence of Bushire and holding Kháraj, for which the troops then left to him would, I think, amply suffice.

Previous to the sailing of the expedition, Captain Jones, I.N., the Resident at Bushire, the Revd. Dr. Badger, Captain M. Green, Military Secretary, Commodore Ethersey and Captain Young, I.N., proceeded to Muhammarah to secure the friendly co-operation of the Arab tribes to whom Muhammarah belonged; to obtain information regarding the strength of the Persian army, the defensive works, the navigation of the Shatt-ul-Aráb, &c., &c.

Sir James Outram hoped to raise levies amongst the nomads to be found on the confines of Western Persia. Lord Clarendon's instructions had assumed that there were independent tribes amongst those with whom the General would come in contact, and, to avoid complications, had restricted him from seeking the aid of others. But whether independent or semi-independent, the sovereignty of the soil on which they lived and moved was a question which could not be disregarded. Outram's idea was that we could avail ourselves of the services of the nomads living some on Turkish, some on Persian, territory, and some migrating periodically from one to the other, provided that, at the close of the war, an amnesty were proclaimed to all who befriended us while the war lasted.

The expedition started six weeks later than the time General Outram had expected; the delay was caused by the non-arrival of reinforcements and the unexpected strength of the armaments prepared by the enemy in front of Bushire.

The lateness of the season before which the ascent of the Kárún could be commenced, and the restrictions precluding him from embodying the Arab nomad tribes, caused him to anticipate that he might have to abandon the advance on Shustar. "In that case," he wrote, "after the seizure of Muhammarah, my operations will be probably confined to driving the enemy from below the passes in our front, and it will depend on the strength and condition in which they retreat up the passes, whether or not I follow on to Shíráz; or content myself with holding the low country and placing the Europeans on the elevated plateau above Borasján for the hot months. But under any circumstances the hot season must have commenced before the troops here can be equipped to move against the enemy.

The rendezvous below Muhammarah was reached between the 21st and 23rd. The river at the anchorage was 1,200 yards broad; both banks were covered with date groves.

Favourable accounts were received of the intentions of the Arab tribes; they brought off supplies, sheep, &c., to the ships.

After mature deliberation, it being impossible to erect counter-batteries on the Turkish bank of the river (neutral territory), and the capture of the south

battery and the occupation of the island of Abadan, and the left bank of the Hafár canal offering no advantages, the battery and island being commanded by the works of the main position on the right bank of the canal, General Outram resolved to attack the enemy's batteries with the armed steamers and sloops of war, and, as soon as the fire was nearly silenced, to pass up rapidly with the troops in small steamers towing boats, land the force 2 miles above the northern point of the Hafár canal, and immediately advance upon and attack the entrenched camp.

Such an operation would be only possible against imperfectly armed batteries manned by Oriental troops.

Orders were issued regarding the landing which was appointed for the 25th. It was, in consequence of some unforeseen accident, postponed till the 26th March (some of the large ships shoaled on the way). The following was the order :

Field Force Order, dated "Feroze," 22nd March 1857.

The order for the attack. "The following plan of attack upon Muhammarah was decided on this day :

"1. The whole of the war vessels and transports to move up Shatt-ul-Aráb; to anchorage some 4 miles below the junction with the Bámishír at such time as the Commodore may appoint with reference to the arrival of the ships not yet come up; the state of the tides, &c.

"2. Immediately after dusk, on the day of arrival at the rendezvous, a party of sappers, with mortars and artillerymen, will proceed to Dubbar island, and erect a mortar battery upon it during the night. Brigadier Hutt will be pleased to direct all arrangements connected with the same in communication with Major Boileau, Commanding Engineer, and Captain Selby, I.N.

"3. The mortars will open fire upon the enemy's works at dawn of day, and the war vessels will move into position off the south-west point of the island as soon after daybreak as possible, under instructions that will be given to the several commanders by the Commodore, opening their fire at first from 800 yards, and subsequently running in abreast of and above the enemy's batteries, as circumstances may determine.

"4. In the meantime the troops, horses, &c., will be transhipped from the transports into small steamers and boats ready to move up to the left bank of the Shatt-ul-Aráb, immediately below Jabis fort, where they will be landed.

"The following are the arrangements for the transshipment of the troops, and any further or more detailed instructions required by commanding officers can be obtained on application from the Deputy Quarter Master General:

*March 23rd.*—The Commodore will be so good as to give the requisite instructions to the commanders of steamers and masters of transports.

"5. During the bombardment of the batteries, the infantry, and that portion of the artillery which will land in advance, will be transferred from the ships to the small steamers and flats as follows; the work to commence at daybreak :

"1. The *Planet* will be alongside the *Ocean Monarch* at daybreak, and will take on board as many horses and men of the battery as she can carry, including the horses of Brigadiers Hale and Hutt and three Majors of Brigade.

"2. The *Napier* will take from the *Avalanche* and *Euzine* 80 horses of the 3rd Troop Horse Artillery and all the staff officers' horses (one horse for



each) and the mounted officers horses of the 78th Highlanders now on board those ships.

"(3) The *Comet* to be kept as a despatch boat.

"(4) The *Assyria* will land the staff officers' horses from the *Fultay Sultan* and *Fultay Salám*; mounted officers' horses, Light Battalion, from *Fultay Salám*; and mounted officers' horses, 26th, from *Fultay Moubarrak*.

"(5) The *Sindian* to be alongside the *Bride of the Seas* at daylight, take off all the 64th Foot from that ship, and afterwards go to the *Fultay Sultan*, and take on board the detachment of the same regiment. The remainder of the 64th will go on in the *Hugh Lindsay*.

"(6) The *Elthersey* flat to be along-side the *Saldanha* on the evening of the arrival at the rendezvous, and the whole of the 23rd Native Light Infantry, with the mounted officers' horses, will be transferred to her at daybreak next morning. She will then be taken in tow by the *Sindian*.

"(7) The detachments 78th Highlanders will be transferred to the *Berenice* in the early morning from the *Kingston*, *Pottinger*, and *Clifton*.

"(8) The head-quarters 26th Native Infantry from the *Earl of Clun* to the *Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy*.

"(9) The wing of the 26th Native Infantry, now on board the *British Queen*, will remain in that vessel, and be towed by the *Berenice*.

"(10) The three companies Light Battalion from the *Feroze* and the one from the *Assaye*, now on board *Precursor*, to the *Chusan*.

"(11) The three companies Light Battalion in the *Fultay Salám* to the *Pioneer*.

"(12) The *Bombay* will take the troop of the Sind Horse coming from the *Mirzapore*.

"Dooly bearers to accompany their own regiments under instructions from the Superintending Surgeon.

"The Commodore has arranged for the horse ships to be towed up as near the batteries as may be found practicable.

"The river steamers and flat, after disembarking their horses and men, will immediately return to the horse ships, and land from them as many more as they can carry.

"The *Kingston* has been appointed the hospital ship.

"The infantry transports will not be brought up from the rendezvous until after the fall of the place, when the baggage tents, &c., will be landed, as will hereafter be directed.

"The troops are to land with three days' cooked provisions."

By command,

(Sd.) E. LUGARD, Colonel,  
Chief of the Staff.

Soon after daylight on the 24th March, the fleet was ready to start for the second rendezvous at Huertáh. The banks of the river continued to be well fringed with date groves and swampy with grassy slopes to the water's edge. The country appeared to be well peopled, and stocked with numerous herds of cattle. The fleet consisted of 14 steamers and 21 transports, besides 5 small river steamers, flats, and boats. The enemy took no means to annoy the transports, the decks of which were closely packed with troops and within easy range. At noon the Huertáh battery was passed; it was found deserted; it was well placed to rake the river, and consisted of three embrasures of date stumps, with roofing of the same material, but without platforms. At 1 P.M. the fleet anchored off Huertáh within sight of Muhammarah.

The Arabs welcomed the fleet, and, putting off from shore, gave information concerning the enemy. Dubbar island proving, on being reconnoitred, to be too swampy for the establishment of a mortar battery upon it, it was decided that a raft should be constructed for two 8" and two smaller (5") mortars, which should be towed up by the *Comet* during the night within range of the batteries.

On the 25th, the arrangements above were completed. Troops, horses, and guns were transhipped into lighter draught steamers and vessels. All ships prepared for action. The enemy continued to throw up breastworks on either bank of the Hafár.

The following order was issued by the Commodore for the attack on the batteries:

Dated "Feroze," 25th April 1857.

"The following is the order of attack upon the enemy's batteries for to-morrow morning:

"At the earliest dawn the *Semiramis*, with *Clive* in tow, leads into the channel on the western bank of the river, and, followed by the *Ajdaha* and *Feroze* in close company, anchoring in such a position that the rearmost vessel may have broadside bearing upon the batteries before opening fire, after which every endeavour will be made to silence the enemy's batteries.

The *Assaye* remains at anchor until her commander can proceed and anchor west of the north fort, taking it on the flank. On the fire slackening, the *Feroze*, followed by the *Ajdaha*, will proceed to cover the landing of the troops, firing on the batteries as she passes. *Semiramis* weighs with *Clive*, and drops her on the flank of the batteries inside of the Bámishír, proceeding onward to the attack of the Persian camp and advanced batteries.

"The *Victoria*, with *Falkland* in tow, to follow *Ajdaha*, and take up a position to the south-east fort, as soon as circumstances will permit, to protect transports from fire of the enemy in the date groves.

"When the rendezvous flag is hoisted on board of the ship of the Commodore commanding, it is to be repeated by the other vessels engaged, upon which the steamers, which have already received instructions to land troops, will proceed on that duty, and land them between the first and second creek, south of Jabi's fort.

"Subsidiary orders regarding the landing of the troops will be issued by the Commodore commanding on the spot.

In operations of this nature unforeseen contingencies will arise. No captain will do wrong who places his vessel in an effective position."

(Sd.) ETHERSEY,

*Commodore Commanding.*

At daylight on the 26th, the mortar battery, placed in position during the previous night, opened fire with effect from the 8" mortars; the range of the 5½" proved to be too short.

The enemy soon found its range, and there being delay in the steamers getting off, it was for the space of an hour in considerable danger, and had the enemy had any enterprise, they might have taken or destroyed it. At about 6-30 A.M. the steamers started: the *Semiramis* lead the way, with the *Clive* in tow, the *Ajdaha* close behind. The *Feroze* followed shortly after, succeeded by the *Assaye*. The *Victoria*, towing the *Falkland* sloop, delayed to engage the guns on the left bank amongst the date groves, evidently awaiting the transports. They then passed on after the others.

The leading vessels passed the southern batteries, neared the point of Dubbar, and opened fire; the *Feroze* and *Assaye* followed the latter, taking station near the mouth of the Bámishír and within 200 yards of the batteries.

The *Semiramis*, trying to get into the Bámishír, grounded. The practice of both sides was excellent.

For an account of the naval operations, which were highly creditable, see despatches.

The bombardment continued till 8 A.M., when the order for the transports to advance was hoisted. At 9-30 A.M. they advanced, a gun from the Abadan opening upon them in succession.

The *Berenice* steamer, carrying the Highlanders, a company of sappers, and General Havelock and staff of the 2nd Division, led the column; her decks, crowded, passed within 100 yards of the batteries. Though struck several times in hull and rigging, the decks escaped.

The transports pushed on to the ground above the batteries, which had ceased firing, the magazine in the northern fort having exploded.

Two field pieces of the enemy opened on the transports—one remained stationary, the other moved up parallel to the shipping, and gave an occasional shot as the ground proved favourable. Much mischief might have been thus caused owing to the crowded state of the decks. Each transport carried a light gun or more.

The *Berenice* lay close in shore, and the Highlanders and the Grenadiers of the 64th landing advanced as skirmishers. All the infantry, with a field battery and 50 Sind Horse, were on shore by 2 P.M., when the rising of the tide having filled the creeks and made impassable the ground to be crossed by the horse artillery and troop of the 14th Dragoons, the General determined to advance with those who were ashore.

In the meantime the fire of the batteries had ceased. After they ceased firing artillery, a firing of musketry was opened from them, as well as from the breastworks, and maintained with great spirit for some time, when storming parties were landed from the *Semiramis*, *Clive*, *Victoria*, and *Falkland*, which drove before them the last of the enemy, and took possession of their works and guns. The naval casualties amounted to 5 killed and 18 wounded.

The Sind Horse pushed to the front without encountering any of the enemy.

The Persian camps, one immediately to the north of Muhammarah, a second a little to the east of it, and a third more to the westward, were clearly seen.


The advance was made as follows:

A line of contiguous quarter-distance columns; a field battery on the right; next came in succession the 78th Highlanders, 26th Native Infantry (one wing), Her Majesty's 64th Regiment, the Light Battalion, the 23rd Bengal Light Infantry—the whole covered by a cloud of skirmishers.

Up to the moment of our advance, these troops were drawn up in order of battle outside the boundary of the Sháhzádah's camp, the right of their line far outflanking our left, which had actually no protection when it had once advanced into the open plain, beyond the 23rd Native Infantry being slightly thrown back. When within gun range of the camp, the Persian army seemed literally to have vanished. At the last moment all courage deserted the foe although the odds were greatly in their favour.

They were reported to have been very confident at first, but to have lost heart at the size and effect of the 68-pounder shot, and the loss very early in the day of Sartíp Agá Jhán Khán, their most able chief, whilst showing a most gallant example. In the north battery, Prince Khánlar Mírzá was in chief command.

Every tent was left standing. The ground was strewn with arms, accoutrements, ammunition, grains, &c. Large quantities of grain, flour,



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ROUGH SKETCH  
OF THE  
ATTACK ON THE BATTERIES  
OF  
**MUHAMMARAH,**

By the combined Naval and Military Forces  
under command of Lieutenant-General  
Sir James Outram, K.C.B.,  
26th March 1857.


Scale 1 Inch = 400 Yards,

YARDS 400 300 200 0 400 YARDS

I. B., April 1861  
Exd. J. A. A

(Sd.) J. WRAY, Captain,  
Dy. Qr. Mr. Genl., P.E.F.F.





ROUGH SKETCH  
OF THE  
ATTACK ON THE BATTERIES  
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MUHAMMARAH,

By the combined Naval and Military Forces  
under command of Lieutenant-General  
Sir James Outram, K.C.B.,  
26th March 1857.

Scale 1 Inch = 400 Yards.  
YARDS 400 300 200 0 400 YARDS

(Sd.) J. WRAY, Captain,  
Dy. Qr. Mr. Genl., P.E.F.F.

The *Semiramis*, trying to get into the Bámishír, grounded. The practice of both sides was excellent.

For an account of the naval operations, which were highly creditable, see despatches.

The bombardment continued till 8 A.M., when the order for the transports to advance was hoisted. At 9-30 A.M. they advanced, a gun from the Abadan opening upon them in succession.

The *Berenice* steamer, carrying the Highlanders, a company of sappers, and General Havelock and staff of the 2nd Division, led the column; her decks, crowded, passed within 100 yards of the batteries. Though struck several times in hull and rigging, the decks escaped.

The transports pushed on to the ground above the batteries, which had ceased firing, the magazine in the northern fort having exploded.

Two field pieces of the enemy opened on the transports—one remained stationary, the other moved up parallel to the shipping, and gave an occasional shot as the ground proved favourable. Much mischief might have been thus caused owing to the crowded state of the decks. Each transport carried a light gun or more.

The *Berenice* lay close in shore, and the Highlanders and the Grenadiers of the 64th landing advanced as skirmishers. All the infantry, with a field battery and 50 Sind Horse, were on shore by 2 P.M., when the rising of the tide having filled the creeks and made impassable the ground to be crossed by the horse artillery and troop of the 14th Dragoons, the General determined to advance with those who were ashore.

In the meantime the fire of the batteries had ceased. After they ceased firing artillery, a firing of musketry was opened from them, as well as from the breastworks, and maintained with great spirit for some time, when storming parties were landed from the *Semiramis*, *Clive*, *Victoria*, and *Falkland*, which drove before them the last of the enemy, and took possession of their works and guns. The naval casualties amounted to 5 killed and 18 wounded.

The Sind Horse pushed to the front without encountering any of the enemy.

The Persian camps, one immediately to the north of Muhammarah, a second a little to the east of it, and a third more to the westward, were clearly seen.

The advance was made as follows:

A line of contiguous quarter-distance columns; a field battery on the right; next came in succession the 78th Highlanders, 26th Native Infantry (one wing), Her Majesty's 64th Regiment, the Light Battalion, the 23rd Bengal Light Infantry—the whole covered by a cloud of skirmishers.

Up to the moment of our advance, these troops were drawn up in order of battle outside the boundary of the Sháhzádah's camp, the right of their line far outflanking our left, which had actually no protection when it had once advanced into the open plain, beyond the 23rd Native Infantry being slightly thrown back. When within gun range of the camp, the Persian army seemed literally to have vanished. At the last moment all courage deserted the foe although the odds were greatly in their favour.

They were reported to have been very confident at first, but to have lost heart at the size and effect of the 68-pounder shot, and the loss very early in the day of Sartíp Agá Jhán Khán, their most able chief, whilst showing a most gallant example. In the north battery, Prince Khánlar Mírzá was in chief command.

Every tent was left standing. The ground was strewn with arms, accoutrements, ammunition, grains, &c. Large quantities of grain, flour,

chopped straw, and dates were secured, and 18 brass guns and mortars (three 12 and 18-pounders, two 9-pounders). Before flight they exploded their reserve ammunition.

The want of cavalry prevented any efficient pursuit; it was pushed to a distance of 3 or 4 miles without results by a few troopers of the Sind Horse. The 14th Dragoons and Blake's Horse Artillery were still delayed on the river banks.

The troops bivouacked in line of battle where they stood; the night proved bitterly cold.

During the night a false alarm induced the outlying pickets of two regiments to fire into each other, by which five men were wounded. The Dragoons and Horse Artillery joined the camp during the night.

On the 27th the army marched back to Muhammarah, and occupied it.

The flies in the date groves by day and the fleas in the sands by night caused great inconvenience.

Guards were posted in the town, and orders issued that private property should be strictly protected, as also every precaution taken to prevent ill-usage to the inhabitants.

The loss of the enemy was estimated to be 300 killed. Many of the wounded were during their flight mercilessly butchered by the Arabs.

The few that fell into our hands, imagining that they were only being reserved for greater torture, at first resisted all kinds of treatment, even water, from the hands of their captors—an unmistakable evidence of their own brutality in warfare.

Our casualties were ten men killed, one officer (Lieutenant Harris, I.N.) and thirty men wounded.

On inspection the batteries were found to be much damaged, and most of the embrasures destroyed. The works were strong and regularly constructed; parapets, 18' thick at base, 10' at top. The embrasures 3' by 2' were formed of date stumps, firmly fixed in the ground, and blinded by a roofing of sods and date stems.

The north battery had embrasures for 18 guns, and stood on the right bank of the Kárún at its junction with the Shatt-ul-Aráb, and looked across and down the stream of that river. The south battery had eleven guns, and was on the opposite bank of the Kárún, commanding in the same direction. A small fort, between the north battery and the town, and connected with the former by a long entrenchment, with embrasures for guns, also mounted 8 or 10 guns.

This entrenchment, crowded with infantry, had kept up a heavy musketry fire during the action.

Several minor batteries of from two to four guns were on either bank; and just outside the west face of the town, on the right bank, was a very carefully made and strong work for 10 guns.


The following is a list of the Persian troops engaged in the defence:

2 regiments	Kassají—commanded by Muhammad Marid Khán,		
	Sartíp	.	1,400
1 regiment	Bahádará—Sartíp Agá Jhán Khán (killed)	.	700
1 "	Silakhorí—Moza Khan, Sarhang	.	700
2 regiments	Ferághání—Muhammad Hussain Khán, Sartíp	.	1,400
2 "	Luristání	.	1,400
1 regiment	Jarrandí—Alí Nukia Khán, Sartíp	.	700
	Artillery	.	600
Total Regulars.			6,900

OF  
PART OF THE  
**KARUN RIVER,**  
NEAR MUHAMMARAH

Scale 1 Inch =  $2\frac{1}{2}$  Miles.

(Sd.) J. WRAY, Captain,  
D. A. Q. M. G., P. E. F. E.





Irregular Infantry, Bakhtiári . . . . .	1,200
" Cavalry " . . . . .	1,500
Arabs . . . . .	3,000
Bilúchis . . . . .	400
Total Irregulars . . . . .	6,100
Grand Total . . . . .	13,000

and 25 guns.

(For General Outram's despatch, see "Calcutta Gazette" of 23rd April 1857.)

Ships of 600 tons can lie in the Hafár channel; ships of small tonnage can lie close in shore, and at low water, both in the Hafár channel and in the Shatt-ul-Aráb, north of Muhammarah. A plank from ship to shore suffices for landing purposes. Thick date groves extend all along the shore, intersected in every direction by water cuts, which render passage through them very difficult for horsemen and impossible for artillery; for many of the cuts are very deep, and at high water very wide. The *Golden Era*, a thousand ton ship, was brought close in to the bank, and slung her horses on shore.

During spring tides the banks are overflowed and landing impossible.

The small steamers ran close alongside the bank,  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile up the Hafár canal. By gang-boards horses were embarked on them at both high and low tide.

The sappers constructed several landing stages and floating platforms by planking over boats.

The facilities for landing here may, therefore, be said to be great. By careful reconnaissance, points along the bank can be found, where the obstruction of creeks does not exist, and troops can at once march inland.

The best camping ground is the high open plain about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles behind the town. For drinking, the water from the Hafár should be used.

To follow up the enemy and to destroy his magazines at Ahwáz, an expedition was organized to ascend the river in the steamers

Kárún expedition. *Comet*, *Planet*, and *Assyria* under the direction of Commander Rennie, I.N.

The delay in the despatch of this reconnaissance, the total want of baggage animals preventing it being carried out in any other way, was due to the necessity of coaling the steamers, and putting on board seven days' provisions, whilst all were busily engaged disembarking tents and stores from the transports.

The troops told off for the service were 150 men from the flank companies of the 64th Regiment, and a like number furnished by the Light and Captain McAndrew's companies of the 78th Highlanders. Each steamer took 100 men. The following officers accompanied the expedition—viz., Captain Wray, Assistant Quarter Master General; Captain Green, Military Secretary to Sir James Outram; Captain Kemball, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia and Consul at Baghdád; Captain Baigree, Lord Kerr, &c. The troops were commanded by Captain Hunt of the 78th Highlanders.

The steamers left Muhammarah about 10-30 A.M. on the morning of the 28th March, the *Comet* leading and lending a tow-rope to the *Assyria*. A gun-boat carrying two 24-pounder howitzers was also in tow of each steamer.

At sunset the flotilla anchored for the night close to the ruined fort of Kotal-al-Abd. The Kárún is here about 100 yards wide, 12' to 20' deep, with a powerful current; its banks fringed on both sides with dwarf poplar and willow jungle, which extends but a short distance from the bank.



Below this point to Muhammarah, the Kárún varies in width from 90 to 180 yards; banks in many places high and generally covered with tamarisk or dwarf poplar jungle. The marks of five guns and a light four-wheeled carriage were noted close to the anchorage, the Shustar road here being within 150 yards of the bank.

Getting under weigh at daylight on the 30th March, the ruined mosque of Imám Sabbah, the enemy's second halting ground, was reached early in the afternoon. At this point the river begins to bend sharply, and the progress was slow; an anchorage for the night was effected off the Arab village of Ismaini; information was here obtained that the enemy had passed up the previous day with 7 regiments, 2,000 horse, and 4 guns; another with its broken carriage was towed up. The Arabs were most friendly, and brought supplies of sheep, milk, &c., in abundance. With the earliest dawn of the 31st March, the flotilla was again under weigh, and the *Comet*, now casting off the *Assyria*, proceeded alone, at full speed, to overtake, if possible, the boat with the gun. At 9 a.m. the first straggler was captured; here another of their bivouacs was passed; the Persian flight was so precipitate that but a small stock of food or fodder was carried with them; their horses appeared to have been fed on camel-thorn, there being no sign of grain or forage anywhere. Moran was passed in the afternoon, and in the evening Kut-Omaira, where the Arabs came out in numbers, bringing sheep, milk, &c. They gave information that the enemy had reached Ahwáz on the 30th, but had not yet crossed the river; that the horses had been sent on on account of scarcity of forage; that provisions were scarce, those at Ahwáz being the only store that they had to depend upon; and that the force was concentrating opposite Ahwáz on the right bank.

At 3 a.m., on the 1st April, the pursuit was resumed, and soon after daylight Ahwáz was sighted, and the Persian army seen drawn up behind a ridge on the right bank. There were crowds of horsemen, some guns, and infantry innumerable. Four large masses of infantry were partly screened by a low range of sand-hills which ran along their front; three guns were in position near a small mosque in their centre, a fourth being on a slope below and to the left of it. Their line fronted down the river and at a slight angle to it, their left resting immediately upon its bank. The flotilla steamed to within 3,000 yards of the position, capturing the boat carrying the 12-pounder brass gun. A couple of horsemen, following the movements of the steamers, were dispersed by a rifle shot.

Some Arabs now hailed from Ahwáz, and were brought on board; they gave information that the garrison of the village did not exceed 500 infantry and 30 horse left to protect the stores which had scarcely been touched by the enemy before our approach. It was now determined to land on the left bank, and to reconnoitre Ahwáz. To cover the movement, a gunboat was to ascend the river and open fire with its two howitzers, covering the retirement, should Ahwáz prove to be held in force.

Beyond two boats and two ballams, the enemy had no means of crossing the river, and the force ran no risks on this account.

At 10 a.m. the landing took place. To deceive the enemy, three separate detachments were formed, each "in rank entire," to act and look like regiments in brigade. The landing and these arrangements were made in jungle sufficiently high to conceal the men, and to prevent their numbers being ascertained.

A single line of skirmishers, each man 10 or 12 paces apart, first issued from the bushes on the plain in view of the enemy; the supports followed these at about 100 yards interval, also in single rank, and with files very

much loosened. At another interval of about 100 yards, the three main detachments advanced, about 200 yards apart, each in columns of threes, and opened out to very wide intervals. The Highlanders were on the left; the 64th in the centre, and Captain McAndrew's detachment of 64th and Highlanders on the right.

Cowed by his recent defeat, the troops exhausted by a rapid retreat and want of food, and the heavy shells from the gun-boat bringing to mind the recent losses experienced at Muhammarah, the Sháhzádh retired, leaving his supplies to their fate. The town was not defended, the garrison retiring up the river. On the approach of the troops, the village Shaikh, with his retinue, came out some 100 yards to claim protection, and to make his submission. On the condition of his pointing out and assisting to destroy the Persian magazines, it was agreed that private houses should not be searched, and the town property should be respected.

The Persians neither returned the fire of the gun-boat nor opened upon the town, although the range was within 500 yards.

About noon a shell was pitched close to a small mosque where the Sháhzádh had his head-quarters, whereupon a movement in retreat commenced, and the army of 9,000 or 10,000 men retired in perfect order before a detachment of 300. Taking the detachment as the advance guard of General Outram's force, and dreading a general action, the Persian prince preferred to run the risk of losing his men by starvation in a retreat upon Shustar, where were his next depôts of supplies, and to abandon his supplies and a strong military position.

Their infantry, still keeping in four distinct masses, first retired, marching very rapidly on a course parallel to the river, taking the four guns seen in position with them. The cavalry, exceeding 2,000 in number, brought up the rear; they were well mounted and dressed in long blue frocks, with trousers of lighter colour, a white belt, and the high black lambskin cap peculiar to the Persians. A sabre and long matchlock, slung across their backs, appeared to be their only arms; no lances were seen. Amongst them were the pick of the Bakhtiári horse, esteemed to be the Sháh's best cavalry. They carried three standards with them in crimson cases, not flying. A party crossed over and exploded the ammunition abandoned.

As much flour and wheat as could be stowed on the steamers was retained; the remainder of the immense stores of grain was thrown open to the Arabs to carry away. Besides grain, 15 cases of firelocks and bayonets were taken, 56 mules, a number of pack saddles, numerous intrenching tools, and many sheep.

It was proposed to follow the enemy to Wais. Had this been possible, the starving army might have surrendered. The scheme was found to be impracticable however, as the steamers could not be got past the river bunds.

(For despatch in full, see "*Calcutta Gazette*" of 2nd May 1857.)

The climate was pleasant; the mornings and nights cool, the maximum heat being 80°.

For a description of Ahwáz, see *Military Report on South-West Persia, Intelligence Branch, Quarter Master General's Department in India*. To the remarks there made upon the means of turning the rapids may be added the simple expedient of blasting a passage in-shore on the left bank, of sufficient width, and of stationing there permanent gangs of Arabs to haul the traffic through. A suitably buoyed passage midstream or along the right bank would enable all boats to shoot them without danger during the spring of the year.

The expedition remained at Ahwáz during the 2nd of April. On the morning of the 3rd, it left for Muhammarah, running down stream at a great speed, and reaching it at 8 P.M.



During its absence all the stores and tentage required for the comfort of the army had been landed, and a large, regularly pitched camp established on the open plain about a mile from the river, the most elevated spot to be found in the neighbourhood. A strong moral effect was produced by the capture of Muhammarah, which the Persians imagined they had rendered impregnable by the massive batteries they had erected, the number of guns they had placed in them, and the strength of the garrison. This was the only blow that could be struck after the occupation of Bushire without penetrating into the interior—an operation which would have caused a heavy drain on our resources. Fortunately for both countries, both had discovered how unwise it was to continue the struggle.

General Outram thus wrote non-officially to the Chairman in the Court of Directors of the result of the Ahwáz expedition: "A more daring feat is not on record perhaps than that of a party of 300 infantry, backed by three small river boats, following up an army of some 8,000 men, braving it by opening fire, deliberately landing and destroying the enemy's magazines, and capturing one of his guns in the face of his entire army, and actually compelling that army to fly before them, and then occupying for three whole days the position they had compelled the enemy to vacate. The effect will be to clear Khúzistán entirely of the Persians; and the entire province, including Shustar and Dizfúl, is now at our command, and the Persians will never make head again in the province, for they have neither troops nor guns, nor stores nor munitions of war, wherewith to reinforce and supply their troops in this quarter. Whether, therefore, we occupy Ahwáz or Shustar, the Persians will certainly leave the province altogether in apprehension of an attack from our army.

The news of the treaty of peace concluded at Paris on the 4th March, negotiated between Lord Cowley and Farúkh Khán, was received and promulgated. The troops were in good health and condition, acclimatized and inured to exposure in all weathers.

The *Comet* proceeded to Baghdád to ascertain the conditions of peace. The 64th Regiment early in the month rejoined the 1st Division at Bushire. Russian influence alone could have protracted Persian resistance after the occupation of Bushire and Muhammarah, her finances being in a deplorable state, and her forces disorganized.

Pending the ratification of the treaty, the Sháhzádh sent in a messenger to inform Sir James Outram of the conclusion of peace, and received a reply that had he not been aware of it, he should have been at Shustar to beat his quarters up days before.

Like notification was received at Bushire by General Jacob from the Sarashkarbáshi, who received in answer the following replies:

Dated Bushire, 12th April 1857.

After compliments, &c., &c.—

"You mention the evils of war. No injury can come to the English from the continuance of the war with Persia, which His Majesty the Sháh, under the influence of foolish advisers, has provoked. But when the English Government shall have been satisfied and may be pleased to give orders to that effect, there will be peace."

And again on the 15th April:

"As to the peace at which the Shújá rejoices, and on hearing of which he has apparently become brave and proposes to advance nearer to the British

camp, I have heard that His Majesty the Sháh having satisfied the demands of the English Government, it has been determined to make peace ; but no terms or particulars have as yet reached me."

"We have not found the Persian soldiers very formidable in war. They have probably out of pure mercy and good-will kept pretty well out of our reach ; but be it peace or be it war, if the Persian Commander-in-Chief or the brave and truthful Shújá-ul-Mulk presuming on our forbearance move nearer our camp, and their people cause any annoyance to our servants and unarmed followers, whether of this country or of India, I shall order my cavalry to take the offenders, and shall cause them to be punished ; for if it be war, they are enemies ; and if it be peace, they are robbers."

The enemy's army in retreat on Shustar was described to be in such extremity from want of provisions, that they might at any moment be heard of as having dispersed, each man seeking to subsist as best he might. The silence of their guns and non-resistance to our proceedings at Ahwáz is fully accounted for by the fact of their having but seven mule-loads of ammunition with their entire army ; and as they were expecting, when they moved off, that they might possibly be overtaken and brought to action, they would, in case they had expended this on us, have been almost without the means of resistance.

To insure his army fighting to the last, the Sháh had actually ordered the hill tribes to close the passes against them, leaving them no retreat ; so that five hundred sabres would in this instance have secured us the Sháhzádáh himself, his guns, and his army days before the intelligence reached us which tied the General's hands. With the magnificent and incomparable cavalry, both regular and irregular, at her command, the greater mismanagement and pity it is that Great Britain should ever lack a sufficiency of this arm when results almost incalculable might, as on this occasion, have been secured by their presence.

The *Planet* steamer left Muhammarah with despatches for Baghdád on the 29th April.

Sir James Outram thus wrote to Mr. Murray on the 23rd April :

"The previous official announcement of peace, received here on the night of the 4th April, of course tied our hands and saved the Prince's army from unconditional capitulation, which must have followed the advance of this division to Ahwaz (if not to Shustar itself) ; for the inhabitants of Shustar and Dizfúl would probably have risen against their oppressors at our approach (as, indeed, we received intimation they proposed doing) ; but without any such compulsion their dread of our advance against them would, there can be no doubt, have induced proffers of surrender in their dispirited state, conscious as they are of their inability to stand against us (even had they the pluck), as they are devoid of ammunition and supplies ; and they would prefer the alternative of surrender to us to running the gauntlet of the tribes in any endeavour to retire towards Búrújird. They have scarcely any musket ammunition even left wherewith to defend themselves.

"Knowing that this division would meet with no opposition, I had arranged to send it up to Ahwáz under command of Havelock, there to be guided by the information Kemball would obtain regarding the state of the enemy, whether or not to push on to Shustar ; and the information we have since received makes it certain that the occupation of Shustar (and Dizfúl) would have been effected without opposition ; consequently Havelock would certainly have advanced, and the surrender of the Persian army must have ensued. I myself

arranged to returned to Bushire (sending back the 64th there) to attack the Sirkesheeh Bashee\*; and from the information we now have of the position he has taken up at Nanizak, there can be little doubt that we could have cut off his retreat by the cavalry dashing round to his rear when attacked by our artillery and infantry from the front. Of the result there can be no doubt: thirty more guns added to our stores, and another army captured or destroyed—a very satisfactory termination for our short campaign.

“No discretionary power has been left to me to sent back any portion of the army to India; and, perhaps, slippery as Persian diplomatists so notoriously are, it is as well to husband all our strength in Southern Persia until the Sháh has really ratified the treaty. But I should have preferred all troops, beyond those who can be maintained in Bushire, being located at Karáclí (whence they could be brought back in time for further operations, should they be necessary) to keeping them here. As it is, I am compelled to leave the 2nd Division in this neighbourhood, for we cannot accommodate more troops at Bushire.”

The banks of the Kárún were examined with the view to the selection of a permanent camping ground as far as Sabla, but none offered itself better than that the troops now occupied. It was determined on the 24th April to collect material and to build huts at once; the shipping to be kept in readiness to receive the troops, and on the least appearance of sickness the men to be transferred to them, and dropped down to the mouth of the river or any other healthy spot.

It was proposed to extemporise quarters for Europeans, double roofed and well ventilated, with tatties to temper the fiery air; to build efficient huts for the sepoy, and to roof in the transports to provide cool barracks for the sickly.

The supply of forage for the baggage animals and the detention were serious considerations.

General Jacob opposed the idea of cantoning troops at Muhammarah, and wrote thus to General Outram on the subject: “I am quite certain that if you do as you propose, you will make a most shocking mess of it, and perhaps cause the most serious loss by sickness.

“We know what the deltas of large rivers are all over the world. I care not what particular spot you select in them or near them; a few miles here or there, or a few feet or a hundred feet of higher or lower level, make no difference. The locality is deadly, and must be so during and after the inundation.

“Muhammarah, or other place near the mouth of the Euphrates, is only valuable, and should only be occupied as the extremity of the Kárún line. If we have not this line, to attempt to hold the mouth of the river is madness; we should have all the injury and inconvenience, and none of the advantage.

“The loss by sickness in one season would probably be fifty times greater than any which we could suffer in retaking the place if necessary; while, in the one case, the survivors would be broken-hearted and demoralized, and, in the other, strengthened and encouraged to further exertions.”

General Jacob expressed his conviction that the climate of Bushire was better than it had been represented to be, and the island of Kháraj was the

\* As now rendered Sarkashakhibáshi, commander of the guard. His force had been estimated in February at 27,000 men, including 31 regiments of regular infantry and a numerous body of cavalry, with 85 guns. But Sir James knew that many of the guns must be left above the passes.



best place in the Gulf for troops, there being abundant springs of beautiful water there.

These opinions were adopted.

In the end of April, the General visited Kháraj and Bushire with the object of providing healthy shelter for the force.

After securing General Jacob's consent to remain in command on his eventual departure for India, he returned to Muhammarah, and thence, on the 17th May, proceeded to Baghdád to arrange the formation of the mission to be deputed to Herát to see the evacuation of that fortress and district carried out by the Persians; and, in conjunction with Captain Kemball, to take measures for the disposal and discharge of such portions of the animals and establishments of the land transport corps as were not required at Bushire.

On June 9th he left Baghdád for Bushire, and on June 17th finally left Persia.

Early in May the force at Muhammarah began to disperse; the Highlanders and Blake's horse artillery, the mountain train and Madras sappers, being the first to leave for India. At this time the thermometer read 102° in the tents.

On the break up of the force, the following Field Force Order was issued:

Field Force Order, dated Camp Muhammarah, 5th May 1857.

"Consequent on the cessation of hostilities in Persia, the following troops will be held in readiness to embark for India:

"Third Troop of Horse Artillery to Karáchi; 1st company 2nd Battalion of Artillery to Karáchi; reserve companies to Bombay; Her Majesty's 64th Regiment to Vingorla; Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders to Bombay; Light Battalion to Bombay; Madras Sappers and Miners to Bombay.

"2. The 23rd Native Light Infantry and the 26th Native Infantry are transferred to the 1st Division, and will proceed to Bushire with the detachment of Sind Horse and Land Transport Corps now at Muhammarah.

"3. The staff of the 2nd Division will return to Bombay, with the exception of the engineers, ordnance, and commissariat departments, which will proceed to Bushire, and await further instructions.

"4. Brigadier-General Jacob, C.B., will command the troops stationed at Bushire, which will be organized as follows:

"*Cavalry Brigade*.—3rd Regiment Light Cavalry, Sind Horse, Púnah Horse, Aden roop, 14th King's Light Dragoons—Brigadier Stewart.

"*Artillery Brigade*.—4th Troop Horse Artillery, 3rd Light Field Battery, 5th Light Field Battery, 8th Light Field Battery, three companies of the 2nd Battalion Artillery, four companies of the 4th Battalion Artillery,—Lieutenant-Colonel Trevelyan.

"*Infantry, 1st Brigade*.—20th Regiment Native Infantry, 26th Regiment Native Infantry.—Colonel Macan; *2nd Brigade*.—4th Bengal Native Infantry, 23rd Regiment Native Light Infantry, Bilúch Battalion.—Colonel Honner.

"5. The Lieutenant-General avails himself of this opportunity to return his warmest thanks to the whole of the troops placed under his command for service in Persia, for their very exemplary conduct since their arrival in this country, evinced by the fact of scarcely one instance of misconduct on the part of any individual having been brought to his notice. This entire absence of crime amongst so large a body of troops assembled in camp redounds to the credit of both officers and men, and is the strongest possible proof of the



high state of discipline of the force; whilst their conduct throughout the expedition to Borasjān and in the engagement at Khúsháb bore ample testimony to the gallantry of all ranks before an enemy, and to their cheerful and patient endurance of fatigue and hardship under most trying circumstances.

"6. Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, as a soldier who has been honoured with such a command, cannot help expressing his regret that more opportunity has not been afforded the troops by the enemy for the display of that prowess and gallant spirit which he knows to prevail amongst all ranks; but as peace has been concluded by Her Gracious Majesty's Government, it is a source of much satisfaction to the Lieutenant-General that a great portion of the force is thus enabled to return at once to India before the monsoon commences; and he hopes that an early compliance on the part of the Persian Government with the conditions of the treaty will shortly remove the necessity which still exists for a further occupation of Bushire.

"7. Whilst bidding farewell to the troops about to leave Persia, and wishing them a pleasant voyage and happy meeting with their families and friends in India, the Lieutenant-General begs to assure that portion of the force that is to remain at Bushire that every care has been taken for their welfare, and that no exertion will be spared to render their short sojourn in this country as comfortable and as little injurious to their health as possible. Spacious barracks are in course of erection, and military materials of every description are being collected for their use.

"8. In conclusion, the Lieutenant-General begs to offer his sincere thanks to all now about to return to India, especially Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., for the zealous and valuable assistance he has afforded him at all times in command of the 2nd Division; and requests he will be so good as to convey to Brigadiers Hutt, Hale, and Hamilton, and to the General officers of his personal, divisional, and brigade staffs, as well as to the medical and departmental officers, a similar expression of his thanks for the valuable and efficient services they have performed.

"The Lieutenant-General has also to thank Brigadier Wilson, K.H., and his staff, who leave with the European Infantry of the 1st Division, and likewise Major Boye, Deputy Judge Advocate-General, and the Reverend G. Watson, Chaplain, who also returns to India."

By command,  
(Sd.) E. LUGARD, Colonel,  
Chief of the Staff.

By the treaty of the 4th March 1857, the Sháh engaged to withdraw his troops from Herát, to relinquish all claims to sovereignty over it, and never to demand any marks of obedience, such as the coinage, or *khutbah* (prayer for the King), from the chiefs. He further agreed to abstain from all interference with the internal affairs of Afghánistán, and to recognize the independence of Herát. All prisoners taken at Herát were to be set at liberty without ransom. The British mission was to be received at Tíhrán with apologies. The slave trade was to be suppressed in the Persian Gulf. Finally, apologies were to be made to Mr. Murray for the insolent conduct of the Sháh and his ministers.

The ratifications of the treaty were exchanged at Baghdád between Mr. Murray and a Persian officer on the 2nd May 1857.

During the absence of the main force on the Kárún, General Jacob remained in command at Bushire.

His best endeavours were given to completing Bushire as a depôt of supplies and to stock it with coal, provisions, hay, &c., all of which had to be forwarded from India before the monsoon set in, or forwarded in country craft from the Euphrates. He also requisitioned India to supply smiths, carpenters, and tools, none being procurable in Persia.

The Persian force collected during April at the foot of the hills at Nanizak was estimated to be some 17,000 to 18,000 men, with 25 to 30 guns, and was known to be strongly posted.

It was necessary to clear the plain of these, and to hold an advanced position dominating the plains; to retreat after beating the enemy, or after his flight would, General Jacob thought, do more harm than the delay necessary to ensure the arrangements to effect the above.

The force under General Jacob was insufficient for this purpose. Leaving one regiment in camp, he could not muster for the expedition over 1,500 infantry. It was therefore proposed not to attack the Sarashkarbâshi until reinforcements could be sent from the Kârûn.

General Jacob's opinion was that the army would never be satisfactorily placed until the whole country from the Kârûn to Bushire was in our occupation, and our communications carried on through it.

Early in April detachments of the 3rd Cavalry and of the 14th Dragoons arrived at Bushire and landed.

The want of coal at the various ports of the Gulf and at Muscât was much felt. Towards the end of the month the stock both of it and of screwed hay became plentiful at Bushire, and sufficient for three months' consumption. On the 23rd April, General Jacob wrote to General Outram proposing that, as he was quite convinced the peace would be confirmed, all the European troops should be sent back to India; that Muhammarah should be abandoned, and the following garrison kept at Bushire, *viz.* :

Two Infantry Brigades—

1st Brigade . . .	{ 20th Regiment.
	{ 27th " "
2nd Brigade . . .	{ Light Battalion altered to 23rd Regiment.
	{ Bilûch " "

One Artillery Brigade—

3rd Troop Horse Artillery . . .	{
Gibbard's Field Battery . . .	{ with four subalterns each.
Hutche's Field Battery . . .	{

Two reserve companies of Golundauze, each with three officers.

Commissary of Ordnance.

Commanding Engineer.

Two companies Sappers.

All the artificers.

One Cavalry Brigade—

3rd Light Cavalry.
Pûnah Irregular Horse.
1st Regiment Sind Irregular Horse.

Two large steamers.

The river steamers *Planet*, *Comet*, and one other to remain at Bushire.

Plenty of coal.

If it were determined not to send the remainder of the force back to India, he counselled the 2nd Division being moved to Khâraj, except the Sind Horse, which should be marched to Bushire, attended by proper Persian officials. To hold Muhammarah, he recommended that two large ships of war be stationed there; so that should the crews get sickly, one at a time might go on a cruise for health.

On the 15th May, Brigadier-General Havelock, with the staff of his late division and the Light Battalion, sailed for India. All had embarked by the 16th May. Previous to his departure, the town of Muhammarah was given up to Shaikh Jabber's tribe of K'áb Arabs, and the *Clive* sloop was left moored in the river to prevent the Persians from molesting them or entering the town before the evacuation of Herát should be certainly ascertained. Of the original force, the 64th Regiment, 2nd European Light Infantry, 78th Highlanders, Light Battalion, 3rd Troop Horse Artillery, No. 2 Light Field Battery, and the Madras Sappers and Miners returned to India.

The 20th, 23rd, 26th, Bilúch Battalion, 4th Rifles, No. 3 and No. 5 Light Field Batteries, No. 4 Troop Horse Artillery, the Native Light Field Battery, 3rd Cavalry, Púnah Horse, Sind Horse, and Bombay Sappers were to remain at Bushire and Kharaj until the terms of the treaty had been fulfilled.

A party of officers (two, Captain Green and Dr. Wood) proceeded to Baghdád to accompany the Ambassador to Tihrán.

The Herát deputation consisted of Major R. L. Taylor, 18th Bombay Native Infantry, Lieutenant Claude Clerk, 2nd Madras Cavalry, and Lieutenant B. Hardy, Bombay Artillery.

When in June General Outram proceeded to India, he handed over the command at Bushire to General Jacob, C.B.

His principal attention was required to provide effective shelter for the four months of summer. This was so well accomplished that the mortality among the troops was no greater than if they had been in a temperate climate.

The occupation of Bushire lasted till October, when it was handed over to the Persians. A single Native Infantry regiment remained on the island of Kháraj till the beginning of 1858, when it too was evacuated (4th February 1858).

The writer\* of "the Persian War of 1856-57" thus concludes his article in *Blackwood*:

"So ended the Persian war of 1856-57. Like the little child in Southey's 'famous victory,' our readers may ask, 'And what good came of it at last?' And we cannot tell, any more than the old man could, except that it certainly was not a 'famous' victory. It is not much to boast of that by an expenditure of two or three millions sterling, we equipped a force sufficient to harass the shores of a barbarous empire, which had not a single war-galley. We made the Persians give up Herát; but what benefit either Her Majesty's Indian or English empire received we cannot comprehend. What little interest we have in Persia should be friendly, and make it an object to strengthen her; but by depriving her of Herát, we of course weakened her, and alienated her affections. Formerly English officers used to drill the Persian battalions; but lately a whole staff of Frenchmen have been summoned to Tihrán. By making Herát independent, we have added one more to the turbulent principalities of Central Asia, and therefore made one more chance of a disturbance. This would matter little to the English public or Indian ryot (who, as he has to pay the war charges, is a principal party interested) were it not for the unfortunate inclination our statesmen evince to meddle in these matters, which concern them not.

"The British Embassy returned to Tihrán in July, and a mission under Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor was despatched to Herát to see the former

\* His conclusions can be received only as those of a Magazine writer with a partial knowledge of the requirements of Imperial interests (*M. S. B.*)


dynasty re-established, and the Persian occupation properly terminated. This object was successfully accomplished.

"There were two circumstances so disposed of by Providence at this time as materially to sustain our empire in the East: one was the conclusion of the war with Persia; the other, the commencement of the war with China. The first sent the 64th and 78th Regiments, with the gallant Havelock, to Bengal, and saved Lucknow from the fate of Cawnpore. The war with China had summoned a large force from Great Britain, who were diverted from their course at Singapore, and placed under the Indian Government by orders of Lord Elgin. Our statesmen have taken measures to prevent another Indian mutiny. We trust that public opinion will prevent our statesmen from commencing another Persian war."



ROUGH SKETCH  
OF THE  
ATTACK ON  
R A S H I R.

(Sd.) J. WRAY, *Captain,*  
A. Q. M. G., P. E. F. F.



REFERENCE.

- A The redoubt of Rashir.  
B Village occupied by the enemy.

## APPENDIX A.

### DESPATCHES AND EXTRACTS FROM REPORTS CONCERNING THE MOVEMENTS AND NUMBERS OF THE ENEMY.

*For detailed despatches, see "Calcutta Gazettes" of 1st November 1856, 7th January,  
12th March, 23rd April, 2nd May, and 19th June 1857.*

Dated Bushire, 12th December 1856.

Despatch from—MAJOR-GENERAL F. STALKER, C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Force,

To—The Adjutant-General, Bombay Army.

I have the honor to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the movements of the Field Force under my command since the commencement of the operations.

On our arrival off Bushire, I despatched reconnoitring parties to examine the coast between the fort and Halílá Bay. *See rough sketch No. 1, and also pages 107 and 110.*

The reports I received were to the effect that the only points at which a landing could be effected at neap tides were immediately to the proper left of the Bushire batteries under the fire of the walls and in Halílá Bay.

There being a deficiency of boats, and being unwilling to expose the infantry to the fire of the enemy's batteries without the certainty of supports from our own artillery, I determined on landing in Halílá Bay. At midday, on the 6th instant, the fleet dropped down to the Bay, and anchored at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the beach. Before evening all our arrangements were made and necessary orders given for the landing, &c. At daylight, on the 7th, the landing of the troops commenced, covered by the gunboats of the fleet. As the boats neared the shore, a number of armed men, between 300 and 400 probably, appeared among the date groves near the landing place, but they were driven away by the fire from the boats. The troops landed without further opposition, and advanced immediately into the date groves, whence they were removed the same evening to better ground near the village of Halílá.

On the morning of the 9th, I advanced towards Bushire, intending to occupy the village of Imámzádáh with my right, and to place my left near the old fort of Bushire, so as to communicate easily with the store and hospital ships, which, by previous arrangement with Rear-Admiral Sir Henry Leeke, had been ordered to stand in and anchor as near shore as possible.

The advance party found Rashír in possession of the enemy—some men of the Tangistání tribes under their chief. The advance skirmished with the enemy until the main body came up, when, after a sharp fight, the tribesmen were destroyed or driven off, and the force encamped. On the following morning I advanced on Bushire, passing the wells and redoubt outside the town without opposition. A number of men occupied the ground, and had entrenched themselves on it close to the redoubt, but, as we approached, they disappeared.

As we neared the town, we saw the garrison passing in great numbers from the batteries towards the creek. At 1 P.M. the force was in front of the town. The governor surrendered, and those of the garrison who had not made their escape across the creek laid down their arms the same evening in front of the gateway.

I am now encamped near the redoubt, a mile from the walls of the town. The permanent encampment is marked out, and we are now moving into it.

The force landed without baggage. The men had their greatcoats, canteens filled with water, and three days' cooked rations, and were for four days and nights without any shelter whatever. I am happy to say that as yet they do not appear to suffer from the exposure.

The want of dooly-bearers was severely felt. We were obliged to make up canvas stretchers for the sick and wounded, and our men, assisted by tent and store lascars, had to carry them.

All the sick are now in the hospital ship, and are well cared for.

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Memo. by—CAPTAIN J. WRAY, Assistant Quarter Master General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

*See rough sketch No. 2-A. of the attack on Rashir.*

A.—The redoubt of Rashir.

B.—Village occupied by the enemy.

The advance moved at the well C, and took up a position as shown. After an hour's delay, some of the enemy made their appearance in the direction of the village B, and the left gun opened to drive them back again. The enemy immediately opened a hot fire from the front face of the work, wounding several of our men. The main body, being now near at hand, the line retired for several hundred yards, the enemy following up closely. At about 800 yards from the redoubt the line deployed and advanced, covered by the fire of the field batteries and horse artillery, and stormed the work, the survivors of the enemy leaving it by its rear face, the cavalry following along the sea beach.

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Memo. by—CAPTAIN J. WRAY, Assistant Quarter Master General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

#### *References.*

(a) battery at point; (b) battery facing sea; (c) battery facing sea; (d) battery facing sea; (e) battery behind gate; (f) gateway; (g) deserted redoubt.


(A) shows the position of the horse artillery and cavalry who were sent off to the right to cut off the guns when we saw them move off from the battery.

(B) The advance of the 5th Light Field Battery on right, 1st Brigade, deployed. 2nd Brigade, in mass of columns, afterwards deployed in contiguous columns at quarter distance.

(C) Small party of cavalry.

(D) Four companies 2nd European Light Infantry, sappers, and 6 guns sent to occupy the deserted battery at b.

ROUGH SKETCH  
OF THE  
ADVANCE ON  
**BUSHIRE,**  
10th December 1856.




(Sd.) J. WRAY, Captain,  
A. Q. M. G., P. E. F. F.

REFERENCES.

- a. Battery at N. point.
- b. " facing sea.
- c. " " "
- d. " " "
- e. " behind gate.
- f. Gateway.
- g. Deserted redoubt.
- A Shows the position of the H. A. and Cavalry, who were sent off to the right to cut off the guns when we saw them move off from the Battery.
- B The advance of the 5th Light Field Battery on right. 1st Brigade deployed 2nd Brigade in mass of columns afterwards deployed in contiguous columns at quarter distance.
- C Small party of Cavalry.
- D 4 Companies 2nd E. L. I. Sappers and 6 guns sent to occupy the deserted battery at b.
- E Intended position of gun boats in the creek.





A A A Shows the first skirmish before the arrival of the main body

Life Pills

VILLAGE OF

IMÁMZÁDÁH

I. B. April 1888.  
Exd. J. A. A.

(Sd.) J. WRAY, Captain,  
Dy. Qr. Mr. Genl., P.E.F.F.

(E) Intended position of gun-boats in the creek.

*See Rough sketch No. 3 of the advance on Bushire, 10th December 1856.*

From the Quarter Master General, Bombay Army, to the Commissary General, Bombay,—  
No. 112, dated 5th January 1857.

Calls for report of the causes which prevented the despatch of the cattle and dooly-bearers from Bombay in time to aid in the landing of the troops and stores at Bushire.

Dated Bushire, 12th December 1856.

Despatch from—MAJOR-GENERAL F. STALKER, C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

To—The Adjutant General, Bombay Army:

I have the honor to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the complete success which, under the protection of Almighty God, has attended our arms. The British flag waves over the walls of Bushire. The place, infinitely stronger than I had any reason to believe from the information I had received, surrendered on the appearance of our troops before it on the 10th instant. The previous day we had a smart affair in dislodging the enemy from a strong position they occupied in the old Dutch fort of Rashir. The casualties on this occasion, though numerically small, were principally among the officers, and, I regret to say, included Brigadier Stopford and Lieutenant-Colonel Malet, 3rd Light Cavalry, killed; Captain Wood, Lieutenants Utterson and Warren, 20th Regiment, wounded; the two latter since dead (Captain Wood, though severely wounded, is doing well). The lesson the enemy received on this occasion, together with the bombarding of the works, the imposing appearance of the troops in line and of the fleet was doubtless the cause of their want of spirit in surrendering the strongly fortified town of Bushire, in which we have found 59 guns,\* with large quantities of ammunition and warlike stores. The governor of the place and the commander of the troops came out and gave up their swords. They and one of the principal officials are now in my camp, and will be sent to Bombay. The garrison, to the number of 1,500 or 2,000 men (a large number having previously effected their escape, and very many others having been drowned in attempting to do so) grounded their arms in front of our line, and were next morning escorted by the cavalry some distance into the country and set free. Every assistance and co-operation has been rendered by the fleet; a heavy fire was opened in the early morning, and kept up spiritedly for some hours, till the place surrendered. At Rashir also, the previous day, all the co-operation possible was rendered by the fleet. And my very best thanks are due to Sir Henry Leeke, the officers and seamen, for their unwearied exertions in landing the troops, which, owing to the absence of any other boats than those of the fleet, was a work of much labour, occupying the greater part of three days and two nights. The force landed at Halilá Bay, about 12 or 13 miles south of Bushire, without any serious opposition, a body of 300 or 400 men who appeared being scattered by the fire of the gun-boats. There being no carriage cattle, the troops were landed without tents or baggage of any description, three days'

\* Six others have since been discovered.



rations being carried in the havresacks. The hardships which the men have been called upon to undergo have been endured most cheerfully, and I cannot say too much in their praise. Being still without our baggage, I have been unable as yet to obtain the reports called for from the several officers commanding brigades, regiments, and detachments; but I shall do myself the honor to enclose them for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. I ought to have mentioned that on approaching Bushire, the enemy were observed to occupy in some force an entrenched position, with a strong redoubt about a mile and a half from the walls, and commanding the wells from which the main supply of water for the town is derived. This position was precipitately abandoned on my line being formed. It also had sustained a bombardment from the fleet.

I would beg especially to mention the unwearied exertions and valuable aid rendered to me, from the landing at Halilá Bay to the taking of Bushire, by my Assistant Adjutant General, Lieutenant-Colonel Younghusband; Captain Wray, the Assistant Quarter Master General; Major Hill, Commanding Engineer; Captain Dunsterville, Assistant Commissary General; and Dr. Mackenzie, the Superintending Surgeon.

Brigadier Stopford and Lieutenant-Colonel Malet died leading on their men in the most gallant style. Brigadier Honner, Commanding 2nd Infantry Brigade; Lieutenant-Colonel Shephard, who succeeded to the command of the 1st Infantry Brigade; Lieutenant-Colonel Trevelyan, Commanding the Artillery Brigade; and Lieutenant-Colonel Tapp, Commanding the Cavalry Brigade, have earned my warmest thanks for the manner in which their arduous duties have been carried out, as also Captain Pottinger, Brigade Major of Artillery, whose exertions were conspicuous; and my best thanks are equally due to Major Sterling, Commanding Her Majesty's 64th Regiment; to Captain Macleod, who succeeded to the command of the 20th Regiment; to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, Commanding 2nd European Light Infantry; to Major Manson, Commanding 4th Rifles; to Captain Hough, commanding 2nd Biluch Battalion; to Captain Forbes, who succeeded to the command of the 3rd Light Cavalry; to Major Blake, Commanding 4th Troop Horse Artillery; to Captain Hatch, Commanding No. 3 Light Field Battery; to Captain Gibbard, Commanding No. 5 Light Field Battery; and to Captain Dickinson, Commanding the Sappers and Miners.

I have also derived every possible assistance from my aide-de-camp, Captain Hunter; Major Ballard, Head of the Intelligence Department; Major Boye, the Deputy Judge Advocate General; Captain Rigby, who has acted as my Persian Interpreter; Captain Finimore, Commissary of Ordnance; Captain Collier, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General; Captain Shewell and Lieutenant Holland, Deputy Assistant Quarter Masters General; Major Barr, Paymaster; and Lieutenant Willoughby, Sub-Assistant Commissary General.

Lord Dunkellin of the Coidstream Guards; Major Taylor of the Persian Embassy; and Mr. Johnstone of the Indian Navy also rendered most efficient service (having attached themselves to my personal staff); and to Mr. Johnstone's knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, with the unwearied zeal he has exhibited, I am much indebted.

In fine, nothing could have surpassed the admirable spirit exhibited by the officers and men of all ranks, and the utmost praise is due for their zeal, devotion, and gallantry.



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
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SKETCH  
OF THE  
ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH TROOPS  
ON  
BUSHIRE,  
Under Major General Stalker, C.B.,  
10th December 1856.

Scale 2 Inches = 1 Mile.

(Sd.) J. WRAY, Captain,  
Dy. Qr. Mr. Genl., P. E. F. F.



I. B., September 1856.  
Exd. J. A. A.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing in the Field Force under the command of Major-General Stalker, C.B., in the action at Rashir on the 9th December 1856.

	KILLED.				WOUNDED.								MISSING.		Remarks.	
	Brigadier.	Major.	Corporals and Natives.	Privates.	Captain.	Lieutenants.	Subadar Majors.	Jemadars.	Sergants.	Corporals and Natives.	Privates.	Bhisti.	Horse-keeper.	Officers' chargers.		Troop horse.
Artillery.																
3rd Troop, Horse Artillery ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	1	...	1	...	...	Names of officers killed and wounded. Brigadier Stopford, C.B., Commanding 1st Infantry Brigade, killed. Major (Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel) Malet, 3rd Light Cavalry, killed. Captain Wood, 20th Regiment Native Infantry, severely wounded. Lieutenant Warren, 20th Regiment Native Infantry, mortally wounded; since dead. Lieutenant Utterson, 20th Regiment Native Infantry, mortally wounded; since dead.
Reserve Artillery ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	
3rd Light Cavalry ...	...	1	...	2	...	...	1	...	...	...	3	...	...	1	1	
Sappers and Miners ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	
1st Brigade Infantry.																
Her Majesty's 64th Regiment	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7*	...	...	...	...	
20th Regiment Native Infantry ...	...	...	...	...	1	2†	1	...	...	1	5	...	...	...	...	
2nd Brigade Infantry.																
2nd European Light Infantry ...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	1	...	5	...	...	...	...	
4th Regiment Native Infantry (Rifles) ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	4	...	...	...	...	
2 B Nil beh attalion ...	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
...	1	1	2	4	1	2	2	1	2	1	27	...	1	1	1	

\* Two of these since dead.

† Both these officers since dead.

F. STALKER, Major-General,  
Commanding Persian Expeditionary Force.

Dated "Assaye" at anchor off Bushire, 10th December 1856.

Despatch from—REAR-ADMIRAL SIR H. J. LEEKE, R.N., Commanding Naval Force, Persian Gulf Expedition,

To—His Excellency the Governor of Bombay.

It becomes my pleasing duty to report to your Lordship in Council that after a bombardment, which commenced this morning at 8 o'clock between the Persian batteries and the men-of-war of the Indian Navy, and lasted on both sides until nearly an hour after noon, the town of Bushire has been taken, and the flag of our sovereign is now flying on the citadel.

It was determined that the disembarkation of the troops should take place in Halilá Bay, about 10 miles south of the town. All was ready on the morning of the 7th instant, and the gunboats in advance to cover the landing, when a number of the enemy were discovered in a dategrove about 200 yards to the left of the beach; the boats opened fire, and, after the exchange of a few shots, the enemy retired. Here the famous chief, the son of Baukar Khán, was killed by a shell from one of the advanced boats, and I trust gave a check to, and prevented the approach of, a large number of Persian troops, who would have very much harassed the army while landing.

On the following day, I paid a visit to General Stalker at the camp, and on parting I promised him that I would keep close to the shore in this ship, and support the left of the army on its approach to the fort of Rashír (about 4 miles from this place), where it was supposed, from the information we had received, the enemy, in number from 1,500 to 2,000, would receive our troops, and make a powerful resistance. On my nearing the fort, this information was confirmed, and we saw it perfectly full of Persian soldiers, who were drawn up ready for the attack. At this moment I was about 1,700 yards from them when we commenced firing shell, many dropping within the trenches and committing much slaughter, which obliged the Persian troops to fly, with the exception of about 800, who made a resolute stand, and were driven out by the troops in one of the most brilliant and gallant charges I ever witnessed. Here the troops halted for the night. I then pushed on for this roadstead, and at daylight this morning, seeing the Persian army drawn up near the wells (their centre supported by a high fortified tower and redoubt), it was my duty to dislodge them; and for this service I ordered the vessels named in the margin under the command of Lieutenants Tronson, Worsley, Chitty, and

*Falkland*, sloop  
*Adjaha*, steam frigate.  
*Berenice*,  
*Victoria*, steam sloop.

Giles, and eight heavy-armed gun boats under Lieutenant Stradling, to place their ships in position to attack it. This was done in a most gallant way,

and in the course of an hour I had the satisfaction to see the whole of the Persian troops in full retreat to the town, but in perfect order and with great coolness, supported by their artillery. A boat, with a white flag, was now seen approaching the ship, and, on one of the chiefs arriving on board, a request was made by the governor of the town for a delay of operations for twenty-four hours to offer terms. This I instantly refused in consequence of his having fired on one of our small steamers bearing a flag of truce the day before. Half an hour was given him to get out of the way of our shot; and the ships having been placed in line of battle, my flag ship in the centre, the action commenced, and continued on both sides for two hours, when observing two batteries outside the town, one a kind of miniature Malakhoff, harassing the *Semiramis* and *Feroze*, I directed our fire towards them, and in three hours they were perfectly silenced, and the guns dismounted. A tower on the north-west angle of the fort, and a masked battery below the Residency flagstaff outside the walls, kept up a constant and steady fire upon the *Semiramis* and *Feroze*. It was necessary to silence them also; and seeing that both ships were much damaged by their steady aim, the foremost guns of this ship were ordered to be directed towards them, and in the course of an hour both batteries ceased firing.

I was now anxious to make an opening in the wall of the town that the troops might have nothing in their way if General Stalker, on his arrival, determined upon carrying the place by assault. Our fire was therefore directed to the south-west angle, and the breach commenced by knocking down a part of the tower



and the embrasure in which a gun was mounted, as well as the lower part of the wall. The fire from their batteries at this time gradually slackened, and at this moment the flagstaff in the town was hauled down in token of submission, and the place surrendered.

The army was by this time close to the town, and it was a source of the greatest pleasure to me to feel that we had cleared away every obstacle that presented itself on their onward march, the more so as they had lost so many gallant fellows the day before when storming the fort of Rashir.

The ships of the fleet have suffered considerably in their hulls, masts, and rigging from the fire of the enemy's guns; the *Semiramis* and *Feroze* have some shot through them, but nothing to prevent all being ready for sea in a day or two. I am most happy to add that no person has been touched, nor has any casualty occurred during the four hours and a half we were under fire. How this has happened is miraculous, for the grape shot which fell at every instant around and abreast the gun-boats and the round shot over and about our ships was very severe, and proved that our enemy was more formidable than they were supposed to be even by those who had known the town years before, there being 59 guns mounted on the batteries.

It now becomes a pleasing part of my duty to bring to the notice of your Lordship in Council the very great assistance I have received from Commodore Ethersey (who met me off the island of Kishm, and from his knowledge of this place gave me much valuable information); Captains Jenkins and Young, Commanders Macdonald (in charge of all the Transports) and Rennie, and Acting Commanders Foulerton and Adams, the latter the captain of this ship, the officers, petty officers, and seamen of the fleet under my command; nor can I ever forget their gallant conduct in this day's battle, or their cheerfulness and activity in carrying out my orders, and in moving their ships into position abreast of the batteries, and I am sure the Government will think with me that this was no easy task to perform, for most of the vessels drew from 15 to 16 feet of water and we had to take them at high water, some way through soft mud, to get near enough to the forts, and this under a heavy fire.

Where all have so ably and gallantly performed their duty, it is difficult to particularise individuals, but I desire to express my warm thanks to Captain Griffith Jenkins, the first captain of this ship, for the very great assistance he has afforded me throughout the whole of the operations, and particularly during the action. He was the first officer, assisted by Major Hill of the Engineers and Lieutenant Clerkson, the first Lieutenant of my flag ship, to enter the town and hoist the British flag.

I trust, my Lord, it will not be taking too much upon myself to express my admiration of General Stalker and his brave army, the more so as I have had the honor of being associated with them for many weeks, and have been an eye-witness of all their proceedings from the day of landing, as well as on their advance to the town. In doing so, I offer the humble tribute of a British Admiral to the brave General, his officers, and soldiers, whose dashing conduct on the day of storming the fort of Rashir can never be forgotten.

I cannot deny myself the satisfaction of bringing to the notice of your Lordship in Council the excellent manner in which the commanders and officers and crews of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's ships named in the margin have conducted their ships during the time they have been with the fleet. They are at all times ready for

any hard work, and have rendered me very essential service, and I beg to express my sincere thanks to them collectively and individually.

*Precursor.*

*Pottinger.*

*Chusan.*

*Sir Jamsetjee Jejee-*  
*bhoy.*

To the masters commanding the merchant ships (named in the margin) and their officers and crews, especially to the Commander of the *Result*, Captain Cow, whose kind and considerate conduct in bringing off the wounded did him honor, I tender my best thanks for their active exertions. All did their duty, and vied with each other, day and night, which ship should do the most in landing the troops, horses, and stores.

*Result.*  
*Abdullah.*  
*Alabama.*  
*Madge Wildfire.*  
*Dakotah.*  
*Fairlie.*  
*Hydree.*  
*Mirzapore.*  
*Melbourne.*  
*Merse.*  
*Maria Grey.*  
*Arthur the Great.*  
*Rajah of Cochin.*  
*Clifton.*  
*Thames City.*  
*Wansfield.*  
*Sindian.*  
*Bombay.*  
*Rhoderic Dhu.*  
*Philo.*  
*Sibella.*

In conclusion, may I again request your Lordship's notice of the gallant officers who have given me so much assistance and support during the time I have been fitting out the Persian Gulf Expedition. By their exertions nearly 10,000 persons, with all their camp equipage, provisions, guns, and stores, and 1,100 horses have been landed on the shores of Persia without the slightest accident, and, with the exception of five horses, without a casualty of any sort; and by to-morrow evening the troops will have their tents pitched, cooking things ready, and every arrangement to give them com-

fort and shelter from the cold weather and rains of the winter. The Indian Navy, being a service of seniority, precludes promotion, and, unlike their brethren of the army, they can gain nothing of advancement to a higher rank; but if in bringing to the notice of your Lordship in Council their good and meritorious conduct upon this as well as every other occasion I have the good fortune to render a service to those who have so thoroughly done their duty, it will be a source of the greatest gratification to me.

Dated Bushire, 13th December 1856.

From—COMMANDER FELIX JONES, I.N., Political Agent with the Force and Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Secret Department.

On the 29th November, a detachment of the fleet as per margin first have in sight of Bushire, and dispelled the prevailing idea that the force would not quit the shores of India. This illusion I had been able to maintain perfect to the last moment, though the object I had contemplated of an immediate descent on the coast failed, from the fleet being scattered in various parts of the Gulf. It was not, indeed, until the 6th instant that they were sufficiently collected to admit of direct operations being commenced; but in the meantime the island of Khâraj was occupied and formed into a military depôt, as reported in my despatch to Major-General Stalker, under date 4th instant.

The day subsequent to the arrival of the first ships, the Governor of Bushire wrote to me officially on the subject of the display before the town; but as I was then about proceeding to meet the General some miles off at sea, an answer to his enquiries was delayed, as shown in the accompanying letters. On the 3rd December, the Governor-General's proclamations were sent to him officially, with the sanction of the Major-General Commanding the Force. To these there was no reply.

On the 6th instant the fleet moved down to Halîlá Bay, which Commodore Ethersey had pronounced the best suited for the disembarkation of the force; and no spot could have been better selected. Dispositions were made for

landing the force on the following morning, when it was effected in admirable order, though not unobserved by the enemy, small parties of whom were driven

\* Commanded by Lieu- from their lurking places in the date groves by the  
tenant Worsley. fire of the gunboats and well directed shot from the  
steam frigate *Ajdaha*\*

Shortly after noon the force was enabled to advance from the beach, and take up an extended front before the enemy, seen at intervals watching our movements, a few miles in advance. Great difficulties, however, had to be contended with in landing the cavalry horses and artillery equipage, from a paucity of native boats, which I had failed in procuring from the Arab coasts owing to the impracticability of dealing with the people in moments of emergency and need. These difficulties were, however, readily surmounted by the skill and activity of the India Naval officers and men, whose exertions on this occasion merit the highest praise. These exertions were fully appreciated by their associates in arms, not less active in their endeavours to get at the enemy with the least possible delay.

Forty-eight hours sufficed to put the troops in motion northward, the ships-of-war, led by the Admiral, advancing along the coast to their support. This was on the morning of the 9th, and by noon the enemy were observed to be in some force in the village of Rashir. Here, amid the ruins of old houses, garden-walls, and steep ravines, they occupied a formidable position. But, notwithstanding their firmness, wall after wall was surmounted, and finally they were driven from their last defence (the old fort of Rashir) bordering on the cliffs at the margin of the sea. This was carried at the point of the bayonet, the enemy only then flying in despair down the cliffs, where many met their death in their endeavours to escape through the ravines of the south. The nature of the ground, however, rendered pursuit difficult to the horse, though many were cut up in a chase of some distance. Details of this spirited affair will be given by the proper officers. I shall, therefore, merely observe that the enemy received at first a lesson he will not readily forget, for the tribal families of Dashti and Tangistán comprising its ranks are regarded as the most brave as well as the most skilled in the defence of posts like Rashir, where regular troops cannot work with full effect. Brigadier Stopford, C.B., met his death here, and other loss was experienced. The wounded were received into the ships the same evening, and provisions were thrown into the camp from seaward during the night.

It had been agreed upon that I should proceed in person to the town of Bushire in a small steamer with a flag of truce, bearing the accompanying copy of a summons to surrender, with the terms offered to the garrison. While the above was exacting, I proceeded on this errand with the humane object also of receiving such of the merchants and townspeople as might be desirous of shelter in the fleet. This was quite in accordance with the wishes of the Government of India in regard to the inhabitants of Bushire; and the Major-General, the Admiral, and myself were induced to believe that my presence near them might tend to avert much bloodshed. In this, however, we were disappointed, for on passing through the intricate channel leading to the town, two batteries, at a distance of 500 yards, opened upon the *Assyria* bearing the flag of truce, in defiance of all usage of war. Deeming it might be a mistake, I caused the vessel to stop; but a second and a third shot passing close to us, I was compelled to retrace my steps, and even then two more guns were discharged. I could scarcely account for this conduct, having taken some pains to explain the meaning of a flag of truce in the event of warfare before quitting the town;



but while relating the circumstance to Rear-Admiral Sir Henry Leake, a flag of truce from the shore was reported, and the bearer (Mirzá Ismail, Collector of Customs in the town) came off with a written apology from the governor, who, with the chief officers of the garrison, were stated to have been outside of the walls examining into the condition of the exterior defences at the time: every regret was expressed; the act was attributed to the ignorance of an artilleryman, with hopes that it would be overlooked. To this the Admiral and self replied that, so far as we were personally concerned, we were willing to credit the statements of the governor and accept the apology, though the act itself, in whatever way originating, must stigmatise the Persian Government and its officers in the eyes of all civilized states. Mirzá Ismail returned with a summons to the shore.

While this was going on, a note from the Major-General commanding announced his intention of advancing on the town the following morning, and the Admiral disposed his fleet in order of battle for first dismantling the newly-erected outworks, and then moving with the view to breaching the south wall of the town. The following morning, as the tide served, the ships were in the positions assigned them. A second flag of truce had come off, begging 24 hours delay; but this was promptly rejected, and at 8 o'clock the signal was hoisted to engage. Shot and shell were aimed at the redoubt south of the town, but with little effect, owing to the great range, though eventually the enemy, assembled there to oppose the troops, were dislodged, and beat a retreat with their guns into the town. The ships in the meantime had moved upon the town, and such was the ardour displayed to get close into the works, that every ship was laid aground at the turn of high water, and for four hours continued to cannonade the defences, which were active in replying the whole time. Many of their guns, however, were not of sufficient calibre to reach the ships; but the perseverance of the Persian gunners in firing from the more heavy pieces was admired by every one. Their shot told very often on the hulls of the *Victoria*, *Falkland*, *Semiramis*, and *Peroze*, which latter vessels, under Captain John Young and Commander James Rennie (if comparisons are admissible where all exerted themselves alike), had the posts of honor for the day. Details of the affair, it is unnecessary for me to enter upon. It will suffice for me to report that some of the guns being silenced on the approach of the army under Major-General Stalker, C.B., to breach the wall on the gate side before assault, the Persian flagstaff was felled in token of submission. This was at noon. The Persian flag has since been recovered by myself, and presented as a joint trophy to the chiefs conducting the combined operations in this expedition, who, with every officer and men in it, whether soldier or sailor, have certainly won for themselves an honorable name.

After surrender, some little hesitation was shown on the part of the governor and garrison to come out of the town. An assuring note, coupled with the threat of an assault in half an hour, was, however, sent in by a freed captive, and on the expiration of the time that officer was seen issuing with his suite from the gate. I moved forward with a party to receive and conduct him to head-quarters, where, after tendering his sword, he met with a gracious reception from the Major-General and Rear-Admiral Commanding the Forces. Shortly afterwards, the Sarhang, or Lieutenant-Colonel and Commandant, submitted, the entire garrison at the same time laying down their arms on my proceeding into the town with assurances of safety from the Major-General Commanding-in-Chief. The British colors were then hoisted at 4-30 P. M. on the Residency flagstaff by Lieutenant Clarkson of the Indian



Navy, the troops under orders to garrison the town moving at sunset into the place.

Since the occupation, I have been engaged with my assistant, Lieutenant Disbrowe, in giving confidence to the townspeople, securing the magazines, granaries, and other public stores, endeavouring to re-open the bazars, and in adopting measures for the public safety, as well as in taking steps for obtaining supplies. Owing to the distrust naturally prevailing amongst suspicious people quite new to us, and generally ignorant as to our usages and institutions, we have some difficulty to contend with. Time, however, will aid to dispel fears, to restore confidence, and eventually, I hope, secure to us all we require. I must not conceal, however, that our chief local supplies of fresh meat, grain, &c., must be drawn from Bassorah and Baghdad, and boats are not readily procurable. A large quantity of coal should therefore be stored, both here and at Bassorah, for the use of steamers, those of small size being best adapted for this service. They should not fail us, for in any case, to ensure cattle living, the voyage should be shortened as much as possible by their taking boats in town.

No intelligence of any kind has come in from the interior; but I may be able to glean some in a few days. All is, however, quiet in the town and districts at the present time. *See rough sketch No. 4 and page 106.*

No. 219, dated Bombay, January 1857.

From—The Adjutant-General, Bombay Army,

To—The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

I have had the honor of submitting to the Commander-in-Chief your despatch, dated Bushire, 12th December 1856, No. 17, with its several accompaniments, and in reply am instructed to acquaint you that His Excellency has perused with the highest pleasure and satisfaction the report of the successful termination of the operations before that place.

2. It has been a source of the greatest satisfaction to the Commander-in-Chief to observe the admirable spirit which has animated the soldiers of this expedition during the embarkation and the long voyage to Bushire.

3. This has been displayed in a remarkable manner by the native troops, especially artillery, cavalry, and infantry, to whom a sea voyage is replete with prejudices, both personal and religious. In no one instance that the Commander-in-Chief is aware of has a word of dissatisfaction been heard. All this is highly creditable to the troops, and their excellent discipline and organization led to the very successful operations reported by you.

4. From the landing at Halílá Bay on the 7th till the surrender of Bushire on the afternoon of the 10th your arrangements have been as judicious as successful, and the Commander-in-Chief most heartily congratulates you and the officers and soldiers under your command upon the brilliant result of the storm of the fort of Rashír, on the subsequent capitulation of the place against which your operations were directed, with the surrender as prisoners of war of the governor, the commander of the troops, and a large portion of the garrison of Bushire.

5. It was not to be supposed that active warfare can be made without loss. Brigadier Stopford, Lieutenant-Colonel Malet, Lieutenants Warren and Utterson have fallen on the field of battle in front of their men leading them to victory; and, however much we may mourn the loss of the two first mentioned highly distinguished officers, and the latter no less gallant young soldiers, there is nothing to lament in their death, as they have died for their queen and country.


SKETCH  
OF THE TOWN  
OF  
BUSHIRE.

Approximate Scale  
710

The outwork has been washed away but they are rebuilding it.

These curtains have been lately built. the Rampart is about 8 feet thick. The Parapet about 5 feet high of lime and small stones, 2 feet thick. very weak, and could be battered to pieces by a 6 pounder.

I believe there is a large gun on each Tower. but the carriage I saw looked like a 9-pounder Field Gun Carriage, the Towers are about 30 and the walls probably 20 feet high.



Bushire from the Anchorage.

L. B., September 1886.  
Exd. J. A. A.

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
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L. B. Septem  
Exd. J.

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6. The report made by Major Hill, Commanding Engineer, of the movement of the division is most complete and satisfactory, and I am to request you will convey to that excellent and efficient officer His Excellency's thanks for the same.

7. The Commander-in-Chief leaves it to superior authority to notice, in such manner as their gallant conduct deserves, the officers whose names you have prominently mentioned in your despatch; but the special thanks of the Commander-in-Chief are due to one and all, soldiers as well as officers, for their gallantry in the field and patient endurance of much privation and exposure.

8. His Excellency's sentiments as above expressed you will be pleased to make known to the division under your command in such manner as you may deem most appropriate, and at the same time yourself accept the hearty congratulations of the Commander-in-Chief on your signal and complete success in the operations entrusted to your direction.

Field Force Orders, dated "*Semiramis*," 27th January 1857.

1. Lieutenant-General Outram, on assuming the command of the Expeditionary Force, has much gratification in promulgating the very just-merited acknowledgment of the Governor-General of India in Council of the great service achieved by Major-General Stalker and the troops under his command in the capture of Bushire, and especially of the gallant conduct in the action at Rashir, which led to the surrender of the city.

The thanks and acknowledgments of the Governor in Council, Bombay, have already been communicated, and the Lieutenant-General trusts those of our Gracious Queen will soon follow.

2. The Lieutenant-General has great pleasure in announcing to the troops at Bushire that Major-General Stalker will continue to command them as now constituting the 1st Division of the augmented expeditionary army, and he begs to thank that officer for the praiseworthy zeal for the public interest which induced him to afford the Lieutenant-General the aid of his valuable services by retaining the command of the troops he has heretofore so ably led.

Dated "*Assuys*," Bombay, 29th December 1856.

Despatch from—REAR-ADMIRAL SIR H. LERKE, K.K., R.N., Commanding Naval Force, Persian Gulf Expedition,

To—His Excellency the Governor of Bombay.

\* \* \* \* \*

The provision and ammunition vessels had been taken into the inner roads; the hospital ship into an airy and healthy locality. Gunboats and a small steamer were placed in the creek to support the right wing of the army in case of an attack from a large number of Persian troops, which may be expected, as many thousands are collecting in the neighbourhood.

The General, his officers, and men were all in high spirits and healthy; and on paying a visit to the General and the army the day before I left Bushire, it would have appeared to me, if I had not known to the contrary, that they had been located in the neighbourhood for months, instead of a week, so cheerful and contented did everybody seem.

General Stalker placed the services of his Chief Engineer, Major Hill, an officer of great talent, at my disposal, and with my Flag Captain (Jenkins) I surveyed the creek at the back of the town, and ascertained that by

lightening a small vessel (*Clive*, 14 gun sloop), and heaving her upon her broadside to a large *buglah*, I could haul her over the shallows, where there is only 7 feet water, and by replacing her guns and stores she would be enabled to ride in 4 fathoms water within 30 yards of the bank and about 250 yards from the right wing of the army in such a position (assisted by a small steamer and light gun-boats, each carrying two 24-pr. howitzers) as would keep off any number of troops that could be brought against them.

I have also directed one or two of my heavy steamers *Feroze* and *Victoria* to be placed on the south side on the left wing of the army; and as the neck of land is not more than  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles across, I feel that the army is so powerfully supported on both sides, that an attack from half the troops of Persia would have but little effect.

I left the anchorage at Bushire on the evening of the 16th instant, and in hauling in towards Lingah, a small fortified town belonging to an Arab tribe, and under the dominion of the Sháh of Persia, I received information of an army of 5,000 Persian troops being in the neighbourhood under a general named Mustáfí Kulí Khán, Amír-i-Panj, on the road to Bushire. I kept close along shore, and at noon of the 19th instant saw them encamped between two date groves, on a commanding situation, about 200 yards from the beach, with their artillery, six guns (apparently 14-prs.) in their front, and between them and the shore was a covered way. I hauled close in, and anchored this ship with a spring on her cable in  $3\frac{1}{2}$  fathoms water, about 1,200 yards from them, and commenced action, which they instantly returned with a steady fire; the

Action near Lingah.

troops drawn up in line; their tents in the rear. A spirited fire was kept up on both sides for about 35 minutes, when their guns being silenced, the Persian army retreated in great confusion, leaving their tents, guns, and killed and wounded behind, the shot and shell from this ship following them, and cutting off a great many men, horses, and camels, and destroying their camp equipage. I gave them a parting shell or two, and, having gained my object of making them change their ground, I got under weigh and stood for the anchorage at Basidu.

Before leaving Basidu, reports were current that a part of the Persian army meditated an attack upon the naval station there, and which from its isolated and unprotected state is not improbable. I therefore ordered the marines of the fleet to be landed, eighty in number, and to be encamped outside the town; and

Position at Basidu.

at the edge of the plateau I have directed two small breastworks to be thrown up, and two 98-pr. guns from the *Punjab* to be landed and placed in them. The *Constance* (schooner), mounting on pivot a 32-pr. and two 24-pr. howitzers, was to go to the narrow part of the channel by Luft, and prevent all communication between the main land and the island, and the *Punjab* to take up in such a position as to be able to enfilade the whole valley below the rising ground. I have formed the marines into two divisions, appointing the senior havildar (a man of excellent character) to act as a native officer, and an acting Lieutenant to command the whole party on shore, all under the orders of Acting Commander Foulerton of the *Punjab*. Thus I trust that no army will attempt to burn our useful station, nor will they dare to make any attack without being certain of a repulse.

It was arranged by General Stalker and myself that the three chief prisoners taken at Bushire, viz., Mirzá Hassan Alí Khán, *Daria Beg* (Lord of the Sea), the late Governor of Bushire; Mehtár Khán, late Commandant of Troops and Garrison; and Mirzá Muhammad Raza, late Minister for Foreign Affairs, should be conveyed to Bombay. They were accordingly received from the shore on board this ship

Mehtar.

the day after they had surrendered to the united forces, and I have now the honor to await the orders of your Lordship in Council as to their disposal.

The late Governor, Mirzá Hassan Ali Khán, is of a high and celebrated Persian family. His late grandfather, Hají Mirzá Ali Akbar, Grand Wazír of Persia, and father, who were always friendly towards the English nation, were favorites of the Sháh, and I am told that both the father and son were extremely averse to the war.

The son has certainly inherited any good qualities his father may have had: he is not only fond of the English, but has never lost an opportunity of doing them a kindness. He is a most amiable and excellent character, and during the time he and his brother captives have been on board the *Assaye*, they have gained the esteem and kind feeling of every one belonging to her.

In making these arrangements, and throughout the arduous and anxious service upon which I have been employed since our departure from Bombay on 13th November, I have been seconded by the captains, officers, and seamen of the Indian Navy in a way which redounds to their credit and to the honor of the British flag.

\* \* \* \* \*

Despatch from MAJOR-GENERAL F. STALKER, C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force, to the Quarter Master General, Bombay Army,—dated Bushire, 20th December 1856.

Reports that the force is now permanently encamped near the redoubt and wells, at about 11 miles distance from the gates of Bushire.

Permanent position before Bushire.

That the camp is formed on a sandy undulating plain in the form of three sides of a square, with the sea about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles to the rear.

That the water generally is very good and plentiful, and after a week's trial the troops have not suffered from the use of it.

That the weather is very delightful; the days moderate, but the nights very cold with heavy dews, and that the tents have been pitched for some days, although every particle of camp equipage and baggage had to be brought up from the beach, a distance of 2 miles, by working parties, only a few donkeys being procurable in the shape of carriage.

States that to secure the safety of the position, he has established two cavalry posts at about 2 miles south of the camp—one to watch the ground and patrol from near Rashír in the direction of Halílá Bay, and across eastward; the other to observe the Shíráz road, and the country to its right in the direction of Halílá also. Large parties of the cavalry patrol the country constantly, so that no one can approach the camp without timely intimation being given. The sloop *Clive* and two gunboats are to be anchored in the creek, and will command the low ground in the neighbourhood of the town, as well as the whole land face of the works. The 20th Regiment Native Infantry is stationed in the town.

Intimates that the engineers are now commencing a deep trench, which will cross the rear, and altogether prevent the passage of horsemen; the other three faces will also be entrenched and strengthened, and with these precautions it is considered the enemy will be unable to attempt a sudden surprise.

States that from reports sent in, it is gathered that the chiefs of tribes in the neighbourhood are inclined to be friendly, and, unless coerced by the Government, will not interfere.

Neighbourhood friendly.



with the force; and that there are some regular troops at Fírúzábád, but it is thought they cannot advance unless they persuade the tribes to act with them—a most unlikely occurrence.

With regard to future movements, remarks that there are two points on which an advance may be made—the one by Muhammarah and the Kárún river as far as Shustar; the other on Shíráz; and for either of these movements large reinforcements will be necessary.

States that the route as far as Shustar appears to be practicable enough, if a flotilla of small steamers and boats can accompany the army in its march along the Kárún; but that beyond Shustar the difficulties are said to be very great. The routes to Shíráz are said to be very difficult, particularly that by Kazrán and the Kotál-i-Múlla; the other by Fírúzábád is believed to be much more practicable; but nothing certain has been ascertained.

Requests that 500 more cavalry may be placed at his disposal in order to reconnoitre these routes, and suggests that these be made up of the remainder of the 3rd Light Cavalry and 200 or 250 of the Southern Mahratta Horse under Major Malcolm. Suggests that as the horse transports are returning to Bombay, these reinforcements should be sent by them: provisions must also be sent for them, none being obtainable in the country. In conclusion, states that the greatest obstacle to an advance into the interior will be the want of carriage, and therefore recommends that the Land Transport Corps should be sent up to join the army.

From MAJOR-GENERAL F. STALKER, C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force, to the Quarter Master General, Bombay Army,—No. 41, dated Bushire, 28th December 1856.

Reports that he has received a good deal of information from the interior regarding the movements of the enemy, the sense of which is that from 8,000 to 10,000 regular troops about, 2,000 irregular cavalry, and 20 guns are now in movement towards Bushire under the Ilkhání, who has been joined by the Shúja-ul-Mulk; and that another large body is moving on Shíráz, either to support or to join the above.

Requests, therefore, that the Commander-in-Chief will despatch a small reinforcement, consisting of a regiment of European and a regiment of Native infantry, with a hundred foot artillery, as an entire regiment has to be kept in the fort at Bushire, and the wet weather may affect the health of the troops, in which case the force would be seriously crippled.

Remarks that the tribes between Bushire and Fírúzábád profess friendship, and have been sending in supplies; but that it is doubtful what effect the advance of an army from Shíráz might have on them, and that supplies are abundant so far, with the exception of forage. Intimates that he has been obliged to reduce the camp a good deal to curtail the entrenchments, and to lessen the night duties; and reports having carried out an armed reconnaissance as far as Teil-a-Sya, about 18 miles on the Fírúzábád road. The country was found to be an open plain as far as Ahrám; the road good, with good water, and the villagers very friendly. Another party will be sent to Borasján, as soon as it can be done conveniently, to seize a good depôt of grain prepared there.

Adds that there is a great want of sweepers in the camp, and requests that one hundred men may be sent up at once.



From the Adjutant General, Bombay Army, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Secret Department,—No. 7158, dated 30th December 1856.

Consequent on the death of Brigadier Stopford, C.B., Commanding 1st Infantry Brigade, Persian Force, conveys the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation that Brigadier N. Wilson, K.H., of Her Majesty's 64th Regiment of Foot, at present in temporary command of the Northern Division, may be directed to hand over charge and proceed forthwith as General Stopford's successor.

Dated Bushire, 22nd January 1857.

Report by LIEUTENANT BALLARD, Superintendent, Intelligence Department.

Since 15th January the following changes have taken place :

The Irregular Infantry (Tufangchís) of the Illyát tribes, which were assembled under orders of the Ilkhání, have been disbanded, partly to economise provisions, and partly owing to the bad understanding which exists between the Ilkhání and the Shúja-ul-Mulk, who at present commands the Persian force.

The enemy have surrounded their camp with a ditch and parapet of small profile, and placed branches of the *kúhnár*, or wild plum tree, on the top of the parapet. There is no water inside the field work, and it is consequently of no use except to guard against a night surprise. The rain which has lately fallen will cause grass to sprout over the plains, and enable the cavalry, who have been suffering from want of forage, to keep together longer than was anticipated.

It was mentioned in the previous report that Sulaimán Khán Afshár, Amír-i-Panj (Major-General), with 500 horse, was expected at Shíráz. He arrived there the beginning of this month, bringing in addition the Ikhlas regiment of infantry, composed chiefly of Afsháris.

His Royal Highness Tahmasp Mirzá, Prince Governor of Shíráz, left Shíráz on the 11th. He was at Kazrán on the 16th, and expected to reach Borasján about this time. Sulaimán Khán, with his horse, accompanied the Prince: the former is said to be an officer of considerable ability.

The Ikhlas regiment left Shíráz on the 11th, together with 4 guns, the whole under Alí Khán, Sartíp, and overtook two regiments (Karagúslús) at Fírúzábád. They are now between Fírúzábád and Borasján, but at what station is not known.

The late rains, by swelling the mountain torrents, would considerably impede their march, as the route is crossed in many places by streams and nullahs.

Hussain Khán of Dashtí, a territory 50 miles from Bushire, has assembled a thousand irregulars (chiefly infantry) at Kakí in Dashtí, but is very unwilling to join the camp until he can be guaranteed safety from the hands of the Ilkhání, with whom he has an old quarrel.

Mustáfí Kulí Khán, Amír-i-Panj, is collecting irregulars at Lár, a town ten marches south of Bushire, through a difficult and barren country.

There are two regiments in Lúristán which have been ordered up to Borasján; but it is not probable they will be spared, as the district has lately been in a disturbed state.

The late agent for the British Government at Shíráz, now living in Bushire, has reported to Captain Jones, Resident, Persian Gulf, that 13,000 men

and 10 guns are under orders for Shíráz from Tihrán and Isfahán; but this must be considered as mere rumour.

We have no general lists of the stations of Persian troops by which to judge whether such troops are available.

It is a remarkable circumstance that hitherto our supplies have not been interfered with. This can solely be attributed to the forbearance of the enemy on grounds of policy, for they could with ease send a party of horse to make an example of one of the convoys; and this would be sufficient to cause a total stoppage. But as the chiefs and their people are making an ample

Enemy's forbearance or  
want of enterprise.

harvest, it would cause great discontent among the tribes. The arrival of the Prince governor may cause an alteration in this system, and we must be prepared

at any moment to fall back on our own resources.

The capabilities of this country for supporting an army have never before been tested. Our present short experience lead to the conclusion that they have been underrated.

There are now 4,000 to 5,000 thousand natives and a thousand horses living

Resources of district.

independent of the commissariat in Bushire, while the enemy appear to reckon on being able to concentrate

8,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry in one spot across the plains.

It remains to be seen how soon this abundance of supplies will become exhausted.

The plans which will be adopted by Tahmasp Mirzá on assuming the command can only be matter of conjecture. Unless urged by orders from Tihrán, which he dare not disobey, it is not probable that he will lead his poorly disciplined troops to attack an entrenched camp mounting such a numerous

Probable plans of the enemy.

artillery as our own. This is an undertaking which a well organized European force of the same numerical strength as the Persians would scarcely venture on,

and which in case of defeat would involve the entire dispersion of their army and loss of their guns in the difficult ground on the neck of the peninsula. Neither is it likely that the enemy will be so ill-advised as to remain at Borásján till the English army can take the field. By giving battle there, they would be cut off from the Haft Múla pass, and fight with impracticable mountains only 4 miles in their rear. In case of defeat, they could only escape to their right flank, leaving the road to Shíráz quite uncovered.

Perhaps the movement which may chiefly be anticipated is that Tahmasp Mirzá will advance to Cháhgádak or some other village near the swampy flat which forms the neck of the Bushire peninsula. This tract of ground has been so softened by the rain that an army could not form up upon it, nor could guns pass except by one narrow route. There he would be secure from attack on our part, and also have an excuse for not pushing forward his own force.

It is, however, extremely probable that an attempt would be made by night to cut up our cavalry picquet, and possibly to raise a general alarm; and I beg to suggest that as there can be no doubt the enemy have good information regarding all our arrangements, it is desirable that neither picquets nor vedettes should occupy the same ground for more than two or three nights following, or the same ground by night that they do by day.

When reinforcements arrive, and there is a sufficiency of baggage animals, the enemy will probably retire to Kalima or some other suitable place behind the first passes, leaving us in undisturbed possession of the plains.

## Summary of Persian Forces.

	Regulars.	Irregulars.	Cavalry.	Guns.
At Borasjân	3,800	...	1,300	10
Expected daily from Shîrâz	2,000	...	500	4
Expected from Bihbahan and Dashtî	...	2,000	150	...
Total	5,800	2,000	1,950	14

or 9,750 of all arms and 14 guns.

No. 88, dated Bushire, 23rd January 1857.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL F. STALKER, C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force,

To—The Quarter Master General, Bombay Army.

Reports as follows :

The enemy is still at Borasjân, and is, I believe, entrenching his camp; but I do not learn that he is fortifying the pass behind him. The Prince of Shîrâz is expected to join the camp about this time with two or three more regiments of regular infantry, and, it is said, ten guns, which number, however, I have little doubt is exaggerated.

Enemy's movements.

The Amîr-i-Panj is also on his march up from Singar with about 1,200 men and six guns.

The whole are expected to unite, and report says we are to be attacked about the 26th instant.

As this threat has been held over us ever since our arrival, I do not place much credit in it. I am inclined to think, however, that an attack on our camp might save both our enemy and ourselves a good deal of future annoyance and trouble, as, if he once attempted it, it is to be hoped the reception he would meet with would induce him to withdraw into the hills, and that he would not venture to face our troops again.

The tribes are, I understand, leaving the enemy's camp, and show very little inclination to fight; indeed, I feel sure that they would willingly help us if we could ensure them protection.

Tribes friendly.

Sir James Outram has not yet arrived, but I am in hourly expectation of seeing him.

There has been a good deal of rain during the last week, but not enough to inconvenience us at all; indeed, we are much in want of more.

There is no sickness among the troops. Agreeably to the suggestions of the Superintending Surgeon, I have been endeavouring to fix a good site at this place whereon to erect the field hospital in the event of our moving on.

Troops healthy.

The site has not yet been decided on, but I intend having hospitals for 300 men erected here immediately as a sick dépôt for our rear.

I have no intelligence yet regarding our carriage, and have procured none here to speak of. I am anxiously looking for the arrival of the Land Transport Corps officers. A party of officers a few days since examined the landing place at Skîf, about 8 miles north-east of Bushire, beyond Shaikh Sa'ad. The beach is easily approached at high water, and for any operations against the Borasjân force, when our reinforcements arrive, we could easily land our infantry at Sharf from the small steamers, whence they would have only 24 miles to march to Borasjân.

No transport.



From MAJOR-GENERAL F. STALKER, C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force,  
to the Quarter Master General, Bombay Army,—No. 105, dated 26th January 1857.

States that the *Hugh Lindsay* came in from Bassorah yesterday bringing letters from the Vice-Consul there in reply to those directing him to collect carriage. Mr. Taylor hopes to be able to procure large numbers of camels in six weeks' or two months' time.

He intends proceeding at once himself into the districts, and seems to anticipate no difficulty in purchasing cattle and camels.

The enemy is still at Borasján. The Prince has not yet joined.

There have been some disputes between the chiefs and the leaders of the tribes, and I believe a number of the irregulars, both horse and foot, have left the army. They are entrenching their camp, cutting down date trees for batteries, and placing their guns in position; so that apparently their intention is to act on the defensive only. I believe there is a great scarcity of forage in their camp.

Captain Selby reports from Bassorah that when he passed Muhammarah last week, the place was full of Sarbáz, but they did not attempt to interfere with

Dispute] in enemy's the passage of the steamer. Also that they have large stores of grain at Muhammarah, and that it is said they intend to block up the mouth of the Kárún.

Supplies. Our supplies still continue to come in, and the native troops are free of the Commissariat; but grain is very dear.

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Dated Bushire, 9th December 1856.

Report from—CAPTAIN H. WILLOUGHBY, 2nd European Regiment Light Infantry,  
Commanding Advance Guard, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,

To—The Assistant Adjutant General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

Agreeably to Brigade Orders of yesterday's date, I proceeded with the advance guard and marched at half past 7 A.M. towards fort Rashir, having sent out a skirmishing party of cavalry under Cornet Malcolmson to the front.

About  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a mile from the fort, I was informed that it was held by 400 of the enemy; and on coming in view at a distance of about 600 yards, I saw two faces lined with men, and others coming in from the direction of Bushire.

I immediately ordered Captain Forbes to take the cavalry to the right, Lieutenant Gibbard to place the guns in position, put the infantry in skirmishing order between them, directing Captain Tyacke to occupy a village on the left, and sent a letter to General Stalker informing him of my position.

Observing that a number of men were leaving the fort for a village in front of Captain Tyacke (and which I had found occupied on my arrival), and assembling as if intending to attack him, I ordered Lieutenant Gibbard's battery to open fire on a party of about 20 men, on which the whole of the enemy in the fort, and many who had remained concealed in the broken ground in my front within a distance of 150 yards, commenced firing, and finding that their shots were falling thick about us, severely wounding Sergeant Blossman and a gunner at their guns, I recalled Captain Tyacke to his former position. This was effected with the loss of one private killed and three privates severely wounded, a horsekeeper and horse of 3rd Troop Horse Brigade were wounded, and a trooper of the skirmishing party of the 3rd Light Cavalry was also severely wounded.



On being reinforced by the head-quarters of the 3rd Light Cavalry, I was requested by Major Hill, Commanding Engineer, to send a company to support them.

I therefore directed Lieutenant Ferguson to take No. 1 Company, remaining myself with the advance guard, till I received Brigadier Honner's orders (as he passed me) to leave No. 10 Company to protect the wounded, when I rode on and overtook some of the skirmishers of my company just as they were storming the fort. I was unable to join Lieutenant Ferguson, but am happy to state that he was well in advance, and entered the fort with most of his men along with Her Majesty's 64th Foot.

Dated Camp before Bushire, 12th December 1856.

Report from—MAJOR HILL, Commanding Engineers, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,

To—The Adjutant General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

Furnishes the following epitome of the operations of the force up to the date of the capture of Bushire. From information afforded me in the most handsome manner by Commodore Ethersey, Captain Rennie, and other naval officers, I was enabled to lay before the Major-General for his approval, while the force was assembled at Kishm, a memorandum showing the manner in which I proposed that the operations against the fort of Bushire should be carried into execution, and in which my reasons are given for considering it inadvisable to land near the fort. Owing to the separation of the force on its departure from Kishm, in consequence of some vessels being ordered to sail up to Bushire, while others were towed by steamers, it became necessary to make a second rendezvous before operations could be commenced, thus rendering a surprise impossible. This entailed an alteration in the plan of operations, which was again made out by Commodore Ethersey, yourself, Captain Wray, and myself on the morning of Saturday, 6th instant, submitted to Major-General and approved by him.

Agreeably to the revised plan of operations, the fleet moved down to the bay of Ras Halilá on the 6th instant, and the landing was effected on the 7th instant at daylight. A body of the enemy had assembled in the date trees near the shore to oppose us, but the fire of the gunboats drove them away, and we were enabled to take up our position on the left, resting on the village of Halilá, without molestation.

The whole of Sunday, 7th, and Monday, 8th, were occupied in landing the troops, and it was not until the morning of Tuesday, 9th, that the force was enabled to march on Ras Rashír, a distance of about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Halilá.

On arriving at Ras Rashír, we found the Quarter Master General, who had preceded the force with a strong party to mark out the encamping ground, hotly engaged with the enemy, who had taken up their position in a very strong old square fort adjoining the village of Rashír, around which the ground was very strong and favorable for them to act against us. They had dug long, deep, narrow pits along the summits of the ramparts of the fort, in which they hid themselves, so that neither our artillery nor that of the ships who fired into it from the seaside could do anything towards dislodging them. The Major-General therefore ordered the suburbs of the village to be cleared by our skirmishers, which was done under cover of the fire of our artillery; and the fort was carried in the most gallant manner at the point of the bayonet, as the Major-General witnessed; and the way in which the troops scaled the nearly precipitous

sides of the fort, surrounded as it was by a rampart from 30 to 35 feet high from the bottom of the ditch, excited the admiration of all who witnessed it. It was only by the merest chance that a single man of the garrison escaped: as it was, they suffered severely. I regret time did not admit of my making a sketch of this fort and the surrounding ground; but the fort was about 400 yards (front face) by 250 yards, with the rear face resting on the cliff overhanging the sea. The troops bivouacked for the night with their left somewhat in advance of the fort of Bushire.

On the morning of the 10th instant, at 8 o'clock the force marched on Bushire, its left being covered by the men-of-war. As previously supposed, we found a strong body of the enemy occupying a strong redoubt and retrenchment about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles in front of Bushire, their left hugging their line of retreat towards the interior. The Major-General now ordered the troops to form up in line of battle; and, while this was being done, the enemy, holding the redoubt and retrenchments, commenced their retreat towards the interior, but our cavalry and horse artillery drove them almost all back again into the fort of Bushire. At this moment it became apparent to every one how essentially necessary it was that the small steamers and gunboats should have forced their way up the creek and communicated with the right flank of the army, as it was arranged they should do prior to the landing of the force in Ras Halílá Bay, and as I strongly recommended to the Major-General should be done after the capture of the fort of Ras Rashír on the 9th instant.

The army having forced up, advanced in the most splendid manner to within  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a mile of the walls of Bushire, when it was observed that the men-of-war had driven the enemy out of the batteries outside the angle of the fort adjoining the Residency, and the sappers and miners, covered by the artillery (half a battery) and four companies of the 2nd Bombay European Regiment, advanced, and, having occupied the enemy's position there, immediately commenced constructing a battery and gabionade within 200 yards of the walls of the fortress. This work was executed in the most expeditious manner under the superintendence of Captain Dickenson and Lieutenant Hancock of the Sappers and Miners and Lieutenant Playfair, Field Engineer, and the fact of their having in the short space of three hours thrown up works that would have resisted the heaviest fire that the enemy could have brought to bear on them, reflects great credit on the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men employed; but the enemy having surrendered, further operations became unnecessary.

Had the gunboats forced the creek, as it was previously arranged they should (and Commodore Ethersey, Captain Rennie, and Lieutenant Giles of the Indian Navy assured me they could do so), not one of the enemy could have escaped.

As it was, they got off in immense numbers across the creek in front of the house of the Governor of Bushire—a point which would have been completely commanded by the gunboats and small steamers.

I have this morning examined the whole of the enemy's defences in the fort, and ascertained that there would have been no difficulty whatever in forcing the creek in the grey of the morning of the 10th instant, when the tide suited admirably for it, the enemy's defences along the creek being very imperfect, and the four guns bearing on it being so placed, that I do not think it possible that each could have fired more than one round at the gunboats; and from the elevated position they are placed in, and the immense charges of powder used for the guns in the fort, it is hardly to be supposed that they would have obtained a correct range the first shot.

Dated Camp before Bushire, 12th December 1856.

Report from—CAPTAIN W. R. DICKINSON, Commanding Sappers and Miners,  
Persian Expeditionary Field Force,  
To—The Commanding Engineer, Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

I have the honor to report to you, in obedience to the instructions conveyed in yesterday's Field Force General Orders, the part that the Corps of Sappers and Miners under my command have taken in the operations which terminated with the fall of Bushire on 1st instant.

Landing early on the morning of the 7th instant, the sappers joined the advance from the beach at Halilá Bay, and occupied the right of the infantry in the encampment during the 7th and 8th, and marched in rear of Her Majesty's 64th Regiment in the advance on Ras Rashír on the 9th instant. When the 1st Brigade deployed and changed its front to the left in order to attack the redoubts, the sappers, being on the right, were unable to get up in time to take part in the assault, and only just entered the fort before the firing ceased. Two sections of sappers with tools were, however, detached; one to accompany each field battery, and remain with the batteries during the assault. One man was here slightly wounded by a bullet, which was our only casualty.

On the 10th, the sappers marched in front of the column, and occupied the right of the infantry after they formed line and advanced on the fort of Bushire. When the line halted, the sappers were called to the left to join the detachment marching on the deserted position of the enemy on the left, and were immediately employed in constructing a 2-gun battery and a gabionade 110 feet long, about 200 yards in front of the face of the south-east bastion of the fort, for future offensive operations, when the "Union Jack," flying from the flagstaff inside the fort, caused me to order the men, who were very tired, to suspend work.

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Dated 12th December 1856.

Report from—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. S. RAMSAY, Commanding 2nd European  
Regiment, Light Infantry, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,  
To—The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

I have the honor to report, for the information of the Brigadier, that agreeably to orders received, I advanced the regiment under my command on the old fort of Rashír, three companies being in extended order to cover the column, and charged the opening in front. All the officers and men of the regiment behaved with gallantry.

I noticed Lieutenant W. Gillespie was the first to gain the opening.

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Dated 12th November 1856.

Report from—MAJOR H. R. MANSON, Commanding 4th Rifles, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,  
To—The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

I have the honor to report that, on approaching Rashír with the rest of the brigade, I was directed to throw out six companies in skirmishing order to clear the village in our front, and in support of the guns of Captain Gibbard's battery.

This duty was duly performed, and, after the place was vacated by the enemy, the regiment rejoined the brigade, and took up its position in the line of bivouac.



Dated 12th December 1856.

Report from—CAPTAIN L. S. HOUGH, Commanding 2nd Biluch Regiment, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,  
To—The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

I have the honor to state that the 2nd Biluch Regiment, though it was their first action, fully answered my expectations, and behaved admirably in the attack on fort Rashir on the 9th instant. On deploying into line on the left of the 2nd European Regiment Light Infantry, they advanced with an unbroken front to within 200 yards of the fort. Here they were necessarily a little broken in passing through the gardens with stone walls, numerous pits and wells, and in defiling through the extremely narrow streets of the small village abutting on the walls of the fort: but these passed, they rushed up the steep ascent of the south-east angle, about 150 yards to the left of the 2nd European Regiment, with a loud cheer, and cleared all before them.

Dated 12th December 1856.

Report from—BRIGADIER R. W. HONNER, Commanding 2nd Infantry Brigade, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,  
To—The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

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The Major-General being a witness to the operations of the 2nd Brigade on the occasion in question, there is nothing for me to add further than to bring prominently to his special notice the high spirit and feeling which pervaded the troops on that day.

I received the most active assistance from my Brigade-Major, Captain Aitchison, and Lieutenant Finch, Field Engineer, attached to the Brigade, in conveying orders and carrying out the execution of the general operations.

Dated 13th December 1856.

Report from—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SHEPHEARD, Commanding 1st Infantry Brigade, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,  
To—The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

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Having been myself at the time in command of the 20th Regiment Native Infantry, I cannot say more regarding Her Majesty's 64th Regiment than that their advance over very difficult ground on the strong position of the enemy, and their rush up the high, steep, and difficult earthwork under fire, was admirable.

I have the pleasure to bear witness to the coolness and gallantry of the 20th Regiment Native Infantry under my own eye, and to add to Captain Macleod's report that, after an advance over a considerable space, entirely broken up by stone walls, wells, ruins, and large pits, under fire, on arriving close to the ditch my order to storm was responded to by cheers and a rush into the ditch and up the high steep of the east face of the work, which was not checked till the whole regiment was inside.

I have only to add that the cheerfulness of both the regiments since the landing at Hakila Bay under circumstances of much privation has been unfailing, and worthy of all praise.

The death of the lamented Brigadier Stopford has been described to me as having occurred at the moment he had all but gained the top of the steep up which he was leading the men of Her Majesty's 64th Regiment with his well known ardour.



Dated 13th December 1856.

Report from—CAPTAIN MACLEOD, Commanding 20th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,  
To—The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

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Having been detached with the Light Company to cover the advance of the line, I am unable to report from personal observation on the conduct of the rest of the battalion, but I feel sure that Brigadier Shepherd, then in command, will do it every justice in his report to superior authority, as I believe the officers and men of the whole regiment one and all behaved with marked steadiness throughout the action. I therefore confine myself to the notice of the two flank companies as brought under my own observation.

As regards the conduct of these two companies, I have to remark that they were, as Brigadier Shepherd is doubtless aware, the first troops that entered the enemy's entrenchments. The steady firing of the Light Company, while advancing in skirmishing order (and specially when close to the breastwork, and exposed to a sharp fire), is well deserving of notice. It had the effect of so on checking very effectually (with the co-operation of the Light Company of Her Majesty's 64th Regiment) the enemy's fire from the right of the entrenchment, and thus the enemy's flank was completely turned.

The enemy, however, in drawing off to the left took up a position out of reach of the fire of our Brigade skirmishers, who (partly owing to their aforesaid favorable position on the right, and their distance for a short time from the line) were not able to cover the centre and left of the 20th Regiment then advancing. To remedy this, I took upon myself to hail Captain Wood (then advancing with the regiment) to bring on his Grenadier Company and extend it to our left. He immediately complied, but before the extension was complete, finding himself near the breastwork, he closed his men, and led them on at once to the assault; and thus both the Grenadier and Light Companies simultaneously dashed up the breastworks, and the position was won.

Dated 12th December 1856.

Report from—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL THOMAS TUPP, Commanding Cavalry Brigade, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,  
To—The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

With reference to the proceedings of the Brigade under my command on the 9th and 10th instant, I have the honor to state that the 3rd Light Cavalry having been on the advance guard, whilst I was on the rear guard with the Púnah Horse, I am unable personally to report on the former corps in the action of the 9th instant near Rashír, but I have heard from all parties that Lieutenant-Colonel Malet (whose death I have to deplore from sabre and shot wounds received on that day) was acting with great energy and gallantry, and was well supported by his corps.

The squadron of the Púnah Irregular Horse was divided, the greater part having been detached under Lieutenant La Touche, my Adjutant, for the protection of the "landing place," where a part of the field force was still being disembarked; and I had with me but 67 men, who formed the rear guard to the advancing force.


Towards the close of the engagement which was going on in our front, I observed that a large body of the enemy, both cavalry and foot (amounting, I believe, to above 500 men, who appeared to have advanced through ravines), was making a very rapid movement over the high ground near the sea, about a mile to my left; and making in a straight line for the "landing place";



# SKETCH OF BORASJÁN,

Showing the position of the Persian Army and  
the advance of the British Troops,  
5th February 1857.

(Sd.) J. WRAY, Captain,  
Dy. Qr. Mr. Genl., P. E. F. F.



and as the troops and stores still disembarking were very much exposed, I thought it best to put my small force about, and by a quick movement endeavour to intercept them; and this, I am happy to say, I was enabled to effect. In the meantime (whilst I was waiting for infantry and guns which I had hoped to procure from the near) the enemy turned sharp to the left through the ravines, passed as quickly as the ground admitted over the precipitous ridge, and proceeded across the swamp into Persia.

The Major-General will be aware from his knowledge of the ground how impossible it was for cavalry to bring this force to action, and I most sincerely regret it; but I trust that it will be considered that a manœuvre, which on such emergency, not only covered our landing place, but also turned the enemy clear away, so as to prevent any interruption of our communications, and prevented his interfering with our followers, stores, or cattle, will be considered by the Major-General at least as beneficial to the State as if the same object had been gained by a bloody victory.

The Major-General was kind enough to reinforce me from the front, as soon as his battle was over, with two guns and a squadron of the 3rd Cavalry under Captain Forbes, who brought them at a rapid pace and excellent order; but the enemy had long passed away, and was almost out of sight.

I should wish to add that Dr. Rogers, of the Púnah Irregular Horse, having no sick to attend to, was enabled to make himself most useful to me as "staff," and I feel much indebted to him for his energy and zeal on this day. I also found Captain Oldfield, who had joined me with a small party of his regiment, the 3rd Light Cavalry, of great service.

On the approach to Bushire on the 10th instant, the Púnah Horse formed part of the advance guard which was under my command, and, when detached by the Major-General to the right flank to cut off a straggling body of the enemy, we dashed at it so as to intercept all who were mounted, and these immediately surrendered. The Infantry, however, with whom they were mixed up, were doubled to rush into the creek on their left, and commenced a very sharp fire; and as I was separated from them by 60 yards of deep mud and water, and our men were much exposed, I was obliged to open a fire on them, explaining to them, as I did so, that if they came on shore and ceased firing, they should be spared. Many accepted the offer and dropped their arms in the creek, but very many more, endeavouring to cross it, were lost.

The enemy's cavalry, I regret to say, would not face us, and most of them escaped across the same creek later in the day, and under the walls of the town. All my officers and men behaved very well, and I am happy to say the enemy's fire was so very high that none were hurt.

The 3rd Light Cavalry was separated from me during the morning by my flank movement to the right, but when it joined me, it came up in excellent order under Captain Forbes, the officer who now commands it.

Dated Camp near Bushire, 10th February 1857.

From—LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR J. OUTRAM, K.C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force,

To—His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.

I have the honor to report, for your Excellency's information, that the Persian Expeditionary Force obtained a signal victory over the Persian army, commanded by Shúja-ul-Mulk in person, on the 8th instant.

2. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded must have been very great; it is impossible to compute the exact amount, but from the number of bodies which strewed the ground of contest, extending several miles, I should say that full 700 must have fallen. Two brass 9-pr. guns, with their carriages and horses,



8 mules laden with ammunition, and several hundred stand of arms, were taken; and the Persian Commander-in-Chief with the remainder of his army only escaped annihilation owing to the numerical weakness of our cavalry.

3. The loss on our side is, I am happy to say, comparatively small, attributable, I am inclined to believe, to the rapid advance of our artillery and cavalry, and the well directed fire of the former, which almost paralysed the Persians from the commencement. I have, however, to regret the loss of Lieutenant Frankland, 2nd European Regiment, who was acting as Brigade Major of Cavalry, and was killed in the first cavalry charge. Captain Forbes also, who commanded and most gallantly led the 3rd Cavalry, and Lieutenant Greentree, 64th Foot, were severely wounded.

4. Returns of the killed and wounded, and also of the ordnance stores taken, are annexed.

5. I myself had little to do with the action, being stunned by my horse falling with me at the commencement of the contest, and recovering only in time to resume my place at the head of the army shortly before the close of the action.

6. To Major-General Stalker and Colonel Lugard, Chief of the Staff, is the credit due for successfully guiding our troops to victory on this occasion.

7. The circumstances preceding this satisfactory termination of a brief but arduous campaign, I now proceed to detail for your Excellency's information.

8. On the 27th ultimo I landed at Bushire, and assumed the command of the army. The vast preparations of the Persian Government for the recovery of Bushire then came to my knowledge.

Shúja-ul-Mulk, who commanded the Persian troops, had assembled a force,			said to amount to 8,500, and subsequently found to be as per margin, at the town of Borasján, 46 miles distant from Bushire, and entrenched his position. This army was well supplied with food and ammunition, of which considerable magazines had been collected. It was intended that this force should form the nucleus of a very large army to be assembled for the recapture of Bushire. I therefore deemed it imperatively necessary to strike a blow in this quarter before prosecuting operations at Muhanmarah or elsewhere.
Guards	...	900	
2 Karagúsá regiments	...	1,500	
Shíráz regiment	...	200	
4 regiments of Tabriz	...	800	
Arab regiment	...	900	
Kashgai regiment	...	800	
		5,100	
Tufangchís	...	1,000	
		300	
Cavalry of Shíráz	...	300	500
Ilkháuí Horse	...	500	
		800	18
Guns said to be	...	18	

secuting operations at Muhanmarah or elsewhere.

9. The 1st Brigade, 2nd Division, which arrived on the 31st ultimo and 1st instant, was landed by the 2nd, and on the evening of the 3rd the troops, as per margin, marched from this camp without tents or extra clothing of any sort, each man carrying his greatcoat, blanket, and two days' cooked provisions, the Commissariat being provided with three days in addition. The protection of the camp and town of Bushire being duly provided for by a detachment of troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Shepherd, reinforced by a party of seamen from all the ships in the			harbour, which the senior officer was so good as to place at my disposal.
3rd Cavalry	...	243	
Púnah Horse	...	176	
64th Foot	...	780	
2nd Europeans	...	693	
78th Highlanders	...	739	
Sappers	...	118	
20th Native Infantry	...	442	
4th Rifles	...	523	
26th Native Infantry	...	479	
Bilúchís	...	460	
3rd Troop Horse	...	6	
Artillery	...	6	
3rd Light Field Battery	...	6	
5th Light Field Battery	...	6	

harbour, which the senior officer was so good as to place at my disposal.

10. After a march of 46 miles in 41 hours, during which the troops were exposed to the worst of weather, cold nights and deluging storms of rain, they reached the enemy's entrenched position on the afternoon of the 5th, and found it abandoned. The enemy, on hearing of our approach, had evacuated his entrenchments the previous night so precipitately, that his tents, camp equipage, and ordnance magazines were left behind; the former were being rapidly carried off by village plunderers operating for some hours before we arrived. I endeavoured to intercept the retreat of some of the Ilkhání horse, who had held the camp during the night and were still in sight; and a little skirmishing took place, but eventually they made off.—*See rough sketch No. 5.*

*Camp.*

378 Europeans.

1,466 Native Infantry.

1 company European

Artillery.

14 guns.

Some of their guns are supposed to have been cast into wells; and as their wheels and axles fell into our hands, it will be impossible they can be used again for the present.

11. The enemy having succeeded in withdrawing their guns to the strong passes, where I did not deem it prudent to follow them, and being satisfied with the moral effect of our occupying their position for two days, I decided upon moving the troops back to Bushire. The return march was accordingly commenced on the night of the 7th, first destroying their magazines, found to contain about 40,000 lbs. of powder, with small arm ammunition and a vast quantity of shot and shell, and carrying away large stores of flour, rice, and grain, which the Persian Government had been collecting for a long time past for their army, thereby effectually crippling their future operations.

12. At midnight an attack was made upon the rear-guard by the enemy's horse, and parties threatened the line of march on every side; the troops were halted, and so formed as to protect the baggage and resist horsemen in whatever direction they might attempt to charge. Four of the enemy's guns of heavy metal opened their fire upon the column, whilst the darkness of the night prevented any steps being taken to capture them.

13. I should here state that on abandoning their position, the Shúja-ul-Mulk with his force had taken the direct road to Shíráz by the Mhak pass, and the Ilkhání with his horse had retired by the one leading to the Haft Múla; and from information subsequently received, I learn that they had planned a combined attack upon our camp the night we marched. Indeed, the explosion of their magazines gave them the first intimation of our departure, when they hastened after us in the expectation of being able to attack us on the line of march, and possibly create confusion and panic in the dark.

14. At daybreak the Persian force, amounting to between 6,000 and 7,000 men, with some guns, was discovered on our left rear (north-east of our line of march) in order of battle.

15. Our artillery and cavalry at once moved rapidly to the attack, supported by two lines of infantry, a third protecting the baggage. The firing of the artillery was most excellent and did great execution, the Cavalry Brigade twice charged with great gallantry and success, a standard (of the Kashgai Regular Infantry Regiment) was captured by the Púnah Horse, and the 3rd Light Cavalry charged a square, and killed nearly the whole regiment; indeed upon the cavalry and artillery fell the whole brunt of the action, as the enemy moved away too rapidly for the infantry to overtake them by 10 o'clock. The defeat of the Persians was complete; two guns were captured; the gun ammunition laden upon mules fell into our hands, and at least 700 men lay dead upon the field.

The number of wounded could not be ascertained, but it must have been very large. The remainder fled in a disorganized state, generally throwing away their arms, which strewed the field in vast numbers; and nothing but the paucity of our cavalry prevented their total destruction and the capture of the remaining guns.—*See rough sketch No. 6.*

16. The troops bivouacked for the day close to the battle field, and at night accomplished a march of 20 miles (by another route) over a country rendered almost impassable by the heavy rain, which fell incessantly. After a rest of six hours, the greater portion of the infantry continued their march to Bushire, which they reached before midnight, thus performing another most arduous march of 44 miles under incessant rain, besides fighting and defeating the enemy during its progress within the short period of 50 hours. The cavalry and artillery reached camp this morning.

17. The result is most satisfactory, and will, I trust, have a very beneficial effect upon our future operations.

18. The greatest praise is due to the troops of all arms for their steadiness and gallantry in the field, their extraordinary exertions on the march, and their cheerful endurance of fatigue and privation under circumstances rendered doubly severe by the inclemency of the weather, to which they were exposed without shelter of any kind; and I cannot too strongly express the obligation I feel to all under my command for the almost incredible exertions they have undergone, and the gallantry they have displayed on this occasion.

19. To Major-General Stalker and to Colonel Lugard my special thanks are due.

20. To the heads of the several departments, as well as to every officer belonging to those departments, and to my personal staff (including Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Dunkellin, who volunteered his services as aide-de-camp), I am much indebted: from all I received every possible assistance; and although I do not now specify by name the departmental and personal staff and other officers alluded to, I shall hereafter take an opportunity of bringing them individually to your Excellency's notice; indeed, when all have behaved so nobly, it is difficult to specify individuals.

21. The rapid retreat of the enemy afforded but little opportunity for deeds of special gallantry I have already alluded to; the successful charges made by the 3rd Cavalry and Púnah Horse under Captain Forbes and Lieutenant-Colonel Tupp, and to the very efficient services performed by the Artillery under Lieutenant Colonel Trevelyan, the Brigadiers Commanding the Infantry Brigades—Willson, Stisted, and Honner,—with the several commanding officers of regiments and indeed every officer and soldier of the force, earned my warmest approbation.

22. To the medical officers of the force, I am under great obligation for their untiring exertions throughout these dangerous operations.

23. I cannot conclude without alluding in strong terms to the valuable assistance I have received from Major Taylor, whose services were placed at my disposal by Hon'ble C. A. Murray, C.B.


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Return of killed and wounded belonging to the Persian Field Force during the action at Khúsháb on 8th February 1857.

DIVISIONAL STAFF.

Lieutenant Frankland	...	...	...	...	Killed.
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○KHÚSHÁB



(Sd.) J. WRAY, *Captain,*  
*Dy. Qr. Mr. Genl., P. E. F. F.*

1. B. September 1888.  
Exd. J. A. A





*3rd Troop Horse Artillery.*

Six wounded (three Europeans); one since dead.

*1st Company, 1st Battalion Artillery.*

One killed (European), one wounded.

*4th Company, 1st Battalion Artillery.*

Two wounded (Europeans).

*3rd Light Cavalry.*

Captain Forbes ... .. Wounded.  
One killed; fourteen wounded; one since dead. ...

*Her Majesty's 64th Regiment.*

Captain Mockler }  
Lieutenant Greentree } ... .. Wounded.  
Eleven wounded (Europeans); two since dead.

*2nd European Regiment Light Infantry.*

Ensign Woodcock ... .. Wounded.  
(Europeans) two killed; nine wounded; one since dead. ...

*Pinnah Irregular Horse.*

Three killed, eight wounded; one since dead.

*26th Regiment Native Infantry.*

Assistant Surgeon J. M. Barwell ... .. Wounded.  
Four wounded.

*2nd Biluch Battalion.*

One killed.

*Ordnance Department.*

One killed; two wounded;  
Total killed: Europeans 3, Natives 7.

Wounded 31 " 31.  
Grand total { killed 10 " 72.  
                  { wounded 62 }

Died of wounds since action—3 Europeans and 3 Natives.

Officers and men recommended by Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram,  
K.C.B., for the Victoria Cross:—

Captain Forbes.	Lieutenant Spens.
Lieutenant and Adjutant Moore.	Cornet Combe.
Captain Moore.	Cornet Hill.
Lieutenant Malcolmson.	Jemadar Ranjīt Sing.
Captain Wray.	Trooper Lall Khān.

All of 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry for distinguished bravery  
at the destruction of the Persian Infantry square on the 8th February 1857,  
action of Khūshāb.

Dated Camp near Bushire, 10th February 1857.

From—CAPTAIN J. FORBES, 3rd Regiment Light Cavalry, Persian Expeditionary  
Field Force,  
To—The Chief of the Staff, Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

I have the honor to submit a report of the part taken by the regiment in  
the action of the 8th instant up to the time when wounded. I had to hand  
over the command to Captain Graves.

2. As soon as it was sufficiently light to discern the Persian army from our position, Brigadier Tupp, with the Pūnah Horse, advanced at a rapid pace to our right front; and as I was left without instructions as to how I was to act, I judged that it was the Brigadier's intention that I should be guided by circumstances.

3. An opportunity almost immediately offered of attacking a considerable body of skirmishers, and to do this I advanced with the 3rd Squadron under Captain Moore, having first directed Captain Graves to support with the 1st Squadron at 200 yards.

4. The nature of the ground sheltered the squadron in this advance from the fire of the enemy's guns, and the charge was most successful. Surprised in extended order without support, the enemy's loss was considerable; ours very trifling.

5. In the pursuit of the skirmishers, from some rising ground, I obtained an excellent view of the Persian force.

6. It was evident that the forward movement of our cavalry towards his left had not been unobserved by the enemy, and troops were in motion to strengthen that flank.

7. One infantry regiment, which, in the imperfect morning light, I mistook for a body of cavalry, was approaching us very rapidly.

8. The squadron was much scattered, the absence of support—Captain Graves having been impeded in his advance by our artillery deploying—made it advisable to retire, which was done very quietly, front rank and officers leading, the men closing in and taking up their dressing.

9. I remained a little in rear to watch the enemy.

10. Soon after we had moved off it, the rising ground before referred to was occupied by the above mentioned infantry regiment.

11. The men and horses of the squadron were in high spirits, the ground most favorable for cavalry, the enemy in a position isolated from the rest of their army; even if an attack against them failed, the consequences would not be serious.

12. I ordered the squadron to wheel about and attack to its front. The enemy halted on the slope and formed square.

13. The men saw at once what was required of them, and by a loud cheer assured their officers of their determination to meet the odds opposed to them.

14. The distance between us and this fine body of men, 700 to 800 strong, armed with musket and bayonet, with confidence awaiting the shock in a formation they had been taught to consider impracticable to horsemen, was soon passed. Without a check, and almost at the same instant along its whole face, was the square dashed upon, broken, and entered, and soldiers, one moment before so perfect an example of discipline, had become a confused mass of fugitives.

15. In no previous action have I witnessed in so short a time so great a destruction of life as was then inflicted by the straight sword, drawn from a steel scabbard, on this regiment; and yet that only weapon for a cavalry soldier has been called an useless one in the hands of a native dragoon.

16. To the right rear of where this square had stood was a very fine gun with six horses, whose gunners and drivers shared the fate of their infantry comrades.

17. This masked gun, had there been any delay in our attack after the enemy appeared on the ground on which they stood to receive the charge, would have been brought to bear on the squadron.

18. By this gun Captain Moore's horse was mortally wounded, and both that officer and Captain Wray, leader of the right troop, of the 3rd Squadron, whose charger I observed was covered with blood from three bullet wounds, greatly exposed themselves in endeavouring to bring it off.

19. I was now obliged to hand over command of the regiment to Captain Graves, owing to a wound received in the attack on the square. At the close of the action, I was highly gratified to hear of the admirable manner in which all ranks did their duty under that excellent officer.

20. I may mention that, whilst retiring to reform before the attack on the square, I observed Captain Graves' squadron advancing at a gallop towards the enemy considerably to our left.

21. I would wish to bring to your notice the gallantry of Lieutenant and Adjutant Moore. In the charge on the square, he dashed in front, and his horse fell dead on the bayonets, precipitating, his rider into the midst of the enemy. Lieutenants Malcolmson and Combe are also very promising and gallant young officers. The latter's horse had three bullet wounds and a bayonet stab.

To the assistance afforded to him by the former, do I consider Lieutenant Moore owes his life; with a sword broken by his fall, he was dragged clear of the enemy by Lieutenant Malcolmson, who, drawing his foot from the stirrup, gave him the leather to hold by.

22. Lieutenant Spens, who so well led the left troop of the 3rd Squadron had also his horse wounded.

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Dated Bushire, 7th May 1857.

Report by CAPTAIN MOORE, who commanded Left Squadron, 3rd Bombay Cavalry, at Khúsháb.

\* \* \* \* \*

Upon the morning of the 8th February at Khúsháb, a little before daylight, the 3rd Cavalry were formed up in close column of squadrons—left in front—facing the direction of the enemy. The Púnah Horse, also in close column, were on our right. \* \* \* At daylight Brigadier Tupp went off to the right at a hard gallop. I heard no previous order given by Brigadier Tupp for this advance, but Captain Forbes immediately advanced, and the squadron was soon employed in cutting up the Persian skirmishers, who had advanced close enough to annoy the line of infantry and guns. After being thus employed for a few minutes, we perceived to our left what appeared to be in the grey of the morning a large mass of cavalry coming in our direction. Captain Forbes instantly ordered the squadron to reform, and we advanced in the direction of what had appeared a body of horse. On getting closer, we observed it was a large body of infantry moving with a gun from the Persian right towards their left. This was a regiment of the Shah's guard. They halted on the rise of a small hill, and fired volleys at us. When we got close, they formed a solid square with kneeling ranks, and awaited us most steadily. When within 30 yards of the square, I observed Lieutenant Moore, who was Adjutant of the regiment, and then riding in front of Captain Wray's troop, spur his horse to speed, and in the most gallant and most determined manner rush the horse into the square in front of the whole squadron. The squadron then in parade order, in a perfect line, rode down the square, and it no longer existed, except as a struggling mass. The squadron had originally consisted of one hundred and twenty men, and it is my opinion that when we entered the square, we were under 100 men, from some having been wounded and several scattered after the enemy's skirmishers. I am confirmed in this opinion by Captain Wray being of the same belief.



I am of opinion that the square consisted of at least 800 men; therefore the bravery and gallantry of Captain Forbes in leading against it entirely on his own responsibility a small body of cavalry, one-tenth of their number, and quite unsupported by any other body, cannot be over-estimated. The Persian regular infantry had never been previously met by us; the regiment was a famous one amongst them, and well armed with excellent muskets and fixed bayonets; and the men were the largest and finest looking body I ever saw, having been enlisted from the northern provinces of Persia.

Captain Forbes unhesitatingly led the charge, and the whole squadron as unhesitatingly followed; and I can only attribute our losing so few men to the excellent order and quick pace that we advanced at; besides, the enemy, being on the rise of a hill, fired considerably too high. We took possession of a gun which the enemy were driving off to the rear of what had been their square, but the men being scattered in single combat, the gun could not be taken off.

Captain Forbes, who was severely wounded in charging the square, Captain Wray, and myself remained with this gun for a little time; but Captain Wray's horse being dangerously wounded, and mine being mortally wounded at the gun, we were obliged to desert it. I beg to bring to notice here the steady and brave conduct of Trooper Lall Khán, 6th Troop, who dismounted under a heavy fire, on my order, to mount the leading gun horse and attempt to drive it off, in which I have no doubt we should have succeeded but for my horse being mortally wounded just then, and the enemy being all round us, and Lall Khán being the only trooper at or near the gun.

The gunners had jumped off the gun, and ran away on our approach. The three drivers were all killed immediately. I am of opinion that the enemy took out the horses, and never moved this gun from where we had to leave it.

The whole squadron nobly did their duty. Captain Forbes was severely wounded in the charge, Captain Wray very severely wounded by three bullets, Cornet Combe's horse severely wounded by two bullets and a swordcut, Lieutenant Spens' horse was slightly bayoneted. Lieutenant Moore's horse was killed in the broken square, and his sword was broken in his fall.

The right squadron (which had been unfortunately unable to support the left from the delay caused by the guns getting between the squadrons), when their front was clear, advanced, and the left squadron, not being in sight, acted independently, and equally distinguished itself by charging and routing large masses of the enemy. During the action both squadrons united, when Captain Graves took command of the regiment, Captain Forbes having been compelled to leave the field some time previously from the effects of his wound.

Captain Wray had command of the left squadron until I was able to mount a trooper's horse, my own having been killed.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Report by CAPTAIN OLDFIELD.

On the day of the engagement at Khúsháb, on the 8th February last, I was in command of the 1st Troop, 3rd Light Cavalry. My own troop was acting in concert with the 2nd Troop, the squadron being commanded by Captain Graves, and on each occasion of its charging the enemy, its success was as brilliant as the courage of the troopers was marked and distinguished. Besides the officers with the squadron, I can appeal to Major Ballard, C.B., who assured me himself at the time that with such men one could go anywhere and do anything. I wish particularly to state that in concert with the 2nd Troop, we

captured one of the two guns taken in the action at Khúsháb, every man round the gun (a 9-pr.) having been slain in active combat for its defence.

Where all behaved so nobly, I feel a difficulty amounting to an impossibility in making any special selection, but I venture respectfully to suggest that the conduct of the troop I had the honor to command on the occasion in question falls exactly within the provisions of the nineteenth rule of the regulations for the distribution of the "Victoria Cross." In conclusion, I trust that the fact of my inability to make any special selections will not be suffered to operate to the disadvantage of the troop, or bar their claim to such favorable consideration as the General Officer Commanding may deem expedient.

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*Extract from Supernumerary Surgeon McKenzie's Report, dated 11th February 1857.*

As I had an opportunity of seeing, I must do myself the pleasure of recording the excellent conduct of the medical officers with the force.

All were in their places and discharged their duties with the greatest order and regularity and most efficiently, and this whilst exposed to the fire of the enemy equally with the officers of their respective regiments. The zeal and ability displayed by Field Surgeon Deas were most praiseworthy and deserving my best thanks; and although nearly all the other medical officers belonged to the first division, and the credit which they merit will no doubt be awarded them by their own Supernumerary Surgeon, I trust I shall be excused when I take the liberty of highly commending the conduct of Surgeon Neilson of the Artillery, Surgeon Wright, 2nd Europeans, Surgeon Inglis, Her Majesty's 64th Regiment, Surgeon Lodwick of the Rifles, and Assistant Surgeon Rogers of the Púnah Irregular Horse, and Assistant Surgeon Corey, Her Majesty's 64th Regiment—officers who have so lately served with me, and of whose ability and devotion to the public service I have had an opportunity of judging. Assistant Surgeon McAlister, Civil Surgeon, Residency Persian Gulf, was also present, and rendered every aid in his power.

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*Extract from Supernumerary Surgeon Stovell's Report.*

Several surgical operations were performed on the field, and the conduct of every medical officer was beyond praise; "and again, "it will be apparent to the Board that the medical officers of the force have, in common with everybody else, been subjected to great fatigue and exposure, and it will be gratifying to be assured that they laboured throughout with unceasing devotion to their duties.

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Dated 14th February 1857.

Despatch from—LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR J. OUTRAM, K.C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force,

To—His Excellency the Governor General of India.

I have the honor to inform your Lordship that I arrived here on the 27th ultimo, when I learnt that extensive preparations were being organised by the enemy, which at first I was led to believe had merely in view to bar our advance to Shíráz; and as I supposed their troops were immediately

under the passes, into which they would retire at our approach, I did not contemplate the advisability of proceeding against them until the capture of Muhammarah had opened a supply of carriage cattle, with which we are yet unprovided.

2. Subsequently, however, it became apparent that the enemy were concentrating a far greater force than heretofore it had been supposed they

possibly could accommodate below the passes, and it was evident that, unless now checked, they would soon be in a position to attempt the recapture of

Detail of enemy's forces occupying the entrenched camp at Borasjan.

Fauji Khalsah	...	...	800
4th Fauji Tabriz	...	...	800
Fauji Shiráz	...	...	600
Fauji Arab	...	...	800
Fauji Kashkái	...	...	800
Tufanchís	...	...	1,000
Two regiments of Karagúsús	...	...	1,600
Sháh Selman	...	...	400
Shirázi (or inhabitants of the neighbourhood of Shiráz)	...	...	400
Illyat Horse	...	...	500
Afshari Horse	...	...	750
Total	..	...	8,450

Bushire. Moreover, that the Persian Commander-in-Chief, Shúja-ul-Mulk, had formed an entrenched camp at Borasján, said to be about 46 miles distant, and 12 from the passes, which he occupied with a force of 8,450 regular infantry and cavalry (as per margin), with 17 guns and one mortar, and that reinforcements from Tihrán and elsewhere were rapidly approaching to the extent of 12 regiments of regular infantry with

35 guns, while preparations were making for raising the tribes, of whom 4,000 would be assembled in 24 hours.

3. Parties of horse had been sent forward, and violent denunciations were proclaimed to deter the people of the country from furnishing supplies to our camp, and mistrust and apprehension prevailed in the town.

4. It became imperatively necessary, therefore, to strike a blow in this quarter before extending our operations elsewhere; and to enable me to effect this, I determined to land the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Division so soon as it should arrive.

5. The first portion of the Brigade in tow of the *Pottinger* anchored in the harbour on the 31st ultimo, and the remainder in tow of the *Precursor* on the 1st instant, and all were landed by the evening of the 2nd in light marching order, leaving all surplus baggage on board.

6. On the evening of the 3rd instant, I marched with a force of 4,653 men of all arms and 18 guns; but having barely sufficient baggage cattle for commissariat supplies for three days, we were necessarily without tents or cover of any sort beyond what the men carried on their backs, in addition to the two days' provisions with which they were supplied.

Cavalry (sabres)	... 419
European infantry	... 2,212
Native infantry	... 2,022
	4,653

18 guns.

7. As we were exposed during the six days occupied in this expedition to frequent heavy rain, the troops suffered much discomfort in bivouac, and still greater hardship on the march, owing to the heavy spongy nature of the ground they traversed, which they bore with admirable cheerfulness and fortitude. The shoes of the greater portion of the infantry were literally drawn off their feet in struggling through the mud, and those which remained so utterly unserviceable that I have had to issue a new pair to all European and Native infantry soldiers, which I have done *gratis*, and I trust this will meet with your Lordship's approval.—See rough sketch No. 7.

8. My despatch of 11th instant, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, will inform your Lordship of our military proceedings. The moral effect of the defeat of the Shúja-ul-Mulk's army, composed of some of the *élite* of the Persian troops, by a British force so numerically inferior, the capture of his camp and destruction of his magazines, must prove advantageous to our cause, and will, I think, deter the Persian General, when reinforced by the troops and guns now approaching from Tihrán, from appearing before Bushire during my absence at Muhammarah. But I consider it



urgently requisite that General Stalker should be reinforced as early as possible by at least another European and two Native infantry régiments, with another troop of horse artillery and a foot battery, horsed, also some guns for positions, to avert the necessity of my detaching to his aid any portion of the force destined for Muhammarah, and the subsequent advance on Shustár, which latter movement, indeed, on which I mainly rely for securing healthy summer quarters for a portion of the European troops, and for effecting any real impression on Persia (and this chiefly through the organization of the Turco-Arabian levies, who could only be raised in that quarter), would in that case have to be abandoned, and our operations would then be confined to the sea coast.

\* \* \* \* \*

12. By the latest accounts from Muhammarah, I learn that the Prince-Governor of Búrújird (Khánlar Mirzá, Governor-General of all Persian Arabistán) had arrived there with large reinforcements of infantry and cavalry and eight guns, and that the enemy's force now there may probably be estimated at about 10,000 men of all arms and 16 guns.

13. Assuming that the Golundauze Company will accompany that brigade (to be left with General Stalker in substitution for the reserve company of artillery now here required for the mountain train), the force for Muhammarah will consist of 3,710 men of all arms as per margin.

Her Majesty's 64th	...	...	550
Her Majesty's 78th	...	...	500
26th Native Infantry	...	...	400
23rd Native Infantry	...	...	750
20th Native Infantry	...	...	300
Light Battalion	...	...	800
Company Sappers	...	...	100
1 troop Horse Artillery	...	...	150
1 company Field Artillery	...	...	100
Mountain Train with Reserve Company of Artillery	...	...	60
Grand total	...	...	3,710

\* \* \* \* \*

22. There are two routes between Shíráz and Isfahan, which unite about two-thirds of the way. The one called the "winter" route is said to possess but few natural difficulties, and the wild Bakhtiári generally migrate by the other or "summer" route during the winter.

23. Between Isfahan and Tihrán the track is fair and practicable for artillery. The march should be accomplished, however, in the cold season owing to the scarcity of water, especially along the "Valley of the shadow of death." Thus the advance to Shíráz during spring would be in time for the further progress to Tihrán in the following winter.

\* \* \* \* \*

The General complains of political restrictions which have been placed upon him, and strongly condemns proposal to abstain from making use of the Arab tribes, who, he explains, will (if not employed by the British) plunder baggage convoys, and cut off supplies and information.

No. 14-A., dated 16th March 1857.

From—LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR J. OUTRAM, K.C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force,

To—The Adjutant General, Bombay Army.

Reports that Major-General Stalker, C.B., died from the effects of a pistol shot inflicted by his own hand on the morning of the 14th instant, and



that Brigadier Wilson, K.H., has been appointed to the command of the 1st Division of Infantry as a temporary measure, and Lieutenant-Colonel Shephard, 20th Regiment Native Infantry, to command the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, in succession.

Adds that Brigadier-General Jacob, C.B., will remain in command of Bushire during his (Sir J. Outram's) absence on the expedition to Muhammarah.

Minute by VISCOUNT CANNING, dated 21st March 1857.

*Persia.*

The thanks of the Government of India to Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram and to the officers and men under his command for the signal success obtained by them over the Persian army in the neighbourhood of Borasjân, and the admiration with which their courage, energy, and discipline have been viewed by the Governor-General in Council, were proclaimed publicly as soon as Sir James Outram's despatches of 10th and 14th February reached Calcutta.

The notification of the 12th March will be conveyed to Sir James Outram forthwith. In the 8th paragraph of the despatch of 10th February, Sir James Outram specifies the reinforcements which, in addition to the second division of the army, he considers necessary in order to make the position of Major-General Stalker at Bushire secure during his absence at Muhammarah. Of these, one European regiment left Madras for Bushire in the *Oriental* on the 17th instant. One company of artillery has already been despatched from Bombay, and the remainder of the artillery, with the two native infantry regiments asked for, will be ready for embarkation at that post about the 28th instant.

The delay in the arrival at Bushire of one brigade of the second division has, as I greatly regret to see, obstructed Sir James Outram's movements. So far as I can judge from frequent communication with the Government of Bushire, this delay has occurred from no other cause than the want of steam

Want of steamers.

power,—a want so great that at least two squadrons of the Sind Horse have been consigned to sailing vessels unassisted by steamers—a mode of transport which at this season is already very tedious, and will soon become more so. But this has been unavoidable. Of all the steam vessels which the Government of India possesses, or can obtain on hire for service in Persia, two only, the *Fire Queen* and *Coromandel*, are on this

\* *Auckland.*  
*Zenobia.*

side of India, each engaged on a duty which admits of no interruption or postponement; two\* are in China, and every other vessel is in use between Bombay and Bushire. I believe that two of these have been retained in the Persian Gulf, and have not contributed to the transport of the second division; but this was to be expected, and in any case it is certain that the steam vessels at the disposal of the Government of India are not sufficient for the purpose of moving a force of little more than six thousand men, with its proportion of followers and horses, from Bombay to Bushire with the rapidity which the shortness of the seasons for operations, whether by sea or land, render desirable. I trust, therefore, that the Hon'ble Court will bear in mind the request for an addition to the number of steamers fit for transport of troops which has already been addressed to them, and that the means of the Government in this respect will be increased before the time for the despatch of the larger reinforcements to the army arrives.

In the 20th and 21st paragraphs, General Outram raises the question of the time at which an advance upon Shîráz should take place, whether before the winter or in the spring, and he gives his reasons for preferring the latter:

"So far as our Persian foes are concerned, I shall, I trust, with the reinforcements I have asked for be sufficiently strong to maintain the country below the passes, namely, Khúzistán and Lúristán, and be prepared to advance on Shíráz whenever the additional troops destined to operate in the interior of Persia shall have joined. I am now thoroughly informed as to the proper seasons for such movement, and have no hesitation in stating that if in time sufficiently strengthened in troops, and supplied with baggage cattle, we can occupy Shíráz before winter, up to which point our sepoys would be available, for though Shíráz itself is very cold, they would not, I believe, suffer there if properly housed; at any rate they would suffice to hold Bushire and the line of communication below Shíráz; but during the summer and autumn the water is bad and scarce, and forage hardly procurable between those two points.

"On all considerations, therefore, it would appear preferable to defer the advance on Shíráz until the early part of spring (March)."

I think the reasons are good.

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No. 5, dated "*Feroze*" off Muhammarah, 25th March 1857.

From—ACTING COMMODORE J. W. YOUNG, I.N., Commanding Persian Gulf Squadron,

To—The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

In acquainting you with my intention of attacking the forts defending Muhammarah with the squadron under my command at early dawn tomorrow morning, I beg to inform you that when the fort appears to me to be sufficiently silenced for the troops to be brought up in the vessels told off for this purpose from the present rendezvous to the place of debarkation between the first and second creek, south of Jabar's fort, the rendezvous flag will be hoisted by the vessel bearing my pendant, and repeated by the other vessels at the time in company with me.

---

Dated Camp near Muhammarah, 27th March 1857.

Despatch from—LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR J. OUTRAM, K.C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force,

To—The Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.

I have the honor to report, for your Excellency's information, the successful result of the operations against Muhammarah. The Persian army evacuated their entrenched position and camp about midday, leaving behind all their tents standing, with nearly the whole of their property, public and private, all their ammunition, and seventeen guns. As far as I am able to learn, only five guns\* and a portion of the personal effects of the Sháhzádah have been carried away.

2. It was my intention to have proceeded against the place immediately upon my return from the Borasján Expedition last month; but owing to the non-arrival of the requisite reinforcements caused by the tempestuous weather in the Gulf, together with unforeseen causes of delay, I was not able to leave Bushire until the 18th instant. In the meantime, however, I had despatched the transports into the Shatt-ul-Aráb from Bushire, as the troops were embarked, so that upon my arrival in the steamer *Feroze* no further delay occurred beyond what was necessarily caused by the tides, and by towing so many large vessels up the river.

\* The remainder supposed to have been thrown in the river.

3. For some months past the Persians had been strengthening their position at Muhammarah; batteries had been erected of great strength of solid earth 20 feet thick and 18 feet high, with casemated embrasures, on the northern and southern parts of the banks of the Kárún and Shatt-ul-Aráb, where the two rivers join; these with other earthworks, armed with heavy ordnance, commanded the entire passage of the latter river, and were so skilfully and judiciously placed, and so scientifically formed, as to sweep the whole stream to the extent of the range of the guns up and down the river and across to the opposite shore; indeed, everything that science could suggest, and labour accomplish in the time, appeared to have been done by the enemy so effectually to prevent any vessel passing up the river above their position. The banks for many miles were covered by dense date groves, affording the most perfect cover for riflemen, and the opposite shore, being neutral territory, (Turkish) was not available for the erection of counter-batteries. *See rough sketch No. 8.*

4. The accompanying rough sketch will, I fear, give your Excellency but a faint idea of the great strength of the Persian position, and the difficulty of successfully attacking them in it without very considerable loss. I could have landed my troops on the island of Abadán, which was strongly occupied by the Persians, and there is no doubt that, after defeating them, the southern battery eventually would have fallen to us; but the several batteries on the northern bank of the Kárún commanded the entire southern bank, as well as the stream of the Shatt-ul-Aráb, and it would have been a serious and an extremely difficult operation to have crossed the rapid current of the Kárún in the face of the enemy had the means existed of doing so, but until our small steamers and boats could round the southern point and join us, we should have been helpless. *See rough sketch No. 9.*

5. After mature deliberation, I resolved to attack the enemy's batteries with the armed steamers and sloops of war, and, so soon as the fire was nearly silenced, to pass up rapidly with the troops in small steamers towing boats, land the force two miles above the northern point, and immediately advance upon and attack the entrenched camp.

6. I have now the very great satisfaction of announcing to your Excellency the complete success of the first two operations, the third to the regret of the army being frustrated by the precipitate flight of the enemy.

7. The Persian army, ascertained from credible report to amount

Cavalry, Irregulars ...	...	1,500	to 13,000 men of all arms,
9 regiments, Regulars, 700 each ...	...	6,300	with 30 guns, was com-
Arabs and Bakhtiáris ...	...	4,600	manded by the Sháhzádah,
Gunners ...	...	600	Prince Khánlar Mirzá, in
Total ...			person.
...			13,000

The British force under my command, as per margin, was the utmost I

Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons ...	89	} 392
Sind Horse ...	303	
64th Foot ...	704	} 1,534
78th Highlanders ...	830	
25th Regiment Native Light Infantry	748	} 2,385
26th " " "	716	
Light Battalion " " "	920	} 4,886
Bombay Sappers and Miners ...	109	
Madras " " "	124	} 233
12 guns { 3 Troop Horse Artillery ...	166	
{ No. 2 Light Field Battery	176	} 342

per margin, was the utmost I deemed it prudent to withdraw from Bushire; but with the aid of four armed steamers and two sloops of war to effect my landing, I felt confident of success, although I anticipated some loss from what I heard of the determination expressed by the enemy to oppose our further



advance to the utmost of their power, and their extreme confidence of succeeding, as evinced by the fact of their having sent away their baggage cattle.

8. On the 24th instant, the steamers, with transport ships in tow, moved up the river to within three miles of the southern battery opposite the Arab village of Hartah; but as some of the large ships shoaled on the way, and did not reach the rendezvous until after dark, I was obliged to defer the attack for another day. During the night a reconnaissance was made in a boat to ascertain the nature of the soil of an island west of and immediately opposite the northern battery, where I wished to erect a mortar battery; but as it was found to be deep mud, I determined to place the mortars upon a raft; this was constructed the following day under the superintendence of Captain Rennie, I.N., and being armed with two 8" and two 5½" mortars, with a party of artillery under Captain Worgan, was towed by the steamer *Comet*, and moored in position close to the island during the night unobserved by the enemy, who from our preparation at the rendezvous, and their confidence as to the impossibility of any vessel being able to pass above their batteries, apparently expected we should land on the southern island (Abadan).

The horses and guns of the artillery, a portion of the cavalry, and the infantry were transhipped into boats and small steamers during the day in readiness for landing the following morning.

9. At break of day on the 26th the mortars opened their fire upon both the northern and southern batteries. The range of the 5½" proved too short, but the 8" shells were very efficient, bursting immediately over and inside the enemy's works; whilst from the position of the raft but few of the Persian guns could be brought to bear upon the mortars. At 7 o'clock the several vessels of war moved up into the positions allotted them by Commodore Young, and by 9 o'clock the fire of the heavy batteries was so reduced that the small steamers, with boats in tow, and one large steamer, the *Pottinger*, towing the transport *Golden Era*, were able to pass up, and land the troops above the northern battery without a single casualty amongst the troops, although they had to run the gauntlet of both gun and musket fire; two or three native followers only were killed in consequence of their unnecessarily exposing themselves.

10. By halfpast one o'clock the troops were landed and formed, and advanced without delay through the date groves and across the plain upon the entrenched camp of the enemy, who, without waiting for our approach, fled precipitately, after exploding their largest magazine, leaving, as I have before stated, their tents and baggage, public and private stores, with several magazines of ammunition and sixteen guns behind.

The want of cavalry (only one troop of Sind Horse having been able to land in time) prevented my pursuing them as I could have wished, but I despatched a party of Sind Irregular Horse under Captain Malcolm Green to follow them up for some distance, this officer reported that he came upon their rear-guard, retiring in good order, but that the road in many places was strewn with property and equipments. The loss of the Persians has been estimated at 200 killed, among whom was an officer of rank and estimation, Brigadier Ágha Ján Khán, who fell in the northern battery.

11. I beg to annex a report received from Commodore Young, with copy of a letter I had previously caused to be addressed to that officer expressing my entire satisfaction with the naval operations; indeed, it was impossible for my instructions to have been more ably or more successfully carried out, and the Commodore and every officer and man under his command have nobly earned



my warmest thanks. From Commodore Young, ably seconded by Captain Rennie, and the other officers of the fleet and masters of transport, I have throughout received every possible assistance.

12. With the exception of the artillery with the mountain battery under Captain Worgan, no portion of the military force was actively engaged with the enemy beyond some European riflemen sent on board the war vessels; but I am not the less indebted to all for their exertions and zeal, and especially for the great order and despatch with which the landing of the troops was effected under Brigadier-General Havelock, c.b.; the highest spirit prevailed, and had the large Persian army only awaited our approach out of the range of the ship's guns, I feel confident that it would have received a lasting lesson.

13. From recent information I learn that the Persian force in a very disorganized state is still in full retreat, and I proposed to despatch immediately up the Kárún to Ahwáz three small armed steamers, with 100 European infantry in each, for the purpose of making a reconnaissance, and, if practicable, effecting the destruction of the magazines at that place.

14. I take this opportunity of recommending to your Excellency's notice Colonel Lugard, c.b., the Chief, and the several officers of my general and personal staff; the Brigadier-General, the Brigadiers, and their respective staff, as also the officers commanding the several regiments, batteries and detachments of cavalry, and heads of departments composing this force, upon whom much responsibility has devolved, and whose zeal and exertions throughout this expedition have been most praiseworthy.

15. To Captain Kembell, Bombay Artillery, Consul-General at Bahgdád, I am much indebted for his very valuable assistance; also to Major Taylor, as well as to Lords Dunkellin, Seymour, and Schomberg Kerr, who volunteered their services on my staff.

Deputy Commissary-General reports that he proceeded to the town of Borasjân on the morning of the 7th instant, and removed from the Persian magazine the undermentioned Commissariat stores:

Flour	...	...	...	...	...	lb.
Rice	...	...	...	...	...	17,042
Barley	...	...	...	...	...	2,907
Wheat	...	...	...	...	...	3,788
Since ascertained by actual weighing:						2,504
Wheat flour	...	...	...	...	...	10,000
Rice	...	...	...	...	...	2,1000
Barley	...	...	...	...	...	2,000
Wheat	...	...	...	...	...	1,500

The whole of the above have been brought on or issued on the march, with the exception of some rice, which was lost by the upsetting of the cart in which it was being conveyed.

No. 2692, dated April 1857.

Extract from a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, to the General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

\* \* \* \* \*

The precipitate flight of the enemy and abandonment of their entrenched position and camp, leaving guns, ammunition, camp equipage, and public and private property, without an effort at resistance after the troops were landed, speaks strongly against the probability of any future opposition in that quarter, and I am in great hopes that the report of your signal success at

Muhammarah will hasten the Sháh of Persia to ratify the treaty of peace which was signed by his Ambassador at Paris on the 3rd ultimo.

Dated Ahwáz, 3rd April 1857.

Despatch from—ACTING COMMODORE J. RENNIE, I.N., Commanding Squadron in the Persian Gulf,

To—The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force. }

\* \* \* \* \*

On arrival near Ahwáz on the morning of the 1st instant, the Persian army was observed posted on a strong position on the right bank of the river, and having reason to believe that whatever force there might be on the left bank did not amount to such a number as would entail serious risk to our force, it was at once determined to carry Ahwáz.

Our arrangements for attack were speedily completed, and by 10-30 A.M. Captain Hunt, his advance well flanked by the gunboats, moved off with his gallant band of three hundred men, and in one hour and a half from the time of the gunboats opening fire he was in possession of Ahwáz; and the Persian army, consisting of 6,000 infantry, 5 guns, and a cloud of Bakhtiári horsemen, were in full retreat upon Dizfúl, leaving in our possession one gun (a brass 14-pr. field piece), 154 stand of arms, 56 mules, 230 sheep, besides an enormous quantity of grain, wheat, and barley.

Captain Kemball requested me to remain at Ahwáz for two days to afford him time to communicate with the Arab tribes, as also to ensure the impossibility of the defeated Persians returning to Ahwáz; they retired so precipitately as to have been unable to carry with them means of subsistence for more than two days.

It would be presumptive in me to offer a remark on the gallantry and zeal of those serving with me. I shall therefore merely take the liberty of attaching a nominal list of the officers, with the number of men under their command, composing an expedition that penetrated over 100 miles beyond Muhammarah, and which in so short a time compelled the Persian army to abandon a depôt of provisions on which it almost entirely depended for subsistence.

In conclusion, I beg to add that it is to Captain Kemball who planned, and to Captain Hunt who executed, this bold stroke that thanks are more especially due. Further comments from me are unnecessary.

#### List of officers and men comprising the expedition to Ahwáz.

##### *Armed steamer "Comet."*

- Commander Selby.
- 2 acting Masters.
- 1 1st class 2nd Master.
- 1 Assistant Surgeon.
- 21 seamen and 16 massulies.

##### *River steamer "Planet."*

- 2 acting Masters.
- 6 Europeans and 13 lascars.

##### *River steamer "Assyria."*

- 2 acting Masters.
- 5 Europeans and 12 Natives.

##### *No. 6 Gunboat.*

- 1 Lieutenant.
- 1 Midshipman.
- 16 seamen.

*No. 5 Gunboat.*

1 Mate.  
1 Midshipman.  
14 seamen.

*No. 9 Gunboat.*

1 Lieutenant.  
1 Midshipman.  
14 seamen.

*Cutters.**Falkland's.*

1 Midshipman.  
11 men.

*Feroze's.*

1 Midshipman.  
11 men.

*Assaye's.*

1 Midshipman.  
9 men.

Assistant Surgeon Asher, in medical charge of gunboat and cutter from *Feroze*.  
Mr. Sims, 3rd class Gunner of *Feroze*, temporarily attached for the expedition to steamer *Planet*.

Nominal Roll of Political and Staff Officers present with the detachment under Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders, in the advance upon Ahwas, 1st April 1857.

Captain A. B. Kemball, Bombay Artillery, Resident in Turkish Arabia.  
Lord Schomberg H. Kerr, attached to Persian Mission.  
Captain J. Wray, Deputy Quarter Master General, Persian Field Force.  
Captain Malcolm Green, Sind Horse.  
Lieutenant Baigrie, Commissariat Department.

Nominal Roll of Officers of detachment under the command of Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders.

*Her Majesty's 64th Regiment*

Captain W. Goode.  
Lieutenant G. H. T. Haldane.  
Ensign J. J. Pack.  
Assistant Surgeon E. L. Lundy.

*28th Highlanders.*

Captain G. H. Hunt.  
„ D. McAndrew.  
Lieutenant A. Cassidy.  
„ J. Finlay.  
„ G. D. Barker.

Detachments consisting of 300 men, being 150 from each of the above regiments.

Dated Camp Muhammarah, 4th April 1857.

Despatch from—LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR J. OUTRAM, K.C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force,  
To—The Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.

In my despatch dated the 27th ultimo, I announced to your Excellency my intention of immediately despatching up the Kárún river to Ahwáz an armed flotilla, being the only means I had of effecting a distant reconnaissance, owing to the total want of baggage cattle; but as the steamers had to be coaled and seven days' provisions for the troops put on board, whilst all were busily engaged, disembarking tents and stores from the transports, some little delay occurred, and it was not until the afternoon of the 29th that the party could be despatched.

2. The flotilla I placed under the immediate command of Captain Rennie, I.N., aided by Captain Kemball, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, who zealously undertook the political conduct of the expedition. Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders, commanded the military detachment, and Captain Wray, Deputy Quarter Master General, and Captain Green, my Military Secretary, accompanied the expedition for the purpose of reporting upon the country in the vicinity of Ahwáz.






Nº 10

SKETCH  
OF THE  
GROUND IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD  
OF  
**AHWÁZ ON THE KÁRÚN,**  
Showing the advance of the British Detachment,  
1st April 1887.

Scale 1 Inch = 4 Furlongs.



(Sd.) J. WRAY, Captain,  
Dy. Qr. Mr. Genl., P. E. F. F.

I. B. September 1888.  
Exd. J. A. A

My instructions to Captain Rennie were "to steam up to Ahwáz, and act with discretion according to circumstances. Should the Persian army have arrived and apparently be prepared to make a determined stand, the party was to return after effecting the reconnaissance; but in the event of the enemy having proceeded beyond Ahwáz, or if they continued their flight on seeing our steamers (as I fully expected they would under the impression that the flotilla was the advance guard of the British army), it was my desire that the party should land, and destroy the magazines and stores which the Persians had collected."

3. By the annexed reports from Captains Rennie and Wray, which I have the honor to submit, your Excellency will learn how admirably my instructions have been carried out, and the complete success which has attended the energetic and judicious measures adopted by all concerned. Indeed, it is impossible to calculate upon the advantages which must ensue from the successful result of this expedition in the effect it will have upon the Arab tribes who in crowds witnessed the extraordinary scene of a large army of 7,000 infantry, with five or six guns,\* and a host of cavalry precipitately retreating before a detachment of 300 British infantry, three small steamers, and three gunboats. *See rough sketch No. 10.*

4. I feel that I cannot sufficiently express to your Excellency the great obligation I am under to the several officers and men of the expedition.

5. Captain Rennie, I.N., whose gallant conduct at the bombardment of Muhammarah I so recently recorded, has again earned highest praise and warmest thanks for the able manner in which he has conducted the expedition.

6. Captain Kemball, who on this as on every occasion of difficulty and danger upon which I have required his services has rendered me most valuable assistance, materially contributed to the success of the expedition by his counsel and energy. Great praise is also due to Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders, who so successfully carried out the military operations; to Captain Wray, Deputy Quarter Master General, and Captain M. Green, my Military Secretary, for the part they so ably performed, and to all the officers and men employed in the expedition. I have to thank them all, and beg to recommend those specially named to your Excellency's notice.

Dated Muhammarah, 5th April 1857.

Despatch from—CAPTAIN J. WRAY, Deputy Quarter Master General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

To—The Chief of the Staff, Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

The operations against the enemy were conducted as follows under the orders of Captain Rennie, I. N.

At 3 A.M., 1st April, our little fleet left Kut-Umaira, an Arab village on the left bank, where we had remained during the night. Soon after daylight we came in sight of Ahwáz, and found the Persian army collected behind a ridge on the right bank. Crowds of horsemen, apparently some guns on ridge, and infantry innumerable anchored at  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles below the place. Some horsemen came down, but a rifle shot sent them off at full gallop, and no one attempted to come very near again.

Heard from the Arabs that Ahwáz was not occupied, and that the troops that had been there had gone up the river the day before frightened by the appearance of the steamers, and that nothing remained now but thirty horsemen; that they had no means of crossing, except by two boats and two canoes. It was therefore determined to land all our party (300 men), advance up the left bank upon Ahwáz, and endeavour to destroy the enemy's depôt of grain and

\* One or two guns said to have joined them at Ahwáz

ammunition; and in the event of our finding that we had been deceived, or that they were in force in the town, that we should turn our move into an armed reconnaissance and return to our ships.

Meanwhile we captured a *bugla*, lying under the left bank, with a brass 21-pr. gun, which was taken on board.

At 11 A.M., the troops commenced landing, and advanced at once in three columns, covered by skirmishers, the whole party being extended in such a way that they looked like a large body of men. Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders, commanded, and arranged it all. Left column consisted of the Light Company, 78th Highlanders, divided into skirmishers and supports both in one rank. The remainder of the company in column of threes also in single ranks. The 61th Grenadiers and the other company, 78th Highlanders, formed centre and right column in the same way.

Two gunboats were sent off in advance up the river, which took up position within shell range of the enemy's ridges, and opened fire.

The enemy apparently had some guns in position on the ridge, but the moment the gunners made their appearance, the gunboats opened and drove them away; they consequently did not return a single shot, though they attempted a little musketry, which did no harm. In the meanwhile the troops pushed on, the Persians still collected, though in reduced numbers, on the opposite bank of the river, at about 1,000 yards from us.

At 12 o'clock the troops approached the town, when the Arab Shaikh came out, tendered submission, and informed our party that the enemy were retreating; and with our glasses we saw a large army of 7,000 men, with a perfect swarm of Bakhtiári horsemen, and 5 or 6 guns, retreating from a very strong position before a body of 300 infantry, three small river steamers, and three gunboats.

The enemy retired in tolerable order, covered by their horse. The Sháhzádah himself travelling in a green palanquin carriage, the wheel marks of which we had seen in the several encamping grounds on the river.

The town was filled with flour, wheat, barley, &c. Fifty-five mules and a horse were also found, besides fourteen boxes of new flint muskets, Tower-mark, each containing ten. A party crossed the river, examined the enemy's camp, and set fire to the remains of their magazines. The Arabs had plundered it before we arrived, and had carried off the powder, ball ammunition, and muskets, the cases of which were found; but the enemy had left a great quantity of loose shot on the ground also, which could not be destroyed or carried away.

Thus ended a very successful day. It was expected that when our troops reached the town, the enemy would open fire with their guns from the ridge on the opposite bank, but that we should be able to hold our ground under cover of the houses and walls until all the stores were destroyed or carried off; but in this little or no loss was anticipated; and as the enemy were unable to cross the river, and it was known that they had never had more than 800 men in the town, there was no great risk incurred in the move.

As it was, the enemy commenced their retreat exactly one hour from the time the first shell was fired from the gunboats.

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No. 2873, dated 20th April 1857.

From—The Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army,  
To—The General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the utter fear in which our united forces are held by the Persian army than the fact you have mentioned of 7,000



infantry, with 5 or 6 guns and a host of cavalry, precipitately retreating before a detachment of 300 British infantry, three small steamers, and three gun-boats.

The capture and destruction of their magazines of ordnance stores and provisions in the face of such an army must also produce the best effect at the Court of the Sháh of Persia in furtherance of the desire of our Government for peace with that potentate.

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From the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Adjutant General, Bombay Army,—No. 5196, dated Bombay, 15th September 1857.

Forwards copy of Lord Clarendon's despatch to Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., of 11th July, conveying Her Majesty's approval of the conduct of the Lieutenant-General and of the troops under his command during the operations against Persia.

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No. 440, dated 9th December 1857.

From—BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN JACOB, C.B., late Commanding Persian Expeditionary Force,

To—The Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department.

Points out that he has received high praise from the Government of India and from the Home Government for his conduct in Persia, but that the Government of Bombay have only expressed disapprobation—a fact for which he fails to account, and which he considers wholly undeserved.

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Extract from demi-official letter from Brigadier-General SIR E. LUGARD, C.B., dated 27th March 1858.

There is no doubt of Muhammadarah being our crowning victory, and also that we owed it entirely to the Indian Navy; but for them our loss must have been terrific.

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From the Adjutant General, Bombay Army, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department,—No. 1598, dated Poona, 19th June 1858.

Conveys the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation that the word "Persia" be inscribed on the colors, standards, and appointments of the different corps forming the expedition, with the addition of "Rashúr" and "Khúsháb" to such as may have been actually engaged in those actions.



## APPENDIX B.

### EXTRACTS FROM CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE OBJECT AND THE PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN, AND ITS CONDUCT.

Extract from a letter from Captain Kemball, Resident at Bushire, to Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay—dated Bushire, 22nd March 1854.

Bushire being the principal seaport of the country, and engrossing, as it does, almost the whole of the trade with India, its occupation would be attended of course with a corresponding effect. The chief, if not the only, obstacle to such a measure is the want of fresh water within the walls of the town; the position, otherwise, is admirably adapted for defence, both to seaward and on the land side. It contains a thriving population, numbering from 20,000 to 25,000 souls; the inhabitants are inoffensive and unwarlike, and from it our influence could be exerted even to the gates of Shíráz.

On reference to letters from my predecessor dated 1838, it will be seen that the force then present at Karáchi (total number of troops of all ranks and arms, 561) was deemed inadequate to the enterprise; and although I concur in opinion with Colonel Shiel, as recorded in a subsequent letter from the same officer, that a body of from 2,000 to 3,000 bayonets would amply suffice to capture the place and maintain its ground against any odds, I imagine that additional defence of the nature of field works, but of some extent, would still be necessary to preserve the communication with the wells outside. By means of a small steamer or other appliance, a supply of water for the troops could at all times be obtained from Kháraj, but it cannot, I think, be denied that a besieger in sufficient strength to invest the place and cope with the garrison in the field, and who should even confine his operations to filling up the wells, would, during the hot season at least, reduce the inhabitants to much distress. That the difficulty referred to is not altogether insurmountable has in more than one instance been shown by sieges of some duration which Bushire has sustained consequent upon feudal broils with neighbouring tribes, or upon the unwilling allegiance formerly rendered by the hereditary Arab governors to the Persian Government authorities. The water in the wells of the town, though brackish, loses in some measure this quality during the rainy season, and is then readily drunk by the lower orders.

Tanks, of which a number now exist, and for the construction of which the nature of the soil is well adapted, might be multiplied under our Government to any extent; while on emergency the higher classes could provide themselves with water by sea at an expense somewhat in advance of that at which it is now brought from the exterior. It should be borne in mind, too, that the garrison could always count upon succour from Bombay and Karáchi, within a limited period.

The accompanying rough sketch *see page 71* presents at one view the outline of the fortress of Bushire as now existing. As from the citadel A on the left, and the bastion B and the battery C on the right, a cross fire could be brought to bear both within and without the main wall upon the only gate of the town, it is evident that, did we once obtain possession of those points, while at the same time we held command of the sea, the place must immediately capitulate.

The attacking force then should, I conceive, be divided into three columns, each accompanied by two field guns, of which that of the centre should disembark at E and F on either flank of the ruined outwork situated at the extreme point of the peninsula, and direct its march at once through the town upon the land defences, while those of the right and left should effect their landing respectively—the one at D, where the ascent from the beach is easy and gradual; the other at A, in front of the citadel. To ensure complete success, the presence of two river steamers, or rather of two vessels, of the class of the *Medusa*, drawing not more than 6 or 8 feet water, would be desirable, as their services would not only be available to transport the party destined to assail the citadel, the gate of which they could easily demolish with their guns, but also in the first instance to cover the landing of the centre column, and keep down the fire of the bastion on either hand, which might otherwise be directed upon it. The capture consecutively of the bastions on the two sea fronts, though a work of no difficulty, would occupy time, tend to dissipate the forces unnecessarily, and be attended perhaps with increased bloodshed. Moreover, a well directed fire from two or three gunboats would render them untenable in as many hours, and their demolition, if considered necessary, should of course precede the assault; but the operation must inevitably inflict much loss of life and property upon the helpless inhabitants, which it is the object of the proposed plan to avoid.

I will not presume to offer any suggestions as to the defences requisite to protect the force now, it is to be presumed, encamped without the walls of the town, as ample time would be allowed to the engineers and commanding officers to form their plans before any serious attempt could be made by the native authorities to dislodge it; but I may venture to suggest that an adequate supply of entrenching tools should be provided to the expedition prior to its quitting the presidency. Neither cavalry nor mounted artillery, at least at the outset, would be required on this service.

Harness for a field battery should be furnished from Bombay. Horses or mules could be procured on the spot. Any heavy guns temporarily required in the field works could, it is presumed, be supplied from the vessels of war, as well as men to serve them.

Thus far I have assumed the coercion of the Persian Government by means of a formidable demonstration to be alone contemplated; but if our object were to threaten the provinces in the interior, or if a chance existed of the expedition being opposed by other than the ill-equipped and undisciplined troops of Persia, I should be disposed to recommend the employment of a force sufficiently large to occupy the whole peninsula of Bushire, extending thence to the village of Halilá, rather than the town alone.

The tract in question exhibits the form of an irregular triangle, of which two sides, the longest 12 or 13 miles, and shortest 4 or 5 miles, border upon the sea, and the third, 9 or 10 miles, abuts throughout more than half its length in high precipitous cliffs upon a marshy plain, stretching inland a distance of 4 or 5 miles, and itself bounded, on the one hand, by the bar of Bushire; on the other, by a creek which runs in from the bay of Halilá. Beyond this plain, the country for an equal extent is a sandy desert, thus making up a space of not less than 9 miles to be travelled over before water is procurable; and even at that limit the supply is most scanty, and of inferior quality.

The accompanying rough sketch (*see page 61*) may convey some idea of the country described, though I should observe it by no means correctly represents the general outline, which, whether on the sea or land fronts, being everywhere

irregular, must be surveyed to be properly delineated ; such, however, seems to me to be the strength of the position, that were the heights between A and B crowned with batteries, where required, the gently sloping ground at either extremity covered with forts, and the defences of the town and old Dutch fort sufficiently strengthened to convert them into places of arms, it might, I conceive, if adequately garrisoned, be rendered impregnable to any army that could be brought against it.

Your Lordship will observe that it possesses a long sea board accessible to shipping at every material point ; that the plain on the land side, apart from the absence of fresh water, is hardly of a nature to admit of a besieger's pushing his attack by regular approaches ; and, moreover, did he even succeed in gaining a footing on the table land, his position would not be tenable, nor could he approach or enter upon the siege of the town until he had reduced the outworks to which I have alluded. On the other hand, the space defined is sufficiently ample to afford a secure asylum to a retreating army, or to admit of any army being assembled within its limits without risk of molestation. To these advantages may be added the situation of Bushire with respect both to Bombay and the river Euphrates, as well as being opposite to a harbour (howbeit a nominal dependency of Turkey) on the Arabian coast, and where the largest ships of the Indian Navy, as well as transports in any number, might ride in safety. In a political point of view, the possession of Bushire would place in our hands the complete control of the coast up to the base of the hills (for the most part inhabited by Arab tribes little affected to their Persian masters) from the Kárún to Bandar Abbás.

\* \* \* \* \*

The force necessary to maintain such a position as that I have endeavoured to describe must doubtless be large, and should not, I am of opinion, fall short of 5,000 men ; nor, on the other hand, could the requisite defences be raised without a very considerable expenditure.

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*Memorandum regarding Bushire, &c., &c., by Colonel Hennell, late Resident, Persian Gulf, October 1856.*

I assume that an expedition to the Persian Gulf has been decided on, and, in compliance with the request of Colonel Sykes, I proceed to offer a few remarks on what I conceive would be the best mode of employing this force with a view to inducing the Sháh to withdraw his troops from Herát.

The former expedition to the Gulf in 1838, having in view the same object as the present one, merely occupied the island of Kháraj. This measure was quite successful owing to the exaggerated reports which reached the King of the extent of the military and naval forces sent from India.

Under the alarm that a formidable invasion of the south of Persia was contemplated by the British Government, His Majesty raised the siege of Herát, and returned to Tihrán. He was, however, known to have afterwards expressed his deep vexation at having been induced to relinquish a prey which he considered within his grasp by such a paltry demonstration. The mere occupation of Kháraj would not therefore, I conceive, now accomplish the object in view. A blockade of the ports on the Persian coast would be equally ineffective. All the loss and damage arising from such a measure would fall upon the merchants and local authorities ; but these are so far removed from the seat of Government that any injury inflicted upon them



would be treated with indifference at Tihrán, as affecting any measure of importance, such as giving up its views upon Herát. Of course, in weighing the effects of any demonstration made in the Persian Gulf, the Court of Tihrán will be greatly influenced by the opinion of the Foreign envoys, and, unless these are satisfied that something serious is intended, their advice may probably confirm the Persian Government in its resistance.

Under these circumstances, I consider that the occupation of Bushire, in addition to Kháraj, would be necessary to afford any prospect of inducing the Sháh to raise the siege of Herát. I do not think that such a measure would inflict any serious loss upon the revenues of the Persian Government, but the moral effect would be great. The Bandar-i-Abushahar is known throughout Persia as the principal seaport of the kingdom, and its occupation by a foreign force would be severely felt. In taking possession of this town, it must, however, be borne in mind that no fresh water is procurable within the walls, the place being wholly dependent in this respect upon the wells outside. It would consequently be absolutely necessary that an invading force should occupy the plain beyond the defences as far as the wells. Those nearest the town are within half a mile, but the supply is scanty and bad. Water of much better quality, and in sufficient quantity for the use of a large force would be found at Júfra, about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles distant from Bushire. From this spot, marked A in the accompanying rough sketch No. 5 (drawn from recollection), to that marked B on the backwater on the east, is a line of about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles. The deep backwater on the one side and the sea on the other would cover both flanks, while a few pit works, armed with artillery thrown up in the interval, and covering a force of 5,000 men, would be sufficient against any army the Persians would bring into the field. I would venture to suggest that a few pieces of heavy ordnance to be placed in position, where required, should accompany the expedition. If cavalry be sent, European Dragoons and Jacob's Sind Horse would be found the most effective.

The climate of Bushire is exceedingly salubrious, and, excepting the few days of the stormy and boisterous weather which generally accompanies the first fall of rain in November, is cool and bracing from that month to March. Judging, however, from the experience of Kháraj, it would be necessary during the hot months of June, July, August, and September to keep the Europeans in barracks or houses. In that island the mortality during the summer under tents was 8 per cent., in mat erections 2 per cent., and barracks nil.

The means of subsisting a large force in the Persian Gulf has always presented great difficulties. With the exception of a few bullocks and goats from Mascat and Bahrain, nothing in the shape of provisions is procurable from the Arabian coast; a few sheep and a small quantity of grain might be obtained from the Persian ports below Kangún; while in Bushire stores of corn to some extent might be found, although these would probably be in some measure exhausted by the extensive exportations which usually take place during the summer months.

Wheat is sometimes to be procured at Mashhúr, the seaport of K'áb. A large quantity of grain is also exported from Bandar Ríg, a small town on the coast, about 30 miles to the north of Bushire, and which with a view to the collection of supplies, both of sheep and corn, it might perhaps be worth while to occupy. During the cold season the Illyáts or nomad tribes of Fárs bring their flocks into the low country for pasturage, and unless the Persian Government takes effectual means for cutting off the communication with the coast, they will gladly avail themselves of any opportunity of



disposing of them. Our reputation for liberal and regular payments was so well established during our occupation of Kháraj, that I have no doubt the tribes in the neighbourhood of Bushire will use every endeavour to sell us their disposable produce. No sentiment of patriotism will ever prevent a Persian from making money even through an enemy, if he can do so without risk. Bassorah, I do not think, could furnish supplies; but a considerable quantity of grain might perhaps be collected in Baghdad, and towed down in native boats by the *Nitocris* to Bassorah, and there embarked on board a sea steamer for Bushire.

The question of the supply of carriage is as difficult as that of provisions. It is to be presumed that the Persian Government will occupy the low country and the mountain passes between the coast and Shíráz, and this will, I fear, prevent the collection of the mules and camels which might otherwise be procurable. A few camels might be obtained from K'áb and the Arabian coast, while a large number of mules might be collected at Baghdád by the Resident, and sent down the river to Bushire.

An advance on Shíráz should, I venture to think, only be contemplated under the failure of all other modes of coercing the Persian Government. To say nothing of the great difficulty of transporting artillery and forcing the *kotals* or mountain passes, the climate of Shíráz is, to Europeans especially, most unhealthy, so much so, that the spring and summer months would, I doubt not, send two-thirds of any force into hospital, while the mortality would be fearful. On the other hand, such is the hatred entertained by the inhabitants of Fárs to their rulers on account of the tyranny and exactions of the latter, that I should not be surprised were such an advance to revolutionize the whole of the province, particularly if the invading force were accompanied by one of the exiled princes of the Sháh's family now residing at Baghdád.

Should any additional troops be required to garrison the places in rear of an advancing army, I have reason to believe that the Arabs of Koweit on the Arabian coast would willingly take temporary service with us, and their fidelity might, I think, be depended upon.

It is now nearly five years since I quitted the Persian Gulf; and as I write from recollection and without any documents to refer to, I trust I may be somewhat excused for the crude and scanty nature of the remarks now submitted.

*P.S.*—It will be observed from the accompanying sketch (*see page 61*) that Bushire stands upon the northern end of a peninsula of about 11 miles in length and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  at its greatest width, formed by Halílá Bay to the south, the sea to the west, and the breakwater to the east. This last terminates in what is called a '*mushedá*,' or marsh, of about 6 miles wide, which extends to Halílá Bay, and during the cold months, particularly after high tides, is almost impassable, excepting at a few points; but in the summer the centre portion is nearly dried up. The rocky ridge, running almost parallel with the marsh, commands the greatest part of it, while room for the cultivation of grain and the pasturage of flocks would be found within the limits above specified. It may, perhaps, be a question worth consideration whether the occupation of the whole of this peninsula would not probably produce a more serious impression on the Court of Tihrán than only taking possession of Bushire and its immediate vicinity.

Will you have the goodness to inform Colonel Sykes, the Chairman, that, in speaking in my memorandum of the insalubrity of Shíráz during the summer months, I omitted to mention that from December to April, that place is

tolerably healthy, although exceedingly cold even to Europeans. There is, however, a village called Dúshákh, about 14 miles from Shíráz, which is noted for its salubrity even during the worst season at the latter city and its neighbourhood. I may also add that, with the exception of Cháhkúta, Khan-i-Takht, and Kazrán, all other stages (or *trimuzils*) on the route from Bushire to Shíráz are unhealthy during the summer months.

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From Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Secret Department,—No. 37, dated Bombay, 3rd September 1856.

Communicates the amount and nature of the force which, in the opinion of the Government of India, should be at once prepared for operations in the Persian Gulf, and states that the Secret Committee name the occupation of Kháraj and of the district of Bushire as the objects of the expedition.

Remarks that the seizure of Kháraj will not produce the same effect now as it did on a former occasion, when the presence of 900 men with four guns sufficed to obtain satisfaction from the Government of Tihrán.

States that Government are aware that the Persians will abandon Kharáj without resistance, and that the Sháh professes indifference even to our occupation of Bushire; but that, nevertheless, the possession of Kharáj is indispensable to a British force holding Bushire, if it were only to secure an unfailing supply of good water.

Remarks that the term "District of Bushire" may be understood to mean as much of the surrounding country as it may be convenient to occupy; and upon this point the annexed extract gives full information. States that, according to the disposition of the Persian army in May last, as reported by Her Majesty's Consul at Tihrán, the whole province of Fárs, which includes Bushire, Shíráz, and Bandar Abbás, contained only 5,000 troops; but that although this makes it very improbable that our occupation will be seriously contested, the Governor-General does not think the force sent should be limited to the bare number sufficient to take and keep possession of the town of Bushire, but should be sufficiently large to indicate that something further is contemplated to keep the communications open, and to give protection to friendly inhabitants.

With this view the Governor-General is of opinion that the force should consist of 5,000 men; that it should include one European regiment, a small body of cavalry (400 would be amply sufficient), one troop of horse artillery, one light field battery, and two companies of sappers.

Adds that the Governor-General leaves the composition of the force in other respects to the Government of Bombay.

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Dated Fort William, 1st November 1856.

*Proclamation by*—G. F. EDMONSTONE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

The Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council having, under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, directed the assemblage of a British Force at Bombay for service in the Persian Gulf, deems it proper to make known the reasons which have rendered this measure necessary.

In the month of January 1853, certain articles of agreement were concluded between Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of the Shah of Persia and His Highness the Sadr Azim, or Prime Minister of the Persian Government.

By those articles the Persian Government engaged not to send troops to Herát on any account, unless foreign troops, that is, troops from the direction of Kábul or Kandahár, or other foreign country, should invade Herát. In the event of troops being sent, the Persian Government engaged that the said troops should not enter the city of Herát, and that on the return of the foreign troops towards their own territory, the Persian troops should be immediately withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Herát to Persian soil.

The Persian Government also engaged to abstain from all interference whatsoever in the internal affairs of Herát, whether "in taking possession, or occupying, or assuming the sovereignty, or governing, except in so far as interference existed between the two parties during the life-time of the late Yár Muhammad."

And, lastly, the Persian Government engaged to relinquish all pretension to, and demand for, the coinage, or the reading of the *khátbah*, or any other acknowledgment of allegiance or subjection, on the part of the people of Herát to the Government of Persia.

It was, at the same time, stipulated that, so long as there should be no interference of any sort whatever on the part of the British Government in the affairs of Herát, the engagements contracted by the Persian Government, as aforesaid, should remain in full force and effect. On the other hand, it was agreed, in the name of the British Government, that "if any foreign power, such as the Afghans or others," should wish to interfere with or to take possession of Herát, the British Government, on the requisition of the Persian Ministers, would not object to restrain such foreign power by friendly advice, "so that Herát might remain in its own state of independence."

While the British Government has faithfully and constantly adhered to the obligations which it accepted under the agreement of January 1853, the Government of Persia has manifested a deliberate and persevering disregard of the reciprocal engagements by which at the same time it became bound, and is now endeavouring to subvert by force the independence of Herát, which was the declared object of the agreement in question.

So far back as December 1855, the Persian Government, by an article in the Tihrán Official Gazette, announced its intention of despatching a force to Herát, alleging that the Amír Dost Muhammad Khán, the ruler of Afghánistán, had been instigated by his "neighbours" to possess himself of Kandahár; that, having with their assistance, succeeded in that enterprize, he meditated an advance upon Herát; and that an armed demonstration in the direction of Herát was required for the preservation of tranquillity in Khurasan.

This assertion, that the ruler of Afghánistán was instigated by his "neighbours" to occupy Kandahár, or that he was assisted by them in possessing himself of that city, or that he received advice or encouragement from them to advance upon Herát, was, if by those "neighbours" the British Government is indicated, wholly untrue. No such instigation, or assistance, or encouragement, direct or indirect, had been given by the British Government; nor, so far as the British Government is informed, had there been, when the assertion was made, any act on the part of the Amír Dost Muhammad Khan evincing a design to advance upon Herát.



Nevertheless, the Persian Government has executed its intention. Not only have Persian troops invaded the territory of Herát, although the contingency which alone could justify such an act has not come to pass, but they have laid siege to the city, and have interfered in its internal affairs, while the Government of Tihrán has not only assumed the right to nominate the ruler of Herát, but, in addressing the present chief of the city, has declared Herát to be Persian soil.

The siege of Herát has now been carried on by the Persian army for many months. Before its commencement, and during its progress, the unfriendly sentiments of Persia towards the British Government have been scarcely veiled, and recently the movements of troops in different parts of Persia have indicated a determination to persist in an aggression which is as unprovoked as it is contrary to good faith.

The conduct of the Persian Government has been pronounced by Her Majesty's Government to constitute an act of open hostility against Great Britain. Reparation has been sought, but without success. The withdrawal of the Persian troops from the neighbourhood of Herát to Persian soil has been demanded as a preliminary to the adjustment of differences to which the acts of Persia alone have given rise; but the demand has been evaded, and, according to the most recent accounts, a Persian army still invests Herát.

Friendly remonstrance having failed, and a reasonable requisition having been rejected or put aside, it becomes incumbent on the British Government to take measures, by which the Persian Government shall be convinced that solemn engagements contracted with Great Britain may not be violated with impunity, and by which effectual guarantees against continuous breach of faith shall be secured.

To this end, a force has been directed to assemble at Bombay, and will embark as soon as the necessary arrangements shall have been completed. The further operations of the force, after it shall have reached the Persian Gulf, will be guided by such instructions as the progress of events and the policy of the British Government, may demand.

By order of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council.

Dated Fort William, 1st November 1856.

Proclamation by—G. F. EDMONSTONE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

The Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council having, under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, directed that hostile operations against Persia shall forthwith be undertaken, is pleased to order, and it is hereby ordered, that Persian merchant vessels, which, at the time of the publication of this order, shall be in any ports or places in Her Majesty's Indian territories under the Government of the East India Company, shall be allowed thirty days from the date of the publication of this order for loading their cargoes and departing from such ports or places; and that such Persian merchant vessels, if met at sea by any of the ships of the Indian Navy, shall be permitted to continue their voyage if, on examination of their papers, it shall appear that their cargoes were taken on board before the expiration of the above term. Provided that nothing herein contained shall extend, or be taken to extend, to Persian vessels having on board any officer in the military service of the Persian Government, or any articles prohibited or contraband of war, or any despatch of or to the Persian Government.

And it is hereby further ordered by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General in Council that any Persian merchant vessels, which, prior to this first day of November 1856, shall have sailed from any foreign port bound



for any port or place in any of Her Majesty's Indian territories, shall be permitted to enter such port or place and to discharge her cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart without molestation, and that any such vessel, if met at sea by any of the ships of the Indian Navy, shall be permitted to pursue her voyage.

The Right Hon'ble the Governors in Council of Madras and Bombay, the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, the Governor of Straits Settlements, the Commissioners of Pegu and of the Tenasserim and Martaban Provinces, and all officers and authorities, whom it may concern, in Her Majesty's Indian territories under the Government of the East India Company, are required to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respectively appertain.

By order of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council.

Dated Fort William, 1st November 1856.

Proclamation by—G. F. EDMONSTONE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

The Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council, being desirous that the hostile operations now about to be undertaken against Persia, should be attended with as little injury as possible to individual interests, is pleased to notify that all subjects of the Sháh of Persia residing within Her Majesty's Indian territories under the Government of the East India Company, and not being Consuls or Consular Agents in the service of the Persian Government, may continue to reside therein without molestation in respect of their persons, their property, or their lawful avocations; and that they will enjoy protection so long as they shall abstain from all acts hostile to the British Government, and shall observe due obedience to the laws under which they live, and to all resolutions or orders of the Governor-General of India in Council.

By order of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council.

No. 79, dated Bombay, 1st November 1856.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Secret Department.

Conveys the following remarks and orders in regard to the object and the conduct of the operations about to be undertaken.

The Governor in Council has reason to know that nearly all the preliminary arrangements for the embarkation of the force are complete, and he indulges the hope that the Government of Bombay will have acted upon the instructions which will have reached it direct, and that within fourteen days from this time the whole force will have left the presidency.

The first object of the expedition has been prescribed by the Hon'ble the Secret Committee to be the seizure of the island of Kháraj, and of the town and district of Bushire on the mainland. The military and naval operations by which this shall be effected may be left to the General who shall be appointed to command the land forces, and to the officer of the Indian Navy who shall be selected by the Government of Bombay to have charge of the naval part of the expedition. These officers will have been furnished, or will now be furnished, by the Government of Bombay with all the information which has been collected as to the points of attack and the measures best calculated to secure the object in view.

But assuming that, with the large means at the disposal of the officers in command, that object will be readily accomplished, there are some points upon which it is desirable that the views of the Government of India should be made known.

Should a summons to the Governor of Bushire to surrender the town be rejected, it will be desirable that possession of the place should be obtained, not only with as little loss of life, but, having regard to the future, with as little injury to property as possible.

There is scarcely anything in the nature of State property in Bushire or its neighbourhood. Some stores of ammunition and grain are probably all that come within that category. It is believed that public buildings belonging to the State, and even barracks, are altogether wanting: certainly they are so few and insignificant as not to be worth taking into account; and, therefore, any injury done to the town will fall upon private persons, and every endeavour must be used to render it as light as possible, consistently with the avoidance of all failure or check. It is the desire of the Governor-General in Council not only that the inhabitants and merchants of the town should not suffer unnecessarily at our hands, but that they should understand from the beginning that it is our intention to encourage trade to the utmost, and to leave peaceful intercourse and avocations undisturbed.

The extent of ground to be occupied beyond the walls of the town will be determined by the General in command mainly upon military considerations; but considerations of health also must be taken carefully into account, and on this head the experience of Dr. Macalister, Civil Surgeon of Bushire, should be consulted.

Immediately from the first occupation of the town, the chief authority, military, political, and civil, will rest with the General in command. The Governor-General in Council has confidence in the discipline and orderly demeanour of the Bombay Army, but he cannot impress too strongly upon Major-General Stalker the importance of taking every precaution that the intercourse of the troops with the inhabitants of the town, and the people generally, shall be such as to give confidence and encouragement to these latter, and that it shall be marked by fair and liberal dealing, kind treatment, and a ready attention to and redress of grievances. This applies equally to all, whether foreign residents, Arabs and natives of the town or of the coast, or Persian subjects from the interior.

The functions of Commander Jones as Resident will have ceased, and he will have withdrawn from Bushire on the first declaration of hostilities; but that officer's experience of the country and knowledge of the people will be of great value to the General in command, and his services should be retained at head-quarters, to which he should be attached in the character of Political Agent, subject to the authority of the General in command.

Once in possession of Bushire and Kháraj, the first object to be attended to will be the quarters of the troops, whether within or without the town.

These must be selected with a view to the possibility of a long continued occupation by some portion of the force at least, and therefore the provision of materials for the construction of sufficient shelter must not be overlooked.

The advice and information which Commander Jones has already furnished upon this point, and the enquiries now being made by the commissariat officer sent on in advance, will enable General Stalker to act at once with promptitude and effect. But it will be essential to bear in mind that we may have to retain both Kháraj and Bushire through the summer as well as through the winter.

In the same view no pains should be spared to invite and encourage a market at Bushire for all articles of food and consumption which the shores of the Gulf can supply.

This must be done mainly by the Commissariat Department, but the General in command will have to consider how to contribute to it by fiscal or other arrangements at Bushire. The customs duties levied in the town, though arbitrary and unequal, and varying with the notion of the resident merchants, or of the importers from whom they are taken, are believed to be, on the whole, light. It will be a question whether they should not be reduced still lower to a general and nominal rate, or even altogether relinquished for a time. In this matter it will be necessary for Major-General Stalker to act upon his own judgment in the first instance.

As no Persian officer of higher authority than the Governor of Bushire is usually present in that part of the country, it is not probable that any overtures or communications of a political character will be addressed to the General in command of the force.

But if anything of this kind should be received by him, he will refer it to the Government of Bombay for communication to the Governor-General in Council, making no change meanwhile in his position at Bushire.

The Governor-General in Council is not aware that any further instructions are required at present. His Lordship is confident that Major-General Stalker will conduct the operations with which he has been entrusted with energy, discretion, and success, and that he may rely upon receiving from the Government of Bombay all the advice, assistance, and co-operation which it can afford.

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Basidu was ordered to be carefully protected, it being useful as a port of call and coaling station.

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No. 180, dated Bombay, 11th November 1856.

From—H. L. ANDERSON, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Secret Department,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Acknowledges receipt of letter on the subject of the selection of Bandar Abbás as the rendezvous of the British forces intended to operate against Persia, and states in reply that the objection against this arrangement mentioned by the Government of India appears to be equally applicable to Basidu, since His Highness the Imám of Mascát also holds from the Persian Government the island of Kishm on which Basidu is situated on terms similar to those on which he occupies Bandar Abbás.

Intimates that the Government does not deem it at all probable that the authorities either of Kishm or of Bandar Abbás will raise any objection on behalf of the Imám to the assemblage of the British fleet in their roadsteads, and the arrangement could not fairly be made a ground of complaint by Persia against His Highness, he having received no previous notice of the intention of the British Government to assemble its forces in the vicinity of Bandar Abbás, and being manifestly not in a position to oppose the arrangement, even if he had the inclination to do so.

States that a considerable number of steamers and transports had, before receipt of Government of India letter, left for Bandar Abbás, and it would, therefore, be impracticable now to alter the rendezvous.

Adds that copies of the Government of India Proclamations have been addressed to the Imám, showing that hostilities against his territories are not contemplated; and as he is now at Zanzibar, these will be forwarded to his son, Sayyid Soweyni, the Governor of Mascát.



From the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Secret Department, to General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Field Force,—No. 477, dated Bombay, 11th November 1856.

Forwards instructions of the Governor-General in Council relative to the expedition, and requests him to address all correspondence connected with the political complications which may arise on the occupation of Bushire to the Secret Department, and all correspondence connected with discipline and interior economy to the head-quarters of the army.

Intimates that Commander Jones, the present Resident in the Persian Gulf, will be instructed to place his services at the General's disposal as Political Agent, and authorizes him to expend such sums as secret service money as may seem to be necessary in order to conciliate the various tribes around Bushire.

From the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Secret Department, to Rear-Admiral Commanding Naval Force, Persian Gulf Expedition,—No. 480, dated Bombay, 11th November 1856.

Intimates that the Governor-General in Council has stated that the first object prescribed for the expedition is the seizure of the island of Kháraj and of the town and district of Bushire on the mainland, and that the military and naval operations by which this object is to be effected are to be left to the guidance of General Stalker and the Admiral.

Points out that if a summons to the Government of Bushire to surrender the town should be rejected, it will be necessary that possession of the place be obtained with as little loss of life, and, having regard to the future, with as little injury to property as possible. Adds that on the occupation of the town, the chief authority will devolve on General Stalker, and requests him to co-operate heartily with the General in the performance of his important duties.

Foreign Office Despatch to the Board of Control,—dated 19th November 1856.

States that the withdrawal of Her Majesty's mission from Persian territory renders it expedient that Sir James Outram should be entrusted, if necessary, with the conduct of any negotiations. Remarks that General Outram will receive instructions for his guidance in his military capacity from the Government of India, but that Her Majesty's Government consider it desirable that he should be apprized that the measures of coercion they have had recourse to are to be strictly limited to bringing the Persian Government to take a just view of its position, and renounce for the future schemes of aggrandisement hostile to England, and to adopt a more becoming line of conduct towards Her Majesty's mission at the Court of the Sháh.

Points out that Her Majesty's Government do not seek to subvert the dynasty of the Sháh, or to encourage rebellion, &c.; but they would not hesitate to avail themselves of the aid of independent tribes.

Remarks that Sir J. Outram will have been fully informed of the particulars of the rupture, and that he will have seen that the reparation and security to be obtained are twofold in their character.

"The most important point by far, unquestionably, is to put an end to the ambitious projects of Persia in the direction of Afghánistán, and so to obtain security from foreign aggression for the countries bordering on British India. Besides this condition *sine quâ non*, it is a matter of great moment, with a view to the permanence of friendly relations between the British and Persian Governments, and to the discouragement of attempts which might be made at Tíhrán to produce distrust and dissension between the two countries, that the Persian Government should be made to feel that it cannot



"with impunity show disrespect to the British Minister, or infringe upon the rights and privileges of British subjects, and refuse to do justice to their well-founded claims."

Points out that Sir J. Outram will learn by telegraphic despatch of 25th October, and communication delivered by Her Majesty's Ambassador to the Persian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, the nature of the reparation with which Her Majesty's Government were then disposed to be satisfied.

Since that time, however, the British Government has been repeatedly insulted and British subjects wronged, and for all these acts some public redress must be given by the Court of Persia.

States that Mr. Murray will be instructed to communicate any information he possesses to Sir J. Outram, and that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople will be directed to discontinue his communications with the Persian authorities, who must address themselves to Sir J. Outram, the sole direction of all military and political questions as regards Persia having been exclusively confided to him.

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Foreign Office Despatch to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe,—dated 19th November 1856.

Remarks that nothing having been heard from him since the 3rd instant? It is concluded that he has not arranged terms with the Persian Ambassador. Informs him that the direction of all negotiations has been confided to Sir J. Outram. Therefore instructs him to break off any negotiation in which he may be engaged, unless there is a prospect of its being brought to an immediate and satisfactory conclusion.

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Conditions imposed on the Persian Government.

The Sadr-i-Azam to write in the Sháh's name a letter to Mr. Murray expressing his regret at having uttered and given currency to the offensive imputations upon the honor of Her Majesty's Minister, requesting to withdraw his own letter of 19th November and the two letters of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 26th November, one of which contains a rescript from the Sháh respecting the imputation upon Mr. Murray, and declaring in the same letter that no such further rescript from the Sháh as that enclosed herewith in copy was communicated, directly or indirectly, to any Foreign Missions at Tihrán.

A copy of this letter to be communicated officially by the Sadr-i-Azam to each of the Foreign Missions at Tihrán, and the substance of it to be made public in that capital.

The original letter to be conveyed to Mr. Murray at Baghdád by the hands of some high Persian officer, and to be accompanied by an invitation to Mr. Murray in the Sháh's name to return with the Mission to Tihrán, or His Majesty's assurance that he shall be received with all the honors and consideration due to the representative of the British Government, another person of suitable rank being sent to conduct him as Mehmándah on his journey through Persia.

Mr. Murray, on approaching the capital, to be received by persons of high rank deputed to escort him to his residence in the town.

Immediately on his arrival there, the Sadr-i-Azam to go in state to the British Mission, and renew friendly relations with Mr. Murray, leaving the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to accompany him to the Royal Palace, the Sadr-i-Azam receiving Mr. Murray and conducting him to the presence of the Sháh. At noon on the following day, the British flag to be hoisted under a salute of twenty-one guns, and the Sadr-i-Azam to visit the Mission

immediately afterwards, which visit Mr. Murray will return at latest on the following day before noon.

Satisfaction being thus given and friendly relations restored, the settlement of the questions of Herát, of Mirzá Háshim, and of his wife remains to be stated.

Should Herát be occupied by the Sháh's troops, His Majesty to engage to withdraw them without delay. Should that city be in any way menaced, though not occupied by the Sháh's troops, His Majesty to engage not to allow them to occupy it on any account; in either case the engagement being solemnly given. The British Mission to defer to His Majesty's wish, if renewed, respecting Mirzá Háshim by not insisting on his appointment at Shíráz; the Mirzá's wife, however, to be restored to him, and himself to enjoy the security, emoluments, and position offered by the Persian Government in a former stage of the question.

The whole of the correspondence respecting Mirzá Háshim may then be mutually withdrawn and cancelled, it being understood that no objection will be made by the Persian Government to the appointment, as heretofore, of a British correspondent at Shíráz till that and other matters can be finally arranged by a suitable convention.

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Secret Despatch from the Board of Directors, Hon'ble East India Company, to the Governor of Bombay in Council,—No. 1685, dated London, 19th November 1856.

The Board deem it advisable that the expedition should be commanded by an officer who can also be implicitly entrusted with the important duty of conducting the negotiations which, it is hoped, will speedily follow the military demonstrations. Their choice has fallen on Sir James Outram, and the Queen has been pleased to grant him the local rank of Lieutenant-General. States that General Outram has received full instructions, and it is hoped that every assistance will be afforded to him in the constitution of his staff and with respect to his allowances, &c.

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Secret Despatch from the Board of Directors, Hon'ble East India Company, to the Governor of Bombay in Council,—No. 1690, dated London, 24th November 1856.

If the occupation of Bushire should not at once have the effect of inducing the Sháh to express his readiness to withdraw all pretension to sovereignty over any portion of Afghánistán (and the most recent advices from Tíhrán represent him as boasting that he was unshaken in his designs for the annexation of Herát), it will, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, be necessary to threaten, at any rate, an advance into the interior of the country.

2. Sanitary considerations would also render it advisable not to retain the European portion of the troops in the neighbourhood of Bushire. With a view, therefore, both to strategy and to health, Her Majesty's Government think that we must, at as early a date as may be practicable, take possession of Shustar on the river Kárún.

3. In order to maintain the menace above mentioned, it will be advisable to keep adding by degrees to our force in the Persian Gulf.

4. Her Majesty's Government believe, moreover, that to occupy Shustar would very much facilitate the organization of the Arab levies, for whose services, if hostilities are prolonged, we shall have continued need.



5. But for the purpose of occupying Bushire and Shustar, of threatening Shíráz and Isfahán, and of keeping open the communications of the army, a considerable addition to the British troops is requisite. Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram calculated the necessary addition at not less than three regiments of native infantry, with some artillery, and at least one regiment of irregular cavalry. The cavalry are, according to his judgment, required not only as a force essentially necessary in themselves, but as a nucleus whereon to form the larger body of horsemen to be raised on the spot. For this purpose General Outram is most anxious to have the services of the Sind Horse, with those of their gallant and energetic leader; and he has suggested that Colonel Jacob should be placed in command of the whole of the cavalry employed in the present operations. You will, we doubt not, give due weight to any representation made to you by General Outram.

Minute by the Right Hon'ble the Governor of Bombay in Council,—dated the 24th December 1856.

*Concurred in by the Council.*

The orders of the Hon'ble the Secret Committee conveyed to us in their letters of the 19th and 24th ultimo must be responded to on our part with promptitude and vigour.

The range of operations against Persia has been extended. We are no longer restricted to the occupation of Bushire and Kháraj. We are to take possession of Shustar and Muhammarah, and to threaten from these points Shíráz and Isfahán.

Sir James Outram has given me a memorandum of the reinforcements which he considers necessary to enable him to carry out the views of Her Majesty's Government. He proposes that these reinforcements shall form a separate division, the force already despatched remaining at Bushire and in its neighbourhood.

I append a memorandum\* of the additional force required. It will, of course, be necessary to solicit the immediate orders of the Government of India upon these reinforcements; but as time is of the utmost importance, I think that we must take upon ourselves to anticipate their sanction so far as to engage the additional shipping which will be required (beyond the number of transports already taken up and expected to return shortly from Bushire) for the conveyance of the cavalry and artillery horses, to order the preparation of all commissariat supplies for the increased force, and to direct the march of one of the regiments of Sind Horse to Káráchí. I have, indeed, already warned Colonel Jacob, in a private letter which I sent by the steamer yesterday, that his services, and those of one of his regiments, would be needed.

*\* Artillery.*

1 troop Horse.  
1 company Foot.  
Mountain trains.

*Cavalry.*

Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons.  
1 regiment Sind Horse.  
Arab Levies.

Under Colonel Jacob.

*Infantry.*

78th Highlanders.  
3 regiments Native Infantry.

*Engineer Department.*

1 company Madras Sappers.

*Baggage Corps.*

4 Captains and 12 Subalterns to be placed at Colonel Jacob's disposal to officer the Arab Levies.

It is a question whether this large additional force can be supplied by this presidency without assistance from Madras or Bengal. I have great confidence

in the peaceable disposition and general contentment of our population; but it is never safe to leave the country without troops, and it is never advisable to harass and overwork the troops. For these reasons, I think that we should ask the Government of India to supply the place of at least two of

- 1 Her Majesty's 64th.
- 1 Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders.
- 1 Hon'ble Company's 2nd Europeans.
- 4 regiments Native Infantry.
- 2 Belûch battalions.

— 9 regiments Infantry, of which 3 are European Infantry.

the nine regiments of infantry which we shall have despatched to the Persian Gulf, and to allow us to bring down a wing of Her Majesty's 83rd Regiment from Deesa to the Deccan. I would further ask for a horsed

battery of artillery or a troop of horse artillery, whichever can be most conveniently spared, and for a company of sappers, which is included in Sir James Outram's memorandum. I think that we should receive immediate authority to complete the whole of our infantry regiments to 800 men; without this the duty will fall very heavily upon the sepoys. Under ordinary circumstances I should have waited for the opinion of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief before expressing my own upon these points, but they appear to me to be of such urgency and importance that I do not think I should be justified in delaying for a single moment to bring them to the notice of the Board and of the Government of India. With every exertion that we can make, I fear that the cold weather will be nearly over before the second division can reach Shustar.

No. 7, dated 8th January 1857.

From—MAJOR J. HILL, Commanding Engineer, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,  
To—The Assistant Quarter Master General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

*Estimate of force required for expedition to Shustar.*

The following points will have to be considered in the preparation of the estimate, viz.:

- (1) What garrison will be sufficient to leave at Bushire.
- (2) What force will be sufficient for the expedition to Shustar, including the posts it may be found necessary to leave to keep up the communication between that place and the sea, and also for protecting our right flank and rear from the direction of Bihbahan, Râm Hurmuz, and Dôrâk.
- (3) Ordnance and Engineer Parks.
- (4) Commissariat Department.
- (5) Land Transport Department.
- (6) Sea and River Transport.

With regard to the garrison to be left at Bushire, the only difficulty is the supply of water, which at present is only found at  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the town. There is a tank in the town which would contain sufficient for a garrison of 1,200 men for three months, but in case of a blockade there would be no supply for the inhabitants. To meet this contingency, it will be necessary to leave a garrison of 1,650 men, divided in the following manner:—

450 infantry and 50 artillery to garrison a fort to be constructed on the commanding ground over the wells.

75 infantry and artillery to garrison a strong redoubt between the fort and the town of Bushire to ensure the communication not being cut off.

750 infantry, 50 artillery, and 200 cavalry to garrison the town of Bushire itself.

The brig *Euphrates* and two gunboats to command the creek and cover the approach to the town from the land side.



There can be no doubt that this arrangement will effectually secure the safety of Bushire, but ample time must be given for the construction of the proposed works, as the ground is rocky. Seamen might be substituted for artillerymen, as the latter would be much needed with the expedition to Shustar.

*2ndly.*—What force will be required for the expedition to Shustar.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.
To garrison Muhammarah at the entrance of the river and guard the depôts, one regiment Native Infantry.	800	.....	4 ships' guns and 50 seamen.
To garrison Dórák, 30 miles from Muhammarah, situated near the head of a creek branching from the left bank of the Kárún, 8 miles above Muhammarah, one regiment Native Infantry.	800	200	A battery of 9-prs. with Golundauze.
To garrison Ahwáz, 2 regiments Native Infantry. (The country between Ahwáz and Dórák is described as a desert.)	1,500	400	A battery of 9-prs. with Golundauze.
To garrison Band-i-Kír at the confluence of the Ab-i-Gargar canal with the Kárún. (The country between Ahwáz and Band-i-Kír also described as a desert.)	400	.....	2 medium ships, 32-prs. manned by seamen.
To besiege Shustar ...		2 squadrons Dragoons.	2 troops Horse Artillery.
6,000 Europeans ... } 3,000 Natives ... }	9,000	1,000 Native Cavalry.	3 European Light Field batteries.
Total ...	12,500	300 Europeans. 1,600 Native Cavalry.	2 troops Horse Artillery. 5 batteries, besides ships guns.

200 men Reserve Artillery.

4 companies of Sappers and Miners.

*Ordnance Park.*

## Siege train—

18-pounders ...	10	} With 600 rounds of shot and shell per gun and mortar, with proportion of other ammunition.
8" howitzers...	6	
8" mortars ...	4	

Gun platforms and all other requisites for the siege train will, as a matter of course, be provided for by the Ordnance Department.

*Engineer Park.*

Eight Engineer officers, exclusive of those with the Sappers and Miners, thirty carpenters and ten smith's forges, a full proportion of entrenching, cutting, sapping and mining tools, laboratory stores, carpenter's and smith's tools, miscellaneous stores, such as sandbags, scaling ladders, &c., drawing and surveying instruments. Pontoon equipment from Púnah, seven rafts. In addition to this, superstructure will be required for 100 yards of bridge.

It may be presumed that river boats will be procurable on the Kárún river, or, if not, they must be obtained from Bassorah and Baghdád, these being required for carrying stores up the river as well as for the bridge.

Carriage for about 25 tons of engineer park stores, exclusive of the pontoon and bridge equipments.

*Commissariat Department.*

The Assistant Commissary-General will furnish reports of the manner in which he proposes provisioning the above force. It would appear that the navigation of the Kárún is not difficult for small craft. We may therefore take advantage of it to convey a great portion of our supplies, stores, &c., and depôts may be established at Ahwáz and Band-i-Kír in addition to that at Muhammarah.

*Land Transport Department.*

This, it is supposed, will be shortly placed under the superintendence of the officers who are expected to join the force from Bombay for the express purpose of organizing a Land Transport Corps. The number of baggage animals required will, however, be comparatively small in consequence of water carriage being available for the heavy stores, &c.

*Sea and River Transport.*

The Commodore Commanding Persian Gulf Squadron should be called on to furnish a report on this subject. The only thing connected with it requiring any remark from me is the urgent necessity of procuring the aid of some of the lightest steamers and flats from the river Indus to be employed on the Kárún, which, it is believed, is navigable for vessels drawing not over 5 feet water to Ahwáz, and for vessels drawing less considerably higher.

\* In the foregoing, I have, I believe, enumerated all the forces and departments requiring organization in order to ensure a successful expedition against Shustar.

\* These estimates are framed upon the idea that Shustar is a walled fortress, and not practically an open town commanded by elevations within easy cannon range. The force is considerably over-estimated.—*M. S. B.*  
For corrections, refer to *Gazetteer of Persia*.

Considering the distance of Shustar from the sea coast, the comparatively unknown nature of the country, our limited knowledge of the forces the enemy could bring to oppose us, and the necessity of keeping up strong posts of communication with our rear, I do not think I have over-estimated the force required. A portion of this, amounting to two European and three Native regiments, a troop of horse artillery, two European field batteries, two companies sappers and miners, and 350 cavalry, the force already here, would proceed from this, their places being taken by 1,275 infantry and 200 cavalry of the force which is to come from Bombay.

Gunboats would be valuable stationed at Ahwáz, Band-i-Kír, and Muhammarah, and in case of the banks of the Kárún proving to be fertile instead of desert, it will be necessary to have a considerably larger and moveable force at Ahwáz, and in such case it may be matter for consideration whether Dórák might not be left with a much smaller detachment placed in a strong position merely to watch the road, and the bulk of the force proposed for that post joined with the post at Ahwáz.

I add a rough estimate of the probable force that would be required to go to Shíráz by Fírúzábád. The easiest way of forcing our passage would be to seize the first pass, and establish a depôt at the nearest good watering place in front of it. From this depôt it would be necessary to render the road to the foot of the next pass practicable for artillery; the pass might then be forced, and a second depôt established.

In this manner, by establishing depôts about 40 miles apart, and improving the road as we advance, all difficulties on the route might be surmounted. It would be necessary to leave 1,500 men with each depôt in our rear to guard the stores and keep our communications open. Taking all the difficulties of the route into consideration, the same force as set down for the Shustar expedition would suffice. On the march from Bushire to the valley of Shíráz little baggage should be taken; and as, when there, we should have the entire command of the Shíráz and Bushire road, the troops guarding the depôts might be reduced to 500 men each, and the army before Shíráz strengthened by those withdrawn.



## APPENDIX C.

### INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED RELATING TO BUSHIRE AND MUHAMMARAH AND THE ADJACENT COAST DISTRICTS.

Confidential Circular Memorandum containing approximate replies to a number of questions put by the Bombay Military Staff Officers in communications they addressed to Captain Jones, I.N., on 28th September 1856.

*Grain and provisions.*—Wheat and barley are procurable in considerable quantities at the Persian ports to the north of Bushire, more particularly at Hindián, Dilám, Gúnáwá, and Bandar Ríg.

In the Rohilla districts much also is to be found. The country to the south of Rohilla yields likewise large supplies of these grains. To the north I should say some 500 *konus* of each could be collected in a short time. To the south two-thirds of that quantity.

Ahrám and Khórmúj, distant from this port 7 and 12 farsakhs respectively, boast flour mills, and it is at these places that is ground the bulk of the wheat converted by the inhabitants of the neighbourhood into flour. The streams the above inland villages are situated on are at all times sufficiently powerful to enable the mills to keep working. Wheat and barley abound at Bassorah, but the Persian produce is superior, and proportionately dearer.

*Kah*, or straw, for bullocks and horses generally plentiful in the country. *Sheep* are principally brought from the Bihbahán district, Kúhgehlú, and the hills inhabited by the Bakhtiári Iliyáts. They are plentiful enough. Probably from 9,000 to 10,000 could be collected, when demand was excessive, in the space of two months.

*Oxen.*—Somewhat scarce. One thousand head of oxen could perhaps be procured from different places round Bushire, and not far in the interior, in 50 or 60 days.

*Ghee* chiefly brought from Bihbihán. From 400 to 500 kegs, each weighing 120 lbs. more or less, could probably be obtained in a month.

*Vegetables* generally scarce; onions plentiful; rice scarce.

*Firewood* exceedingly scarce in the neighbourhood of Bushire. Must all be procured from sea. It superabounds between Khumir and Suft in Kishm.

*Baggage animals.*—Few mules round Bushire to be obtained either for purchase or on hire. In Borasján a very limited number could be procured. In the Bihbahán, Kazrán, and Shíráz districts collectively perhaps 500 mules could be got together for purchase in three months. Their selling price would average from 25 to 35 tománs a head (Rs. 100 to Rs. 140). On hire it is impossible to state even approximately how many of these animals could be collected. I may observe, however, for your information the system that obtains in respect to charges for their hire. For every 100 Tabríz maunds they carry, the party hiring the mules would pay the sum of 20 krans, and on each mule would be laden an average weight of 4 maunds.

Asses would mostly carry a load of half that weight, and could be hired at 7 or 18 krans per 100 Tabríz maunds to be carried.

Asses are pretty plentiful. I dare say 1,000 head could be collected for hire in two or three months from Fírúzábád, Maimún, Kazrán, and the low country adjacent to Bushire. The general price of an ass may be stated at 25 krans.



*Camels.*—From 400 to 500 could perhaps be procured in two or three months between Borasjân and Bushire.

*Equipments for baggage animals.*—It is generally understood these are not kept in large quantities ready made up, but in Bihbahân, Kazrân, and Shîrâz *jhûldars* abound, who could speedily make up as many as might be ordered. The majority of the baggage animals, I may observe, would possess their own equipments.

*Carriage for sick.*—An important consideration for ourselves, because seldom dreamt of in Persia. No such thing as a regular litter is made use of for the conveyance of an invalid on the simple line of march. The person sick, if a common soldier, would probably either remain behind or ride on a donkey, if he could get or steal one. If the invalids were entitled to more consideration from position or otherwise—for instance, the non-commissioned officer of highest grade—would either possibly be accommodated with a *kujâwa*, or some rude apparatus would be rigged up to convey him to his destination. A Persian of rank, however, such as a *sarhang* or *sartîp*, would ride comfortably in a *takht-rowân*. *Kujâwas* and *takht-rowans* ready made are scarce. The former are simple affairs, and could be quickly and easily got ready on the spot were the timber available. A supply, to commence with, should most certainly, however, be brought up.

*Small craft.*—Some 30 or 40 *buglas* are at this moment available in or close to Bushire harbour. This account includes those obtainable from ship hard by. They are tolerably adapted for plying between the ships and the shore. At Bârakî, a small port situate in a creek, distant from Bushire about 7 farsakhs and from Tangistân 40 or 50 more, could be found, besides 5 or 6 *bultîls* and 3 or 4 *ghachas*.

*Water and water mussacks.*—The water at the wells close to Bushire is exceedingly brackish, but those distant 3 or 4 miles from the town afford very good drinkable water. Further inland its quality varies considerably I am told.

I know that in some places it is anything but sweet, and incline to the belief that between Bushire and Shîrâz it is, on the whole, rather brackish than sweet. Simple boring apparatus for sinking fresh wells would be essentially necessary to a force advancing through Persia. Rain deposits, the accumulation of winter falls, are supposed to be plentiful at divers depths beneath the sedimentary strata, which are situated among the hollows in the country.

Ropes, blocks, and hides for buckets would also be in great requisition for the working of these wells. Every soldier should have in his possession a mussack or water skin. These might on emergency prove of invaluable service to him. They are light and portable, and are capable, when stuffed with fighting clothes, ammunition, and eatables, of conveying him and his musket across any unfordable river or torrent. By joining them in considerable numbers together, too, rafts would bear the weight of the heaviest guns and stores, and transport them in safety.

*A few general remarks.*—The natural resources of Persia, it will be observed, are, on the whole, extremely scanty. A British force coming up, therefore, to the Gulf should arrive having at its command everything necessary to start with. If permitted to venture an opinion, I should say not less than three months' provisions of every sort and kind should be within actual reach of every man in the force.

The probability is that, on the expiry of that period, supplies would be pouring in even from many of the coast towns in Persia. The low country presents no obstacle to artillery whatever, but once arrive at the passes, and inconceivable difficulties, I believe, present themselves; all the roads through the mountains between Bushire and Shíráz are said to be impracticable for artillery, save by the way of Fírúzábád. How far this may be true it is impossible to say.

Possibly enough, what are impracticabilities to Persians might prove to able pioneers mere works of great labour and difficulty.

All I can now observe is that guns of 18-pr. calibre have been brought down the passes by the Persians by that route, and that lighter fieldpieces are frequently taken to all parts of Persia.

A force destined to surmount these mountain difficulties should, however, it is clear, be amply provided with every appliance that might be requisite to move their guns over and out of trying positions. Indeed, more than the usual complement of such necessities should be supplied them. Once beyond the mountains, the roads are tolerably practicable, I am told, in every direction, save the east and north-east, which swarm with deserts untraversable by an army.

The following articles would be found particularly needful at first starting: Light millstones for grinding wheat, small military forges on trucks, a supply of pack saddles, suleetahs, and mule and horse equipments, wheelbarrows, carts; ambulances are not to be had in Persia, and might be of great service in the plains; and, finally, I would observe, considering the possibilities of our having from first to last to obtain the bulk of our supplies from the sea, it must be remembered that the tonnage required to keep up our depôts would necessarily be enormous.

I will conclude by noticing that the assistance to be derived in grains, edibles, and cattle from the coast of Oman, always excepting Mascat, must be looked upon as generally insignificant, and would at many places scarcely repay the trouble and expense of despatching vessels to receive it.

(Sd.) H. DISBROWE, *Lieutenant,*  
*Assistant Resident, Persian Gulf.*

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*Supplementary Remarks.*

Leechees are procurable in large quantities from Kazrán and Shíráz. Limes also to be obtained in abundance from the Oman coast, south of Khíri-Fakán, as far as Mascat.

Warm clothing fitted for the soldier decidedly scarce. Every man should arrive armed with apparel adapted to resist the effect of both wet and cold and not trust to obtain the needful in Persia.

Numdas could no doubt be collected in due course of time from the interior, and *abás*, warm and thick, are to be procured in the neighbourhood of Muhammarah; but for immediate use few or none would be available. Mesopotamia, so soon as the Arabs could be taught to perceive the advantages of a regular traffic, would probably afford a large supply of sheep, camels, oxen, buffaloes, and grain; but much tact, forbearance, and knowledge of Arab character would be requisite to deal successfully with the independents of these regions.

From MAJOR J. HILL, Commanding Engineers, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, to the Assistant Quarter Master General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,—No. 1, dated 1st January 1857.

Strongly recommends the supply of boring apparatus to the force, as the well water in Bushire is not drinkable, and a large force is required to guard the wells  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the town.

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Extract of a private letter from Captain Kemball, Political Agent, Baghdád, to Captain Felix Jones, I.N., Political Resident at Bushire,—dated 28th November 1856.

*Forts at mouth of Hafár river.*—These much spoken of forts constructed by the Persians are absolutely contemptible.

On either side of the Hafár river, there is a mud structure capable of mounting three or four guns, but differing only from the common mud forts of the Arabs in that it is pierced with embrasures, or apertures intended as such. On the Jazírah\* the defences are mere *sangars*.

\* Island opposite the Muhammarah river.

From their unfinished state one would suppose that the Persians had abandoned the construction as useless. All that we shall require is one or two small vessels constantly stationed on the spot to guard our commerce and suppress any propensity to plunder engendered in the minds of our quasi-Arab allies (for one and all declare themselves the servants of the *Ingleez*) by the arrival of the expedition.

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Memorandum on Muhammarah and the River Kárún, by Major-General Sir W. F. Williams.

In the event of hostilities being prosecuted against Persia on the part of the Indian Government by the capture of Bushire and the advance of a British army into the interior of Persia on the line of Shíráz and Isfahán, I consider a diversion through the Hafár canal and up the river Kárún to be highly desirable. Our means of annoyance would be very formidable, as we should be enabled through the agency of Indian officers speaking the Persian language to enlist into our service all the warlike inhabitants of the western slopes of the mountains of the Bakhtiáris and of Lúristán. These tribes are constantly at war with the Persian authorities, and the British agents acting from Muhammarah in the direction of Shápúr, Shustar, and Dizfúl, and from Baghdád in the direction of Karínd and Karmánsháh, would with ready money rally round their standards vast numbers of hardy foot and admirable horsemen. The climate of Muhammarah from the month of June to October is very deadly to Europeans. During the remainder of the year, it is well adapted for the operations of warfare. The Hafár is navigable up to the quay of Muhammarah for the largest sloops of war, and two or three well placed redoubts would protect any depôt established at the town of Muhammarah. During the hot months, these forts should be guarded by sepoys and Arabs in our service, while our European troops should be encamped in the hills to the east of Shustar and Dizfúl, where my camps have passed the summer.

Large supplies of buffaloes and sheep can always be had from the Arabs for ready money; and wheat and barley by timely precautions can be floated down the Tigris from Mosul and Baghdád, and down the Euphrates from Hillah and other cities. Two or three small steamers upon these rivers could



be advantageously employed in towing and guarding these supplies, and with respect to land carriage, almost any amount of camels can be with ready money procured from the neighbouring tribes.

With reference to the navigation of the Kárún, small steamers can run between Muhammarah and the bund of Ahwáz during the winter and spring. Great numbers of Arab boats from the Tigris and Euphrates can always be procured for ready money, especially the canoes of the Baní Lám Arabs, who keep up their own internal communication through the great inundation by these means of transport, which is never interrupted by sand banks and want of water in these rivers. As the whole population of Persian Arabistán, as well as the aforementioned mountaineers of Lúristán, &c., detest the Persian rule, I consider that operations judiciously undertaken, and followed up in this direction, would cause greater inquietude—indeed terror—at Tihrán than even the capture of Bushire.

In fact Muhammarah is a point of such vital importance that I should recommend both the Imperial and Indian Governments never to lose sight of it, either in the present conjuncture, or in a general scheme of future political combinations.

Dated Bushire, 3rd January 1857.

From—J. E. TAYLOR, Esq., Vice-Consul at Basrah,

To—The LIEUTENANT H. BALLARD, C.B., In charge Intelligence Department,  
Bushire.

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The climate of Muhammarah is unhealthy, although boasting of water unequalled in any port of Turkey or Persia. Its situation is, however, favorable in other respects; and situated as it is, on the banks of the Hafár, which is capable of admitting ships of a large burden close to the walls of the town, it is the port for Shustar, Dizfúl, and the surrounding district, as well as an *entrepôt* for the pastoral tribes of Southern Arabistán, for the disposal of their produce and the supply of their wants. The grain grown in the neighbourhood and about Ahwáz is largely exported, and its quality is scarcely inferior to the best sorts obtained to the north of Baghdád.

The upper country as far as Shustar is proverbially fertile, and abounds in flocks of sheep. Shustar itself is a most desirable position. It is situated in a fertile basin, and its only drawback is the intense heat prevailing in summer. The town is walled, and there are about eleven guns in the place, capable, I understand, of being put in position. I am unaware of the number of field guns available there or with the Persian force in Lúristán and Arabistán; but it is well known that, in common with all Eastern nations, this arm is a favorite branch of their service, and we may safely calculate that in this respect the Persian army will not be deficient. The force at Shustar may still be estimated at 3,000 men and 11 guns; at Muhammarah, where reinforcements have arrived within the last ten days, there are now four fauj of Sarbáz amounting, should the fauj be complete, to 3,200 men; the whole force in Lúristán and Arabistán may still be computed at 11,000 men; but from the disturbed state of the tribes, and inefficient state of communication, I do not think one-half would be capable of concentration at Shustar and Dizfúl. I may add that considerable stores of provisions have been collected between Muhammarah and Ahwáz, as also at Hawízah. The chief command of the troops at Muhammarah has been confided to Eller Mirzá, son of Khánlar Mirzá, the Prince Governor of Arabistán. His sartíps are Jábír Khán and



Hájí Isabir Khán; but the latter is not trusted, as I believe he is suspected of lukewarmness, if not treachery, to the Prince's cause. I enclose the list of Arab tribes called for.

*Arab Tribes tributary to the Persians.*

		Men.
K'áb.—Living on the banks of the Shatt-ul-Aráb, Kárún Feláhiyah, Jerrahi, Hindián, and Bahr-ul-Mashír	...	...
Aal Shatt-ul-Aráb	... The Muhaisin Shaikh Hájí Isabir-el-Mudan, divided into 16 divisions, viz., Al-bú Ferhan, Shaikh Hussain, Ebn Alf-ez-Ziara, and Hájí Sulbúkh	300
Aal ul Aveydh	... Shaikh Músa-ul-Múl Alí and Yúsuf-el-Ghanam, and Sayyid ebn Sayyid and Yustíf ebn Muhammad-el-Jassan, and Muhammad-el-Kenán	450
El Mattúr	... Shaikh Sufteh ebn Abd-el-Nehhí, and Abdúllah ebn Mal Allah, and Shenaneh ebn Hussain	450
El Hallálát	... Shaikh Sangúr ebn Mahmud and ebn Sirhan	200
El Morázijeh	... Shaikh Abbás ebn Abud-el-Dehlemme	50
El Derárijeh	... Shaikh Muhammad ebn Salem	40
Al-bú-Máref	... Shaikhs Naseh and Hashim, sons of Mír Saod ebn Mutruk	60
Al-bú-Mehsen	... Shaikh Hamíd ebn Ahmad	30
Mineyat	... Shaikh Khereh	30
El Ramdhan	... Shaikh Yúsuf ebn Muhammad	20
		<hr/> 1,630

*Pastoral Tribes of Muhaisin.*

Al-bú Atní, Baghlanieh, Hussainat, Zuneidat, Soweilát	...	300
El Aydan	...	50
Mo'áwiyah (at the Ismailiyah)	...	80
Aal-el-Hanaz	...	80
		<hr/> 510
Under Hájí Isabir	...	<hr/> 2,140

Nassar ... Two divisions.

*Jádúda and Mughala.*

Jádúda	... Shaikh Hamíd ebn Násir, Serban ebn Hamíd, Saleh ebn Salem.	...
Mughala	... Shaikh Darwesh ebn Seleh, Ibrahim ebn Manid, and Ahmad ebn Guthban	1,000
Idris	... Shaikh Súlaimán ebn Guthban, and Músa-el-Jendíl (refugees in Turkish territory)	1,000
		<hr/> 4,140

*Small Tribes of Feláhiyah.*

Mujaddim	... Shaikh Rahmah ebn Muhammad-el-Sábi	200
El Khanáfírah	... Shaikh Hamdan	200
El Mushasekeh	... Shaikh Abdarideh	100
Al-bú-Ghubaish	... Shaikh Rayyid ebn Khalíl	100
'Asakirah	... Shaikh Zair Kraidi	100
Hazbah	... Shaikh Múl'Múlla ebn Nusrut	200
		<hr/> 900
	Carried over	...

		Brought over	...	900
<i>El Báwí.</i>				
El Báwí	... Shaikh of the whole Akhil ebn Dáod	...	...	200
	Muth Rúr ebn Rahmah Zobera and ebn Sameh and Muhaihes ebn Dáod	...	...	700
	Thaheyo ebn Dagher and his sons Asad, Hussain, and Ramadhi	...	...	600
El Newáser	... Shaikh Algum ebn Múlla	...	...	500
El Amár	... Shaikh Suwaití	...	...	300
El Zerkán	... Shaikh Khábir	...	...	300
El Humaid	... Shaikh Fudhl	...	...	500
El Sallámát	... Shaikh Shulahi	...	...	100
	Others exiled from the tribe, viz., Jábbir ebn Tullab and Murad ebn Súlaimán	...	...	200
				<hr/> 4,800 <hr/>
<i>El Amareh.</i>				
Bani Semím	... Shaikh Mír Míhúna ebn Rashad	...	...	500
	Mír Abdúllah and others	...	...	500
	Shaikh of Hindíán Sayyid-el-Abdúllah	...	...	300
	All Bandar Mashhúr Sayyid Muhaihes	...	...	100
	Small scattered tribes in number	...	...	1,000
				<hr/> 10,840 <hr/>

These Arabs have amongst them about 7,000 muskets and about 3,000 horses.

The proportion of armed men is equal in each tribe, but the Báwí tribe have the largest proportion of horse, say 1,500, and they are capital horsemen, and well armed with a small Persian carbine, pistols, and sword.

Their horses are of good breed and well trained.

Amongst the above tribes are 5,000 camels, 100,000 sheep, and 3,000 buffaloes; the latter principally about Muhammarah.

#### *Arab Tribes about Hawízah subject to Persia.*

Es' Sakieh Shaikh Shellahi ebn Mir Sayyid	...	300
Es' Saadeh-Ahl-el Turf Shaikh Sayyid Abd ebn Sayyid Hamid	...	300
Ab-el-Kuat Shaikh Assad ebn Háji Abbás	...	200
Nees Shaikh Alí Khán ebn Shaikh Hamid	...	200
Sein Seleh Shaikh Sayyid ebn Sahin	...	800
Esh' Shurrufa Shaikh Abbás-el Hamíd	...	800
El Hurdan Shaikh Shaiyaa-el Misser Allah	...	300
El Qataa Shaikh Abd-es' Saeed	...	400
El Echresh Shaikh Bertan ebn Ghuleb and Chemyan ebn Hussain	...	600
Villages under Sayyid Isa, Músa, and Muhammad, sons of Sayyid Shebí	...	1,500
Beni Hurruf Shaikh Abbas-el-Abd Allah and Metani ebn Sendal	...	800
Es' Suaree Shaikh Sueydej-ibn Abu Hemdee	...	400
Es' Sondan Shaikh Qataa-el Abd Allah	...	1,000
Albu Ghurba Shaikh Aswed ebn Shebí and Sufteh-el-Hamadeh	...	400
Bereyha	...	200
Total		<hr/> 8,600 <hr/>

These Arabs have 2,000 horses, 2,000 camels, 20,000 sheep, 1,000 buffaloes.

*Arabs about Shustar.*

El Anafeja Shaikh Mughames ez' Zeudi and his son Mutlub Aban Maileh

These have—

Men	...	...	...	3,000
Horses	...	...	...	500
Camels	...	...	...	1,000
Sheep	...	...	...	10,000 (underrated.)

*Arabs about Dizful.*

El Kethir Shaikh Fares-el-Hashi.

These have—

Men	...	...	...	4,000
Horses	...	...	...	1,000
Camels	...	...	...	1,500
Sheep	...	...	...	12,000 (underrated.)
Buffaloes	...	...	...	5,000

Under Persian rule, or in Persian territory—

These have—

Men	...	...	...	25,440
Horses	...	...	...	6,500
Camels	...	...	...	9,500
Buffaloes	...	...	...	9,000
Sheep	...	...	...	142,000 (underrated.)

No. 3, dated 5th January 1857.

From—LIEUTENANT J. TRONSON, I.N., Commanding Corvette *Falkland*,

To—The Assistant Resident, Persian Gulf.

I have the honor to submit the following observations made by me during our recent cruise to northern parts.

Sháh Abúl Sháh is the commencement of the Hindíán territory, and at present has a blood feud with the people of Bandar Dilám. Its position on the chart is incorrect: instead of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Bandar Dilám, it is 6 miles. The soundings are most regular in Dúhat Dilám, but they are one fathom less than marked on the chart. The soundings gradually decrease to about one fathom, a quarter of a mile from shore.

The rise and fall five days past the new moon was from 7 to 8 feet. The water is very smooth, and the bay would afford good shelter to ships in a nor'-wester, and tolerably good in a south-easter, if, for the latter, it did not blow to the southward of south-south-east. The best anchorage is with Bandar Dilám bearing east in  $3\frac{1}{2}$  to 4 fathoms.

The wells which supply Bandar Dilám with water are situated one mile to the northward of the place, and are protected by a large fort called Bandar Hamid. At  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Tonara the wells are situated, and the natives say that extensive ruins extend in that distance from the beach. There is a remarkable tree here which is a good mark for making the place. We were at anchor in three fathoms mud, with town north-east, distant about 1 mile. At Bandar, Ríg we anchored with the Shaikh's house N.  $39^{\circ}$  E., entrance to creek E.  $11^{\circ}$  N. in 3 fathoms; the latter  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles distant.

At Khúr Hussaini, anchored with the village of the same name N.  $65^{\circ}$  E. Rohilla S.  $77^{\circ}$  E. about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles off shore.

A remarkable clump of trees S.  $75^{\circ}$  E. The bearings taken of Kháraj at these places placed them 6 miles to the north of their position on the chart.



The soundings along the coast appear to be very correct, but the line of coast is a good deal out, being in some parts  $1\frac{1}{2}$  too far west.

Extract from report by LIEUTENANT H. DISEROWE, Assistant Political Agent to the Force, Persian Gulf,—dated "Berenice," 6th January 1857.

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It remains for me now to offer a few remarks on the subject of Dilám, Hindián, and Bihbahán, their resources for supporting an army and so forth.

Bihbahán, from the enquiries I instituted, must be exceedingly fertile, and, one would imagine, perfectly capable of administering to the wants of a large force.

Grain, fuel, and live stock plentiful. Water too abounds, and a stream, on which numerous watermills are worked, flows in the neighbourhood of the city. When rain fails too, recourse is had to irrigation. Artificers, more especially masons, are said to be plentiful.

From Dilám to Bihbahán, the roads are reported practicable for guns. In like manner from Hindián to Bihbahán, and at a point called Burdákhn, distant some 8 or 9 miles from the Dilám anchorage, the Hindián river is said to be not further from the beach than 3 to 4 miles. The road, too, up to Hindián town is reported exceedingly easy and flat. This, then, if operations were contemplated in that quarter, would appear to be an eligible spot for landing the forces. Distance from Burdákhn to Hindián 8 farsakhs. Hindián district must be fruitful.

Zaitún, a kind of central position between Hindián, Dilám, and Bihbahán, is also productive and watered by a river. Zaitún, too, abounds in dense jungles of trees yielding firewood.

Dilám itself is not productive, the bulk of the grain that is brought to it coming from Zaitún, Kúhmareh, and Bihbahán.

Dated 10th January 1857.

From—COMMANDER J. SELBY, I. N., Commanding *Comet*, and Surveyor in Mesopotamia,

To—LIEUTENANT H. BALLARD, C.B., In charge Intelligence Department, Bushire.

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter with queries attached, and in reply to send you the accompanying answers.

Q. 1.—Much doubt has been thrown on the salubrity of Muhammarah during the hot weather. Do you retain your opinion regarding its possessing a good climate?

A.—I am still of opinion that the immediate vicinity of Muhammarah, on the banks of the Kárún, possesses a good climate as compared with all adjacent country south of Kúrna; and why? The groves of date trees on which Muhammarah itself stands, with irrigating ditches filled and emptied by flow and reflux of tide, together with other cultivation, only extends along banks of Kárún at most 2 miles above Muhammarah. There pure air of the desert and dry soil commence. Again, the water at Muhammarah, from July to October inclusive, is that which drains from the marshes between Súk-es-Shaikh and Bassorah, divested of all vitality by probably six months' stagnation, and heated, as I have proved, to a temperature of  $94^{\circ}$  Fahr. The Kárún, on the other hand, in its short course of some 160 miles from the mountains, comes



almost pure; and, if I remember rightly, its temperature is seldom above  $82^{\circ}$ . With pure air, and cool, fresh, and excellent water, I seek in vain for causes of unhealthiness in the locality I refer to, say 5 miles *above* Muhammarah, on the banks of the Kárún.

At Bassorah three months ago, where the poorer classes drink the water of a muddy creek leading from river to town, and in which all filth is thrown, about 700 died of cholera out of a population of 5,000.

At Majíl, a large village on the river, about 3 miles from Bassorah, two inhabitants fell victims to it. I have mentioned in my memoir published among the Royal Geographical Society's reports that I attribute the healthiness of the *Assyria* crew under my command in 1842 to the fact that when duty called me to the vicinity of Bassorah, I always ran a few miles up Kárún rather than remain at that place. The medical returns of the vessel would attest the same if more proof is needed.

Q. 2.—Could large ships unload at any point (not necessarily a town or village) higher up the Kárún which might be more healthy?

A.—Six fathoms (36 feet) water are marked in my chart, some 6 miles above Muhammarah, more than sufficient for the largest vessels that could pass the Míán, a bar at the mouth of the Shatt-ul-Aráb or Bassorah river.

Q. 3.—Would the force of the current and windings of the river prevent the river steamers towing boats? If not, how many tons could a vessel like *Assyria*, with boats in tow, convey?

A.—The windings of the river and force of current would offer no obstruction to river steamers towing boats, even in the highest tide, as far as Ahwáz. Above this point, I find I made against a very strong current and high tide, on an average  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles an hour, and I remember I cut my own fuel as I went along. I have no doubt such a steamer as the *Comet* would tow a boat carrying 150 tons, herself laden to a certain extent (say 50 tons without her armament) at the lowest rate of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles per hour against the strongest current to be found south of Band-i-Kír; if not, a few trackers would overcome the difficulty.

From Band-i-Kír to Shustar by Ab-i-Gargar current not above three miles an hour.

Q. 4.—Does the river overflow its banks at any point?

A.—I was up the Kárún in the highest season, and did not find the river overflowing its banks; an extraordinary high rise might cause it to do so; and, indeed, I find a statement to that effect in my memoir, *viz.*, that in February (1842) the river overflowed its banks.

Q. 5.—Can troops march on both sides of the river uninterrupted by jungle, &c., &c.?

A.—Yes.

Q. 6.—What amount of supplies could be obtained below Shustar on the march, or would the troops have to depend on the river steamers for bringing up supplies from Muhammarah?

A.—The whole country about Shustar on the north and Feláhiyah on the south being grain-producing countries, it would entirely depend on the willingness or otherwise of the inhabitants. I myself confidently believe that as much grain and cattle would be brought in as an army would require.

The inhabitants of Band-i-Kír unroofed their houses to sell me the rafters for firewood at 5 krans the 1,000 lbs. The fact of ready money paid for their produce would have an effect which cannot be understood but by those who have been in this country.

Q. 7.—If the Persians tried to hold the plains of Ák Kala (from whence you state Shustar draws a large amount of grain), can it be approached by Baitavand, thus avoiding the difficult pass described by you? Is much barley grown on these plains.

A.—I cannot say whether Ák Kala can be approached by Baitavand, but this I know that before an English army was half way from Muhammarah to Shustar in hostility to Persia, the whole of Khúzistán would be in revolt, and the Bakhtiáris, who hold all the passes, would, I feel very confident, not be the last.

I don't know whether much barley in particular is grown on these plains, but I know that all grain is most abundant; vegetables also.

Dated 12th January 1857.

From—MAJOR R. TAYLOR, on special duty in Persia,

To—LIEUTENANT H. BALLARD, C.B., in charge Intelligence Branch, Bushire.

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The best place for collecting supplies preparatory to the occupation of Muhammarah in November would decidedly be Bassorah; but if the preparations be much earlier, no place seems at once safe and healthy nearer than Baghdád.

The quantity of supplies in the K'áb district is abundant, the transport about 4,500 camels. Baghdád and Bassorah could probably procure from 8,000 to 10,000 mules, and an equal number of camels with six months' notice. In the event of an advance on Shustar and a threatened attack from the rear, the most desirable point for a depôt or detachment would be Ah-wáz. It is remarkably fertile, and, being situated on the river, could, if required, be protected by steamers.

I take this opportunity of mentioning that since descending the Shatt-ul-Aráb a month ago, the Persians have been, and still are, working most industriously at Muhammarah. The fort on the northern side of the Hafár has been strengthened by stumps of date trees placed slanting against the wall, and the interstices filled up with earth after the manner of a buttress. It seemed pierced for three guns, at which point the wall did not exceed 3 feet in thickness; but the embrasures were diagonal, apparently with the object of firing the moment a steamer attempted to turn up the Hafár. They are also working very hard opposite the town. This is entirely new, and consists of a ditch and parapet on an old mound, or ruins of walls. There is no doubt that in a short time the place will be of considerable strength, but at present could easily be destroyed. The most desirable point for landing troops is on the island south of Muhammarah, anywhere between 5 and 10 miles. The water is deep under the bank, and the men would merely have to walk from the vessel to the shore. The garden walls are mostly in ruins, and the date trees scattered. No defences have been put up on this side.

If the landing be effected to the north, the ships would be exposed to fire in passing, and the ground now held by the regular infantry would be very difficult to carry, the date trees being much thicker than the south side, and walls in good order.

I have been informed that the insalubrity of Muhammarah is confined to the cultivated tracts, so that in all probability an eligible site might be found a few miles higher up the stream. There will be difficulty in bringing the camels from Bassorah, but they could be made to swim across—a mode occasionally adopted by the Arabs.

Dated Camp near Bushire, 12th January 1857.

Report by LIEUTENANT H. BALLARD, C.B., Superintendent, Intelligence Department, Bushire.

In compliance with the orders of the Major-General Commanding, I have prepared the following report regarding the countries through which a force marching on Shustar or Bihbahán respectively would have to pass; and although extremely imperfect, it seems desirable to furnish it at once, because many reports have been spread regarding the fertility of the country near the Kárún river, the correctness of which a more close examination renders doubtful. Unfortunately it is from natives alone that much of the information must come, as few Englishmen have explored these parts.

The points to be considered are—

1st.—The injury which an occupation of Khúzistán could inflict on the Persian Government.

2nd.—The facility with which we can carry out an expedition for that purpose.

The injury which would be inflicted on the Persian Government is a political question. It would chiefly arise from the effect which the presence of invaders would have on the turbulent population of the mountains. An occupation of Khúzistán itself would be but a small triumph compared to the difficulties attending it, and the disadvantages in a strategical point of view which attend a march to Shustar.

The province is thus described by Fraser:

"Khúzistán, the ancient Súsiana, which lies to the north-west of Fárs upon the northern bank of the Tigris, may be divided into two portions, essentially differing from each other in character and climate.

"The first extending from the shores of the Gulf to the hills bordering upon the fine valley of Rám Hormuz, and from the banks of the Sa'ab to the confluence of the Kárún and Dizfúl, is called the K'áb country. It is subject to an Arab Shaikh, who maintains a dubious independence in this miserable territory, by far the greater part of which is entirely desert, and during the heats of summer very dangerous from a scorching wind that, like the simoon, destroys both travellers and cattle. Only on the banks of the Hafár, or those of the Shatt-ul-Aráb and in the vicinity of Dórák, is there found any fertility, and there dates and rice are produced. Dórák, or rather Feláhiyah, built upon the site of the ancient Dórák by Shaikh Súlaimán, is a wretched place. It stands upon the banks of the Jaráhi, is about two miles in circumference, consists chiefly of date tree huts, is surrounded by a mud wall, and contains 7,000 or 8,000 inhabitants.

"The Shaikh's revenues amount to about £50,000 a year, and in 1809 he could bring 25,000 horse and 20,000 foot into the field."

Mr. Taylor, the Vice-Consul at Bassorah, in a carefully prepared memorandum entering into details, only estimates the adult male population of K'áb at 11,000, possessing 7,000 muskets and 3,000 horses, from which it would appear that the country is now even poorer than when Fraser wrote. Lieutenant Selby, who ascended the Kárún personally, marks the whole country (in a map published by him) along the banks of the Kárún, from the junction of the Kárún and Dizfúl to Muhammarah, as jungle and desert.

To continue from Fraser:

"The Government of Shustar, which is under charge of a Begler Beg, forms the second division, and comprises not only the fairest part of Khúzistán, but that which might be rendered the most productive province of Persia; but ignorance and oppression have reduced a country which once



yielded the best crops of cotton and sugar, of rice and grain, to a condition little better than a forsaken waste."

This account is exaggerated; there is a good deal of cultivation about Shustar and Dizfúl, but the subject will be considered further on under the head of supplies.

The superfluity of corn cannot be great, as the trade on the Kárún is small, and Muhammarah, the natural *entrepôt* for its produce, has an insignificant population and trifling trade.

Rawlinson.

Kemball.

The Baron de Bode estimates the revenue of Shustar (not including Dizfúl, but including Akíli, where most corn is grown) at £10,000.

The whole revenue of Khúzistán probably amounts to about £20,000.

I will now proceed to a more detailed account of the Kárún river and the requirements of an enemy advancing on Shustar, reserving a few remarks on the military advantages or disadvantages of the expedition for the conclusion.

Fortification of Muham- Previous to an expedition to Shustar, the town of marah. Muhammarah must first be seized.

The climate of Muhammarah is described as most unhealthy during the summer months; in fact uninhabitable for Europeans.

Climate.

Captain Selby, however, considers that by ascending the Kárún for a few miles, a more endurable climate could be obtained; even if it could not, the obstacle is not insurmountable, for an army would not assemble there before November, when the climate is healthy; and, after the advance, it might be entrusted to natives and some gunboats.

If Muhammarah is occupied this spring, it would still be better to form dépôts at Bassorah and Baghdad than there, because these places are in Turkish territory; and it would only be necessary to send a few officers and conductors to collect the supplies and means of transport, which could afterwards be transferred to Muhammarah.

An abundance of cattle for slaughter can be procured at Muhammarah, but there are different accounts of the amount of grain to be obtained in the immediate neighbourhood. The whole adult male population of the large district of K'áb only amounts to 11,000, a small proportion of whom are village Arabs. This fact alone would seem conclusive that no large quantity of grain can be grown; and Colonel Rawlinson, the highest authority on these subjects, states: "The country at the mouth of the Euphrates, although prolific in rice and dates, does not produce wheat and barley enough for the consumption of the inhabitants. Large supplies, however, might be obtained from Shustar down the Kárún, and from Mosúl and Baghdád down the Tigris. Mosúl is overflowing with corn, and could send any quantity down the river by rafts at a moderate price; that is, at half the average price that rules in India." These remarks were made regarding Bassorah in Turkish territory, only 40 miles from Muhammarah, so there would be no difficulty in arranging for an abundant supply to be brought down the Tigris to Shatt-ul-Aráb.

Supplies at Muhammarah.

The tribes of K'áb are said to possess 5,000 camels; a thousand of these might be available for inland transport; but if a depôt was made at Bassorah, they could be collected there in any numbers and taken across the river in rafts, as swimming camels is a troublesome business. The journey to Muhammarah could be accomplished by land in two days after crossing the river.

Land transport.



Colonel Rawlinson says "that in a few weeks he could collect from 10,000 to 20,000 camels, 2,000 mules, and 2,000 donkeys at Baghdád," and a number would be found near Bassorah itself. From Baghdád to Bassorah is 250 miles. Precautions must be taken for guarding the convoys along this route from the predatory tribes who infest the banks; but this would not be difficult.

Most of the horses sent to Bombay from Bassorah come by land from Baghdád.

On this important subject the authorities I have had access to are General Williams, Colonel Rawlinson, and Captain Selby. Major Estcourt has published a survey of the Kárún from Muhammarah to Ahwáz, which I beg to suggest be applied for from Government.

The ascent of the Kárún divides itself into three stages.

From Muhammarah to Ahwáz, where there is an ancient bund, past which steamers must be dragged by hawsers, is 80 miles. From Ahwáz to Band-i-Kír, where the Kárún and an artificial canal drawn from it higher up unite, 25 miles, and from Band-i-Kír to Shustar, which is most easily affected by the Ah-i-Gargar canal above mentioned, 35 miles. This is as troops march the windings of the river would add another 20 miles for steamers, or 160 miles in all.

Captain Selby ascended to within two miles of Shustar in the spring of 1842 with the steamer *Assyria*. He states that the river is navigable to Ahwáz at the lowest season for vessels drawing 5 feet water, and to Shustar all the year round for vessels drawing 4 feet.

General Williams says "small steamers can run between Muhammarah and Ahwáz during the winter and spring. Great numbers of Arab boats from the Tigris and Euphrates can always be procured for ready money, especially the boats of the Baní Lam Arabs, who keep up their own communications by these means, which is never interrupted by want of water in these rivers."

Colonel Rawlinson says another avenue into Persia may be supposed to be up the Kárún; but this I leave for the present out of consideration, as the river is only practicable for steamers during two months in the year.

As General Williams and Colonel Rawlinson must both have seen Lieutenant Selby's report, the conclusion is that neither of these experienced officers, who at the moment of writing had in view the passage of an army, considered it would be safe to trust to receiving supplies from Muhammarah during the low season by steam navigation. It would therefore be desirable to reach Shustar as early as possible after the beginning of the high season, in order that our requirements there might be known, and, as far as possible, provided for before the river began to fall.

There is plenty of fuel on the banks according to Lieutenant Selby. Until depôts were made some inconvenience would be found from the wood being green.

Fuel.

As káfilas move with ease along the banks, there seems no reason to apprehend any difficulty to troops marching. A creek on the left bank which runs up to Dórák would require a bridge of boats; it is from 15 to 20 yards wide.

Native authority and Lieutenant Selby.

From this creek (8 miles above Muhammarah) the country on both sides of the river is desert, or covered with brushwood and dwarf poplars as far as Ahwáz; there are only two villages, Idrísíah and Ismáíliáh, in this long distance. (See rough sketch No. 11.)

From the right bank to Hawízah the country is badly supplied with water, and thinly inhabited. On the left bank there is a large, but still scanty, population of nomad tribes. It may be

Native authority.

fairly conjectured that any cultivation would be found near the banks, and that the Arab tribes live chiefly by their flocks and herds. A supply of fresh meat, and at certain seasons green grass for the horses and mules, might be found; all the other necessities for an army must be brought from Muhammarah. We have no account by personal knowledge of Ahwáz, except from Lieutenant Selby, who indicates the country as a desert, which agrees with accounts I have had from natives. Mr. Taylor of Bassorah and Major Taylor say the country about Ahwáz is fertile; but this applies more to its capabilities, if cultivated, than present resources. The reports regarding its produce of corn probably arise from the fact that, owing to the bund across the river, all the corn brought from Shustar must here be transhipped from one boat to another, and there depôts of grain are made; hence the merchants at Muhammarah and elsewhere are accustomed to hear of their boats being laden at Ahwáz, and imagine the corn is grown there.

Lieutenant Selby's map From Ahwáz to Band-i-Kír, the banks of the river are in the same unprofitable state.

Kinneir "says from Ab-i-Zál and the Tigris to the river which I consider Gyndes on the western side, and from the banks of the Kárún to those of the Shatt-ul-Aráb, it is dreary and desolate, and from the eastern side of Shustar a lonely wild, upwards of 60 miles in extent, extends from that city to the entrance of the valley of Rám Hormuz.

"Even between Band-i-Kír and Dizfúl, just mentioned as the most flourishing part of the country, the corn when I visited Khúzistán in February 1810 was principally raised by the officers of Government, and the principal inhabitants of Shustar and Dizfúl."

Above Band-i-Kír the Kárún and Áb-i-Gargar canal enclose an island called the Mian-áb, 35 miles in length by 5 broad. A good deal of corn is grown on it; but this might be removed for the use of the garrison, and stored in Shustar before our arrival.

The chief supplies of grain are obtained from the plains of Ák Kala, 12 miles beyond Shustar, whence, says Lieutenant Selby, Shustar and a vast extent of adjacent country is supplied with corn. This would not be available before we had taken the town.

Shustar contains at present 8,000 inhabitants. Kinneir reckons them in his time at 15,000. When we have occupied it, there would be a sufficiency of food for the men; but if the cavalry and artillery force was large, we cannot feel confident of procuring forage, always scarce in the low country, where few horses and mules are used. If Shaikh Hákim Ibin Gheis at Dórak and his relative Hájí Jábír at Muhammarah could be bought over, it would save much trouble. The latter must, indeed, from self interest be friendly; and if it is necessary to coerce the former, a force could march from Muhammarah (while the Shustar expedition was preparing) to Dórak, 30 miles, following a creek by which small boats can go; but our communications would still be threatened from Bihbahán (described further on) in a manner which, even if the K'áb chief was our faithful ally, could not be disregarded, and would require a force to protect them. It will be seen by the sketch representing the supposed movements of the enemy's troops, appended to this report, that a formidable force could assemble on the K'áb frontier in our right rear, and we must be prepared to meet it before it approached the Kárún. Moreover, it is certain that we must have intercourse more or less intimate with some of the K'áb chiefs; and if they had been assisting us, the Persians would have little scruple in carrying out on the Arab tribes the horrible threats they have lately

issued to those near Bushire who might be found favoring the English. We would be bound to protect those people if our friends, and to have a strong guard over them if our enemies.

When that was settled, there would not be any fear of opposition till we reached Band-i-Kír; a well placed redoubt at the extremity of the Mian-áb would effectually bar the upward passage of our steamers and boats, and we should require a pontoon train to carry by land to some other point where the enemy were less prepared. Colonel Rawlinson once took guns across the Kárún on rafts supported by inflated skins, but this would not be safe in the presence of an enemy, and under any circumstances we must carry the superstructure for a bridge complete.

Supposing our progress stopped at Band-i-Kír, there would be two courses open—1st, to bridge the Áb-i-Gargar canal higher up; 2nd, to cross the Dizfúl river, where we would probably not be opposed, and then to cross the Kárún.

The following is Lieutenant Selby's account of the Áb-i-Gargar:

"Like all streams running through a similar soil, it is rather serpentine, and winds from side to side of the valley."

This valley is formed by steep marl cliffs, which gradually approximate, until, at the junction of the canal with the other rivers at Band-i-Kír, they form the immediate banks, and tower perpendicularly overhead to the height of 130 feet. The depth of the Áb-i-Gargar is nearly uniform, being in the channel from 12 to 18 feet; in the lowest season the breadth varies from 60 to 120 yards, with a current of not more than  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles an hour, till near Shustar.

This is clearly seen in the map, and it will probably be found easier to cross the Dizfúl and force the passage of the Kárún, where some deep re-entering angles and a command of position offer a facility for the manœuvre. The Dizfúl and Kárún, according to the map, are about the same size as the canal.

The Mian-áb occupied, there remains Shustar itself containing a garrison of 3,000 men and 11 guns, but which might be increased to 8,000. Small reinforcements of artillery could come from Bihbahán and Karmánsháh.

The town is thus described:

Shustar is built on a small hill, which rises gradually from the south-westward, and increases in elevation towards the citadel, which presents on the north-east side an abrupt face of 130 feet in height, having the river immediately beneath it.

Having the river on both sides, and on the other a wet ditch which might easily be put in order, the place itself, naturally strong, might be rendered sufficiently so to resist any other than a well appointed European force.

Shustar once taken, it would be necessary to follow up by occupying the plains of Ák Kala. The direct route is very difficult, but it can be turned by Baitavand, 15 miles distant; it would also be necessary to occupy Dizfúl, containing 20,000 inhabitants, the capital of the province, 35 miles from Shustar; the army recruited at Shustar could effect that without reinforcements.

Inferences from Colonel Rawlinson and the Baron de Bode (*Native authority*.)

It remains to add to this report an account of Bihbahán, as it is from this that one rear would be threatened in an expedition to Shustar, and that the



relative advantages of an expedition there or to Shustar may be compared as far as imperfect information will permit.

I will also give some extracts from Colonel Rawlinson regarding the passes from Shustar to the interior:

"Bihbahán, the second capital of the Fárs district, lies in a plain watered by the streams of Khánábád and Shir, from which the town is supplied by artificial means. The governor is Súft Alí Mirzá, son of Tahmasp Mirzá, Governor of Shíráz. Four hundred sárbáz under Yaour (Major) Hussain Khán and 400 horse of the Sevan tribe under Alí Khán were stationed here at the beginning of the war; but these may at any moment be changed. There are seven or eight guns of position, but no moveable artillery. Bihbahán is 50 miles from Bandar Dílám and 65 from Hindián, posts 70 and 85 miles respectively north of Bushire."

Mr. Kinneir says: "On leaving Bandar Dílám and ascending the mountains, the first town which presents itself is Zaitún, containing about 2,000 souls, situated in a pleasant valley fertilised by both branches of the Záb, which here form a junction; 15 miles further on is Bihbahán, containing, according to the governor, 10,000 souls. The plain of Bihbahán is of considerable extent and highly cultivated." All native accounts agree in stating that there is a large quantity of grain and cattle to be had near Bihbahán.

This must to a certain extent be true, as grain of all sorts and ghee are exported from Bandar Dílám and Hindián. An intelligent native, who has been of much use in collecting supplies for the Commissariat, told me he stayed for some time at Zaitún, and that there was plenty of supplies there and draught cattle to be had in the district.

An itinerary is appended, by which it will be seen that both the roads from Bandar Dílám and Hindián are practicable for guns.

The climate of Bihbahán is said to be healthy, and not so hot as Bushire.

The fortifications of Bihbahán consist of a wall with bastions in dilapidated state. There was once a ditch, but it has filled up in course of time. The most advantageous position for an enemy to take would be where the road passes through the hills to the westward of the town.

Reinforcements of troops, including artillery, can be sent from Shíráz, 130 miles, and from Isfahán (but with great difficulty for artillery), 170 miles. The roads in both cases badly supplied.

It is not probable that in the unsettled state into which an invasion would throw the Arab tribes, any force could be spared from Shustar, 120 miles.

If the troops in the province of Fárs were concentrated, as at present, in Farráshband, or any other point on the route from Bushire to Shíráz *via* Fírúzábád, they could go to Borasján by Kazrán, 140 miles, or by Borasján, 150 miles. Looking at an expedition to Shustar and Bihbahán respectively purely in a military point of view, and without any reference to political considerations, the following appear to be some of the inferences regarding it: That the road to Shustar is objectionable, as exposing the flank and rear of an army to attack. This arises from its running parallel to the frontier, whereas in a line of march perpendicular to the frontier, the enemy must meet the invaders in front. Shustar is no strategical point for future operations, as the passes to the interior are impracticable. It is in fact a *cul de sac*.

The advantages attending it are that there is water carriage most of the way, and supplies to be obtained when the army was settled. If it was ordered by Government to extend our operation for the purpose of further coercing the Sháh, the troops necessary for the occupation of Shustar would remain inactive at a time when their services could be least spared.



In the case of an expedition to Shustar, some force must be posted to guard our right rear. If the Persians concentrated troops on Bihbahán, this would be seriously threatened, as the country between there and the Kárún is passable for troops, and in the direction of Dórák not destitute of supplies for a Persian army. Dórák itself would

Native authority. not answer for this station, as it is unhealthy.

Natives say that the flies there in summer form an intolerable pest. It would, therefore, either have to be on the lowest healthy point of the Kárún, or at Bandar Dílám or Bihbahán itself; in all cases fully equipped for the field. The country between Bihbahán and Shíráz is so badly supplied, except near the former place, that the Persian Government would find it exceedingly difficult, if not quite impossible, to command the resources necessary for moving a large body of troops along it at once; and if they came down it in small bodies, an active force at Bihbahán could attack them in detail; this is equally true regarding the road from Isfahán. A force to operate on Bihbahán should assemble at Bushire, and, while making preparations, could also be employed in demonstrations towards Fírúzábád, in which direction lies the best route to Shíráz. This would induce the Persians to concentrate on that line, of which their present preparations indicate great jealousy. When ready, the troops would embark, and in ten hours be at Bandar Dílám or Hindíán.

They could disembark altogether at Bandar Dílám or form two columns, and, marching from the above named ports, unite at Zaitún, thus more easily obtaining supplies. It is beyond Zaitún that the difficult ground commences; but as Bihbahán would certainly be denuded of troops, its occupation would be easy. From Bihbahán to Fahliún,

Native authority. on the Shíráz road, is 60 miles through a country well watered and wooded, but thinly populated even for Persia. The road does not present any insurmountable impediment to the advance of an army.

Fahliún is a point of considerable strategical importance, as from there roads lead to Kazrán, Dasht-i-Arzán, Mián-i-Kótal (half way station of the Kótal-i-Pírzan), and direct to Shíráz. Guns can be taken to Shíráz from all these places. On the subject of the roads to Shíráz, I shall lay before the Major-General a separate memorandum of the information which has been collected at present, merely offering the following remarks. If we are to ascend the passes, Shíráz must be the point on which to direct our forces. A direct advance on Isfahán by other routes is impracticable.

If it is determined at once to ascend the passes, the Farráshband route is the best, and Bushire, being then in our rear, would require a very small garrison to protect it.

If we advance on Shustar, it should only be on the understanding that no further operations are probable, or it would be a clog on further movements.

An occupation of Bihbahán is the easiest movement of all, and would be of use whether future operations are contemplated against Shustar or Shíráz. In the one case, the force there would defend our right rear; in the other, effect a diversion in our favor by the route of Fahliún. But this would only be a diversion; the real blow would be struck by Fírúzábád, and, unless the invading force was very large, they would be more weakened than assisted by a division of their numbers. The remark regarding Shustar applies, though in a less degree, to Bihbahán, namely, that whatever may be the political or other advantages of effecting its occupation, there would be none in a strategical point of view for invading the country on a large scale.

The direct passes from Shustar to the interior are of so rugged a character, that they are not followed by the caravans. These make a long round by Málamír and Dih-i-Diz, a village about 50 miles from Bihbahán. The distance by this route to Isfahán is upwards of 250 miles. Guns have been brought down it by the Persians, but they were 6-prs., and the difficulties experienced were extreme.

Colonel Rawlinson says regarding Shustar:

"The great difficulty is the communication with the interior; the passes between Shustar and Isfahán cannot be traversed even by a laden mule. The only routes practicable to an army with guns, both long and difficult and badly supplied, are one which runs easterly by Rám Hormuz and Bihbahán, and debouches on the plains of Persepolis; and the other which follows up the valleys of the Karkháh and Kashghán rivers, till it reaches the high plateau of Central Persia near Khuramábád."

Elsewhere he says: "The passes beyond Shu-tar and Dizfúl are of the utmost difficulty. I have myself, it is true, carried 6-prs. up the valley of the Karkháh from Dizfúl to Karmánsháh, but I was obliged to rely almost entirely on manual labour, telling off a regiment to each gun."

The latter route independently of these considerations is an ineligible one, being a long march on the skirts of the kingdom; and the former leading to the plains of Persepolis, and thence to Shíráz, is not so practicable as those which lead direct inland from Bushire.

*See Sketch No. 8 showing supposed movements of the enemy on English army seizing Muhammarah preparatory to ascending Kárún, page 98.*

Dated Camp Muhammarah, 5th April 1857.

Despatch from—CAPTAIN J. WRAY, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,

To—The Chief of the Staff, Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

According to the instructions received from you, I have the honor to forward the following report upon Ahwáz and the country in its vicinity, with a brief account of the military operations of the expedition.

Ahwáz is situated on the left bank of the Kárún river, at about 100 miles from its mouth. The town is in ruins, and not more than one-third of the houses appear to be occupied. There is no fort or defence of any kind beyond an old ruinous stone wall round part of it. The inhabitants number about 1,200, chiefly Arabs of the Arab tribes. Close to the town are two old broken down bunds across the river, through which the water rushes with great rapidity. One of these is just opposite the town; the other considerably below it. These bunds are impassable for boats drawing more than a few feet water, and the strength of the current renders the passage of any boats a matter of great difficulty; indeed, we did not ascertain satisfactorily that boats could pass at all.

The river is from 90 to 140 yards wide, and there are several low islands in the middle covered with low tamarisk jungle; the banks of the river are generally high, and the water so deep that one small steamer could lie close alongside.

The country of the town side of the river is a bare plain, with very slight patches of cultivation here and there; and on the south-east side of the town is a range of sandstone hills perfectly bare.

The country on the opposite side of the river is much the same—a barren plain without a tree, and the most desolate looking place imaginable. A few hundred yards above the bank is a ridge, which, when we approached Ahwáz, we found occupied by the Persian army.

The river passes round this point, rendering the position very strong; but, at the same time, a force driven out of it by an enemy attacking at A, and being obliged to embark and retire down the river in boats or small steamers, would be exposed to the fire of batteries or musketry from the river banks from any point which an active enemy might select.

The advantages of this site for a cantonment for our troops are, first, that our commissariat and stores coming by land from Muhammarah could join our camp without having to cross the river; second, the strength of the position.

It is impossible to form any idea of the healthiness of the place. There had been a good deal of rain when we were there, and the surface of the ground was very heavy; but there is no reason to suppose that troops stationed here would be otherwise than healthy.

At present the climates is very pleasant, the mornings delightful, and the days, though warm, quite bearable. The Arabs furnished us with sheep in abundance, milk, ghee, &c.

The Karún river has already been reported on by Captain Selby, and I found the map drawn up by that officer perfectly correct. The river is generally from 90 to 180 yards wide—a fine stream, with very rapid current, the banks for the first few miles after leaving Muhammarah covered with date trees; afterwards with cypress or dwarf poplar. Jungle for a hundred yards or so from the water's edge, the interior a barren desert. We passed a few Arab villages on the left bank at long intervals, and anchored for the night at two of them to get supplies. Excepting here, we did not see a single soul the whole way. The country on the right side appears an uninhabited wilderness.

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From the Chief of the Staff, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, to Quarter Master General, Bombay Army, —No. 14-Q., dated 28th April 1857.

Reports that, after a very careful examination, the Lieutenant-General has decided upon forming a standing camp for the second division on the ground now occupied by that force, about 2 miles north-east of the town of Muhammarah.

It has also been decided upon to make the transports in the river available for temporary barracks, where the sickly may be accommodated, and where companies of Europeans may alternately enjoy a change of air, or in the event of any epidemic breaking out, or other immediate necessity occurring for such a step, enable the Lieutenant-General to remove the whole force from Muhammarah to Karáchi or Bombay.

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From CAPTAIN J. WRAY, Deputy Quarter Master General, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, to the Chief of the Staff, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, —No. 164, dated Muhammarah, 26th April 1857.

Reports that he proceeded on 24th instant to inspect the ground for some distance along the banks of the Karún with a view to the selection of a good site for the cantonment of the troops.

States that the country for 8 miles after leaving Muhammarah is dry, but after crossing the wide creek at Kusbih, and turning to the right towards the river bank, the surface of the ground becomes more and more damp, and the soil so heavy that their horses sank over the hoof at every step.

That he examined the whole of the ground from the village for about 5 miles up the river, but the result was the same; the ground the whole way along the bank to the depth of half a mile is crusted with salt, several inches



deep in mud, and never dry. Beyond that distance from the water's edge, there are open spaces here and there of dry hard sand; but even these are crossed by ridges of the salt muddy soil, which appears to run in veins across the plain in every direction, rendering it quite unsuited for a cantonment.

Intimates that about 5 miles above Sabla he found a small patch of good ground on a high bank of the river, hard, free from mud, and covered with tamarisk jungle, but of so small extent, about half a mile long by 200 yards in depth, that it would not answer the purpose, and, moreover, at such a distance from building material that hutting the troops there must be attended with great delay and difficulty.

Remarks that the only other spots at all suitable are the open spaces between the villages of Kusbih and Sishan and between Sishan and Deyrat Ali Pasha. The country on the Sabla side also appears to be an open desert, level, with ridges of muddy soil.

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From BRIGADIER-GENERAL HAVELOCK, Commanding 2nd Division, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, to the Chief of the Staff, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,—No. 200, dated 25th April 1857.

Entirely disapproves of any movement from Muhammarah on sanitary grounds, also on account of its accessibility from the ships, and its value as a strategical position. Recommends erection of huts and enforcement of strict sanitation, &c., at Muhammarah, after which the chances of sickness will probably be less than if the division moved further up the river.

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From Chief of the Staff, Persian Expeditionary Field Force, to Assistant Adjutant General, 2nd Division, Persian Expeditionary Field Force,—No. 49, dated 26th April 1857.

Superintending Surgeon Mackenzie states that there is no suitable locality for the encampment of troops near Muhammarah, and that the main thing is to get the troops under cover in Muhammarah itself before the heat sets in, their health being carefully watched, and severe cases removed at once to the ships.

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Summary of information obtained on the 24th and 25th of April 1857 from several Arabs as to the respective salubrity of different localities between Sabla and Muhammarah.

*1st.—From a Native of Sabla.*

"Sabla is tolerably healthy, more so than Muhammarah. By Muhammarah I mean the town and its immediate vicinity. The high ground 2 miles beyond the town is as healthy as Sabla. Sabla is occasionally flooded, with the exception of a small hill upon which the ruin stands. Such floodings occur after very heavy rains in the interior.

"The rainy season does not terminate till the end of this month (Ramadhán). The mud you speak of as now existing is in consequence of the late heavy rains. It is always damp here and there owing to the saltiness of the soil in different places. The chief sickness with us is continued fever, but not many die of it, because we are so few in number. The country beyond Sabla as far as Ahwáz is much the same as this, no better."

2nd.—*From the Chica and two others of the village of Sishan, 3 miles below Sabla, on the right bank.*

"We have lived here all our lives, and consider it more healthy than the port of Muhammarah. The spot where the Sháhzádh's camp was pitched is as healthy as this. We know it because we frequent the town and its vicinity every day, and have occasionally resided there for weeks. This spot, and the district beyond it for many miles, is sometimes, but not often, covered with water. Such floodings take place in consequence of an extraordinary rise of the river, when it is swollen by heavy rain. It was thus flooded last year, and again this year when the Commissioners were here; but such has not occurred this year. It may yet occur, because the rainy season will not be over till the end of Ramadhán. Fever, chiefly hot (remittent), is the most prevalent disease, but is confined to the autumn (September) after the dates are gathered in. There are many snakes and scorpions here, and mosquitoes abound. It is the same higher up and lower down the river. The ground hereabouts is muddy now in consequence of the rain. No troops have ever encamped here to our knowledge. Darwesh Pásha, the Turkish commander, encamped at Omm-et-Telool, 4 miles lower down."

*Omm-Et-Telool.*

"The river frequently rises to within a short distance of these ridges: the ridges are wet because of the rain, and because the soil is bitter (impregnated with saltpetre). We do not say that it is preferable to the spot lately occupied by the Sháhzádh, but we thought you wished to come higher up. This place has frequently been selected by a portion of the Persian garrison. They came here when sickness broke out among the troops who were located on the other side of the river opposite Muhammarah."

*Of Ed-duna near Muhammarah, lately occupied by the camp of the Sháhzádh.*

"The floods have never been known to rise as high as this spot.

"The Persian soldiers have encamped there for years. Alí Pásha of Baghdád, when he took the place, fixed his camp there. He arrived in, autumn and left in the spring. No particular sickness prevailed in the Turkish army. We know of no occasion when the Persian troops suffered severely but when they were encamped near the fort on the opposite side of the river. The left of your present camp is in a bad spot, for the ground there is sometimes flooded. You should make your extreme right your extreme left, and then you would be on the best position. We prefer mud to reed huts; but many of us are too poor to build with mud. We prefer mud huts to tents, unless the tent is double and a wall built round the sides to keep the heat off. Hot winds prevail here during the summer, more so we hear than at Bushire; but our climate is better, and the water here makes us healthy."

3rd.—*From Abd-er-Redha of Kháraj, an old Pilot, who has been in the service of the Indian Navy Gulf Squadron for many years, and from several other Pilots well acquainted with Muhammarah.*

"I have frequented Muhammarah at intervals for the last 25 years, and these, my companions, are equally conversant with the place. My father and grandfather used to relate to me that two English regiments under General Fisly (Paisly?) occupied Muhammarah for two years."

Mr. Manisty was the agent at Bassorah. There were also from 12 to 13 ships here; they remained at the mouth of the Shatt-ul-Aráb for some time, because the authorities at Basrah objected to their going higher up. Then they anchored half way between the mouth of the river and the Hafár, and finally they came up to Muhammarah, where they remained for some months. The soldiers were encamped in tents there, where the Sháhzádh's regiments were lately located. Alí Pásha's army was also encamped there. Several of us know it because we saw it. Alí Pásha came here just when the date harvest was being gathered, and he left in the winter. We never heard that the English soldiers suffered from sickness. The Turks under Alí Pásha, we know, did not suffer. The Persians on the island of Abádán lost 300 men from diarrhoea and dysentery, and one of their commanders, named Yawar, died about 3 years ago. They then removed to this side, and became healthy. They went higher up on the river because another force occupied the site where the Sháhzádh's camp lately stood, and besides it was deemed imprudent to bring them in too close contact with the healthy troops. We never heard of the site we now speak of being unhealthy. True the town is so, but it is very dirty and very close.

Persians frequently come here from Bassorah for change of air, and also for change of water, because the water in the Kárún is the best in the world. The heat here is less than at Bushire, but the hot winds are more frequent; and the mosquitoes are so troublesome that a man must sleep under cover to get any rest. Fever is the prevalent disease, but it is confined to the season when the dates are gathered. From our own experience, and from what we have heard of others, the place where Alí Pásha's troops were is tolerably free from it. Your present camp is too near the Shatt-ul-Aráb; you should move it to the right. A very large tent with double lining would be as good as a mud hut, but it should have a wall round it. Barracks, such as the English built at Kháraj, would be a thousand times better than any tents. Those are built of mortar and stones; but mud would be as good. From what we know of both places, you will be better off here than at Bushire; but you must get water from the river, not from the canals.

(Sd.) G. P. BADGER,

*Arabic Interpreter.*



## APPENDIX D.

### ABSTRACT OF CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO THE NEUTRALIZATION OF THE COAST SHAIKHS, AND THE ENLISTMENT OF THE COAST TRIBES IN OUR SERVICE.

All the coast Shaikhs sealed a secret compact of friendship and to furnish supplies, but were refused all written guarantee of indemnity for so doing on our part.

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No. 67, dated 14th January 1857, from General Stalker, to the Secretary to Government, Bombay.

Forwards report by Lieutenant Disbrowe on the various ports of the Persian shore and intimates that allowances have been granted to Shaikhs as under who have promised to assist the British, and for whom protection cannot be guaranteed :

Banker Khán Tangistání Shaikh Muhammad Hussain of Borasján.  
Shaikh Hussain of Cháhkúta.  
Shaikh Bahmyár of Tel-i-Siah.  
Múlla Ahmad ben Tahir of Dílár.  
Ahmad Khán ben Múrád of Gunáwá.  
Shaikh Abdúlla ben Shaikh Muhammad, and Shaikh Abdúlla ben Rahmah of Bandar Rig.

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No. 49, dated 28th March 1857, from General Outram, to Lord Clarendon (On board the "*Ferooz*" near Hartep, 4 miles below Muhammarah).

Intimates that Rashíd Pasha, Governor of Bassorah, declared Muhammarah to be disputed territory and objected to any attack there by the British, in virtue of the claims put forth by the Porte. A further difficulty arose with the Turkish authorities, namely, the removal of an Ottoman ship of war stationed in the channel before Muhammarah. Captain Kemball was despatched to settle these points, the first of which fell through in consequence of an unprovoked attack by the Persians on the "*Comet*" despatch boat, and in the case of the second, Rashíd Pasha consented to order the removal of the war ship. This, the General looks upon as a sign of the friendliness of the Turkish authorities.

Captain Kemball was further directed to secure, if possible, the neutrality of the Arab tribes and overtures were made to the undermentioned\* chiefs to abstain from assisting the Persians and to withdraw their followers, in order to avoid collision with the British army. No guarantee was held out to them, but they were promised an ample reward if found deserving.

The success of these negotiations was displayed as the "*Ferooz*" steamed up to its present anchorage. At several of the villages the Arabs, male and female, approached the river unarmed, waving their flags and when the vessel anchored, several came on board volunteering to give any information in their power, as to the numbers and disposition of the enemy.

\* Shaikh Faris al Ghadhan chief of Felláhíah.  
Múlla Abdúlla, Chief of Hawízah.  
Shaikh Jábir-el-Murdao Chief of the Mohaisen tribes.  
Shaikh Suwaila, Ferhan and Darwísh Chiefs of the Nasárs tribe Khúsháb.

A copy of General Outram's proclamation was sent to the following chiefs:

Hussain ben Alí,	Alí Bú Ferhan.
Zúsuf ben Ghanam.	
Múlla ben Múlla Alí.	
Simgúr ben Ferhan.	
The Shaikh of the	Alí Bú Muhurzeh.
"	" Khulífeh.
"	" Mahmúd Shatait.
"	" Elmwanís.
"	" Amírí—Hirtah.
"	" Kasabah.

Despatch from General Outram to Earl Clarendon, dated Muhammarah, 11th April 1857.

Forwards translation of letters\* received from Shaikhs Faris of Felláhiáh and Jábír of Muhammarah and states that a visit from these Sheikhs to the camp would have been attended with many advantages, but before this could be arranged, news arrived of the conclusion of peace at Paris, and the outward bearing of the chiefs has in consequence undergone a change owing to their dread of vengeance on the part of the Persian Government.

Remarks that the Turkish authorities appeared to labor under the impression that Muhammarah would be handed over to them, but that this delusion was not in any way countenanced or encouraged.

Letter from A. B. Kemball, Esq., Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, to T. G. Taylor, Esq., British Agent.

Directs him to discountenance any schemes of rebellion against the authority of the Persian Government on the part of its subjects, while approving of his reply to Muhammad-ez-Ziaruth, the confidential agent of Múlla Abdúlla. Remarks that Múlla Abdúlla is no longer *de facto*, as indeed he is not *de jure* Governor of Hawízah, as it was reported that he had been deposed of his government by his nephew Múlla Muhammad, aided by a military force under the command of the son of Khauler Mírzá.

Extract from despatch of Viscount Canning of 21st March 1857.

Sir J. Outram points out in the 24th and following paragraphs, certain political restrictions which he fears will so hamper his proceedings as to render nugatory his proposed advance to Shustar, referring to that part of the instructions which debars him from seeking the aid of any but "independent" tribes. Her Majesty's Government advertent to this point have declared that they do not seek to subvert the dynasty of the Sháh or to encourage insurrection on the part of his subjects; that they have no wish to weaken the hold which he may have to the allegiance of his people, or to enlist the subjects of Persia in the ranks of the British Army, but that they would not hesitate to avail themselves of any assistance which may be obtained from independent native tribes.

Sir J. Outram observes that there are no such independent tribes; that all are either Persian or Turkish subjects; but that as regards the former, they will

become virtually our subjects when once our army is in possession of their territory, and that the objection to enlistment will then lose its force.

I feel it necessary to say that I do not think that in acting upon this view the spirit of the policy laid down by Her Majesty's Government would be carried out.

So far indeed as regards our right as belligerents, and the practice of war, examples may be found of arms placed in the hands of native population, and of recruits drawn from it by an invading army. But in such cases the subversion of the dynasty and the weakening of the government of the country invaded have been objects sought, not shunned.

In the present instance, seeing how decidedly, and I believe wisely, Her Majesty's Government deprecate any dismemberment of Persia,—seeing how mischievous an example would be given to Russia in dealing with the subjects of Persia, and having regards to the future embarrassment which we should lay up for ourselves, I am of opinion that the enlistment should not take place.

I fear it is impossible to contend confidently that although we should effect a dismemberment for the moment, we should be able, upon the re-establishment of peace to restore to the Persian empire its integrity. This, when we have once fanned the flame of rebellion may be beyond our power, unless indeed we should be prepared hereafter to coerce into re-subjection to the Sháh, the tribes of whose aid in the field we wish to avail ourselves: and such a course is not to be thought of.

It must be remembered that enlistment into our ranks, and submission to the discipline and command of our officers, implies a service in a great degree voluntary, and of a nature far more offensive to the Persian Government than those smaller services which, as a matter of necessity, and for the sake of subsistence and self-defence, an invading army is compelled to exact.

Such a service as enlistment into the British army, is not I apprehend contemplated in Art. VII of the draft of the proposed treaty between Her Majesty and the Sháh, lately received from the Secret Committee of the H. C., which stipulates for an amnesty in favor of those who, from fear of damage to themselves and families, have afforded "supplies and different kinds of service to the invading forces, whom they were unable to resist."

The inhabitant of an invaded country may plead with truth that he is compelled by fear to surrender his stock, and his substance, and even to give information and some degree of aid to the enemy; and the offence is one for which amnesty may reasonably be required from the Government when peace is made. But I do not see how this plea could be put forward by large bodies of warlike men, well able to escape from serving us, even if they could not resist us.

Nor do I see that we could support the plea if they adduced it.

It is also to be observed that in this war with Persia we have no interest in common with the Persian Tribes. There is no common cause of quarrel, no sympathy except in hostility to the Persian Government. When the Sháh shall concede our demands, the Bakhtiári and the K'Áb tribes will reap no benefit from our success.

They will have received our pay (if we enlist them) and nothing more; we have no thoughts of exacting from the Persian Government any concessions to them, if indeed we know what they desire. They may be supposed



to seek the permanent weakening of the Sháh's authority in a portion at least of his own dominions, and so far our object is opposed to theirs, not in unison with it. There is certainly no political bond between us. They would be our mercenaries, not our allies, in a cause, and I think there are grave objections to taking our mercenaries from the Sháh's own subjects.

As to the future, the fierce denunciations which the Persian authorities have issued against all who allow the invaders to obtain the smallest article of supply, might lead to the conclusion that we should not compromise the future safety of the Sháh's subjects to any greater extent by taking them into active military service, than by trafficking with them.

But it is scarcely possible that this should be so. There is, notwithstanding the big threats of the Persian Commander, a real and wide difference between the two kinds of aid; and if the opportunity and power of punishing a tribe for taking up arms in the British ranks should present themselves to the Sháh's Government, it is not to be supposed that the vengeance would not be sharper and more determined than if the offence should have been the mere sale of provisions or camels.

Possibly the Bakhtiári and K'Áb tribes may be strong enough to defend themselves unaided against the ultimate consequences of their junction with the British force, but it is not to be expected that this will lead them to forego their claim to protection from us.

If we meet that claim by requiring that they shall be included in the amnesty, we must watch the observance of that amnesty in regard to them with more than usual care, and we must be prepared to enforce it.

Our obligations to the men who had stood in the ranks with our own soldiers would not be light. We should owe something more to them than to the peasants who had supplied our camp, and our debt would be greater from the fact that they would have gained nothing by the success to which they would have contributed.

Upon the whole the enlistment of tribes from within the Sháh's dominions, and whom we must acknowledge to be under his rightful authority, appears to me to lead directly to the future protectorate of a portion of his subjects. An embarrassing condition of things at best, and one which in this instance would be of the worst example to Persia's neighbours.

It is impossible not to foresee with Sir James Outram that an important means of success will be lost by abstaining from using the aid in arms, of those subjects of Persia who are hostile to its Government. But probably it is not necessary that their assistance should be entirely foregone because we refuse to take them into military service, or that unless enlisted into our ranks they should be actively opposed to us.

Their aid in furnishing supplies and carriage, their forbearance from molestation of our convoys and sources of information, and from any marauding upon ground from which our supplies are drawn, might, I should hope, be secured by money and by friendly and judicious treatment.

As regards the Sháh's troops I see no reason why the tribes should not be left to take their own course. I would not attempt to enforce their neutrality.

If the Sháh has misgoverned and alienated them, he must take the consequence. All that is necessary for us to do is to make it well understood by the tribes that we do not seek to put them in collision with the Sháh's forces; that it is not for this purpose, but for the purposes above mentioned that we pay them and seek friendly relations with them. That

for such services as we ask, an amnesty will be required of the Persian Government, but that beyond this we have no intention to interfere between the Sháh and his subjects. It requires more information than the Government of India has at present at command, to judge whether any impediment to this course will be found in the character of the tribes in their relations to their Government and to each other, or in our position towards them. So far as my knowledge goes I see no reason to think that such a course will be impracticable.

These are the views which present themselves to me upon a consideration of this important subject as set forth in Sir James Outram's despatch. If they meet with the concurrence of my Honourable colleagues, I propose that they be communicated to Sir James Outram, not as instructions, because these will come from Her Majesty's Government who can alone explain, or if thought necessary, modify the instructions which they have already given; and therefore Sir James Outram, has most properly addressed Her Majesty's Government upon the subject, but because in a question of much difficulty arising in such circumstances as the present, it is not right that the opinion of the Governor General in Council should be withheld from him.

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Minute by the Honourable J. A. Dorin, dated 21st March 1857.

I assent entirely to the line of policy recommended by the Right Hon'ble the Governor General. It is indeed the only one that can be adopted with prudence under the views thus far entertained and communicated to us by Her Majesty's Government in respect to the war with Persia.

It must be remembered that so far as we are informed there is no intention of retaining permanently any portion of Persian territory. That when the objects of the war are accomplished all acquisitions on the mainland of Persia will be abandoned, and knowing this to be the case it will only be a source of embarrassment if engagements are contracted with subjects of Persia which cannot be relinquished as easily as we shall withdraw our own forces from Persian soil. Her Majesty's Government have distinctly declared that "they have no wish to weaken the hold which the Sháh may have on the allegiance of his people or to enlist the subjects of Persia in the ranks of the British Army," and it seems necessarily to follow, now that Sir James Outram has found that the tribes with whom he is likely to come in contact are not independent, as he had been led to believe, but are Persian subjects, that it would be contrary to the spirit in which the war is undertaken if any attempt is made to enlist them to serve as soldiers under British command against the Government of Persia.

The neutrality or even countenance of these tribes over whom the Sháh possesses little real authority may probably be rendered willingly, or may be acquired by good management or by purchase or by other methods of self interest, but beyond this it can scarcely be advisable to enter into engagements with men to whom the British Government can extend no effective protection and with whom they will have no link of affinity when once the ends of the war with Persia are accomplished.

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Minute by the Honourable J. P. Grant, dated 22nd March 1857.

On the important question regarding the policy of enlisting Persian subjects into our ranks, to make war against their own sovereign, I have only

to express my entire concurrence in the view taken by the Right Hon'ble the Governor General, for all the reasons stated in His Lordship's minute.

We have no quarrel with Persia excepting in the matter of her external relations, and we have no intention of taking the subjects in question under permanent British protection. Sir James Outram's argument that a temporary military occupation of a country warrants an inhabitant in throwing off his allegiance, and taking arms against his sovereign, because it warrants him in a temporary submission in matters civil to an irresistible power, is untenable. I think the proposed course would be unjustifiable, would be inexpedient, in the highest degree.

On the question of communicating to Sir James Outram the opinion of the Governor General upon this point, on which that officer has received instructions immediately from Her Majesty's Government, I observe that this opinion is consonant with those instructions, wherefore the communication in the manner proposed seems to me very proper. The expedition which Sir James Outram commands is an Indian expedition. The utmost effect of such a communication will be to confirm the General in acting upon his present instructions, so long as they shall remain unrecalled and unmodified by the high authority from whom they issue.



## APPENDIX E.

### CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE AND THE FORMATION OF AN INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT.

No. 1668, dated 18th September 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to Captain Wray,  
Assistant Quarter Master General.

Informs him that the Commander-in-Chief has directed his despatch to the Persian Gulf in advance of the force in view to the collection of intelligence, and that he is to be accompanied by Lieutenant Holland, 13th Native Infantry, as Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.

Directs him to hold himself in readiness to embark at the shortest notice in a steamer in which some officers of the Commissariat and Bazar Departments will also proceed to prepare for the troops.

The following information to be obtained :

#### *Arrangements for landing the troops.*

Description of prevailing winds, of the rise and time of tide, of the depth of water on various parts of the coast and facilities for landing either in face of an enemy or for taking them or their defences in flank or reverse; the number of boats and their condition, &c., procurable either by management or seizure. Care to be taken that the boats are supplied with drinking water.

Intimates that the Commissary General is sending up a number of light bullock carts with 300 bullocks to aid in conveying tents and stores on shore, and requests him to arrange for a camp and for the seizure of the wells if necessary.

Requests him further to obtain full information regarding supplies of all kinds, and means of carriage; and with regard to the latter, remarks that under the impression that the number of native followers should be reduced as much as possible, and that camels will be of little use above the passes, the only sick carriage sent from Bombay will be 50 doolies with some 300 bearers; and 50 iron camel kajawahs of Major Shaw's pattern. On these a report will be submitted, also stating whether the mule litter or *tukt-i-rowan* of the country is to be preferred and procured in sufficient numbers in case of an advance. Report to be also submitted on hutting of the troops in case of a prolonged residence, and on supply of warm clothing, &c. In conclusion, points out that careful examination of the country in advance is of paramount importance, but it must be carefully carried out, guided by the advice and opinion of the Resident.

No. 2650, dated 17th September 1856, from the Military Department, to the Commissary General.

States that it has been resolved to despatch two Commissariat Officers to the Persian Gulf to consult with the Resident at Bushire and to make arrangements for collection of supplies on arrival of the force. Intimates that it is not intended that these officers shall actually purchase stores until there is a

certainly of the expedition proceeding to its destination, this information can be furnished by the Resident, who will also supply funds and all necessary aid.

Remarks that detailed orders should be issued for these officers' guidance and such native assistance attached to them as may be deemed expedient.

Appoints Captain Rigby, Bazar Master; and requests that he may be despatched in advance and furnished with detailed instructions for his guidance. Adds that the Resident, Persian Gulf, will be requested to obtain the services of Naval Officers to be placed in communication with the Commissariat Officers for the more effectual carrying out of the object of their mission.

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General No. 35, Confidential Circular, dated 25th September 1856, from the Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the Staff Officers of the Bombay Army on board the *Feroze* steam frigate.

Having been informed by the authorities of the motives for despatching you to this town, where your presence coupled with the reports and native intelligence received from Bombay yesterday by the *Feroze*, has already created alarm and threatens great popular ferment, I have the honour to request you will return at once to the steam frigate and in her proceed to the naval station at Bassadore. There you will be pleased to remain until further instructions may reach you from myself or from the authorities in Bombay.

The Treasury of the Residency having been removed to the corvette of war *Falkland* the Commodore Commanding the Indian Naval Squadron in the Persian Gulf will be requested to furnish three boxes containing an aggregate amount of Company's rupees, 18,266-9-0. This specie is for the contingent expenses of the Commissariat Department, and the officers connected with that branch will be good enough to furnish me with detailed receipts.

You will bear in mind that you are at present simply to observe and collect information connected with your various Departments.

In this duty you cannot be too circumspect. Your arrival here indeed has awakened suspicions as to your objects, and hostile as the attitude of the Persians is, the unguarded pursuit of them on Persian soil at this late period cannot but be attended with disastrous consequences to your own persons, and perhaps to all British subjects in Persia.

Residency Bushire,

(Sd.) FELIX JONES,

28th September 1856.

*Resident, Persian Gulf.*

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General No. 39, dated 29th September 1856, from the Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the Quarter Master General.

A want of time compels me to acknowledge in a circular the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date, enclosing copies of the instructions given for your guidance. These will be considered and such information as I possess or can obtain will be forwarded to you at Bassadore.

By the Steam Frigate *Assaye* I furnished to Government a memorandum containing much of the information sought both in the Quarter Master General's and Commissariat Departments. I am not aware if you possess a copy of this memorandum, but I send the original of the prices current in this Bazar. This can be copied and returned to this Office by the *Falkland*.



It would be desirable that one of the Commissariat officers should return by the *Falkland* to this port for employment in the Bassorah and Baghdád districts from whence our chief supplies of men and animals must be obtained.

If it were possible to proceed to that port at once, it would be still more desirable, but aware as you are of the suspicions caused by your presence in the town yesterday, I see no plan for adoption but the above course. The officer named for duty in the above districts would then have to remain afloat until means of proceeding to Bassorah were available.

The Senior Commissariat Officer had therefore better consult Commodore Ethersey on this point, as if he can spare the *Constance* schooner from Bassadore she can be detached at once on this duty to Bassorah. The officer proceeding there will find Mr. Taylor, Her Majesty's Vice Consul, in possession of all requisite information, and I presume will be able to supply him with funds by drawing bills direct on India. In the meantime I shall address Her Majesty's Consul-General in Baghdád on the subject.

Residency in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

(Sd.) FELIX JONES,

29th September 1856.

*Resident, Persian Gulf.*

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Secret Department No. 43, dated 29th September 1856.

I find that I have time briefly to acknowledge the receipt of your respective communications wherein you report your arrival, and whilst setting forth the nature of the duties you have severally been deputed to perform, request me to furnish you with instructions and information calculated to facilitate the performance of these duties.

The short period at my disposal, I regret to say, will not admit of my addressing you separately as I would otherwise have wished, nor will it even allow me to supply you with details as full as are desirable. I will hasten, however, to string together in the form of a confidential memorandum addressed to you collectively, such remarks as appear to me likely to be of immediate and general use to you, and to give you some insight into the amount of supplies probably to be found in these parts, the difficulties to be contended with, &c., &c. I may here observe that the Bombay Government have already been placed in possession by me of the matter in bulk now communicated and that I endeavoured to impress upon them, whilst transmitting the information, the fact that any remarks I had offered were merely applicable to the natural resources of the country in times of peace, when buyers and sellers might be plentiful and no obstacles were thrown in their way. You will be good enough to bear carefully in mind, therefore, that I by no means intend to imply that the supplies mentioned as available in these tracts would be forthcoming in the event of hostilities. Far from it. It is much to be feared that, so far as Bushire and its neighbourhood is concerned, little or nothing would be obtainable in the outset, and farther in the interior literally nothing. A Persian army retreating from its pursuers would scarcely fail to resort to its customary mode of dealing with a powerful enemy, which as you are doubtless aware, consists simply in refusing to face its antagonist and leaving him to pursue it through tracts it has designedly laid waste in its flight. This is a point that deserves your special consideration, and already shows that no hostile force, when first planting foot in Persian soil, has a right to count on receiving even a particle of sustenance or assistance from Persia or Persian



resources. I would further wish you to remember that in the confidential memorandum to your address, I do not even propose to be exact in the information I am therein conveying to you. It is merely approximative and derived from such sources as could with most safety be relied upon.

Shortly after your arrival at Basidu, I trust it will be in my power to supply you with more definite instructions. In the meantime it shall be my endeavour quietly to obtain the services of a few intelligent and trustworthy Persians, who shall be deputed to join you and assist you in collecting information. This, however, pray remember, is a matter you must keep inviolably secret, for did my intentions once get abroad, so suspicious is the Persian, that not only should I find the greatest difficulty in finding and obtaining the people I required, but considerable irritation would likewise be created in the minds of the authorities. Whilst negotiations are still pending, it appears to me too much caution cannot be exercised by us, I would recommend you therefore on the arrival of these agents simply to engage them as domestics, and whilst culling from them the information they are able to impart, to warn them for their own sakes to conduct their proceedings with the utmost secrecy and deliberation. For the rest, your own discretion and judgment must be your guides whilst carrying into effect the duties you have been instructed to perform.

In conclusion, I would suggest, (I refer more particularly to supplies), that the plan we have in view would be most successfully attained, did one of the Commissariat Officers after obtaining such information as he required at Bussadore proceed and station himself at Mascat: and the other, so soon as Commodore Ethersey has the means of despatching him, return up the Gulf and be located at Bassorah. In this way either officer would be unshackled and ready on receipt of instructions to commence purchasing supplies and cattle for the coming expeditionary force.

No. 2035, dated 13th October 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department.

Requests that report by Captain Wray, Assistant Quartermaster-General, may be submitted to the Right Honourable the Governor, and states that the Commander-in-Chief considers it very much to be regretted, supposing the state of affairs to have been such as to justify the Resident in sending the officers deputed by Government away in somewhat unseemly haste, that the opportunity was not taken of detaching Captain Wray and his assistant to some quarter on the frontier of Persia where useful information might have been obtained, in lieu of banishing them to a desert island, where their usefulness is altogether paralysed.

Adds that His Excellency desires that in case of any mail preceding the despatch of the force, this error may be rectified.

Lieutenant Ballard, in charge of the Intelligence Department, was assisted by a small staff of clerks and draftsmen.

No. 2112, dated 18th October 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department.

Requests submission to Government of an application from Abdulla ben Hassan, an Arab horsedealer, to Major-General Stalker, to be allowed to

accompany him to the Persian Gulf as an assistant. Remarks that Major General Beresford, Commanding Mysore Division, testifies to the man's respectability, and states that he is a person of considerable ability and a member of a powerful tribe on the confines of Persia, and this testimony is concurred in by General Stalker.

Recommends his appointment as interpreter on a salary of Rs. 250 per mensem.

---

No. 3396, dated 3rd November 1856, from the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

States that Government, although sensible that the services of Abdulla ben Hassan might possibly be very useful, cannot consider that an Arab horse dealer is exactly the person on whom so confidential an appointment as that of interpreter should be conferred. Adds that if General Stalker, however, is himself desirous that the appointment of interpreter upon his personal staff should be so filled, the Governor is prepared to accord his sanction subject to confirmation by the Government of India.

---

No. 3478, dated 5th November 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department.

Intimates that Major General Stalker states that from his personal knowledge of Abdulla ben Hassan, he conceives that his services with the expedition would be most valuable.

Adds that the Major General further states that if Government should be pleased to place the services of this person at his disposal, he proposes employing him in the Intelligence Department, for which he considers him admirably fitted, and that occasion may arise when his services would be very valuable in assisting the Commissariat Department in procuring supplies.

---

[Abdulla ben Hassan was employed by the Intelligence Department in Persia.]

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No. 1772, dated 25th September 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to Government, Military Department.

Requests sanction to the following office establishment for the Quarter Master General's Department:

					Rs.	
1	Writer	...	...	...	120	per mensem.
1	"	...	...	...	80	"
1	"	...	...	...	50	"
1	Draftsman	...	...	...	100	"
1	"	...	...	...	80	"
	Stationery, &c.	...	...	...	50	"

In regard to the Intelligence Department recommends that instead of the kossids usually entertained, such persons, natives of the country, be employed as may be found necessary.

From the Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 6493, dated 8th November 1856.

Recommends the appointment of Lieutenant Ballard, R.E., as head of the Intelligence Department, he being a well qualified officer for the post.

This appointment was made No. 3527 of 10th November 1856, (from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General) the remark it is to be understood that this appointment is not to interfere with any departmental arrangements already made among the officers of the Quartermaster General's Department. Lieutenant Ballard will have the position and the allowances of an Assistant Quartermaster General in the Field, but he is to be regarded as only temporarily attached to the Department and for the purposes of the pending service only.

Bushire, 21st January 1857, No. 1, Lieutenant Ballard, C.S., has been authorised to entertain the following establishment in the Intelligence Department :

			Rs.
One Munshi at	...	...	80 from 21st December 1856.
Two Peons, at each	...	...	10 from 20th instant.

From the Quarter Master General, Bombay, to the General Officer Commanding 1st Division, Persian Field Force, No. 1106, dated 9th February 1857.

States that his recommendation to attach Lieutenant Brydon of the Artillery to the Intelligence Department has been referred to Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram; also that the draftsman applied for by Lieutenant Holland has been sanctioned at a salary of Rs. 100 per mensem.

Order, dated 16th March 1857, by Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., authorised the entertainment of such native establishment for interpreters and guides on such pay, as Brigadier General J. Jacob, C.B., may deem expedient.

From the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India, No. 6891, dated 4th December 1857.

Intimates that the Governor in Council cannot confirm so vague an order as the foregoing, and that it should be explained what Interpreters, Guides, and establishment were entertained under the order, and what object is to be subserved by formal confirmation being accorded to it at this distance of time.

From Brigadier-General J. Jacob, to the Adjutant General in India, No. 450, dated Camp Jacobabad, 14th December 1857.

Intimates that the Interpreters, &c., were engaged for the proposed corps of irregular cavalry, and as it was not known what the numerical strength of the corps might be it was impossible for the General-in-Chief to determine the number of guides and interpreters required. Points out that on Sir J. Outram leaving him in the neighbourhood of the enemy he considered it necessary to retain the services of these men for the Intelligence Department, and later to assist him in the daily prosecution of his political and military correspondence and other duties.

States that the order for these men's entertainment was forwarded with other papers by a French Frigate and these papers were lost *en route*.

The following was the establishment entertained as interpreters and guides for the corps of irregular cavalry :

Two Munshis or Interpreters from March to June inclusive.

One Munshi from middle of March to close of May at Rs. 80 per mensem.



Two Munshis or writers from April to October inclusive at Rs. 80 per mensem each. Guides in the Intelligence Department varying in number as occasion required, from 4 to 12, and salaries averaging about Rs. 12 per mensem from March to September inclusive.

From Brigadier-General J. Jacob, to the Political Department, No. 451, dated 14th December 1857.

Brings to notice the annoyance to which he is subjected by the Military Department in connection with the Persian expedition particularly in the case of the order about interpreters, guides, &c., points out that this order was lost in transit to India by a foreign vessel, and the establishment was consequently not sanctioned by Government at the date of his return. A copy was obtained from the Adjutant General's Office, and submitted for Government sanction which was refused (see *ante*). Remarks that it is not for him to defend against the charge of vagueness, the orders of the General under whom he was serving, and explains that the establishment in question was found to be absolutely necessary to enable the operations of the force to proceed. Also that as Sir J. Outram had authority from Her Majesty's Government to entertain any number of irregular troops the charge of vagueness must rest on the orders of Her Majesty's ministry if anywhere.

Finally requests that in consideration of his services the Governor in Council may be moved to relieve him from the continued annoyance which the Military Secretary inflicts on him.

## APPENDIX F.

### ABSTRACT OF CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE COMPOSITION AND DESPATCH OF THE FORCE.

Memorandum by Commander-in-Chief, dated Púnah, 8th August 1886.

To transport an army of 5,000 men of all arms, it was calculated would require 13 steam vessels and 8 transports of 1,000 tons each ;

1 transport in addition, for	...	...	...	Hospital Ship.
1	...	...	...	Ammunition.
5 transports	...	...	...	Provisions.

The tents to go on the orlop deck of each merchant ship.

Letter from the Quarter Master General, to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, Bombay, dated 24th August 1886.

Submits the following opinions and suggestions on the occupation of the Island of Kháraj and District of Bushire in the Persian Gulf.

Assuming that the duty of the force is to be limited to the above objects, and that it may expect to meet with opposition at one or possibly both places and that for any ulterior proceedings it will be largely reinforced, the Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that a force of not less than 5,000 of all arms, including a large proportion of Europeans and of field artillery should be made available, and on every account he considers the numbers named the least that should be provided.

States that the annexed table shows the composition of the proposed force and other information in connection therewith. The total shown amounts to more than 5,000 men, and if necessary, a regiment of native infantry can be omitted.

States that the average length of ship passage to Bushire in October and November, is about 30 days, and therefore recommends that as large a portion of the force as possible may be sent in steamers. The Púnah Horse may be sent on Arab *baglahs*. But some place of rendezvous should be selected in order to ensure the arrival of the entire force simultaneously off Bushire.

Recommends the provision on each transport of a large number of boats for landing purposes, &c., and platform boats in addition for use as gun boats and for landing guns without dismounting.

Remarks that some bunder boats sent from Bombay in 1819 to Rás-ul-Khán were found very useful, those furnished by the Imám of Mascat drawing too much water to be of any use, but if the former are sent, the crews should be well selected and bound to do their duty.

Points out that in selecting transports and allotting troops to them, the rules as to space and baggage should be carefully attended to, and great care should be taken in stowing the artillery and ordnance stores, the latter being under the superintendence of an ordnance officer, and the stores put away in such manner as to be at once available in presence of the enemy.

Recommends the provision of liberal supplies of warm clothing for all troops and public followers, as the climate of Persia is understood to be severe for natives.

States that the Commander-in-Chief believes that ample supplies are to be had in the country, but in case they may not be available, our Agents in Mesopotamia must be depended upon to meet the wants of the force. Remarks that it is desirable to reduce the number of followers as much as possible, and one class, dooly bearers, can be dispensed with, mule litters and camel kajas being used for the sick, and in order to aid in their construction as well as in case the force has to be huddled, the Commander-in-Chief recommends the despatch of an artificer establishment on a much larger scale than usual, and also advises the establishment of a large depôt of tents, ammunition, and stores of all kinds, including shoes and clothing on the island of Kháraj or on the mainland, as may be found most expedient.

Among minor matters the Commander-in-Chief recommends the issue to the cavalry of leathern chaguls, altered as taken to the Crimea by the 10th Hussars and also of forage nets, as well as tin or wooden canteens to the remaining troops, and havresacks to all.

As the Commander-in-Chief considers an advance into the interior out of the question, states that report of all further requirements can be made by the officer in command of the troops as soon as he has ascertained his wants.

Adds that although the troops can be ready for embarkation by the time specified if the transports are ready to receive them, yet it is considered desirable that longer notice should be given to enable departments, &c., to do their work in a complete manner.



Strength and composition of a proposed Force for service in the Persian Gulf, with the present stations and proposed ports of embarkation of troops, and date by which each can be ready to embark.

Arm.	Corps.	Strength.				Present Station.	Port of Embarkation.	Number of days' notice required.	Remarks.
		Officers, non-Commissioned, Rank and File.		Horses.	Guns.				
		European.	Native.						
Artillery	1st Troop H. B.	125	...	200	66-prs.	Punah	Bombay	20	
	3rd "	125	...	200	66-prs.	Karachi	Karachi	8	
	4 Companies 1st Battalion	110	...	90	69-prs.	Ahmednuggur	Bombay	25	
	1 " 1st "	110	...	90	69-prs.		Do.	15	
Engineers	Reserve	50	...	...	28 H.	Punah	Do.	15	
	2 Companies, sappers	...	220	...	...	Kirki	Do.	20	
	2 Squadrons 14th Dragoons	300	...	300	...	Peroor	Do.	15	
	4 Troop Punah Horse	...	400	400	...	Belgaum	Vingorla	25	
Cavalry	Her Majesty's 64th Regiment	900	...	...	...	Hyderabad	Karachi	15	
	2nd European Light Infantry	900	...	...	...	Punah	Bombay	15	
	4th Regiment Native Infantry	...	700	...	...	Bombay	Do.	8	
	Rifles.	...	700	...	...	Belgaum	Vingorla	25	
Infantry	5th Native Infantry	...	700	...	...	Karachi	Karachi	8	
	20th Native Infantry	...	700	...	...	...	...	...	
	Baluch Battalion	...	700	...	...	...	...	...	
		2,520	3,420	24 Field.	4 Siege.	...	...	...	
		5,940		1,280	23				

PUNAH,

The 24th August 1856.

(Sd.) J. HOLLAND, Lieutenant-Colonel,

Quarter Master General.

*Abstract of Statement showing strength of Force.*

European officers	...	...	...	...	150
European and native non-commissioned, rank and file	...	...	...	...	4,965
Followers	...	...	...	...	3,203
Horses	...	...	...	...	975
Guns	...	...	...	...	28
Bullocks	...	...	...	...	381

*Statement showing the probable tonnage that will be required.*

				Tons.
Provisions, forage, grain, &c., for the voyage about	...	...	...	603
Do. grain, &c., for the march	...	...	...	579
Dead stock calculated at half of the tonnage of the provisions	...	...	...	591
Water 3,200 butts about (4 lacs gallons)	...	...	...	1,600
Commissariat followers and cattle about	...	...	...	1,247 $\frac{1}{2}$
To meet contingencies, about	...	...	...	100
			Total	4,720 $\frac{1}{2}$

No. 2407, dated 27th August 1856, from Military Department, to Quarter Master General.

Approves of the arrangements made by the Commander-in-Chief, but states that it seems to the Right Honourable the Governor to be doubtful whether for the first and immediate object of the expedition, it is necessary or desirable to send so large a number of cavalry and mounted artillery as the Commander-in-Chief has proposed. His Lordship in Council thinks that for the present at all events, the Dragoons and one troop of horse artillery may be regarded as supernumerary, and be reserved to form part of a second division. Further recommends the substitution of a line regiment (Native) for the Baluch Battalion; and adds that the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation as regards warm clothing, provision of transports, boats, and formation of an Artificer corps, will receive due attention.

Letter dated Púnah, 28th August 1856, from Quarter Master General, to Military Department.

States that the Commander-in-Chief in recommending the despatch of the Dragoons and of so large a body of horse artillery, was and is, under the conviction that it is necessary to be fully prepared after disembarkation, not only against probable attempts at surprise from the enemy, but to be able to seize and hold the wells, about two miles from Bushire, to send out patrols and to support foraging parties, and for all these duties the Commander-in-Chief does not consider the force proposed numerically strong. Further it is considered advisable to give the native cavalry the support of European cavalry, with which they will acquire the requisite confidence, owing to their not having heretofore met the Persians as enemies, and to the size and bravery of the latter.

States with regard to the Balúch battalion, that the Commander-in-Chief considers them much better fitted for campaigning in Persia than the natives of India Proper, and he is prepared to attach additional European officers to the corps if it be thought necessary. Requests early settlement of the points at issue, and also solicits permission to warn the corps detailed for service, as otherwise no effective preparations can be made.

---

No. 2443, dated 29th August 1856, from the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

States that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief may consider himself authorised to warn the corps selected for service, except the 14th Dragoons, one troop of horse artillery, and the Balúch battalion, respecting which the Governor in Council wishes to confer with His Excellency before forming a definitive decision.

Adds that in warning the troops as above, Commanding Officers should be desired to refrain from giving the matter publicity, as the despatch of the Force is still uncertain.

---

No. 899, dated 30th August 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Commandant of Artillery.

Inform him that the following strength of artillery has been sanctioned for service in the Persian gulf :—

3rd Troop Horse Artillery from Púnah, 6 guns.	
A European Horse Artillery from Ahmednugger, 6 guns.	
Reserve Artillery European, ditto	{ 2—18 Pounders.
	{ 2—8" Howitzers.
A Horse Battery, European from Karáchi, 6 guns.	

and requests him to take immediate measures for completing the companies to the full field strength, also to prepare a reserve of such number as he considers adequate.

---

No. 1774, dated 2nd September 1856, from the Commissary General, to the Quarter Master General.

States that orders have been served upon the boat contractors to supply Arab "baglahs" for 400 Irregular Horse. When tendered, they will be surveyed, and provisioned, and will be ready within 6 or 8 days. Remarks that the probable length of passage by Arab "baglahs" is from 45 to 50 days.

Adds that the troops proceeding in the steamers will be provided with 20 days' rations for use on the passage, and a month's stock of shorerations for use of the force will also be despatched.

The sanction to employ Arab "baglahs" was eventually negatived.

Acknowledges receipt of letter stating that under instructions from Calcutta, the number of cavalry to form part of the expeditionary force is restricted to 300, and of European infantry, to one regiment; and states that the arrangements having been altered, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief now thinks it his duty to represent that in case of hostilities he does not consider on purely military grounds the number of either arm as now restricted to be sufficient.



Points out that a force of 5,000 encamped on a plain requires a large body of cavalry to protect supplies and foragers and to watch over its safety. 300 men would therefore soon be knocked up by disease engendered by hard work. With regard to European soldiers, states that every authority, His Excellency has consulted, is of opinion that the force should be particularly strong in this arm. The numbers will probably be greatly reduced by sickness, &c., and the impression made on the people will be infinitely weakened if the proposed reduction be carried out.

---

Memorandum on the requirements of a Division to be embarked for service to Persia.

It will be highly necessary that the troops proceeding on this service be furnished with perfectly serviceable arms and accoutrements. The muskets of the 2nd European Regiment (if I remember right) and most of those with the fusiliers are as bad. It would be well if the troop could be completed with the new description of belts.

Should the 4th Rifles be ordered for service, it will be necessary to look to the service ammunition. That issued for the 60th Royal Rifles at Karáchi in 1848 was too large and the whole was re-made by Captain Finnimore, Deputy Commissary of Ordnance.

It is understood that the baggage animals for the force will be mules and camels. The efficiency of the force will be materially influenced by the arrangements which may be ordered for packing the men's kits. Nothing destroys animals so quickly as carrying ill-arranged bundles.

The method of packing the canvas bags should be laid down as respects the rotation in which the different articles should be placed in it; so that all may be uniform. It will be necessary at once to take in hand the marching order for the soldiers, European and Native.

The perishable portion of the soldiers uniform and necessaries should be placed in the knapsack and when this is determined upon, it should be made known for the guidance of all.

The orders for the Field Force will, it is supposed, emanate from the Commander. The Bombay column, Army of the Punjab took for its guide, the orders of Major-General Robert Crawford, modified to the requirements of campaigning in India.

Regiments proceeding to Persia should be increased to 800 effective privates by selected Volunteers from other Corps.

Depôt companies should be established at Bombay and Karáchi to the extent of 100 men for each regiment and 25 men for each Troop, Company and Battery of Artillery and sappers and miners, embarked on this service. These should be completed also by volunteers or drafts and the depôt be attached to a regiment at the before mentioned station.

The vacancies occasioned by this measure to be filled up by recruiting without loss of time.

As opportunities occur, drafts from the depôt, should be sent to join the service companies. By these means regiments and detachments would be kept complete, and the depôt companies would entail no expense beyond the small native staff required for their discipline.

Men proposed to be brought before the annual invaliding committee should be examined without delay. The retention of weakly men with Regiments proceeding on field service is most baneful. They fill the hospitals and doolies.

## Strength of Force.

Arm.	Corps.	Max.		Horses.	Guns.	Station.
		Euro-peans.	Natives.			
Artillery ...	3 Troops Horse Battery	125	...	200	6 6-Pounders	Punah.
	4th Company 1st Battalion	110	...	90	6 9 "	Karschi.
	1st " 1st " ...	110	...	90	6 9 "	Ahmednagar.
	Reserve ...	50	...	...	2 18 "	
	.....	...	...	...	2 8-inches Howitzers.	
Engineers ...	2 Companies, Sapper ...	...	220	...	.....	Punah.
Cavalry ...	4 Troops Punah Horse ...	...	400	400	.....	Seroor.
	Her Majesty's 64th Regiment.	900	...	...	... "	Belgaum.
	2nd European Light Infantry	800	...	...	.....	Hyderabad.
	4th Native Infantry Rifles	...	700	...	.....	Punah.
	5th Native Light Infantry	...	700	...	.....	Bombay.
	20th Native Infantry ...	...	700	...	.....	Belgaum.
	Europeans ... ..	2,095	2,720	...	18 Field.	
	Natives ... ..	2,720	...	...	4 Siege.	
	Grand Total ...	4,815	...	780	22	

Punah, 31st August 1856.

Above was stated to be estimated strength only, as the corps would be completed to their proper establishment.

No. 4008, dated 31st August 1856, from the Adjutant General, to the Military Department (Bombay).

By direction of the Commander-in-Chief I have the honor to convey His Excellency's recommendation to the Royal Highness the Governor in Council that the undermentioned staff be sanctioned for the field force under preparation for service in Persia :

*Commands.*

- A General Officer to command the force.
- A Field Officer to command the Artillery.
- Two 2nd Class Brigadiers of Infantry.

*Divisional and Brigade Staff.*

- 1 Assistant Adjutant General.
- 1 Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.
- 1 Assistant Quarter-Master General.
- 2 Deputy Assistant Quarter-Masters General.
- 1 Deputy Judge Advocate General.
- 1 Paymaster.

- 1 Assistant Commissary General.
- 1 Deputy Assistant Commissary General.
- 3 Sub-Assistant Commissaries General.
- 1 Commissary of Ordnance.
- 1 Commanding Engineer.
- 2 Field Engineers.
- 4 Assistant Field Engineers.
- 1 Brigade Major of Artillery.
- 2 Brigade Majors of Infantry.
- 1 Superintending Surgeon.
- 1 Field Surgeon.
- 1 Deputy Medical Storekeeper and Staff Surgeon.
- 1 Chaplain.

The officer commanding the force to appoint one of the Sub-Assistant Commissaries to the charge of Bazars and to make such arrangements as he may deem requisite, with respect to the appointment of Baggage and Post Masters, Provost Marshal, &c., &c., submitting his nominations to army head quarters in the usual manner for confirmation.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Commander-in-Chief has proposed the same scale for the Divisional Staff that was sanctioned for the field Force sent to the Punjab in 1848, as although the force at present warned for service in Persia is of somewhat less total strength, there appears reason to believe that it will be eventually, increased to a still greater one. His Excellency has proposed an additional Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General as the services of a third officer will he think be absolutely necessary, with that Department on the present occasion.

No. 4012, dated 31st August 1856, from the Adjutant General, to the Secretary, Medical Board.

Requests them to nominate Medical Officers for the following appointments :

- Superintending Surgeon.
- Field Surgeon.
- Deputy Medical Storekeeper and Staff Surgeon.

And states that the Commander-in-Chief considers Superintending Surgeon Collier the most efficient medical officer available for this service.

Also requests them to make arrangements for completing the medical establishments and for providing the additional medical officers and Field Establishment which they may consider requisite.

No. 2260, dated 2nd September 1856, from the Secretary, Medical Board, to the Adjutant General.

Furnishes list of Medical Officers, &c., recommended for appointment. List as under received sanction of Commander-in-Chief :

- |                         |     |   |
|-------------------------|-----|---|
| Surgeon Mackenzie       | ... | ... Superintending Surgeon.                       |
| Surgeon Stovel          | ... | ... Field Surgeon.                                |
| Assistant Surgeon Mills | ... | ... Deputy Medical Storekeeper and Staff Surgeon. |
| Surgeon Ward            | ... | ... In charge of the Artillery.                   |



*Assistant Surgeons.*

Hammond and Dick	...	...	To be appointed to the 2nd European Light Infantry.	
General duty.	{	Glasse	...	To join the force.
		Plumptre	...	To accompany detachment of Artillery from Nuggar.
		Wheatlez	...	To proceed to Bombay to join the Force.
		Bell	...	To accompany the Sappers.
		McConnell	...	To accompany 3rd Troop Horse Artillery.
		Boxwell	...	To be attached to 4—1 with Horse Battery from Karáchi.
		Cruickshank	...	To join the Force.
		E. T. Burrowes.	...	
To be attached to the Field Force.				
Hospital Steward J. Cross	...	...	With the rank of Acting Apothecary.	
Assistant Apothecary P. T. DeSouza,			With the rank of Acting Hospital Steward.	
" "	J. Nazareth	...	General duty, Punah.	
" "	J. D. Thompson	...	" " Sind.	
" "	J. W. Pinto	...	" " "	
" "	A. Pereira	...	Medical Store Department.	
1st Hospital Assistant N. Agostino	...		General duty Presidency Division.	
Acting Hospital Assistant Bhica Prub			General duty, Punah.	
2nd Hospital Assistant A. Barretto	...		With the rank of Acting 1st Hospital Assistant.	
" "	P. J. De Silva		Marine Battalion.	
" "	Bacher Sing		6th Regiment Native Infantry, Tanna.	

No. 2477, dated 3rd September 1856, from Military Department, to the Adjutant General.

In reply to 4008 states that the Governor General in Council generally approves of the scale of staff for the force, subject to such modifications as may hereafter be found expedient, to suit the employment of particular officers, whose services it may be deemed desirable to employ upon the expedition.

*Staff of Expedition.*

Major General F. Stalker, C.B., to command the Force.

*Brigadiers, 2nd Class.*

Colonel J. Stopford, C. B.	...	Her Majesty's 61th Foot.
" R. W. Honner	...	4th Regiment Native Infantry (Rifle Corps).

*Staff.*

Captain (Brigadier Lieutenant-Colonel)		
R. R. Younghusband	...	Assistant Adjutant General.
Captain J. A. Collier	...	Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.
" J. Wray	...	Assistant Quarter Master General.
Lieutenant W. V. Shewell	...	Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
" T. J. Holland	...	13th Regiment Native Infantry, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
Captain (Brevet Major) H. Boyé	...	Deputy Judge Advocate General.
" " H. J. Barr	...	Paymaster.
Major G. Pope	...	Deputy or Assistant Commissary-General.
Lieutenant W. F. Gordon	...	Deputy Assistant Commissary General.
" W. Gray	...	Sub-Assistant Commissary General.
" M. W. Willoughby	...	" " "
" E. L'Estrange	...	" " "
" D. Thain	...	" " "
Captain C. P. Rigby	...	Superintendent of Bazaars.
" B. K. Finimore	...	Commissary of Ordnance.
Major J. Hill	...	Commanding Engineers.

Lieutenant J. W. Playfair	...	} Field Engineers.
" J. G. B. Close	...	
" J. S. Trevor	...	} Assistant Field Engineers.
" C. J. Merrimen	...	
" C. W. Finch	...	
" W. W. Goodfellow	...	
Surgeon T. Mackenzie	...	Superintending Surgeon.
" M. Stovell	...	Field Surgeon.
" Assistant Surgeon J. Mills	...	Deputy Medical Storekeeper and Staff Surgeon.
Rev. G. A. F. Watson	...	Chaplain.

Letter dated 4th September 1856, from the Secretary to the Government with the Right Honourable the Governor (Bombay), to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Forwards copy of No. 954 (foregoing letter) and recommends the addition of 300 more cavalry to the force, and states that two squadrons of a native cavalry regiment now at Rajkot in Kattywar can conveniently be embarked at Porebunder.

Recommends the substitution of a British infantry regiment for one of the native regiments, as the Military authorities concur in the opinion that the force should contain a large proportion of Europeans.

States that in order to diminish the expense of transport, it has been proposed to send the Irregular Horse dismounted, and procure horses for them in Persia, but that this plan has not received the concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief and has been laid aside because it is neither practicable nor desirable as long as the irregular horse are the only cavalry attached to the force; should however, 300 regular cavalry be sent, the whole might be despatched without necessitating any additional number of transports.

No. 954, dated 4th September 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department.

Adds a strong expression of the Commander-in-Chief's disapproval of the reduction in question.

No. 2505, dated 8th September 1856, from the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

States that the Governor in Council approves of the strength and composition of the force as detailed, subject to modification.

With regard to the Púnah Irregular Horse observes by desire of the Governor that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is aware that Government has pointed out to the Government of India the advantage of sending the men of that corps dismounted, in the event of 300 regular cavalry being added to the force.

Adds that for the present more need not be determined, than that the Púnah Horse, if sent with their horses will be transported without their baggage cattle at the public expense,

No. 88, dated 8th September 1856, from the Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines, to the Adjutant General.

With regard to request that the spare or reserve wagons of the 3rd Troop Horse Artillery and of Nos. 3 and 5 Horse Field Batteries may be equipped with harness for horse or mule draft as circumstances may render expedient, states that he will make application to Government for the requisite sanction to the above arrangement, but points out that horse harness is the only kind recognised

and provided for in the Army accoutrement contract. Mule harness would therefore require to be made up and the contractor could demand whatever price he pleased for it, horse harness could however be issued at once from the arsenal stock.

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No. 5, dated 8th September 1856, from the Military Auditor General, to the Adjutant General.

Intimates that the Superintendent of Family Payments is ready to make all the necessary arrangements respecting the family remittances of the Native Troops, ordered on service, and that Lithographed Forms are prepared and will be forwarded on application.

Adds that the women may be permitted to reside at any station in the Presidency where troops are located, or pensioners receive their stipends.

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No. 4235, dated 12th September 1856, from the Deputy Adjutant General, to the Inspector General, Ordnance.

In reply to No. 88, communicates the desire of the Commander-in-Chief that Horse harness should be prepared for the batteries in question.

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No. 733, dated 17th September 1856, from the Commandant of Artillery, to the Adjutant General (Bombay).

Suggests that the Royal Pattern store cart attached to Light Field Batteries which is equipped for Bullocks (for which description of draft it is best adopted) may for the present service be fitted with loops and swingletrees for horse draft, in case of such draft only being available.

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No. 2015, dated 8th September 1856, from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General.

Governor in Council sanctions transfer from the Remount Depot attached to the 14th Dragoons to the Horse Brigade of such number of horses as may be required to complete the Troop proceeding with the Field Force under preparation for Persia.

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No. 1062, dated 19th September 1856, from the Adjutant General, to the Military Department.

Commandant of Artillery represents, having seen horses at the depot attached to 14th Dragoons some horses better suited for foot batteries than for Dragoons therefore recommends that they may be made available if their cost is not much in excess of regulations.

As No. 1, Light Field Battery, was horsed up to the Field complement with trained horses from Battery at Sholapoor, thinks it necessary that the latter should be completed at once and accordingly. Commander-in-Chief recommends that Lieutenant Colonel Scobie, Remount Agent, and Lieutenant and Adjutant Wallace, Horse Brigade, may be permitted to point out the horses alluded to and make further selections as His Excellency considers, that a few horses of a more powerful description than those which can be purchased for the sum laid down, are required for the wheel.



No. 2918, dated 3rd October 1856, from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General.

Approves of the above.

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No. 107, dated 13th September 1856, from the Officer Commanding 1st Baluch Battalion, to the Bridge Major, Karachi.

States that the officers and men of all ranks have volunteered for active service, and as the battalion was raised for service within the province, hopes that the soldierlike feeling which prompted the request may obtain for it, the favourable consideration of Government.

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Extract of No. 2618, dated 16th September 1856, from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General.

Captain Rigby (Superintendent of Bazaars at Púnah) is to be appointed Bazaar master to the expeditionary force, and it is desired that he should proceed in advance together with officers of the Commissariat Department and one of the Quarter Master General's Department.

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Letter from Captain Rigby, dated Bushire, 30th December 1856, to Military Department.

Requests that a decision may be arrived at regarding the amount of staff allowance granted him in his present office; as in addition to his duties as Bazaar Superintendent he has charge of the entire police duties in the Town of Bushire, has to raise and equip a police force, perform all the magisterial duties including the trial of minor civil suits, and to superintend the cleaning of the whole town, &c. Therefore trusts that he may be granted a somewhat higher allowances than that granted to a Superintendent of Bazaars.

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No. 1986, dated 19th September 1856, from the Commissary General, to the Adjutant General.

Points out that soldiers from European Regiments, were attached to the Commissariat Department as Butchers during the first and second campaigns in Afghanistan, were paid at the rate of 10 per mensem and were liable to recall if required. Requests that a similar arrangement may be made in connection with the Persian Field Force.

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No. 1023, dated 11th September 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department.

With regard to the opinion of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, that the Púnah Horse should be sent to Persia dismounted, if the Government of India sanction the despatch of two squadrons 3rd Cavalry; states that the Commander-in-Chief trusts, should it be possible to procure tonnage for the full number of horses, that the Governor will reconsider his opinion, as the whole of the cavalry will be required from the first, and delay would necessarily occur in procuring horses and rendering them fit for service, and this would probably overwork the cavalry men and render them unfit for service; and adds that the want of a sufficient number of light cavalry would seriously cripple the movements of the force.

Return showing the staff with followers, &c., proceeding to Persia and embarking at Karachi and Vingorla.

Corps.	European Officers.	Warrant Officers.	European Non-Commiss- ioned Rank and File.	Native Commissioned- ed, Rank and File.	FOLLOWERS.						HORSES.		Bullocks.	Baggage of Officers and men, &c.	
					PUBLIC.				PRIVATE.		Officers'.	Regimental.			
					Syces.	Grass- cutters.	Hospi- tal.	Artifi- cer, mess Lascars, &c.	Officer's and mess servants.	Troops' follow- ers.					
<i>At Karachi.</i>															
Adjutant General's Department.	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	6	...		2	...	...	...	Brigadier Stopford included in Her Majesty's 64th Return, to which add 6 tent Lascars, 2 servants.
Commissariat ...	1	1	1	...	...	...	301	4	3		1	...	...	...	
Medical establishment ...	3	3	...	...	...	...	...	12	3		3	...	...	...	
Total ...	5	4	1	...	...	...	301	22	6		6	...	...	...	
<i>At Vingorla.</i>															
Quarter Master General's Depart- ment.	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	...		2	...	...	...	
Commissariat ...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1	...	2		...	...	...	...	
Brigadier of Infantry ...	1	...	...	...	...	...	5	9	...		1	...	...	...	
Total ...	2	...	1	...	...	...	6	14	2		3	...	...	...	

(Sd.) J. J. POLLEXFEN, Captain,  
Assistant Deputy Quarter Master General.

Return showing the Staff with followers, &amp;c., proceeding to Persia and Embarking at Bombay.

	FOLLOWERS.										HORSES.		Bullocks.	Baggage of officers and men, and mess stores.	
	European Officers.	Warrant Officers.	European Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Public.				Private.		Officers.	Regimental.			
					Syces.	Grass-cutters.	Hospital.	Artificers, Lascars, Rhis, &c.	Officers, and mess servants.	Troops, followers.					
Major General Commanding	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	11	11	..	1	..	..	..	Brigadier Honner is included in the returns of the 4th Rifles to which 6 infantry lascars and 2 additional servants should be added. Do. Do. 1 public follower, 1 servant of do. and 1 syce and horse should be added. "Melbourne." Major Sibley has been included in the return of Her Majesty's 64th Regiment out of which should be struck 1 captain, 1 horse, 5 servants. To Porbander and thence to Persia. Major Hill included in the return of Sappers and Miners.
Brigadier of Infantry	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	9	..	1	..	..	..	
Brigade Major of Infantry	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	5	..	1	..	..	..	
Brigade Major of Infantry	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	
Brigade Major of Artillery	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	
Brigade Major of Artillery	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	..	1	..	..	..	
Adjutant General's Department.	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	6	..	2	..	..	..	
Quarter Master General's Department.	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	15	..	7	..	8	..	..	
Judge Advocate General's Department.	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	5	1	1	..	..	..	
Pay Master	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	10	5	7	1	..	..	..	
Commissariat	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	310	4	20	1	..	300	..	
Commissariat Department	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	15	4	2	1	..	..	..	
Ordnance Department	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	181	5	8	1	..	..	..	
Engineer Department	7	..	..	..	..	..	..	138	29	1	7	..	..	..	
Medical staff	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	17	4	3	..	..	..	
Medical establishment unattached.	8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	32	..	8	..	..	..	
Total	30	11	13	..	3	1	5	704	153	75	34	3	303	..	

(Sd.) J. J. POLLEXFEN, Captain,

Assistant Deputy Quarter Master General.



No. 1083 of 16th September 1856, from the Quartermaster-General, to the President, Special Committee, Bombay.

In addition to the foregoing return, states that the 2nd European Light Infantry now at Hyderabad, and the Head-quarters, and 2nd Squadron 3rd Regiment Light Cavalry at Rajkot, are to proceed to Persia.

PROBABLE STRENGTH.		<i>3rd Light Cavalry.</i>	
<i>2nd European Light Infantry.</i>		Officers	... 11
Officers	... 24	Non-Commissioned Officers	...
Non-Commissioned Officers rank and file	... 860	rank and file	300
Followers	... 252	Followers	... 300
Horses	... 24	Bullocks	... 3
Bullocks	... 30	Horses	... 340

The 2nd European Light Infantry and 2nd Baluch battalion will embark from Karachi, the 3rd Cavalry from Porebunder, and Her Majesty's 61th and the 20th Native Infantry

from Vingorla.

Statement showing probable force for service in Persia.

	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned Officers R. & F.	Native troops.	Followers.	Horses.	Bullocks.	ORDNANCE.						CARRIAGE.		Baggage officers and men.	Tons of 50 cubic feet.	Soldier's tents.	Grand total of baggage and tents.	Abstract.
							9 Pounder field guns.	6 Pounder field guns.	24 Pounder field guns.	12 Pounder field guns.	12 Pounder Howitzers.	8" Howitzers.	Ammunition.	Store carts.					
3rd Troop Horse Artillery	5	150	25	290	245	4	...	4	...	2	...	...	6	2	...	...	...	128	...
2 European Horse Batteries and reserve.	11	278	64	640	261	8	...	...	...	...	...	...	12	4	...	...	...	...	...
2 Companies Sappers	4	13	232	200	4	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
3 Troops Poonah Horse	3	...	300	175	306	21	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Her Majesty's 64th Regiment	...	997	...	203	19	27	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
4th Rifles	17	...	799	205	17	10	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
6th Regiment Native Infantry	13	...	752	155	13	10	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
20th Regiment Native Infantry	11	...	765	189	11	10	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Baluch Battalion	4	...	780	145	4	10	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Commissariat Department	4	10	...	672	4	300	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Staff and other Departments	34	2	...	931	44	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Total	128	1,450	3,737	3,354	938	402	8	4	4	2	2	2	18	6	1800	437	1,865	...	...

PUNAH,

(Sd.) J. HOLLAND, *Lieut.-Colonel,**Quartermaster General.*

The 14th September 1856.

No. 2595 of 15th September 1856, from the Military Department, to the Quartermaster General.

By desire of the Governor in Council, requests the Commander-in-Chief to name the regiment of European infantry to be added to the force and that of native infantry withdrawn, also to issue orders for the two squadrons of native cavalry at Rajkot to be prepared for movement and embarkation at Porebunder.

Solicits His Excellency's attention to the plan proposed of sending the Púnah Horse dismounted or partly mounted, and states that Government will be happy to receive a report upon the manner in which the arrangement could be most efficiently carried out.

No. 3089, dated 14th October 1856, from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General.

Conveys sanction of the Government of India to the augmentation of the Native Regiments proceeding on service, to their full establishment of 800 privates.

2nd European Light Infantry made up to 800 privates by transfers from 1st Fusiliers.

Extract letter from Deputy Adjutant General.

Volunteers for 5th Native Light Infantry.

The men should be from 2 to 8 years' service, if possible well trained light infantry soldiers, and Commanding Officers must be careful to explain to their Regiments in communicating these instructions that while absent from India on foreign service the sepoys will be entitled to extra clothing, *vide* G. G. O., 12th December 1855, full data, and money rations, the latter as fixed in page 70 of Jameson's Code and under paragraphs 106-107, page 69. Volunteers came forward in plenty to complete the establishments of regiments ordered to Persia, provided that on return they were allowed to revert to their own Regiments.

No. 2721, dated 20th September 1856, from the Military Department, to the Quartermaster General.

Intimates that in deference to the opinion expressed by the Commander-in-Chief, Government will no longer pursue the plan of sending the Púnah Horse dismounted, but as the instructions of the Government of India limit the cavalry to 400 as "amply sufficient", and as the transport of the horses is the most difficult part of the expedition, the Governor in Council considers that the detachment Púnah Horse should not exceed 200. The cavalry arm will then number 500 sabres in addition to the mounted artillery.

No. 1756, dated 24th September 1856, from the Quartermaster General, to the President, Transport Committee.

States that the troops will embark off the ports named below, from whence they will probably sail direct for their destination :

Bombay and Ulwa	{	3rd troop Horse Artillery.
	{	1 company 1st Battalion Artillery and reserve ordnance.
	{	Púnah Horse.
	{	2 companies Sappers.
	{	4th Native Infantry (Rifles) with reserve stores of all kinds and departmental followers.
Vingorla	...	{ Her Majesty's 64th Regiment.
	...	{ 20th Native Infantry.
Porebunder	...	{ 2 squadrons 3rd Light Cavalry.



Karáchi ... { 4th company 1st Battalion Artillery.  
2nd European Regiment.  
Balúch battalion.

*Memorandum.*

Seven transports as follows :

Artillery	...	{ Melbourne. Raja of Cochín. Madge Wildfire. Sibella. Merse. Dacotah. Mirzapoor.	}	Are being fitted up and will contain all the artillery including the reserves and the reserve ordnance and stores.
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Four transports as follows :

3rd Light Cavalry	...	{ Abdulla ... Boyne ... Alabama ... Fairlie ...	Horses. ... 100 ... 74 ... 84 ... 80	}	Will take up the whole of the 3rd Light Cavalry at Porebunder.
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Two transports as follows :

Púnah Horse	...	{ Clifton ... Arthur the great ...	Horses. ... 92 ... 116	}	Will carry the Púnah Horse.
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*The following steamers and transports will be sent to Vingorla :*

64th Foot	...	{ Precursor ... Pottinger ...	497 500	150 Her Majesty's 64th foot. 145
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20th Native Infantry	{	Unknown ...	19	27	384	50	} 20th Regiment Native Infantry.
		Unknown ...	18	2	400	87	

*These are to be two large transports (not yet taken up) to convey the whole of the 20th Native Infantry with the camp equipage and horses of the 64th regiment.*

There will then remain :

The Sappers and Miners and remaining Infantry of the force.	{	2nd European Regiment ... 4th Rifles ... Balúch Battalion ... Sappers and Miners ...	1,112 1,003 925 320	} Including followers.
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Total ... 3,360

or say a total of 3,500 infantry to be conveyed, which the Commander-in-Chief, Indian Navy, proposes to do in, the following eleven steamers, at an average of about 320 men in each, which would give a total of 3,520, about the required number.

*Assaye, Punjab, Feroze, Ajdaha, Berenice, Semiramis, Victoria, Hugh Lindsay, Chusan, Scindian, Bombay.*

The *Zenobia* may also be available. The Ordnance and Commissariat stores, followers and bullocks, will require additional transport.

The Commander-in-Chief intends to have a special powder ship, also a hospital ship.

Total number of transports will be about 24.

No. 1853, dated 30th September 1856, from Quartermaster General, to Transport Committee.

Requests that the attention of the Committee may be directed to the providing some means of personal ablution to the troops on the steamers and transports, and that a small but suitable place may be marked off on each vessel as a sick bay.

No. 3129, dated 17th October 1856, from the Military Department, to the Commander-in-Chief, Indian Navy.

Requests him to arrange the time and order of sailing of the transports and to name the place which he desires to recommend as the first *rendezvous* of the expedition after leaving India. States that as orders may be received by the next mail for the immediate despatch of the force, and as the preparations are in an advanced state, the Governor in Council considers that the time has arrived for the final arrangements to be made for the embarkation of the troops and the disposition of the transports. Intimates that it appears to be advisable to separate the fleet into three distinct divisions—

- 1st,—the Bombay Division.
- 2nd,—the Vingorla Division.
- 3rd,—the Karáchi and Porebunder Division.

and states that the Governor in Council is aware that it may not be practicable to make these divisions entirely distinct, it being difficult to divide the steamers so as to exactly accord with the sailing transports at each point of embarkation, but an approximation may be effected, and the arrangements may be governed by the principle of keeping the three divisions as distinct as may be practicable.

Remarks that on the issue of the final order for departure, the 2nd and 3rd divisions should be despatched first, and they should not be required to communicate with the Presidency, but on receiving their complement of troops, stores, &c., should sail for the *rendezvous* previously given, each division would thus make the voyage separately and there would be no risk of the confusion that may be expected if the fleet is kept together. Informs him that an officer of the Quarter Master General's and Commissariat Departments will be present at Vingorla and Porebunder to superintend the embarkation, and requests him to take measures to ensure the presence also of an Indian Naval officer of sufficient standing to command and control all naval operations of each division until united under a superior command at the place of *rendezvous*.

Requests that a small steamer may be employed at Porebunder to tow the boats with the horses off to the transports, also that a fast steamer may be held in readiness to proceed to the gulf immediately after the arrival of the mail.

No. 459, dated 23rd October 1856, from the Superintending Surgeon, Sind, to the Secretary, Medical Board.

Reports that there are 325 men in Hospital of the 2nd European Light Infantry with slight Intermittent Fever contracted during the passage down the Indus through the creeks.

No. 810, dated 23rd October 1856, from the General Officer Commanding Sind Division, to the Adjutant General.

Reports that the sickness in the 2nd European Regiment, Light Infantry has increased to a great extent. They arrived from Hyderabad, on 19th instant.

The prevailing disease is fever of a simple character such as is generally met with at this season of the year in Sind, and the General Officer Commanding concurs with the Medical authorities in opinion, that with the change and rest the disease will disappear.

Requests orders however in regard to attaching two or more companies of the Fusiliers to the corps in the event of a sudden embarkation. Number of sick on morning of date was 340.

No. 1918, dated 29th October 1856, from the Adjutant General, to the General Officer Commanding Sind Division.

Intimates that in the event of the 2nd European Regiment, being unfit to embark on the arrival of the Transports at Karáchi, the 1st European Regiment (Fusiliers) must take its place, but that in the event of the sickness having abated and it having been decided to embark the 2nd Europeans, the General Officer Commanding is at liberty to attach to it two or more companies from the Fusiliers.

No. 3251, dated 24th October 1856, from the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

The expedition which will have been prepared under previous instructions, shall as soon as it can be completed, proceed to its destination in the Gulf of Persia.

States that a despatch as per margin has been received from the Home Government, and requests the Commander-in-Chief to take upon himself the immediate superintendence of the despatch of the force and make all the necessary arrangements in connection therewith: naval matters to be arranged with Sir H. Leeke, who has been given the command of the fleet and to whose discretion the order of sailing and appointment of places of *rendezvous* have been entrusted.

Intimates that the troops take one month's rations with them and that the Commissary General has been instructed to prepare provisions and stores for one month more, to be forwarded hereafter. Adds that there is a small supply of Enfield rifles in the arsenal, and requests the Commander-in-Chief's opinion as to the advisability of issuing about 500 to be at the disposition of the officer in command.

In conclusion points out that it may be possible to obtain the services of an officer who has passed at Hythe and of some Non-commissioned officers who have been instructed in the use of the Enfield rifle, to teach the men the method of using the weapon.

No. 829, dated 31st October 1856, from the Commander-in-Chief, Indian Navy, to the Governor in Council.

Reports that the men of war of the Indian Navy are all ready for immediate service, and that the transports of the 4th division, that is those for Vingorla, are also ready to proceed. States that the transports of the 2nd and 3rd divisions will be ready to proceed to Porebunder and Karáchi very shortly, and requests orders as to sending them off.

Adds that the 1st and last division, that is the vessels to embark the 4th Rifles, Artillery, and Púnah Horse, will be ready to receive the troops at any time after 5th November.

No. 6456, dated 7th November 1856, from the Adjutant General, to Major-General Stalker, C.B.

Conveys the assurance of the trust reposed by the Commander-in-Chief that he will maintain in the force, the most perfect discipline and efficiency, and points out that the material of which the force is composed is in every way complete and that the staff departmental officers have been selected with every regard to their qualifications for affording the General Officer Commanding, effective aid in the performance of their respective duties.



No. 526, dated 11th November 1856, from the Deputy Adjutant General, to the Adjutant General of the Army.

Intimates that he inspected the 64th Foot and the 20th Native Infantry at Vingorla, prior to departure for Persia, and found both corps in a very efficient state and in the highest spirits at the prospect of active service. Points out that the wooden canteens now in the men's possession are useless and that there is a great want of uniformity in the accoutrement. Also that the ration for the European Troops— $\frac{1}{3}$ rd of all of salt meat is much too small, and that the amount of tea is also insufficient.

Letter No. 88, dated 17th November 1856, from the Bombay Government, to the Directors, East India Company.

\* \* \* \*

9. We beg to report that the last portion of the expedition, which is comprised of the following corps, accompanied by Major General Stalker and Sir Henry Leeke, left the Bombay Harbour for the Persian gulf on the 13th instant :

Corps.	TOTAL STRENGTH.			
	European Commissioned Officers.	European non-commissioned, Rank and File.	Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Horses.
3rd Troop Horse Artillery ... ..	8	150	25	244
1st Company 1st Brigade Artillery with No. 3 Light Field Battery.	5	103	96	136
4th Company 1st Brigade Artillery with No. 5 Light Field Battery.	5	103	100	131
Reserve Artillery ... ..	2	65	...	...
Two Squadrons 3rd Regiment Light Cavalry ... ..	17	...	294	317
Two Troops Pūnah Irregular Horse ... ..	3	...	174	183
Two Companies Sappers and Miners ... ..	4	11	233	...
Her Majesty's 64th Regiment ... ..	25	912	...	...
Hon'ble Company's 2nd Regiment European Light Infantry ...	31	926	...	...
4th Regiment Native Infantry (Rifles) ... ..	19	1	857	...
20th Regiment Native Infantry ... ..	14	...	718	...
2nd Balūch Battalion ... ..	4	...	906	...
Total ... ..	137	2,271	3,412	1,006

Abstract of total force comprising the expedition :

European Commissioned Officers	...	...	137
European non-commissioned rank and file	...	...	2,271
Native ditto	...	...	3,412

Grand Total ... 5,820

Total No. of Horses ... 1,006

10. The following further statement exhibits the names, number of guns and tonnage of the vessels belonging to the Indian Navy which have been despatched with the expedition to the Persian Gulf:

Name.	Tonnage.	Number of guns.	Date of sailing.	Remarks.
<i>Punjab</i> Steam vessel ...	1,800 Tons ...	Ten 68-pounders ...	8th November 1856.	2, 12-pounder and 2, 3-pounder brass boat guns.
<i>Semiramis</i> " ...	960 " ...	Six 68-pounders ...		2, 12-pounder and 2, 3-pounder brass boat guns.
<i>Ajdaha</i> " ...	1,450 " ...	Two 68-pounders and two 32-pounders.		2, 12-pounder and 2, 3-pounder brass boat guns.
<i>Victoria</i> " ...	705 " ...	Four 32-pounders ...		2, 3-pounder boat guns.
<i>Berenice</i> " ...	664 " ...	One 32-pounder ...		2, 12-pounder and 2, 3-pounder brass boat guns.
<i>Feroze</i> " ...	1,450 " ...	Four 68-pounders and four 32-pounders.	13th November 1856.	2, 12-pounder and 2, 3-pounder brass boat guns.
<i>Assaye</i> " ...	1,800 " ...	Ten 68-pounders ...		1, 12-pounder and 2, 3-pounder brass boat guns.
<i>Clive</i> Sloop ...	420 " ...	Fourteen 32-pounders ...	11th November 1856.	1, 12-pounder and 2, 3-pounder boat guns.
<i>Euphrates</i> , Brig ...	255 " ...	Ten 18-pounders ...	15th November 1856.	One 3-pounder boat gun.

1st Division.

Corps or Department.	EUROPEANS.					NATIVES.			
	Officers.	Riding Masters.	Band Master.	Medical Warrant Officers Assistants and Apprentices.	Non-Commissioned Rank and File.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Rank and File.	Public Followers.	Private Followers.
2nd European Regiment Light Infantry ...	*20	...	1	3	840	...	...	132	145
Her Majesty's 64th Regiment ...	26	...	...	4	880	...	...	124	164
3rd Regiment Light Cavalry ...	†12	1	...	...	...	8	261	250	124
Punah Irregular Horse ...	3	...	...	...	...	9	191	...	...
4th Regiment Native Infantry (Rifles) ...	16	...	...	...	1	19	708	48	106
20th Regiment Native Infantry ...	10	...	1	...	...	15	718	54	98
Sappers and Miners ...	4	...	...	...	13	4	228	32	41
2nd Balach Battalion ...	4	...	...	...	...	16	890	51	70

\* 13 Officers to join not included.

† 2 more officers possibly to join not included.

G. O. C. 12th December 1856.

The Commander-in-Chief has much pleasure and satisfaction in communicating to the army the approbation of Government as expressed in General orders by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council No. 903, of 3rd December.

Adverting to paragraph 9 of the above order, His Excellency is desirous of recording his thanks to the Heads of Departments and the officers of the general staff of the army for the very satisfactory manner in which the arrangements have been carried out in organising and equipping the force lately despatched to the Persian Gulf.

The sentiments of His Lordship in Council bear testimony to the combined efforts of the various departments, and which have been graciously acknowledged by the Government in terms most gratifying to all those who have been so zealously employed in fitting out the expedition.

The Commander-in-Chief therefore most cordially acknowledges the assistance rendered by the Departments of the Adjutant-General and Quarter-Master General of the Army. Upon Colonel Holland and the officers of the latter department necessarily devolved the more arduous part of the movement of the expedition, for the efficient and satisfactory performance of which the acknowledgments of His Excellency are especially due.

His Excellency is also much indebted to Colonel Lugard, C.B., Deputy Adjutant General, Queen's Forces, detached on special duty to Vingorla for the very satisfactory inspection and report made by him of Her Majesty's 64th Foot and the 20th Regiment Native Infantry previous to their embarkation.

The thanks of the Commander-in-Chief are also due to the Medical Board for the completeness of the arrangements in this most important part of the expedition, and for the care which the Board has evinced in providing in the most perfect manner for all connected with the Medical Department.

His Excellency has observed with much pleasure the very favourable notice which the Right Honourable the Governor in Council has been pleased to bestow upon Major Glasse and the members of the committee of embarkation, whose exertions were most praiseworthy and conspicuous.

By the various reports, received from the General Officers Commanding Divisions, His Excellency has become acquainted with the precision with which the several instructions issued to them have been carried out, and in thanking them for their assistance the Commander-in-Chief desires that his acknowledgments may be conveyed to their several staff officers.

Extract from Confidential letter No. 4121, dated 26th December 1856, from the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

Large reinforcements are immediately to be prepared for despatch to the Persian Gulf.

2. These reinforcements it is proposed, to organise as a separate division to form the second division of the expeditionary Force to Persia, and to be complete with all its staff as a distinct corps *d'armée*

3. The division the Governor in Council proposes to be composed of the following corps:

- 1 Troop Horse Artillery.
- 1 European Horse and Field Battery.
- Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons.
- 1 Regiment, Sind Horse.
- Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders.
- 26th Regiment Native Infantry.
- Baluch Battalion.



4. In addition, a mountain train will be added to the equipment for which artillery men may probably be spared from the 1st Division when perfectly established in the occupation of Bushire, and application will be made to the Madras Government for the aid of a company of Sappers, if they possibly can be spared from the army of that Presidency.

5. The Commander-in-Chief will observe that the greater part of the troops above named have already been told of, and held ready as a reserve for reinforcing the force now operating in the Gulf of Persia. The additional troop of Horse Artillery may be taken from Karáchi, if that at Púnah cannot be completed in time, and the Sind Horse has been specially indicated for the service by the Home Government.

6. All these Corps should be immediately warned, and every preparation made for movement and embarkation as soon as transports can be got ready, and the Governor in Council will be glad to receive, as early as convenient an embarkation return of the whole force for the guidance of the naval authorities, together with a statement of the dates on which the several corps may be at the point where they are to be embarked.

7. The same proportionate number of artificers should be attached to the Batteries, as proceeded with those of the 1st division, and I am to convey to you, authority to augment the corps of Tent Lascars to the extent recommended in your letter of the 22nd instant. The staff of the 2nd division is to include the complete establishment of a Land Transport Corps as before proposed.

8. Under ordinary circumstances the Right Honourable the Governor in Council would not have directed the despatch on distant service of so very large a part of the forces of this Presidency without consulting His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, but as time is of great importance His Lordship in council has anticipated His Excellency's concurrence, and has already referred to the Government of India for assistance in supplying such part of the force withdrawn as may be essentially necessary to ensure the continued peace of the country, and to diminish in some measure the severity of the duty which must fall upon the troops remaining in our garrisons and cantonments.

9. The Governor in Council will be happy to receive the Commander-in-Chief's suggestions and recommendations for the preparation and equipment of the 2nd division of the expeditionary force with the same efficiency as the 1st.

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No. 4109, dated 26th December 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department

With the view of placing at the disposal of Government the three regiments of Native Infantry required for the additional force to be sent to Persia, I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to submit for sanction the following proposition.

2. The 26th Regiment Native Infantry now on route to Poona may be considered ready and available.

3. As submitted in my confidential letter of 24th August last, a Native Infantry regiment may be divided between Bhúj and Rajkote, and one of these regiments made available for service, or if the jail and civil duties performed by the Brigade at Ahmedabad can be taken by the Police, one regiment can be reduced from Ahmedabad.

#### 4. A Light Battalion may be formed by taking the Light Companies of

2nd Grenadier.  
3rd Regiment Native  
Infantry.  
5th Regiment Light In-  
fantry.  
8th Regiment Native In-  
fantry.  
11th Regiment Native  
Infantry.  
15th Regiment Native  
Infantry.  
22nd Regiment Native  
Infantry.  
25th Regiment Native  
Infantry.  
\* 27th Regiment Native  
Infantry.  
29th Regiment Native  
Infantry.  
\* Since altered to 28th.

the Regiments noted in the margin.

5. In regard to this last measure, I have been directed in accordance with the understood desire of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, to order the companies in question to prepare for movement.

6. The Commander-in-Chief understands that Government has applied for sanction to increase the established strength of Regiments to 800 privates, but so exhausted are we by the large drafts made on this small army, and so severe has the duty become in every quarter, that His Excellency desires me strongly to recommend an additional increase of 100 men per regiment for those regiments whence the Light Companies are withdrawn.

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No. 4154, dated 27th December 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Adjutant General.

Intimates that the following troops have been ordered to be prepared for service in Persia.

4th Troop Horse Artillery from Karáchi.

1st Company 2nd Battalion Artillery with No. 2 Light Field Battery now *en route* from Sholapore to Púnah.

Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons from Kirkí.

One Regiment, Sind Irregular Horse from Sind.

Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders from Púnah.

23rd Regiment Native Light Infantry from Rajkote.

26th Regiment Native Infantry now *en route* from Sattara to Púnah.

A flank battalion composed of the Light Companies, 2nd Grenadiers, 3rd, 5th, 8th, 11th, 15th, 22nd, 25th, 28th, and 29th Native Infantry.

P.S.—A wing, 17th Native Infantry, has been ordered from Bhúj for duty at Rajkote.

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No. 4170, dated 29th December 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Adjutant General.

States that Government have applied for the augmentation of all the Native Regiments to the strength of 800 privates, and of those which are to lose their Light Companies, to 900 privates. That consequent on a representation by the Political Superintendent of Kolapore of a want of troops the Light Company 28th Native Infantry has been substituted for that of the 27th Native Infantry.

That the Commandant of Artillery has been directed to complete the 4th troop Horse Artillery at Karáchi to the full field establishment and to report to you whether he proposes any and what increase to the Artillery staff.

That the Commissary General is of opinion that the same proportion of Commissariat Officers and Establishment should accompany the force as were sent with the force lately despatched.

Adds that the troops approved by Government have been warned for service, and that Major Curtis, the officer recommended by the Commander-in-Chief as director of the Land Transport Corps, has been ordered to Bombay and is now in communication with the Quarter Master General.

No. 7150, dated 29th December 1856, from the Adjutant General, to the Secretary,  
Medical Board.

Requests the Board to appoint the Medical staff for the second division, and also to nominate a Medical Officers to superintend the whole medical arrangements of the two divisions, under such designation as they may think advisable to adopt.

*Appointments.*

Field Surgeon M. Stovell to be	...	Superintending Surgeon, 1st Division.
Surgeon Burn, Artillery	...	Field Surgeon, 1st Division.
" A. Stewart, 14th Dragoons	...	Field Surgeon 2nd Division.
" Nailson, 20th Regiment, Native Infantry	...	Surgeon of the Artillery.
" Lodwick, 4th Rifles	...	2nd Division.
" Butho, 26th Native Infantry	...	3rd Cavalry.
" Pelly	...	4th Rifles.
Assistant Surgeon Bayne	...	20th Native Infantry.
Surgeon W. Davey	...	Deputy Medical Storekeeper and Storekeepers, 2nd Division.
" Barnett	...	26th Native Infantry.

N. B.—It is to be presumed that Surgeon Mackenzie was placed in charge of the whole force, but the papers don't show who was appointed.

No. 14 of 25th November 1856, from Quarter Master General, Púnah, to the  
Adjutant General.

Forwards Extract from letter from Commandant of Artillery for Commander-in-Chief's orders.

"The completion of the 1st troop can only be effected by a draft from the 4th troop at Karáchi. The recruits expected from England will not I believe exceed 60 men, a number so inadequate to meet our present and probable wants that I would suggest for His Excellency's consideration, the expediency of inviting approved volunteers from the Infantry for Artillery service or of making a selection from that branch of the service to meet our wants.

If the remount agent is unable to afford present assistance towards completing the 1st Troop, I would suggest that a selection from the Crimean remounts may be made towards this desired end.

No. 65, dated 1st December 1856, from the Adjutant General, to the Military  
Department.

Commander-in-Chief recommends that a Light Field Battery be as soon as possible completed with the garrison establishment of horses and constituted a Horsed Field Battery in supercession of bullock draft it being in his opinion highly expedient that a Horsed Battery should be organised at Ahmednugur ready for any emergency.

Quarter Master General's Memorandum No. 14.

The artillery is exhausted, and as recruits are not expected (I believe) something must be done for its relief. Volunteering from the Line has been permitted by Government to recruit the Native Artillery and perhaps might be sanctioned from the European Infantry on the present occasion.

The Volunteers should be sent to the several batteries for training to admit of trained men being withdrawn therefrom to meet the present emergency.



2 The Remount agent to whom I have spoken, thinks he could at once obtain about 80 horses towards the completion of the Sholapore Battery it wants 57 to complete it to the full field establishment. He must have a Committee though to pass the horses and I therefore propose for sanction the assembly of a special one composed as follows :

Major Prescott.

Lieutenant Wallace.

A. M. B. Artillery.

Captain Aitkin, Artillery.

We have no Veterinary Surgeon available. Never mind?

3. The Crimean depôt won't yield many remounts towards the completion of the 1st troop. A few may be selected, but for the bulk, we must trust to the Agent. The market won't yield them yet; and if we go to war with our supplies, there is a chance of our supplies being cut short!!! But what about the annual Remount Committee? let us have that in orders, and assembled as soon as possible to expedite matters.

4. A set of carriages will, I understand, be supplied from the Grand Arsenal for the Sholapore Battery.

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No. 3884, dated 8th December 1856, from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General.

Sanctions such horses remaining in the depôt attached to the 14th Dragoons, as may be fit for Horse Artillery being made available for the 1st Troop Horse Brigade at Pûnah.

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No. 198, dated 24th February 1857, from General Officer Commanding Sind Division, Karachi, to the Adjutant General, Bombay.

Reports departure of the 4th Troop Horse Artillery for Persian Gulf that day.

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No. 4018, dated 17th December 1856, from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General.

States that orders have been given for the purchase of 57 horses to complete one of the Light Field Batteries to its full field strength, and intimates that orders will be given for the purchase of 50 additional horses for Battery draft, which may hereafter be applied, either in exchange for bullock draft or to fill up casualties in the batteries of the existing establishment.

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No. 8, dated 22nd December 1856, from Lieutenant-Colonel Trevelyan.

Suggests that a mountain train as per margin be procured from Bombay with full equipment, also that mules should be purchased for this train as well as horses for the spare wagons of the 3rd Troop Horse Artillery and Nos. 3 and 5 Light Field Batteries the labour of breaking in these afterwards to draught being a work of time.

Brings to notice the insufficiency of the siege train and recommends that it should be increased from Bombay by—

2, 18-pounder guns.

2, 8-inch howitzers.

with the established proportion of shot and shell.

No. 33, dated Bushire, 23rd December 1856, from Major-General Stalker, to the Adjutant General, Bombay.

Forwards letter from Lieutenant Colonel Trevelyan and states that he concurs with the Lieutenant Colonel in considering that for an advance into the interior it is very desirable to have a mountain train with the force, and that the proposed increase to the siege train appears very desirable. Adds that he has authorised Lieutenant Colonel Trevelyan to commence the purchase of horses for the spare wagons which are at present without draft animals, but has desired that the orders of the Commander-in-Chief should be taken regarding purchase of mules for mountain train.

No. 66, dated 3rd January 1857, from the Quarter Master General, to the Adjutant General.

States Government have desired that Her Majesty's 78th and a Native Infantry Regiment (the 26th) shall be sent to the Persian Gulf as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made, adding that the "staff equipment and following of a complete Brigade should be embarked at the same time" and calls for report whether he (Adjutant General) can send any, and what portion of the Division or Brigade Staff of the 2nd Division with this Brigade.

No. 84, dated 5th January 1857, from the Adjutant General, to the Military Department.

Forwards list showing the whole of the appointments connected with the *corps d'armée* with the exception of the Personal Staff of Sir James Outram. States that the appointments against which no name has been inserted rest with the Government or will be submitted hereafter by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for sanction.

Adds that the Commander-in-Chief considers it desirable that it be left to Major General Stalker, C. B., to select an officer as Superintendent of Bazaars at Bushire, in the place of Captain Rigby, whose knowledge of the Persian language will naturally be very useful in that department in the Head Quarters Staff.

#### *Field Force.*

Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram, K. C. B.	...	To Command.
		To Command 1st Division.
		To Command 2nd Division.
		To Command the Cavalry.

#### *Head-Quarter Staff.*

Lieutenant Colonel R. R. Younghusband	...	Deputy Adjutant General.
Captain J. Wray	...	Deputy Quarter Master General.
Captain J. A. Macdonald	...	Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
Major H. Boye	...	Deputy Judge Advocate General, Paymaster.
Lieutenant Colonel G. Pope	...	Deputy Commissary General.
Captain C. B. Rigby	...	Superintendent of Bazaars.
Captain B. K. Finnimore	...	Commissary of Ordnance.
Lieutenant J. Ballard, C. B.	...	Assistant Quarter Master General and Superintendent, Intelligence Department.
Major J. Hill	...	Commanding Engineer.
Major W. F. Curtis	...	Director, Land Transport Corps.

Captain W. W. Taylor	...	...	1st Assistant Director, Land Transport Corps.
Captain R. P. Warden	...	...	1st Assistant Director, Land Transport Corps.
Lieutenant C. E. Boodle	...	...	1st Assistant Director, Land Transport Corps, and Staff Officer.
„ W. A. Armstrong	...	...	2nd Assistant Director, Land Transport Corps.
„ A. R. Wilson	...	...	2nd Assistant Director, Land Transport Corps.
„ D. B. Young	...	...	3rd Assistant Director, Land Transport Corps.
„ G. S. Morris	...	...	3rd Assistant Director, Land Transport Corps.
„ H. Moore	...	...	3rd Assistant Director, Land Transport Corps and Interpreter in Persian and Arabic.

*1st Division.*

Captain J. A. Collier	...	...	Commanding and Aide-de-Camp.
„ W. W. Shewell	...	...	Assistant Adjutant General.
Major P. P. Christie	...	...	Assistant Quarter Master General.
		...	Deputy Judge Advocate General.
		...	Deputy Paymaster.
Captain J. B. Dunsterville	...	...	Assistant Commissary General.
Lieutenant W. Gray	...	...	Deputy Assistant Commissary General.
„ J. P. Mignon	...	...	Sub-Assistant Commissary General.
„ E. LeStrange	...	...	Sub-Assistant Commissary General.
„ D. D. Thain	...	...	Sub-Assistant Commissary General.
„ G. B. Mellersh	...	...	Deputy Commissary of Ordnance.
Captain W. Dickinson	...	...	Field Engineer and Commanding Sappers and Miners.
Lieutenant C. J. Merriman	...	...	Field Engineer.
„ G. M. Duncan	...	...	Assistant Engineer.
„ H. Pyne	...	...	Assistant Engineer.
Surgeon M. Stovell	...	...	Superintending Surgeon.
„ A. Burn, M. D.	...	...	Field Surgeon.
Assistant Surgeon J. Mills.	...	...	Deputy Medical Storekeeper and Staff Surgeon.
Reverend G. A. F. Watson	...	...	Chaplain.

3rd Troop, Horse Artillery.  
 1st Company, 1st Battalion European Artillery.  
 4th Company, 1st Battalion European Artillery.  
 2nd Company, 4th Battalion (Reserve) Artillery.  
 3rd Regiment, Light Cavalry (2 Squadrons).  
 Head Quarters and 2 troops, Púnah Irregular Horse.  
 Her Majesty's 64th Regiment of foot.  
 2nd European Regiment, Light Infantry.  
 4th Regiment, Night Infantry (Rifles).  
 20th Regiment, Native Infantry.  
 2nd Balúch Battalion.  
 Head Quarters and 2 Companies.  
 Corps of Sappers and Miners.

**BRIGADE STAFF.***Artillery.*

Lieutenant Colonel H. W. Trevelyan	...	...	Commanding.
Captain J. Pottinger	...	...	Major of Brigade.



*Cavalry.*

Lieutenant Colonel F. Tapp ... ... Commanding.

*1st Infantry Brigade.*

Brigadier N. Wilson, K. H. ... ... Commanding.  
Major C. W. Sibley ... ... Major of Brigade.

*2nd Infantry Brigade.*

Brigadier R. W. Honner ... ... Commanding.  
Captain C. P. Aitchison ... ... Major of Brigade.

*Engineer Department.*

Captain C. Dickinson ... ... Field Engineer and Commanding  
Sappers and Miners.

*2nd Division.*

## Commanding and Aide-de-Camp.

Captain P. J. Holland ... ... Assistant Quarter Master General.  
" Deputy Paymaster.  
" A. W. Lucas ... ... Deputy Assistant Commissary General.  
Lieutenant W. W. Willoughby ... ... Sub-Assistant Commissary General.  
" F. D. Steuart ... ... Ditto.  
" W. W. Blowers ... ... Ditto.  
" E. H. Shewell ... ... Ditto.  
" J. W. Playfair ... ... Field Engineer.  
" W. W. Goodfellow ... ... Ditto.  
" C. W. Finch ... ... Assistant Engineer.  
" J. LeMesurier ... ... Ditto.  
" J. Hills ... ... Ditto.  
Surgeon J. Mackenzie ... ... Superintendent Surgeon.  
" J. Deas ... ... Field Surgeon.  
Assistant Surgeon W. Davey ... ... Deputy Medical Storekeeper and  
Staff Surgeon.

4th Troop, Horse Artillery.

1st Company, 2nd Battalion European Artillery.

Reserve Artillery and Mountain Train.

Her Majesty's 14th Regiment (the Kings) Light Dragoons.

1st Regiment, Sind Irregular Horse.

Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders.

23rd Regiment, Native Light Infantry.

26th Regiment, Native Infantry.

Light Battalion.

## BRIGADE STAFF.

*Artillery.*

Lieutenant Colonel G. Hutt, C. B. ... ... Commanding.  
Captain H. M. Douglas ... ... Major of Brigade.

*Cavalry.*

Brigadier Colonel C. Stewart ... ... Commanding.  
*1st Infantry Brigade.*

Brigadier W. Hamilton ... ... Commanding.

*2nd Infantry Brigade.*

Brigadier J. Hale ... ... Commanding.

*Engineer Department.*

Major J. Hill ... ... Commanding.

No. 75, dated 5th January 1857, from the Adjutant General, to the Military Department.

Applies for sanction to the employment of a Chief of the Staff with the Persian force, and in explanation of the necessity for making this appointment (a novel one in India) point out as Lieutenant General Outram will have the entire political and Military control and Command of the forces in Persia, it would be impossible for him to receive the reports from and give orders to the various officers of the several departments and at the same time conduct the other important duties which will devolve upon him.

An Officer therefore should be selected who from his standing in the army perfect acquaintance with the routine of the several departments, and habit of giving instructions on such subjects, will be able to collate the reports, and issuing orders thereon, submit to the Lieutenant General only such as he should be made acquainted with, and thus relieve Lieutenant General Outram of a burden too onerous for any one officer to carry on, also perform his highly important civil duties.

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No. 391, dated 14th January 1857, from the Adjutant General, to the Military Department.

Proposes the following Establishments and allowances for Chief of Staff :

				Rs.	
Office tentage	...	...	...	75	per mensem.
1 Head Clerk, European	...	...	...	100	"
1 2nd "	...	...	...	50	"
1 Head Clerk, Native	...	...	...	80	"
1 2nd " "	...	...	...	60	"
1 3rd " "	...	...	...	50	"

4 Peons Pay and Batta as sanctioned for this class of servant in other Establishments.

Probable Return of Officers, Troops, Followers, Horses and Bullocks, forming 2nd Division of the Persian Gulf Expeditionary Force, Bombay, 30th December 1856.

Corps or Department.	European Officers.	Warrant Officers.	European Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned Rank and File, and Drivers.	FOLLOWERS.		HORSES.		Bullocks.
					Public.	Private.	Officers.	Regimental.	
Four Troops Horse Artillery ...	6	1	150	25	240	50	12	230	4
1 Company 2nd Brigade Artillery with No. 2 Light Field Battery.	5	...	108	97	130	40	8	125	4
Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons ...	22	3	700	...	600	150	50	700	24
One Regiment Sind Irregular Horse ...	4	...	...	800	500	50	10	800	...
One Company Sappers and Miners ...	2	...	5	120	22	23	2	...	2
Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders ...	28	3	900	...	180	150	25	...	30
23rd Regiment Native Light Infantry ...	20	...	...	800	50	100	16	...	10
26th Regiment Native Infantry...	20	...	...	800	50	100	16	...	10
Light Battalion ...	30	...	...	900	50	135	30	...	10
Total ...	187	7	1,853	3,512	1,822	803	169	1,855	94
General Officer Commanding and Aide-de-Camp.	40	15	15	...	1,000	250	50	...	...
Brigadiers and Brigade Majors ...									
Artillery Commandant and Staff ...									
Chaplains ...									
Adjutant General's and Post Office Departments.									
Quarter Master General's Department ...									
Judge Advocate General's Department ...									
Commissariat Department ...									
Pay Master's Department ...									
Ordnance Department ...									
Engineer Department ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Medical Department...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Provost Marshal ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
GRAND TOTAL ...	177	22	1,873	3,542	2,822	1,053	219	1,855	94

Extract from a Minute from the Right Honourable the Governor General of India, dated the 7th January 1857.

Para. 16.—The entire force asked for by General Outram is placed at his command. It includes, over and above the three Regiments of Native



Infantry, and one Regiment of Irregular Cavalry which are specified in the despatch of the Secret Committee :

One Troop of Horse Artillery.  
 One Company of Foot Artillery.  
 Mountain Train.  
 Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons.  
 Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders.  
 One Company of Sappers.  
 Baggage Corps.  
 Four Captains and twelve Subalterns for the Arab Levies.

17. The whole of the above force with the exception of the sappers, will be drawn from the Bombay Presidency, which will then be left too weak in troops for home service. The deficiency so far as native infantry or artillery is concerned can be supplied without any difficulty from Bengal.

18. The services of Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob have been given to Sir James Outram, and in order to secure that those services shall be available in the command of the whole of the cavalry, as to the expediency of which I fully concur with Sir James Outram, I propose that Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob shall receive from the Governor-General in Council, the rank of Brigadier-General for particular service in Persia.

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Minute by the Governor General, dated 10th January 1857.

*Concurred in by the Members of Council.*

#### Army in Persia.

Proposes that the command of the 2nd Division be given to an officer of the Queen's Army (Colonel Havelock) also that, as Sir James Outram is charged with other duties besides the command of the whole force, a Chief of the Staff be appointed, the selection of the officer being left to the Government of Bombay.

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#### General Orders.

By the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India in Council.

*Fort William, 12th January 1857.*

No. 70 A. of 1857. With reference to General Order No. 24 of 6th instant, Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., is appointed to the command of the Expeditionary Force in Persia.

The following Personal Staff is authorised for Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B.

A Military Secretary and A.D.C. An Aide-de-camp. A Persian Interpreter.

The following Officers are directed to proceed forthwith, and place themselves under the orders of Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., and they are appointed to the Expeditionary Force with the rank of Brigadier-General.

Colonel H. Havelock, C.B., Her Majesty's Service (*h.p.* unattached) Adjutant General of the Queen's Forces serving in the East Indies, to command the 2nd Division of the Force.

Lieutenant Colonel James Jacob, C. B., Bombay Artillery, and Commandant of the Sind Irregular Horse, to command the cavalry of the Force.

An officer of rank will be appointed Chief of the Staff of the Expeditionary Force, for the purpose of superintending and controlling all the Staff Departments, under the immediate orders of the Lieutenant General Commanding.

The officer to be appointed Chief of the Staff will be selected by the Government of Bombay.

(Sd.) R. I. H. BIRCH, *Colonel,*  
*Secretary to the Government of India,*  
*Military Department.*

No. 431, dated 16th January 1857, from the Quarter Master General to the Adjutant General.

I am directed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to acquaint you that the following troops will embark for the Persian Gulf on the vessels and dates specified :

	Vessels.	Dates.
Head Quarter Wing	} <i>Precursor</i>	17th January 1857.
Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders		
Left Wing do.	} <i>Pottinger</i> and <i>Kingston</i>	18th January 1857.
26th Regiment Native Infantry.	} <i>Earl of Clare</i> <i>British Queen</i>	17th January 1857.

No. 451, dated 21st January 1857, from Military Department, to the Adjutant General.

States that the Government of India has sanctioned the proposed raising of the strength of Regiments of Native Infantry, including the Marine Battalion to 800 privates and of those which lose their Light Companies, by the formation of the Light Battalion for Service in Persia to 900.

No. 652, dated 23rd January 1857, from the Quarter Master General, to the Adjutant General.

States that the intended despatch of the Regiment of Sind Horse on service to Persia is countermanded, and that a Regiment of Irregular Cavalry formed as follows will embark for Persia in lieu of the Sind Horse :

Pánah Horse	...	...	...	200
Southern Mahratta Horse	...	...	...	300
Gúzerát Irregular Horse	...	...	...	300
				<u>800</u>

No. 820 of 29th January 1857, from Quarter Master General, to the Adjutant General.

States that the order for the Sind Horse to embark for Persia as originally directed is to hold good.

No. 634 of 28th January 1857, from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General.

Sanctions the Office establishment proposed for Colonel Lugard, Chief of the Staff, and States that with respect the allowances to be granted to him a reference has been made to the Government of India.

No. 732, dated 22nd January 1857, from Government of India, Military Department, to Military Department, Bombay.

Sanctions for Chief of Staff a consolidated salary of Rs. 2,070 a month inclusive of every allowance in the field except net pay of rank that being the salary allowed to Brigadier-Generals not on the permanent Divisional Staff appointed to command divisions in the field.

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Extract from Military Department, No. 530, dated 17th January 1856, relative to the proposed appointment of a "Chief of the Staff."

It will be necessary to select an officer who from his standing in the Army, perfect acquaintance with the routine of the several Departments, and habit of giving instructions on such subjects, will be able to collate the reports, and issuing orders thereon, submit to the Lieutenant-General only such as he should be made acquainted with, and thus relieve Lieutenant-General Outram of a burden which is too onerous for any one officer to carry on, and also perform his highly important civil duties.

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Telegram 644—30 of 30th January 1857, from the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department.

Desires Bombay Government not to send the Sind Horse to Persia, but the Irregulars, *viz* :—Southern Mahratta Horse 300, Gúzratí Horse 300, and Púnah Horse 200.

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No. 639 of 28th January 1857, from the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

States that under present circumstances the Government consider that all the serviceable mules or ponies belonging to the men of corps of Irregular Horse proceeding to Persia, should if possible, be taken with them.

---

Minute by the Governor General, dated 7th February 1857.

Remarks that in a few days the last Regiments of the second division of the army for Persia will have left Bombay. This will place at the disposal of Lieutenant-General Outram a force amounting to something less than twelve thousand men\* of all arms of which about one-third will be Europeans. The proportion of Cavalry will be about two thousand six hundred.

Goes on to show that very large reinforcements will be required before extending the operations, and that as the European troops in India are under the establishment, the utmost number that can be spared is three regiments.

Further proposes to retain the 10th and 29th regiments, which would otherwise return to England, and that the remaining regiment required to complete the Bengal establishment be sent out from England, as also the force which will be needed as a reserve,—at the lowest estimate two Regiments.

\* 1st Division (under Major-General Stalker) 5,820 of all arms, of which 2,270 are Europeans.

2nd Division (under Brigadier General Havelock) 5,340 of all arms, of which about 1,770 are Europeans.

Add 800 Cavalry (200 Regular and 600 Irregular) about to be sent as a reinforcement of the 1st Division, = 11,960 in all.



Adds that the request to be made to Her Majesty's Government will stand thus :

"That the four regiments already announced for embarkation in the summer of 1857 be despatched.

It will now be desirable that three of these should be sent to Bombay and one to Madras, not two to Madras and two to Karáchi as had been desired by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. It will also be necessary that their arrival should not be postponed beyond the usual time in September.

That three more Regiments be sent out, also to Bombay. The arrival of these may conveniently be fixed two months later.

That the 10th and 29th Regiments be retained by the Government of India."

In conclusion states that the present demand admits of no delay, and that upon the cessation of hostilities the supernumerary Regiment will return at once to England.

---

No. 27 of 9th February 1857, from the Officer Commanding Púnah Irregular Horse, Bushire, to the Quarter Master General, Bombay.

Requests that the Aden Police (if they have not yet left Bombay) may be sent to the Deccan, and a detachment of similar strength from the Púnah Horse despatched to Persia in their place, as he is of opinion that his own men will be worth double their number of Police.

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N. B.—*Madras troops as far as possible took the place of Bombay troops sent to Púnah.*

---

Military Department No. 1436, dated Bombay Castle, 10th March 1857.

States that as it is of importance to give General Outram another European regiment of infantry, the Governor in Council will avail himself of the return of the *Punjab* from the Persian Gulf, to despatch the 3rd Europeans from

—that the Madras Government have been requested to send the regiment intended for Bushire to Bombay to take the place of the 3rd—that a European company of artillery with guns but without horses, has been sent by the *Aden* and the Madras company awaiting passage to Rangoon has been detained for duty in Bombay (a second Madras Company would be of great use, but there is no steamer to send for it) : and that the Bombay Government can provide another Golundaz company for Bushire, and also the native infantry regiment, which General Outram requires.

---

Telegram, dated 14th March 1857, from the Military Secretary at Madras, to the Military Secretary, Calcutta.

"*Oriental*" in the roads. Fusiliers completely equipped for active service, one-fourth armed with Enfield rifles, and will be embarked on Monday morning for Bushire unless peremptory prohibition is received from Government of India, and this Government earnestly entreats that the regiment may still be allowed to go to Bushire, irrespectively of the regiment from Bombay. This Government is prepared to incur great risk to meet all urgent call for active service, but this presidency is now so drained of European Troops that Government would urgently protest against detaching when merely for garrison duty elsewhere. Wing of 43rd will be at Madras in a few days, and it would be very advisable (?unadvisable) to turn them back to Mangalore at this advanced Season.

Telegram, dated 14th March 1857, from Military Department, Calcutta, to Military Department, Bombay.

The Madras Fusiliers will go to Bushire direct, embarking on 16th instant on steamer *Oriental*.

No. 1727, dated 20th March 1857, from Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

States that the requisition made by Lieutenant-General Sir J Outram for additional Troops to reinforce Bushire, in addition to the whole of those detailed for the 2nd Division, extended to the following, viz:—

One European Infantry Regiment.  
Two Native Infantry Regiments.  
One Troop Horse Artillery.  
One Horsed Battery Foot Artillery.  
Guns of Position.

This requisition is answered by—

European Fusiliers from Madras.

25th Regiment of Native Infantry.

European Company with Battery from Bombay.

Golundáz

Guns sent per "Aden."

and horses from Bhuj.

One Native Infantry Regiment remains to be supplied and solicits information as to what Regiment has been selected.

No. 64, dated 14th February 1857, from the Officer Commanding Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse, to the Adjutant General.

Request that "Commissions" may be given to the Native Officers of the Corps as they are in daily contact with the Púnah Horse (whose officers hold commissions) and are not treated with the usual compliments.

Extract No. 1326 of 7th March 1857, from the Military Department, to the Judge Advocate General.

2. Unless regularly subjected to Military Law, the Officers and men now going on service will, or joining the army, be rendered amenable to Military Law as camp followers—not as soldiers.

3. They ought therefore like the Púnah Irregular Horse to be formally brought under the articles of war as military men before leaving India and the officers provided with commissions to empower them to command those of inferior rank and to render them available for all duties on which commissioned officers in the native branch of the army are liable to be employed.

No. 1318, dated 18th February 1857, from the Quarter Master General, to the Adjutant General.

States that a detachment consisting of an officer and 60 men Her Majesty's 64th Regiment, has been ordered from Belgaum to Vingorla there to embark in one of the steamers which will tow the transports of Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons to Bushire, and to join Regimental Head Quarters.

No. 1829, dated 10th March 1857, from the Quarter Master General, to the Adjutant General.

Intimates that the 3rd European Regiment at Púnah has been ordered to be ready to march immediately on field service to Persia, and that the Head Quarters and 3 companies will go in the "*Punjab*" at an early date, and the remainder of the Regiment as soon as ships are ready.

No. 1610, dated 4th March 1857, from the Adjutant General, to the Military Department.

Forwards foregoing letter and recommends that the Remount Agent be instructed immediately to purchase horses for replacing casualties in the artillery of the Persian Force and for the spare wagons.

No. 1471 of 12th March 1857, from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General.

Forwards copy of No. 1471, addressed to the Remount Agent in which he is authorised to purchase horses for the batteries without the intervention of a committee, taking care that they are serviceable and of a reasonable price.

No. 1698, dated 5th March 1857, from the Quarter Master General, to the Adjutant General.

Intimates that the 3rd Company 2nd Battalion Artillery now in Bombay, will embark on the Peninsular and Oriental Steamer *Aden* on the 7th instant.

Also the 4th Company 3rd Battalion Golundauze with No. 8 Light Field Battery at Bhúj, has been ordered to be placed on the field establishment immediately and embarked as soon as possible.

Extract No. 1562, dated 16th March 1857, from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General.

The Governor in Council is of opinion that the whole corps should be brought under martial law at once, and assimilated in this respect to the Sind Horse and the Púnah Horse, and I am to convey to you the authority of Government that this measure may be carried out in such manner as His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief may deem most proper.

No. 112 of 18th March, by the Judge Advocate General.

It is necessary to make known to the officers and men of the Southern Mahratta Horse that henceforth they will be amenable to all the provisions of Military Law, and to direct that the articles of war for the native branch of the army be fully explained to them, offering at the same time a discharge to those persons who may be unwilling to serve under military control—excepting however from such discharge the officers and men of the detachment proceeding to Persia, who, as accepted volunteers for Field Service are already subject to military law. The measure of subjecting the Southern Mahratta Horse to military law should then be publicly notified by Government.

*P.S.*—The Secretary to Government makes use of the words "Martial Law" in describing the law to which the Southern Mahratta Horse is to be subjects. But I beg to observe that "Martial Law" is generally applied to the exercise of military power at periods when the ordinary course of law is in abeyance, and extending to Civilians as well as military men, sometimes subjects a whole



kingdom to its control. But military law is the ordinary rule by which military men are disciplined and governed.

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No. 114, dated 23rd March 1857, from the Commandant, Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse, to the Adjutant General.

States that the Southern Mahratta Horse are as a body pleased at their being placed under military law, and that he has written to Light Battery to inform the officers and men at Sattara, that Government has been pleased to direct their transfer to the Military Department and that they will be placed on the same footing as the Púnah Horse.

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Military Department, No. 1920 of 31st March 1857.

"Colonel Lugard, C. B., Chief of the Staff of the Expeditionary Force in Persia, has been appointed a Brigadier-General from the 12th January last.

N. B.—Above is copy of a telegram, from Government of India, to Government, Bombay.

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No. 2485, dated 4th April 1857, from the Adjutant General, Bombay, to the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Persian Expeditionary Force.

Requests that on the arrival of the undermentioned corps at Bushire, he will post them to divisions as may seem most expedient:

3rd Company 2nd Battalion of Artillery.

4th Company 3rd Battalion of Artillery

3rd Squadron Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse, Aden Mounted Police

Troop.

1st Madras European Regiment (Fusiliers).

10th Regiment Native Infantry.

25th Regiment Native Infantry.

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No. 5422, dated 12th August 1857, from the Adjutant General, to the Military Department.

Conveys the recommendation of the Governor-General in Council that a G. G. O. may be issued announcing that the Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse has been formed into a Military Corps with effect from 16th March 1857.

Order in question was published on 25th August 1857.

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## APPENDIX G.

### ABSTRACT OF THE CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE LAND TRANSPORT CORPS AND TRANSPORT GENERALLY.

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No. 1817, dated 27th September 1856, from Quarter Master General, to Transport Committee.

Directs particular attention to the number and capacity of boats on each transport, and calls for report showing the arrangements made for providing necessaries on them and on the steamers for the troops.

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No. 9, dated 1st March 1857, from Lieutenant General Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., to Quarter Master General, Bombay.

Requests that some cotton boats and bunder boats may be sent out, as there are no means of landing troops at Bushire except in a few Arab boats.

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No. 1873, dated 31st March 1857, from Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

With regard to boats required for the force, states that all efforts to obtain them at Bombay have failed, and enquiry is being pursued in the ports to the northward, but there also success is doubtful.

Adds that it has been suggested to General Outram that if boats cannot be had in the Gulf itself, rafts might be constructed, and used in fine weather for landing troops and stores.

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No. 2405, dated 2nd April 1857, from the Quarter Master General, to Chief of the Staff, Persian Field Force.

States the Commander-in-Chief has been informed that boats for the service of the force at Bushire could very probably be obtained by the Naval authorities, from the opposite coast.

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No. 2524, dated 11th September 1856, from the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

States, that the Land Transport Corps will only be formed in the event of an advance into the interior of Persia being contemplated.

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No. 1872, dated 11th September 1856, from the Commissary General, to the Military Department.

Forwards for approval a tender received from the Bullock Contractor, Púnah, Commissariat Department, offering to supply 300 draught bullocks from his establishment for service in Persia at Rs. 12 each per mensem, including the pay of a driver to every pair of bullocks.

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Report by Major Curtis, 1st Lancers, on the organization of the Land Transport Corps.

The duty of the Director or Chief of this Corps, under the orders of the Commander of the Forces, will consist in providing for its working and maintenance.

For the former purpose he must receive the assistance of an establishment adequately officered and materially organised.

For the latter he will have to place himself in communication with every description of agent and public officer who has it in his power to supply the losses, at times enormous, of the baggage animals of an army. The Director would thus become the medium through whom the army is supplied with carriage, and it would depend on his foresight to maintain a constant stream.

At Head Quarters of the Corps the Director should have the assistance of an officer, who would be permanent there and to whom the office routine would be entrusted. This officer should receive the pay and allowances of a Quarter-Master, and Interpreter if he speaks Persian, but if not a slight deduction should be made, say Rs. 30 or 40, and he should have forage for two horses.

He would be the Director's Staff Officer.

The Quarter-Master should be permitted to take with him English writers, sufficient to guarantee him against a disaster at the commencement of his duties.

A Veterinary Surgeon with an adequate establishment is indispensable to the Corps, and he should be placed strictly under the orders of the Director.

The detached service should be thus organised :

To each Division—a commissioned officer, of which grade there should be a higher and a lower class, but both should receive forage for 2 horses.

Under this Officer there should be—

Per Brigade—a Conductor or Sub-Conductor.

Per Regiment—a Sergeant (or for a European Regiment perhaps two Sergeants) assisted by several native subordinates who might be designated drove leaders, pack leaders, or muccadums.

Per Troop of Horse Artillery or Battery—a Sergeant, &c., &c.

A commissioned officer would likewise be required for the Artillery Park; another for the Commissariat; another, very probably, for the enormous quantity of stores which always remain in the rear; and if there is an Engineer Park of any magnitude, one for that.

A Conductor would be required for the Head Quarters camp of the Commander of the Forces and one for the Cavalry, if amounting to a Brigade, both with Sergeants and muccadums assisting. Saddlers, smiths, &c., should be taken from the muleteers and paid a trifle more for the extra duty.

The muleteers should alter the padding of the pack saddle when necessary, and should be provided with implements for camping and foraging.

The following chain of responsibility would thus be established :

1. The muleteers, of whom there would be several, under a
2. Muccadam or leader of a drive, pack or eullah, a sort of non-commissioned officer of a squad.
3. Sergeant, who would command a troop composed of several eullahs.
4. Conductor or Sub-Conductor—Commanding a brigade of several troops.
5. Commissioned Officer—A division of several brigades.

The latter would report to the Quarter-Master (or Staff Officer) of the corps, as the Captain of a company does to an Adjutant, for the information of the Director.



The detachments of the corps would always be kept efficient, but never beyond their complement, so that men as well as animals not absolutely required would be remanded to the reserve ready to supply vacancies. To the strength to be maintained, an orderly sergeant and muccadam to the officer of a division may be added, and an orderly muccadam to the conductor of a brigade, perhaps also an orderly of lower grade to each sergeant; while the Director and his Quarter-Master would likewise require several subordinates of that sort.

There should be classes in each grade, the higher getting superior pay, so as to render it a matter of importance to the lower class to succeed.

The animals should be conspicuously branded, and all branded animals found should be appropriated, the brand on any that die to be cut out and sent to the Director.

This brand should not be formed of letters written consecutively T. C. which may be ingeniously altered, but of letters placed across each other, which if made large enough will baffle most contrivances.

If the corps has to prepare bills for supply of carriage to regiments on indent for the use of officers or messes on payment, the Paymaster of the Force should be required to recover them. Such indents should be signed by the Commanding Officer, of the amount when deducted from the Regimental Paymaster.

Stationery, &c., to be supplied by the Commissariat. The actual cost and repair only of line equipments and saddles should be charged, and they might in the first instance, be supplied by the Commissariat when practicable.

Orders should be issued in the regimental manner.

The corps would require the support of the Commander of the Forces in preventing animals from being overladen and in declaring that no person has claims on its services excepting when a march is ordered, or under circumstances specially indicated.

A corps thus formed is capable of undergoing an easy extension or diminution, but it would be unwise to reduce its Quarter-Master until its numbers had very much diminished.

The Veterinary service of a small corps must be conducted by a steady Farrier-Major.

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Extract paragraphs 2 to 8 of a letter from the Quarter Master General of the Army, dated 2nd January 1857.

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#### Land Transport Corps.

2. Major Curtis to be appointed Director of Land Transport with a staff salary of Rupees five hundred (500) per mensem, he and all the commissioned military officers attached receiving in addition to their staff salaries the pay and full allowances of their regimental rank and allowance for two chargers. Major Curtis to be placed as to rank, position and advantages of every kind on the footing of a Deputy Adjutant or Deputy Quarter Master General.

3. The European Commissioned Establishment to consist of—

				Rs.
3	Assistants 1st class on salary of	...	...	260 per mensem.
2	" 2nd "	...	...	170 "
2	" 3rd "	...	...	100 "
1	Veterinary Surgeon	...	...	100 "

One of the 1st Assistants, selected from the above number, to be Staff Officer in charge of the accounts and to receive an addition to his salary of Rupees one hundred per mensem, and one of the second or third class assistants, if qualified as interpreter in Arabic and Persian, to receive an extra allowance of Rupees one hundred and seventy-five per mensem, or Rupees one hundred for each language.

4. The Warrant and Non-Commissioned Staff to consist of—

			Rs.	
European	{	1 Conductor, 1st class @ ...	...	200 per mensem.
		2 Conductors, 2nd „ ...	...	150 „
		5 Sub-Conductors ...	...	100 „
		12 Sergeants, 1st class ...	...	60 „
		15 „ 2nd „ ...	...	45 „
Natives	{	1 Farrier-Major „ ...	...	60 „
		30 Havildars, 1st class ...	...	35 „
		50 „ 2nd „ ...	...	28 „
		1 Farrier-Major ...	...	40 „

All of the warrant and non-commissioned staff, European and Native, to be on the same footing as to tentage, rations and quarters, as corresponding grades in the regular corps and departments, and all to be mounted, armed, and equipped by the Director from the Government stores and establishments.

It would, the Commander-in-Chief considers, be a great advantage if these men were armed with Colt's revolver, and he directs me to recommend that a supply be ordered out from England.

5. The whole of the above staff to be procured from the ranks of the army if possible, but the Director to have power to entertain other persons not in the service, on the same salaries, to perform the same duties.

6. The following Subordinate Establishment is recommended :

1 Head Clerk, at Rs. 250 per mensem ; 3 2nd Clerks at Headquarters, at Rs. 100 each per mensem ; 2 Divisional Head Clerks, at Rs. 120 each per mensem ; 2 Divisional 2nd Clerks, at Rs. 80 each per mensem ; 2 Depôt Clerks, at Rs. 120 each per mensem ; 1 Depôt Clerk, at Rs. 80 per mensem ; 1 Head Múnshí, at Rs. 150 per mensem ; 8 Múnshís, at Rs. 75 each per mensem ; 3 Muccadums of Peons, at Rs. 13 each per mensem ; 10 Puckalies with Bullocks, at Rs. 23 each per mensem ; 8 1st Nalbunds, at Rs. 30 each per mensem ; 16 2nd Nalbunds, at Rs. 20 each per mensem.

To be supplied if possible from the Ordnance and other departments in Bombay.

1 Head Smith, 8 Smiths, 1 Head carpenter, 6 Carpenters, 1 Head Mochí, 10 Mochís, 1 Head Rope maker, 6 Rope makers, Bellows boys, and Hammermen.

To be supplied in Persia.

Persian Writers, Peons, Syces and Muleteers, Grass-cutters, Bhistics, Dhobies, Sweepers, and Cattle Doctors.

7. The above establishment to be altered and enlarged as to numbers under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding according to local circumstances.

8. The foregoing recommendations comprise the first requisites for the establishment of the corps to which the Commander-in-Chief requests sanction, on receipt of which every endeavour will be made to find qualified and efficient persons to fill the various positions. The whole detailed arrangements as to what is to be carried by the corps, and the terms and arrangements for procuring and supplying carriage should, His Excellency conceives,

on mature consideration, be left to the Director to arrange hereafter under the orders and sanction of the Lieutenant General Commanding the Force.

Proposed terms of agreement to be made with men engaged for the Land Transport corps :

*1st.*—They are to serve the British Government as long as their services are required.

*2nd.*—They are to receive their pay wherever they may be, or a portion of it not exceeding one-half is to be paid to their families in Kutch, according to the individual wishes of the camelmen.

*3rd.*—If proceeding to a part of the country where provisions are not procurable or are very dear they are to receive rations from the commissariat paying for the same at the rate of Rs. 3 per mensem for such time as they may be supplied.

*4th.*—When the services of the coachmen are no longer required they are to have the option of being sent back to Kutch, and to receive pay up to date of reaching Kutch. If any Jemadar, muccadum, or camelman should be killed by the hands of the enemy, or so severely wounded as to deprive him of the use of a limb, the necessity of awarding a gratuity to his family in the former instance, or to him in the latter, shall be enquired into by His Highness the Rao and Political Agent, and reported for the orders of Government with a view to a suitable gratuity being granted not exceeding the hereinafter mentioned sums :

				Rs.
For a Jemadar killed	...	...	...	200
„ Muccadum „	...	...	...	140
„ Camelman „	...	...	...	100
For a Jemadar wounded so as to deprive him of the use of a limb	...	...	...	100
Muccadum	...	...	...	70
Camelman	...	...	...	50

In the event of a Jemadar, Muccadum, or camelman dying or being killed, one month's pay will be granted from date of decease for funeral expenses.

No. 1, dated Bombay, 9th January 1857, from the Director, Land Transport Corps, to the Quarter Master General.

As there will probably be great difficulty in procuring camelmen in Persia, requests that 100 men with proportion of muccadums, &c., may be sent with the force.

Salary about :—

				Rs.	A.	P.
Camelmen	...	...	...	8	0	0
2nd Muccadums	...	...	...	10	0	0
Muccadums	...	...	...	14	0	0

with ration money.

Points out that these men would be trustworthy while in a foreign country, and further that they would disseminate among the Arab camelmen, &c., a true view of the prospects the British employ holds out.



Camelmen could not be procured at Rs. 8 per mensem or tattú wallas at under Rs. 10-8.

Nalbunds Rs. 25 to 35.

Extract paras. 1, 2 and 3 of a letter from the Assistant Commissary-General, Persian Field Force, to the Commissary General, Bombay,—No. 110, dated 12th January 1857.

Intimates that the 60 Gaisford pattern carts despatched to Bushire are unsuitable, as they are too heavy for the bullocks in that sandy place, it having been found necessary to employ six bullocks to each cart instead of four as customary. Therefore requests to be furnished with a similar number of carts the same as those used by the Commissariat at Belgaum. Cost about Rs. 25 to 30 each.

Requests that 300 bullocks of the same kind as already sent may be despatched as soon as possible, carriage being extremely difficult to obtain.

Letter dated Bassorah, 18th January 1857, from Vice Consul J. Taylor, Commissariat Agent, to Captain Kembal, Baghdad.

Requests him to procure as many mules with pack saddles, &c., &c., as are available in Baghdad and its vicinity; and to retain them in deposit until further notice. Such engagements to be contracted with drivers as would obviate any difficulty on their part regarding species or duration of service in the enemy's country or elsewhere.

States that about 8,000 mules are required.

Requests him to engage as many camel drivers as possible, and also to purchase ghee to the extent of ten taghars.

Adds that he will be prepared to take as much forage (chopped straw and rice straw) as Captain Kembal can forward either from Hillah Baghdad or the Baní Lám districts.

No. 26 of 1857, from Director, Land Transport Corps, to Colonel Lugard, Chief of the Staff.

Proposes that a requisition be made on the Bombay Government for 2,500 camel equipments, for the camels likely to be purchased at Bassorah.

Further proposes that 1,000 camelmen, with proportion of muccadums, be engaged in India for service in Persia.

States that he is forwarding specimen mule shoes, Persian pattern, and requests that about 2,000 per mensem may be forwarded, also a mule chain, of which 1,500 are immediately required.

No. 27, dated 18th February 1857, from Major Curtis, to the Commissary General, Bombay.

Advises despatch of specimen mule shoes and mule chain. "The latter are made similar to our dog chains and with several swivels, the tethering part being much stronger than that going over the face and nose."

Military Department, Government of India, No. 654, dated 21st March 1857, to Military Department, Bombay.

States that, in the opinion of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, the scale of establishment and allowances proposed for the Land Transport Corps is large, but as the Bombay Government have provisionally sanctioned it, His Lordship is not disposed to interfere with the organization of the corps, and accordingly confirms the scale suggested.

No. 186, dated 11th May 1857, from the Director, Land Transport Corps, to the Chief of the Staff.

States that, commencing with the 9th February last, batches of mules have been organised into Ghols or troops for the corps at Baghdad by the officers of the Political Agency at that place. The Ghol consist in 121 mules, having—

- 1 Gholbashi at Kráns 60 per mensem.
- 20 Drivers at 30 Kráns per mensem,
- and there is
- 1 Farrier to every 2 Ghols at 50 Kráns per mensem.

By the muster rolls received from Baghdad the establishments of these Ghols from 9th February to 4th March were 6 Gholbashes, 3 farriers, 120 drivers.

By opportunities the Ghols were sent down the country, and were eventually shipped at Margil and arrived at Bushire in the last days of April.

When the muleteers arrived at Bushire there was a feeling of disaffection amongst them and they were much inclined to strike for the higher, say the exorbitant pay, they received in the Crimea, where many of them had served.

At that time Captain Kemball, the Resident in Turkish Arabia had an application from some people for service; and the writer, fearing that his own muleteers might not act up to their agreement, and having likewise great misgivings of the organisation of the Kúrd Ghols, which gives as many as 6 mules to one man's charge,—misgivings which have been since quite verified; and also finding that the general duty men received from India were from want of habit nearly useless as volunteers, he decided on engaging the under-mentioned men at Captain Kemball's suggestion dating from 28th April.

- 2 Bulukbashes at Kráns 25 } per mensem.
- 24 Drivers at Kráns 20 }

Despatch from Sir J. Outram, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Baghdad, 1st June 1857.

States that as the demeanour of the Persian Government appears to afford an assurance that the Sháh will fulfil the obligations imposed upon him by the Treaty, he has directed the reduction of the transport animals in Turkish Arabia to be carried out. The camels to be sold at once, but the mules retained for the present in case of hostilities being resumed.

No. 264, dated 8th June 1857, to the Military Department.

Submits for sanction an extract from Field Force Orders by Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., distributing the Land Transport Corps as follows.

In Turkish Arabia the officers as per margin are to stay until further

Major Curtis, Director.  
 Captain Bowen, 1st Assistant Director.  
 Lieutenant Pengelly, Assistant Director.  
 Captain Barne, 2nd Assistant, Director.  
 Lieutenant Young, 3rd Assistant Director.  
 3 Clerks.

orders. They appear from a report just received from Major Curtis, to have the distinct charge of three thousand nine hundred and twenty-one camels (3,921) and 850 to 1,000 mules stationed at the place shown in the sketch as per margin. States that as these animals have not been brought within the ordinary organization of the corps it is supposed that they are on hire through the medium of Political Agents and merely superintended by the Officers

above-named; for Major Curtis says regarding them:

Have been paid up to date of arrival in Bombay and discharged, or ordered to join their corps, as the case may be.

- 2 1st Assistant Directors.
- 9 Sergeants.
- 12 Havildars.
- 2 Munsifs.
- 1 Head Clerk.
- 3 Clerks.
- 4 Nalbunds.
- 1 Muccadum of Drivers.
- 100 Drivers.
- 2 Muccadums of Peons.
- 4 Smiths.
- 4 Hammermen.
- 3 Bellows Boys.
- 5 Mochis.
- 2 Rope makers.

"The disposal of all the above animals becomes rather a political than a military question, and I shall not further allude to them beyond pointing out that the services of the officers I have named cannot be dispensed with, till an arrangement has been made which will clear our hands of them."

The establishments as per margin have returned to Bombay. Lieutenant Boodle has been placed in charge of the Depôt, Lieutenant Armstrong has been ordered to join his regiment, and the other officers have already appeared in Government General Orders to return to their Presidency.

No. 3356, dated 18th June 1857, from the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

Acknowledges receipt of letter suggesting that a detachment, Land Transport Corps (strength as per margin) now at Bushire, be sent to Bombay for service in India, and points out that this would not appear advisable, as the animals would probably not be worth the transport, the pay of the establishment would be enormous in India, and finally they have not gained much experience in Persia.

Is therefore of opinion that the establishment should either be discharged or retained on much smaller pay.

147 Camels.  
 776 Mules.  
 431 Tattús.  
 12 Donkeys.  
 5 Horses.  
 282 Bullocks.  
 60 Carts.  
 1 1st Assistant Director.  
 1 Conductor.  
 1 2nd class Conductor.  
 2 Sub-Conductors.  
 3 1st class Sergeants.  
 6 2nd class Sergeants.  
 1 1st class Havildar, 10 2nd class Havildars, 3 Nalbunds, 1 Nalbund, 32 Muccadums of Drivers, 85 Drivers, 2 Puckal Bhists, 1 Head Smith, 2 Smiths, 2 Hammermen, 2 Bellows Boys, 1 Head Mochi, 4 Mochis, 1 Head Rope Maker, and 4 Rope Makers.

No. 418, dated 19th June 1857, from Quarter Master General, to Military Department.

In reply to 3356 states that if tonnage is available at Bushire, the tattús and mules would repay the cost of transit as there is a great scarcity of baggage cattle. Remarks that His Excellency would not recommend the present high rates of pay being continued, and that all these points should be most clearly and fully explained to Major Curtis before a man is put on board.



No. 3444, dated 22nd June 1857, from the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

States that the Governor-General in Council has resolved that all the animals useful for baggage shall be returned to India in such of the transports as may have room for them, and requests him to give instructions to that effect.

---

No. 301, dated 19th June 1857, from Director, Land Transport Corps, to Chief of the Staff.

Regarding the disposal of the camels, states that he has directed all the camels at Suk-ar-Shaikh with equipment, &c., to be sold off. The camels number 1,400, and consist of—

Bagdad camels sent by Dr. Hyslop. Suggur camels, Teshan camels, Saadeh camels, Ali Keyab camels, Miscellaneous purchased by Mr. Taylor.

That Captain Barnes will clear the depôt of stores, &c., at Evagil and proceed to Fobeir, there to sell off 400 camels.

There will then remain 1,560 camels at Kuwait purchased by Yúsuf ben Bedr, an Arab agent of Mr. Taylor's, for Rs. 90,419, and he proposes to let Yúsuf ben Bedr dispose of them again.

---

No. 1, dated 25th February 1857, from Colonel Trevelyan, on special duty, Camp Rajkote, to the Quarter Master General, Bombay.

Reports progress made in purchasing ponies for the Land Transport Corps.

1. Thirty-four ponies were purchased at Kutch and handed over to Captain Raikes, Political Agent, for despatch in a country boat to Persia. This batch started on 18th or 19th instant in charge of one mucedum at Rs. 12 and fifteen men at 10 per mensem.

Eleven other ponies were also purchased and left with Captain Raikes to be despatched when sufficient number for another boat load could be collected.

All future purchases will be forwarded to Captain Raikes at Bhuj for transmission to Mandavie.

Within the last three weeks at least 300 tattús have been looked over, but only about  $\frac{1}{4}$  of these have been purchased, it cannot therefore be stated how many are likely to be got by the end of March.

---

No. 3795, dated 9th July 1857, from Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

Conveys approval to the proceedings of a Committee held at Bushire to condemn and order the sale of the tattús forwarded from India for the Land Transport Corps, they having been found unfit for service and not worth their keep.

---

No. 844, dated 4th August 1857, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department.

States that the Commander-in-Chief entertains the hope that Government will obtain the necessary sanction for the Land Transport Corps forming a part of the permanent establishment of the Bombay Presidency, as he considers

such a corps an absolute necessity in order to render the army divisions mobile.

His Excellency further requests that none of the corps may be landed at Karáchi on its return, as it is required for the Deccan Column about to advance into Central India and the resources of Sind are greater than those of the Deccan.

---

No. 4941, dated 17th October 1857, from the Commissary General, to the Military Department.

Having been requested to submit suggestions on the subject of maintaining depôts of carriage in place of one general transport Corps for the supply of carriage to the army, strongly recommends the former system, and advocates the employment of a European Establishment at each divisional depôt. Also considers that it will prove more economical to hire cattle by contract than to keep up Government cattle permanently. The establishment recommended is—

One warrant officer and two sergeants for every thousand draft bullocks, mules, and camels, and havildars or naiks might be appointed in place of some of the European non-commissioned staff.

As regards the mules received from Persia, recommends that the whole of them be assembled at Púnah, inspected, and those fit for Artillery draft made over to the Commanding Officer of the Artillery, while the remainder should be divided into two classes, those fit for light draft and those only adapted for pack carriage. The former might then be broken into draft, and every effort made to establish a mule train with light wagons; and as camels do not thrive within the Southern Division, proposes that some of the pack mules be sent to Belgaum in view that the supply of camel carriage there may be restricted as much as possible.

## APPENDIX H.

### ABSTRACT OF CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE TRANSPORT OF HORSES BY SEA, AND HORSE-TRANSPORT FITTINGS.

No. 1925 of 16th September 1856, from the Commissary General, to the President,  
Transport Committee.

States that horses on board ship are entitled to 5 lbs. of gram, 14 lbs. of hay, and 6 gallons of water each per diem.

According to this scale about 262 bales of hay will be required for 100 horses, each bale containing 224 lbs., average gross weight 234 lbs., and dimensions as follow:

Length	4' 6"	} Each bale.
Breadth	1' 8"	
Depth	1' 8"	

No. 1923 of 6th October 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Transport Committee.

Directs their attention to the necessity for providing sheep skins for the breast and side bales of the horse stalls. If sheep skins are not available, numdas may be used. Points out that a basket for the removal of dirt and dung should be provided, the scupper holes looked to, and vinegar, sponges, choloxide of lime and gypsum supplied, also that the canvas slings should be wide, and the ship head-collars and pad should be of good size and material.

No. 1866, dated 1st October 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Transport Committee.

Directs them to apply to the Commander-in-Chief, Indian Navy, for the hay nets he stated he would order to be prepared.

States that as there is a difference of opinion regarding the utility of mangers, and as they have been provided, they can remain.

Requests them to pay particular attention to the ventilation of the vessels, and to see that the coir mats supplied for the horses to stand on are close together.

No. 223, dated 4th October 1856, from the Officer Commanding Púnah Horse, to the Quarter Master General.

Reports that the quantity of grass or kirbee given to the horses is as follows:

Grass or kirbee without limit.

Grain (3) three Ahmednuggur seers, weighing eight lbs. and six ounces.

And that he is of opinion that this quantity of grain with 30 lbs. of grass would suffice when on service in the field.

No. 6670, dated 4th October 1856, from the Deputy Assistant Commissary General in Charge, to the Transport Committee.

Remarks that in requisition from the 3rd Troop Horse Artillery one sling, horse, canvas, to each horse is required, whereas the Commissary General



has directed that one to every two horses should be furnished, also one bucket to two horses ; and encloses a list of articles shipped for every 100 horses on board the transports which conveyed the 10th Hussars and 12th Lancers to Suez, and which scale he has been directed by the Commissary General to adopt in shipping equipment for the horses proceeding to the Persian Gulf.

Memorandum showing the equipments shipped for every 100 horses of Her Majesty's 10th Hussars and 12th Lancers, proceeded to Suez :

Slings, horse; 4 Collars, horse, canvas; 100 Mangers, wooden; 100 Mats, coir; 100 Slings, horse, canvas; 50 Nets, hay; 100 Numdas; 100 Buckets, horse, wooden; 50 Lanterns, tin, with lock and key; 10.

---

No. 2167, dated 21st October 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to Officers Commanding Mounted Corps.

Requests them to submit a report after arrival at Bushire, bringing to notice any defects observed by them on the transports, and improvements they may wish to suggest for future guidance.

States that the space allowed to each horse is 33 inches from the centre of one stall to that of another, the space actually taken up on the transports is three inches less than this; and it is stated that this is an improvement, the horses suffering less from the rolling of the ship. Calls for report on this point; also as to whether wooden mangers are approved of, and whether the use of sheep skins and numdas to cover the bales is advisable, having regard to the fact that the horses are stated to have suffered injury through eating it.

---

Report by Captain Moore, 3rd Bombay Cavalry, 2nd January 1857.

*Stalls.*—The stalls were sufficiently broad.

*Bales.*—Numdas were found useful for covering the bales. Sheep and goat skins are of no use.

*Grain and water.*—Until the allowance was reduced on board the *Boyne*, the horses were in good order. On the water being reduced from 6 gallons to 3½ and the grain from 5 lbs. to 3 lbs., the horses immediately fell off in condition.

Considers that a horse's rations at sea should be 5 pounds of grain and 6 gallons of water, and that this should never be reduced, unless under great necessity, below 5 gallons of water and 4 pounds of grain.

12 lbs. of grass is ample for a horse.

---

Report by Veterinary Surgeon Lamb, 3rd Light Cavalry, 2nd January 1857.

*Voyage.*—Arrangements were excellent, and the horses, after a voyage of 30 days, landed in good condition.

*Stalls.*—Reduction of width to 33 inches is an improvement.

*Mangers.*—Nose bags were found more useful than mangers.

*Water.*—The horses cannot be kept in health if the allowance of water is much reduced.

On board the *Fairlie* they were for two days limited to 3½ gallons, when many became frantic, and the noise made by their pawing, screaming and fighting was deafening. But next day when they had full allowance this ceased.

From Captain Oldfield 3rd Light Cavalry, 2nd January 1857.

*Stalls.*—Does not consider reduction of the space allotted to each horse judicious, as it leaves no room for grooming, and does not, as supposed, protect the horse in rough weather from the rolling of the vessel.

*Mangers.*—Wooden mangers are useless.

*Bales.*—Is in favor of covering the bales with sheep skin.

*Hay nets.*—The net work should be of a smaller mesh to prevent waste.

*Ventilation.* 5.—Suggests that large scupper holes be made fore and aft to increase the ventilation.

---

No. 3, dated 4th January 1857, from Major Blake, Commanding 3rd Troop Horse Artillery, to the Quarter Master General.

Reports that the horses of the right and centre divisions of his troop have landed in a very efficient state; those however of the left division suffered from bad ventilation (on board the *Madge Wildfire*) and also from skin disease caused by their being washed with salt water and not effectually dried afterwards.

---

No. 5, dated 8th January 1857, from the Officer Commanding Púnah Horse and Cavalry Brigade.

*Water.*—Less than 4 gallons of water is insufficient.

*Gram.*—Four pounds of gram is sufficient for most horses, some require five.

*Hay.*—Ten pounds is the minimum which ought to be issued, 12 pounds is not too much.

*Head stalls.*—Head stalls can be dispensed with as line ones do very well.

---

Report by Brigadier (Lieutenant-Colonel) Thos. Tapp, Commanding Púnah Horse and Cavalry Brigade.

*Stalls.*—The space now allotted, of 30 inches, is quite sufficient.

*Mangers.*—The wooden mangers are very objectionable.

*Mats.*—Mats were most useful.

*Disinfectants.*—The vinegar and disinfecting fluid were of great service.

---

Report by Captain Graves, 3rd Light Cavalry, 9th January 1857.

*Stalls.*—33 inches of space should be allowed instead of 30.

*Bales.*—Considers numda and sheep skins quite unnecessary except in a few cases.

*Mangers.*—Wooden mangers were found useless and injurious.

*Hay net.*—Considers that the hay net should be a bag with a slit in the side (the reverse from the horse) to put the hay into, with meshes large enough for the horse to pull the hay through.

*Water and grain.*—Water 5 gallons, grain 5 pounds and hay 13 pounds is the least quantity that a horse can keep his condition on.

---

No. 1, dated 11th January 1857, from Officer Commanding 3rd Light Cavalry.

*Stalls.*—The space allotted is quite sufficient.

*Bales.*—The bales answered quite well without any covering on them.

*Mangers.*—Much grain was wasted by feeding the horses from mangers.

*Water.*—Water should never be reduced under 5 gallons.

No. 11, dated Bushire, 24th January 1857, from Officer Commanding Artillery Brigade, Persian Field Force, to the Quarter Master General, Bombay.

In reply to communications on the subject of horse transport states:

*Stalls.*—Stalls of 30 inches in width were ample for the largest horses.

*Mangers.*—Wooden mangers were generally condemned.

*Covering for bales.*—For covering the bales numda is considered preferable to sheep skins.

*Mats.*—Mats are most useful in bad weather.

*Water.*—The quantity of water issued daily to each horse may vary from 4 to 6 gallons.

*Gram.*—Gram may be restricted to 4lbs. a day.

*Hay.*—Hay may be fixed at 10 pounds daily.

*Hay bags.*—With the present description of hay bag there is much waste. Gunny should therefore be substituted for netting.

No. 2383, dated 1st April 1857, from the Quarter Master General, to the Officer Commanding, Southern Mahratta Horse, Ulwa.

Communicates the following remarks in connection with the embarkation of horses and their care on board ship.

The horse stalls originally 30 inches broad have been altered to 26 inches clear space.

Each stall is to be supplied with a numda and small tacks so that in rough weather the racks may be padded. There is also a coir mat for the horse to stand on with a strong loop attached to enable its being towed overboard occasionally. The mat is fastened to the stanchions by a coir line.

As a relief to the horse's feet, and to equalise the wear of the mat, it should be reversed frequently.

Hay nets of strong tarred coir rope are secured to cleats in the deck above and to the side stanchions below. The following articles are to be supplied for use during the voyage:

- 1 Basket to 2 horses.
- 1 Bucket       "
- 2 Brooms to each horse.
- 20 Horse hammocks for 100 horses.

There will also be a proportion of spare articles on board.

Ship halters made of canvas having been found better than the line halters they will be put on board.

A gunny painted tobra, bound with leather, will be supplied for each horse, in place of mangers which are cumbersome.

Three horse slings are to be on board each ship, these ought to be tested thoroughly.

The horse's head must be tied down sufficiently tight to prevent his hitting his poll against the beam above when in his stall, a proportion of padded head stalls is in each ship for horses placed under beams.

The spot where the horse alights on board when transhipped will be matted, and a matted path must be made for him to his stall.

Vinegar, chloride of lime, pounded alabaster, and gypsum will be placed in charge of the master, for sprinkling the decks to remove the smell of urine, &c. The hind legs must be hobbled when the horses are being cleaned, which should be done as regularly as on shore. The jhools when required are never to be hung between decks but should be aired daily and taken down in the evening for use. In hot weather, when not required, they should be stowed away.



On disembarkation the horse equipment will be handed over to the master of the ship and all missing articles replaced.

No. 1139, dated 8th April 1857, from the Secretary, Medical Board, to the Quarter Master General.

States that, with respect to disinfectants in horse ships, the following rules should be observed.

1st—Vinegar being only of doubtful advantage or power, should not be trusted to, but there can be no harm in sprinkling it about the decks occasionally.

2nd—Chloride of lime should be freely used, mixed with water, in the proportion of one part to sixty, and plentifully sprinkled on the decks during the day and suspended in buckets during the night, or cloths soaked in it should be hung up between decks.

3rd—Pounded alabaster and gypsum are meant to act as absorbents of ammonia from the urine and dung of horses. Portions of either should be placed in thin layers where these excrements fall, and when soddened should be removed.

No. 63, dated 1st July 1857, from Lieutenant Brown, Commanding No. 8 Light Field Battery, to the Adjutant, Royal Artillery in Sind.

Reports that the following casualties occurred among the horses of the battery since it sailed from Bushire on the 7th ultimo.

Three horses died on board the *Maria Grey* under charge of Lieutenant Brown. Fourteen horses died on board the *Walter Morrice* under charge of Lieutenant Whish.

One horse since landing from *Maria Grey* from effects of sickness during the voyage.

Out of one hundred and twenty-one horses that were embarked at Bushire, only one hundred and three are now alive, and of these many that came in the *Walter Morrice* will be some time before they pick up their condition.

The horses had their full allowance of water on both ships, and were rationed as the officers in charge thought advisable, there was no scarcity of water or grain. Remarks that from his own knowledge and from the report of Lieutenant Whish, he can state the mortality was due to want of ventilation.

The voyage occupied twenty days, and for many of these there was not a breath of wind, during these dead calms the heat between decks was very great, and in his ship, which was better ventilated than the *Walter Morrice* it was found quite impossible to establish a current of air between decks.

States that a few of the horses died of inflammation of the lungs, but the greater part of affection of the brain. A horse would appear well, eat his grain and grass, and fall down and die before any relief could be given. Of the 18 horses dead, 7 were old, and 11 young, 13 Herátis, 3 Persians, and 2 Arabs.

Letter dated Púnah, 22nd August 1857, from Lieutenant Shekleton, Commanding 1—2 Artillery, to Brigade Major, Artillery.

Reports that he sailed from Bushire on 8th June 1857, on the transport *Abdoolah* and that he heard the Captain remark that unless they got out of harbour that day, there might be a scarcity of water. As they got out, he

did not take notice of doubts so expressed, as he considered they might easily run into Bandar Abbás or Mascat.

Up to this, 16th June, they experienced light breezes and calms, the heat was unbearable between decks, and five horses died. Disinfectants were freely used and the horses' noses and faces sponged with vinegar.

States that on the 20th June the steamer *Pioneer* hove in sight and arrangements were made for her to tow the transport, but she left without doing so.

At this time windsails were used, but no benefit whatever was derived from them in the calms.

Remarks that there were but five empty stalls when leaving Bushire. All the horses, with one exception, between the fore hatchway and the bows, died, though two spare stalls were left there.

On 26th June water was reduced to 4 gallons per horse, and on the 28th to three gallons.

States that up to 22nd June, 15 horses died, and from that date the mortality increased, and from the 22nd to 30th June, when they arrived in Karáchi Harbour, they had lost 25 horses. Death was probably caused in many cases by the heavy sea encountered for the last few days of the voyage.

Adds that the *Abdoola* was well fitted up, and had a higher deck than most of the other transports, that the horses were given fever balls and bled without effect, and that the mortality may be attributed to the unusually long voyage in an over-heated atmosphere. If the horses had not been enervated by their previous sufferings from heat, he does not think that the short allowance of water would have injured them.

---

No. 407, dated 9th October 1857, from the Commandant of Artillery, to the Quarter Master General.

Submits the following report on the manner in which the horses underwent the sea transport from Persia.

The periods of passage varied from 20 days to 2 months, but the effects on the horses were not proportional to the duration of the confinement, as those which had been the longer period, were for the most part landed in good condition.

All the horses suffered more or less at first from swelled legs, but this symptom generally disappeared after a week's time.

The horses that suffered most were those on ill ventilated ships, also where a deficiency of good water was experienced. The Gulf horses, Arabs and Persians appeared to suffer least; and with regard to age, the older horses appear to have suffered the most from swelled legs and stiffness of the limbs, and in one or two cases the effect was permanent and the animals had to be destroyed.

Numda was found preferable to sheepskin to prevent chafing, the latter very soon becoming offensive and breeding vermin, &c.

It is recommended that a few stalls should be boarded up for vicious horses, to avoid the commotion caused by kicking. The proportion of food and water allowed was found ample, green forage when obtainable in the river Shatt-ul-Arab, proved very beneficial. Frequent hand rubbing of legs and cleaning of manes and tails strongly recommended, but the use of salt water for the latter purpose should be avoided on account of its great tendency to produce mange.

When the weather admits of it, half the coir mats should be daily removed and towed overboard, and the decks well washed.

The chief points to be observed are ventilation, cleanliness, and a full supply of good water, a deficiency of the latter being at once found to prove detrimental to health in the warm latitudes. And when practicable no horse above 12 years of age should be embarked.

A small bucket should be supplied to every 3 horses to catch the urine instead of being allowed to stale on the mats.



## APPENDIX I.

### ABSTRACT OF CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO FOLLOWERS.

Extract of a letter from the Commissary General No. 1737, dated 29th August 1856.

A Bazár is a simple and economical means of supplying an Army with many wants and if judiciously worked and superintended may become an important source for obtaining supplies of all kinds.

I would therefore submit for the consideration of Government the expediency of appointing at an early date, an officer in every way qualified by his knowledge of the Persian language to the situation of Superintendent of Bazárs to the Force.

No. 1830, dated 8th September 1856, from the Commissary General, to the Quartermaster General.

Forwards a memorandum of the probable number of Commissariat followers of every description to embark with the troops.

Warrant Officers, 5; Commissariat Sergeants, 5; Office clerks, 10; Shroffs, 2; Inspectors, 6; Weighing men, 6; Coopers, 4; Measuring men, 4; Tin men, 3; Carpenters, 2; Iron Smiths, 2; Master Bakers, 2; Assistant Bakers, 15; Mochis, 2; Cattle Muccadums, 5; Peons, 20; Coolies, 80; Dooly Bearers, 300; Bullock Drivers, 150; Bullock Contractor's Establishment, 8; Servants of Warrant Officers, &c., 46; Cattle Muccadums, 5—Total 682.

#### BAZAAR AND POLICE ESTABLISHMENTS FOR THE TOWN OF BUSHIRE.

##### *Bazaar.*

1 English writer, Rs. 40; 1 Persian moonshi, Rs. 50; 1 Persian clerk, Rs. 30; 1 Arabic clerk, Rs. 30; 2 Havildars @ 12 each, Rs. 24; 2 Naiks @ 9 each, Rs. 18; 26 Peons @ 7 each, Rs. 182—Total Rs. 374.

##### *Police.*

1 Daroga, Rs. 50; 5 Jemadars @ 20 each, Rs. 100; 10 Havildars @ 12 each, Rs. 120; 10 Naiks @ 9 each, Rs. 90; 130 Sepoys @ 7 each, Rs. 910—Total Rs. 1,270—Grand Total Rs. 1,644.

1 Syrang; 4 1st Tindals; 6 2nd Tindals.

The Commander-in-Chief considers that the lascars sent on service should all be of the permanent establishment.

No. 2091, dated 26th September 1856, from the Commissary General, to the Quarter Master General.

Requests him to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief that the Governor General has been pleased to order 300 dooly bearers from the establishment kept up in Sind to be sent with the force to Persia, and states that he has ordered the Assistant Commissary General at Karáchi to select that number with the regulated proportion of 1st and 2nd muccadums.

No. 1831, dated 29th September 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department.

Remarks that the full field complement of grasscutters is two for every three troop horses, which would have given a total of 506 in lieu of 220 as

shown in the return, but the Commander-in-Chief had already desired that not more than one for every three troop horses should be taken, leaving it to the discretion of Commanding Officers still further to reduce this number, a discretion which the artillery have exercised by reducing their numbers to little more than one to every four horses. The grass-cutters in the return of the 3rd Light Cavalry are 93, or one to three horses, and may possibly be still further reduced.

In regard to horse-keepers, the rule in the Horse Artillery is to have one horse-keeper for the horse of each sergeant, corporal, farrier, and trumpeter, and one for every two remaining horses, and this number the Commander-in-Chief does not think ought to be reduced. In the foot batteries there is a driver or horse-keeper to each horse, and as the soldiers of these batteries are foot soldiers, neither trained nor paid to clean or take care of horses, the Commander-in-Chief does not recommend any reduction in this amount.

In the Native Cavalry, the rule is one horse-keeper to every two horses, whether of native officers, non-commissioned officers or men and this number should not, the Commander-in-Chief considers, be reduced.

In the Pūnah Horse, the horse-keepers and private servants of the native officers are so mixed up, that it is impossible to separate them, but allowing one servant to each officer there remains about one horse-keeper to every two horses, and as many of these men are approved candidates for employment, ready to fill casualties, it would not be desirable to reduce their numbers.

No. 3556, dated 31st October 1856, from the Post Master General, to the Military Department.

States that the Government of India has ordered the establishment as per margin, to be sent from the Postal Department with the *ex-officio* Postmaster, and requests that arrangements may be made to provision them from the Commissariat.

	Rs.
Head clerk	80
2nd "	40
Mūnshī	20
4 peons at Rs. 8	32
Contingencies	25
Total	197

discharge.

At Aden, Interpreters speaking Arabic, Hindustani, Persian, Turkish and Somali were entertained, return passage to Aden being promised if they desired it on

No. 1677, dated 18th October 1856, from the Deputy Adjutant General of the Army to Lieutenant-Colonel Younghusband, Assistant Adjutant General, Sind Division.

States that in the event of the Persian Frontier Force proceeding to its destination, the undermentioned Establishment has been sanctioned by Government for his office :

	Rs.
1 Head clerk	120
1 Second	80
Stationery	50
Office Tentage	75
Total	325

As many halalcotes for cleaning the town as may be found necessary, to be entertained at Rs. 6 each per mensem. The commandant of the Town is authorised to hire 5 houses as police stations in the town and a house as a police office.

Bushire, 2nd January 1857.

No. 7. The following establishment is sanctioned for the Sudder Bazaar of camp, from the dates on which the individuals respectively may have been entertained :

					Rs.	A.	P.
1 Kotwal	...	...	...	...	40	0	0
1 Persian writer	...	...	...	...	33	0	0
1 English writer	...	...	...	...	35	0	0
1 Havildar of Peons	...	...	...	...	12	8	0
1 Naik	...	...	...	...	8	0	0
6 Peons @ 7 each	...	...	...	...	42	0	0
2 Halalcores @ 7 each	...	...	...	...	14	0	0
Contingencies	...	...	...	...	30	0	0
Total	...	...	...	...	214	8	0

No. 29, dated 5th January 1857, from the Assistant Commissary General, P. D. A., to the Acting Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, P. D. A., Púnah.

States that no dooly bearers can be found willing to accompany the force proceeding on service, and therefore requests him to cause orders to be issued to the bazar authorities to compel all unemployed dooly bearers and hamals within the cantonment to be entertained at once.

No. 392 of 14th January 1857, from the Adjutant General, to the Military Department.

With reference to the appointment of Captain Collier to be Assistant Adjutant General to the force *vice* Younghusband appointed Deputy Assistant General, conveys the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation that the under-mentioned office establishment may be sanctioned for Captain Collier :

					Per mensem.
					Rs.
1 Head clerk	...	...	...	...	120
1 Second clerk	...	...	...	...	80
Stationery	...	...	...	...	50
Office Tentage	...	...	...	...	75
Total	...	...	...	...	325

No. 762, dated 29th January 1857, from the Adjutant General, to the Military Department.

Requests that the undermentioned office establishment may be sanctioned to the Assistant Adjutant General of the Cavalry Division of the Persian Expeditionary Force, from date of its entertainment :

					Rs.
1 Head clerk	...	...	...	...	120
1 Second clerk	...	...	...	...	80
Stationery	...	...	...	...	50
Office Tentage	...	...	...	...	75
Total	...	...	...	...	325



Paragraph 3 of No. 54, Bushire, 1st March 1857, from Director, Transport Corps, to Captain Taylor, 1st Assistant Director.

Points out that it will be impossible to obtain the undermentioned followers in Persia, and therefore too great a number cannot be sent from India.

Peons, Syces and muleteers, Grass-cutters, Bhisties, Dhobies, Sweepers, Cattle Doctors.

No. 7207 of 12th March 1857, from the Commissary General, to the Military Department.

States that the following officers are employed with the Commissariat Department in Persia.

1 Deputy Commissary General	...	Lieutenant Colonel Pope.
		Captain Dunsterville, 1st Division.
2 Assistant Commissaries General	...	Lieutenant Gordon, 2nd Division.
		Lieutenant Gray, 1st Division.
2 Deputy Assistant Commissaries General...	...	Captain Lucas, 2nd Division.
		Lieutenant Mignon.
		" Willoughby.
		" L'Estrange.
		" Thain.
8 Sub-Assistant Commissaries General	...	" Stuart.
		" Blowers.
		" Shewell.
		" Baigre.

Lieutenant Hutcheon is employed as 1st Class Commissariat Agent with the Force, and Mr. J. E. Taylor, Her Majesty's Vice Consul, has been appointed Commissariat Agent at "Busreh."

States that there are no other experienced Commissariat Officers available to be detached to Persia, and recommends that the Lieutenant General Commanding the Force be directed to select some intelligent officers from the Regiments under his command, and appoint them temporarily to the Field Commissariat, as was done in former campaigns, "Sind," "Afghanistan," and "Punjab."

No. 2214 of 25th March 1857, from the Adjutant General, to Sir James Outram.

Communicates above to Sir James Outram, the measure having met with the concurrence of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council.

No. 31, dated Bushire, 14th March 1857, from Lieutenant-Colonel Trevelyan, Commanding Artillery Brigade, Persian Expeditionary Force, to the Acting Brigade Major of Artillery, Bombay.

States that it has been found impossible to obtain men to replace the syces withdrawn from their original duties to perform those of drivers to the Field Batteries. Requests therefore that a number of able bodied men (about 40 for each battery) may be entertained at Ahmednuggur and sent by an early ship.

No. 2224, dated 25th March 1857, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department.

Intimates that Captain Curtis, Director, Land Transport Corps, reports as follows:

"No class of men is more required than sweepers, whom it will be impossible to obtain up here. They will be wanted comparatively in great numbers, and they should be accompanied by derzies and persons who are skilful in tanning leather."

No. 46, dated Camp Mandavee, 27th March 1857, from the Officer Commanding No. 8 Light Field Battery, to the Brigade Major of Artillery, Bombay.

Brings to notice the utter impossibility of obtaining syces and grasscutters, and encloses reply of Political Agent to application for assistance in the matter, also copy of agreement entered in to by Volunteers for the Land Transport Corps.

No. 265 of 27th March 1857, from Political Agent, Kutch, to Officer Commanding No. 8 Light Field Battery.

States that he cannot hold out any hope of the required class of men being obtained.

1st.—Because the inhabitants of the province have an apparent aversion to Persia.

2nd.—Because those who feel disposed to serve there can obtain service in the Land Transport Corps at 10 Rupees a month as camelmen or syces to take care of ponies.

No. 137, dated Calcutta, 19th May 1857, from the Director General, Post Offices in India, to the Home Department.

States that he cannot recommend the grant of any special allowance to the Staff Officer who performed Postal duties with the Force, as the duties were conducted in the most unsatisfactory manner, and there being great confusion in the accounts and it is feared some defalcations.

No. 407, dated Bushire, 22nd September 1857, from Brigadier General Jacob, C.B., to the Adjutant General, Bombay.

States that it was precisely because of the disorderly state of the Postal Department that an Officer was appointed Post master and therefore recommends that Lieutenant Crispin may be granted the allowance assigned him in orders.

At Karrack a Commandant was appointed also Superintendent of Bazaars and a Postal Staff consisting of—

					Per mensem.
					Rs.
1 Postmaster @	...	...	...	...	50
1 Clerk	...	...	...	...	30
1 Peon	...	...	...	...	8
Contingent allowance	...	...	...	...	15
Total					103

## APPENDIX J.

### ABSTRACT OF CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO ENGINEER PARK, TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT BARRACKS, AND HOSPITALS.

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No. 9, dated Bombay, 2nd September 1856, from Inspector General of Ordnance,  
to Government, Military Department.

With regard to the artificers to proceed with the force, states that the Principal Commissary of Ordnance has been requested to ascertain the complement laid down for the service of four pieces of heavy ordnance, with a few supernumeraries to meet casualties. Remarks that the regiments and batteries will of course take with them their regular complement of artificers, but that as it is believed to be the wish of His Lordship in Council that a large proportion of the artificers should be of a class usually employed in building, he has addressed a communication to the Chief Engineer of Public Works requesting him to cause the following artificers to be held in readiness for service :

50 House carpenters, 50 Brick-layers, 10 Smiths, 10 Hammermen, 10 Bellows boys,—Total 130.

Adding to these the ordnance artificers for the heavy ordnance, 43 in number, there will be a total of 173 of all trades available.

Adds that the superintendence of these artificers should be in the hands of the Commanding Engineer or the Quarter Master General's Department as it cannot with advantage be given to the artillery or ordnance officers.

---

No. 643, dated 3rd September 1856, from Officer Commanding Sappers and Miners, to the  
Quarter Master General.

Forwards rough list of stores for an Engineer Park sufficient for a force of 12,000 men, which he considers should be got ready in case of the expedition taking place, as, to properly steel sharpen and arrange the various tools and stores, is a work of time and labour.

States that the officer proceeding in command of the Sappers and Miners should take with him the undermentioned articles :

1. Drawing and surveying instruments; paper, pencils, &c., &c., and professional books for reference.
2. A galvanic battery.
3. Instruments for blasting in rock.
4. A few additional carpenter's and smith's tools.
5. Powder bags, and empty powder hose, fuzes and other articles that may appear necessary to render the corps efficient, such as pick-axe helves, &c.



List showing the quantity of stores to be prepared to form an Engineer Park for 5,000 men, and also the quantity requiring to be kept in reserve for an additional 5,000 men.

Names.	For 5,000 men.	Remarks.	Reserve of 5,000 men.	Remarks.
<i>Cutting Tools.</i>				
Axes, felling, with helvcs '...	50	.....	25	.....
Helves, axes, felling, spare ...	10	.....	8	.....
Chockers, fascine ...	15	.....	15	.....
Hatchets, hand ...	150	.....	150	.....
Hooks, bill ...	500	.....	500	.....
Do. „ with long handles ...	50	For cutting jungle ...	...	.....
Knives, Gabion ...	500	.....	500	.....
Twine, country, for fascines and gabions— lbs. of ...	750	.....	750	.....
Saws, hand ...	50	In case of having to hut the Force ...	25	.....
Stones, grinding ...	4	.....	2	.....
„ wet ...	10	.....	10	.....
Saw, sets ...	6	.....	3	.....
Do. files ...	25	.....	18	.....
Total ...	2,895	lbs. about ...	2,895	lbs. about.
<i>Entrenching tools.</i>				
Axes, pick, with helvcs ...	750	Sap. picks if possible	750	.....
Helves, axe, pick, spare ...	250	.....	250	.....
Hoes with helvcs ...	50	.....	50	.....
Do. spare helvcs ...	5	.....	5	.....
Mallets, large ...	12	.....	10	.....
Do. small ...	12	.....	10	.....
Shovels with helvcs ...	750	Sap. shovels if possible ...	750	.....
Do. spare „ ...	250	.....	250	.....
Hoes (Powrahs) ...	150	.....	...	.....
Tapes, measuring ...	6	.....	6	.....
Tape, tracing, 1½ yards ...	1,500	.....	1,500	.....
Total ...	11,211	lbs. ...	11,211	lbs.

List showing the quantity of stores to be prepared to form an Engineer Park for 5,000 men, and also the quantity requiring to be kept in reserve for an additional 5,000 men—*contd.*

Names.	For 5,000 men.	Remarks.	Reserve of 5,000 men.	Remarks
<i>Sapping and Mining Tools.</i>				
Axes, pick, sap, with helvcs ...	12	.....	12	.....
Do. „ „ miners' ...	6	.....	6	.....
Do. „ „ with push ...	6	.....	...	.....
Do. „ „ pole ...	6	.....	...	.....
Bars, tamping copper ...	10	.....	...	.....
Borers, jumpers' ...	20	.....	...	.....
Do. hand 2 feet ...	12	.....	...	.....
Bars, crow, iron ...	20	.....	...	.....
Buckets, canvas, mining ...	3	.....	3	.....
Candles, wax, lbs. of — ...	10	.....	10	.....
Candle-sticks, miners' ...	2	.....	1	.....
Hammers, hand, for boring bars ...	6	.....	...	.....
Hammers, sledge ...	10	Will be received in building and road making ...	5	.....
Ladders, miners' rope ...	2	.....	...	.....
Needles, priming ...	10	Copper ...	5	.....
Shovels, sap, with helvcs ...	12	.....	12	.....
Do. „ miners' pointed ...	5	.....	5	.....
Scoops, miners' ...	6	.....	...	.....
Sap forks, long ...	6	.....	...	.....
Do. „ short ...	6	.....	...	.....
Trucks, miners' wheels and axles ...	2	.....	1	.....
Wedges, iron, large... ..	8	.....	8	.....
Do. „ small ...	8	.....	8	.....
Worm and screw ...	3	.....	...	.....
Total ...	1,000	lbs. ...	180	lbs.
<i>Laboratory Stores.</i>				
Bags, petard, leather, 50 lbs....	2	.....	2	.....
Barrels, bridge ...	1	.....	...	.....

List showing the quantity of stores to be prepared to form an Engineer Park for 5,000 men and also the quantity requiring to be kept in reserve for an additional 5,000 men—*contd.*

Names.	For 5,000 men.	Remarks.	Reserve of 5,000 men.	Remarks.
<i>Laboratory Stores—contd.</i>				
Dungree, yards ... ..	50	.....	50	.....
Funnels, copper for filling Saucisson ...	1	.....	1	.....
Fuse, Bickford's, feet ... ..	100	.....	200	.....
Horns, powder ... ..	2	.....	1	.....
Match, quick, lbs. ... ..	3	.....	3	.....
Match, slow lbs. ... ..	5	.....	5	.....
Measures, powder, copper, set of ...	1	.....	...	.....
Needles, sewing, large ... ..	50	.....	50	.....
Port fires ... ..	25	.....	25	.....
Powder, lbs. ... ..	150	.....	150	.....
Scales, copper, with weights ... ..	1	.....	...	.....
Saw, tennon ... ..	1	.....	...	.....
Saucisson, made up, yards of ... ..	50	.....	50	.....
Scissors ... ..	3	.....	3	.....
Thread, lbs. ... ..	2½	.....	2½	.....
Wire, platinum, fine, lbs. ... ..	½	.....	...	.....
Copper, portable, powder magazine ...	1	.....	...	.....
Total ...	400	lbs.	250	lbs.
<i>Miscellaneous Stores.</i>				
Candles, lbs. ... ..	5	.....	5	.....
Bags, Sand ... ..	10,000	To be of much stronger material than usual.	10,000	.....
Gunny, 2 feet wide, pieces ... ..	50	.....	...	.....
Ladders, scaling, joints of ... ..	20	.....	20	.....
Lanterns, dark ... ..	1	.....	2	.....
Lanterns, signal ... ..	3	.....	3	.....
Needles, packing ... ..	50	.....	50	.....
Paulins, wax ... ..	10	.....	10	.....
Rope, white, 2 fathoms ... ..	50	.....	50	.....
Steel, yards ... ..	1	.....	...	.....
Twine, for packing, lbs. ... ..	20	.....	20	.....
Total ...	9,977	lbs.	9,950	lbs.



List showing the quantity of stores to be prepared to form an Engineer Park for 5,000 men and also the quantity requiring to be kept in reserve for an additional 5,000 men—*contd.*

Names.	For 5,000 men.	Remarks.	Reserve of 5,000 men.	Remarks.
<i>Carpenters' Tools.</i>				
Adzes ...	5	The hired carpenters will bring their own working tools with them and but they may possibly require occasional assistance from our stores, therefore it will be well to take these tools without making any deduction from them.	...	...
Augurs of sizes ...	5		...	...
Brace and bits ...	2		...	...
Chalk, lbs. ...	5		5	...
Chalk, red, lbs. ...	5		5	...
Chisels, mortice ...	10		...	...
Chisels trimmer ...	10		...	...
Compasses, calliper ...	1		...	...
Compasses, common ...	1		...	...
Files, pit saw ...	20		10	...
Files, cross cut ...	6		3	...
Files, hand ...	30		15	...
Gauges, of sizes ...	5		...	...
Gauges, common ...	5		...	...
Hatchets, hand ...	2		...	...
Hammer, claw ...	4		...	...
Hammer, rivetting ...	1		...	...
Knives, drawing ...	2		...	...
Nails of sorts, lbs. of ...	20		10	...
Planes ...	6		...	...
Pincers ...	1		...	...
Rasps ...	2		...	...
Rules, 2 feet ...	4		...	...
Saws, cross cut ...	1		...	...
Saws, pit with frame ...	10		...	...
Saws, hand ...	5		...	...
Saws, tennon ...	5		...	...
Screw drivers ...	3		...	...
Screws of sorts, lbs. ...	15		5	...
Setters, pit saw with frame ...	5		...	...
Setters, cross cut ...	2		...	...
Setters, hand ...	10		...	...
Setters Tennon ...	2		...	...
Stones oil ...	2		...	...
Screws jack ...	2		...	...
Squares, carpenters ...	2		...	...
Vice, hand ...	2		...	...
Total ...	380	lbs.	35	lbs.

List showing the quantity of stores to be prepared to form an Engineer Park for 5,000 men and also the quantity requiring to be kept in reserve for an additional 5,000 men—*contd.*

Names.	For 5,000 men.	Remarks.	Reserve of 5,000 men.	Remarks.
<i>Smiths' Tools, &amp; Forges.</i>				
Anvils ...	10	The hired smiths will not bring either tools or forges with them, therefore a full complement of these articles must be taken for 10 smiths.	2	.....
Bellows, with frame ...	2		1	.....
Bellows, small ...	10		4	.....
Borax, lbs. ...	10		5	.....
Chisels of sorts ...	24		6	.....
Charcoal, lbs. ...	600		600	.....
Files, flat ...	72		15	.....
Files, triangular ...	72		15	.....
Files, half round ...	72		15	.....
Hammer, hand ...	12		5	.....
Hammer, sledge ...	10		3	.....
Iron, lbs. ...	400		200	.....
Pincers, large ...	20		5	.....
Pokers ...	10		2	.....
Pincers, small ...	20		5	.....
Steels, lbs. ...	224		112	.....
Total ...	3,700	lbs.	550	lbs.
<i>Drawing and Surveying Instruments.</i>				
Boards, drawing and square ...	3	.....	...	.....
Cakes Indian ink ...	3	.....	3	.....
Compass, prismatic with stand ...	4	.....	2	.....
Paper, scrampoon sheets ...	5	.....	5	.....
Paper foolscap, ream ...	2	.....	1	.....
Protractor, semi-circular ...	1	.....	1	.....
Pencils, lead, H. H. H. ...	36	.....	36	.....
Pencils, camel hair ...	12	.....	12	.....
Rulers, parallel, 18" ...	3	.....	1	.....
Scales, brass, 18" or 2' ...	2	.....	1	.....
Sextant, pocket ...	3	.....	...	.....
Telescope ...	3	.....	...	.....
Chains measuring ...	3	.....	1	.....
Tapes, measuring, 50' ...	3	.....	3	.....
Theodolite with stand, Everest ...	1	.....	...	.....
Instruments, mathematical, cases ...	3	Second sort	...	.....
Paper mounted on cloth, yards ...	10	.....	...	.....
Paper, tracing ...	40	.....	...	.....
Total ...	150	lbs.	50	lbs.

List showing the quantity of stores to be prepared to form an Engineer Park for 5,000 men and also the quantity requiring to be kept in reserve for an additional 5,000 men—*concl'd.*

Names.	For 5,000 men.	Remarks.	Reserve of 5,000 men.	Remarks.
<i>Additional Stores.</i>				
Powder, spare in 100 lbs. barrels ...	5,000	To be carried by Ordnance Department.	5,000	To be carried by Ordnance Department.
Chest, store ...	1	.....	...	.....
Chest, tools, artificers' empty ...	3	.....	...	.....
Locks, pad, brass single, small ...	7	.....	...	.....
Lashing, country, yards ...	4,000	Will be used in hutting the Force.	2,000	.....
Barrels, powder, 4 copper hooks each, 100 lbs. ....	51½	.....	51½	.....
Boxes, ammunition musketry ...	1	To be filled with Port Fires, &c.	...	.....
Twine, Bengal, country, coarse, lbs. ...	200	Will be required for hutting the Force.	50	.....
Coir twine, lbs. ...	3,000		...	.....
Nails of sorts, lbs. ...	3,000		...	.....
Screws of sorts ...	500	Will be required for hutting the Force.	...	.....
Rope 3¼" coir, fathoms ...	600		...	.....
Bamboos' large 4" diameter, 30' long ...	20	For scaling ladders ...	20	.....
Pieces of bamboo for rungs ...	250	3' long 1½" in diameter	250	To be made Bamboos.
Colour boxes, 2 sorts ...	2	.....	...	.....
Compass, prismatic ...	3	.....	...	.....
Paper, drawing, sheets ...	30	.....	...	.....
Paper, foolscap, ream ...	1	.....	...	.....
Pencils, H. B. ...	30	.....	...	.....
Rulers, parallel, 18" ...	1	.....	...	.....
Rulers, parallel, 1' ...	1	.....	...	.....
Scales, Marquois, Sets ...	...	.....	...	.....
Instruments, case, pocket ...	4	.....	...	.....
Galvanic battery ...	1	These stores are to be taken from the Head-quarters of the Corps by the Sappers and Miners, in addition to those carried by men.	...	.....
Telescopes ...	2		...	.....
Chain, measuring ...	1		...	.....
Tapes, measuring ...	3		...	.....
Sets of tools for blasting ...	3		...	.....
Powder bags ...	1		...	.....
Additional carpenters' and smiths' tools in one chest	1		...	.....
Bickford fuse, feet ...	50		...	.....
Slow match, feet ...	100		...	.....
Total ...	14,450	lbs. ...	7,000	lbs.
Grand total ...	44,063	Or about 19½ Tons dead weight.	32,068	lbs. or about 14 Tons dead weight.



Supplementary list of Stores required to be packed with the Engineer Park for the Expeditionary Force to the Persian Gulf.

As follows :

Blocks, single, for $3\frac{1}{2}$ " rope	...	...	...	6
" double, for $3\frac{1}{2}$ " "	...	...	...	6
" snatch	...	...	...	2
Moulds for brick-making	...	...	...	12
Copper wire for galvanic battery 4,000 yards $\frac{1}{16}$ " in diameter.	...	...	...	...
Rope $1\frac{1}{2}$ "	...	...	...	... 2,000 yards.

The wire to be cut into lengths of 300 yards and covered with a composition of pitch, bees-wax and tallow, and before it dries tape is to be wound round the wire so that it will adhere firmly. The composition must be hot when laid on the wire and not allowed to cool before the tape is wound to it, each wire is now to be divided into two lengths of 150 yards each, and laid on either side of the  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inch rope and bound on to the rope with good waxed pack thread, a turn being taken round each wire every time to keep them in their position; the whole is then to be again laid over with the water proof composition, and wound round with broad tape as before. The rope should be run over with Stockholm tar before the wires are applied to it, and a little heated as the wires are laid on, in order to make them stick; great care is necessary in joining two pieces of wire together that the ends fairly meet.

The composition is made as follows :

1 lb. of pitch  
2 ozs. of bees-wax  
2 ozs. of tallow

melted together well, but not made too hot.

The rope is also to be cut into lengths of 150 yards, the ends being left sufficiently long to join two pieces or lengths together when requisite.

No. 732, dated Púnah, 27th September 1856, from Officer Commanding Sappers and Miners, to the Adjutant General.

Objects to his Adjutant, Lieutenant Hancock being appointed to superintend the preparation of the Engineer Park, &c., for service as his services cannot be spared and Captain Dickinson would have to assume command of the service companies without any one to assist him.

Adjutant General's No. 1290 of 30th September 1856, to the Officers Commanding Sappers and Miners.

State that Captain Hart of the Engineer Corps now at Bombay has been substituted for Lieutenant Hancock.

No. 766, dated 6th October 1856, from the Officer Commanding Sappers and Miners, to the Quarter Master General.

Submits a supplementary list of stores which appear necessary to have packed with the Engineer Park in order to enable the force readily to overcome any contingencies that may arise, and states that in sinking temporary wells the shaft frames and sheeting will be very useful, and doubtless the country will afford some materials in aid.

Remarks that should it be necessary to hut the troops, a large quantity of rafters, bamboos, date matting and date battens will be required. Rafters and bamboos must be taken with the force. Date matting and battens can be obtained in large quantities in the Persian Gulf, therefore suggests that the authorities there may be requested to take measures at once for obtaining them.

The mats to be made as large as possible in order to reduce labour in sewing them together. Supposing 5,000 men have to be hutted, there will be required of the above materials, about as follows:

Rafters	...	...	...	20,000
„ Salkie	...	...	...	7,000
for posts and trusses.				
Date matting	...	...	...	800,000 square feet.
„ battens (stem of date leaves)	...	...	...	60,000
Bamboos in bundles.				
25 per bundle	...	...	...	2,000 bundles.

Supplementary list of stores required to be packed with the Engineer Park for the Expeditionary Force to Persia.

As follows:

*Sapping and Mining Tools.*

Axes, pick, miners' short handled	...	...	...	20
„ „ single pointed „	...	...	...	20
Blocks, single, for $3\frac{1}{2}$ \" rope	...	...	...	12
„ double „ $3\frac{1}{2}$ \" „	...	...	...	12
Buckets, canvas, mining	...	...	...	6
Frames, shaft, (top frames) $4 \times 3$ inside $4\frac{1}{2} \times 3$	...	...	...	10
„ „ $4 \times 3$ inside $4\frac{1}{2} \times 3$	...	...	...	50
Field levels	...	...	...	6
Ladders, miners' rope	...	...	...	6
Powrahs, short handled	...	...	...	10
Rammers, short	...	...	...	10
Shovels, miners'	...	...	...	20
Sheeting planks $5 \times 1 \times 1\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	...	600
Wedges, 1' long	...	...	...	25
Windlasses, small, each with 40' of 2\" rope	...	...	...	6

*Miscellaneous Stores.*

Bags, sand	...	...	...	10,000
Iron, lbs.	...	...	...	300
Nails, $3\frac{1}{2}$ to $4\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.	...	...	...	3,000
Hides, buffalo	...	...	...	15
Steel, lbs.	...	...	...	200
Twine, coir, lbs.	...	...	...	3,000
„ fine Bengal, for sewing mats together, lbs.	...	...	...	200
Needles for sewing date mats	...	...	...	50

No. 733, dated 25th July 1857, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department.

Forwards report by the Commanding Engineer of the force on the inferior quality of many of the tools and stores issued from the Grand Arsenal, together with remarks by the Principal Commissary of Ordnance.

*Report by Commanding Engineer.*

*Pick-axes.*—They are not steeled for more than one inch from the tips. They are not thick enough for the last 8 inches of their length and therefore would if properly steel-ed, be very liable to break. As it is they generally bend and thus become useless. The helves are round instead of oval and they slip round in a man's hand unless he picks true. Some of the eyes were badly welded and have split very soon.

*Remarks by Principal Commissary of Ordnance.*

The greater number of these were received from the Honourable Court of Directors. Those received from the Commissary are of the same pattern and were all carefully examined by a master artificer. The helves supplied were all received from the agent for gun carriages and were agreeably to the established musters.

*Axes, Felling.*—Unserviceable, together with the helves, which in some instances break at the first blow.

This is a very serious matter in a campaign.

Those supplied were of the same description and pattern as have for many years been recognised as the established muster, and generally approved. The helves had been a long time in store but when issued were sound and free from flaws and the attacks of insects.

*Iron.*—Very bad.

That supplied to the Engineer Park was received into the Grand Arsenal from the Honourable Court of Directors.

States that the Commander-in-Chief considers it desirable that measures should be taken for securing good and serviceable articles which can easily be got and are cheapest in the end, as if this be not done, the evil may be expected to recur.

Report by Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines, No. 4745 of 29th July 1857.

With regard to the tools, &c., complained of by Major Hill, remarks that the pickaxes and iron must have been considered of fair quality, or they would have been rejected at the time by the Engineer Officer appointed to receive and superintend the packing of the park stores, and that with regard to the iron, no complaint is made by other departments to which it has been issued.

States that pick axe helves are made according to a pattern furnished to the military board by Major London in 1855.

Points out that native workmen render their picks unserviceable by using them as substitutes for crowbars, and adds that all tools before being received into the Grand Arsenal are examined and passed as serviceable by competent judges.

List of Stores, Ammunition, &c., accompanying the Corps of Sappers and Miners, 31st October 1856.

To be carried by companies, packed on 8 camel kajawahs; to be placed on board ship in the kajawahs or to be packed separately, as may be found most convenient.

Axes, felling; 16 Axes pick sap; 80 Bars, crow, iron; 8 Hammers, sledge; 8 Hatchets, hand; 8 Helves, axe, pick; 80 Hooks, bill, hand, Europe; 80 Levels, field, wooden; 16 Saws, hand, carpenters'; 8 Shovels, Europe; 80 Chests, tool, carpenters'; 2 Chests, tool, smiths'; 6 Chests, laboratory; 1 Chest, voltaic battery; 1 Chest, mat. instruments; 1 Chest, arms. 1 Blasting tools, sets; 2 Hides, bullock and buffalo; 12 Helves, pick, axe; 15 Helves, hooks, bill; 18 Helves, felling axe; 10 Boxes, ammunition, rifle; 37.

No. 748, dated 2nd October 1856, from the Officer Commanding Sappers and Miners, to the Quarter Master General.

Submits the following suggestions in connection with the Engineer Park:

1. Pickaxes, felling axes, &c., to be properly handled. If the handle fills the eye of the tool completely it will last much longer. The handles should not project above  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inches, oval handles are better than round ones.

2. All the picks and cutting tools to be carefully pointed, steeled, and sharpened. Mules will most probably be employed to carry the stores, therefore they should be made up in packages of 125 lbs. each, and of 100 lbs. each in case of bulky stores.

4. Each package to be clearly numbered.

5. The cutting tools should be packed with pieces of wood projecting beyond the cutting edges to prevent the edges injured.



6. The tools should all be dammered prior to packing to prevent their rusting.

7. Cases used for packing stores must not be too heavy to be carried by mules.

8. The contents of each case to be carefully recorded.

9. Slings of good strong rope should be prepared, one pair of slings to every two packages, to sling them on the mules.

10. Every individual tool should be looked at, and every helve carefully fitted.

11. Sap picks are preferable to any other whether for Europeans or Natives, therefore as many as possible of this description should be packed.

No. 1933, dated 7th October 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Inspector General of Ordnance.

By desire of the Commander-in-Chief recommends Major Hill's proposal that the sand bags for the Engineer Park may be made of stouter material than the common thin dungaree sometimes employed, particularly as much use will have to be made of sand bags in case of entrenching, in the absence of good materials for gabions and fascines.

No. 1529, dated 10th October 1856, from the Adjutant General, to the General Officers Commanding Púnah Division.

Requests him to despatch two non-commissioned officers from the Sappers and Miners to assist in arranging and packing the stores for the Engineer Park.

Letter from Major Hill, Commanding Engineer, Persian Field Force, dated Bushire, 4th March 1857, to the Chief of the Staff.

Requests that sanction may be obtained for despatch to Bushire of the following materials, to enable officers to cover in their tents :

Solki Rafters 20' long and upwards for Posts and Hip Rafters, &c. ...	3,500
Common Rafters ...	9,000
Coir string, lbs. ...	2,000
Nails, 6 inch ...	500
" 4 " ...	500
" 3 " ...	400
" 1½ " ...	300
Bar Iron (flat and round) "	500
Steel "	100
Charcoal (for general use) "	5,000

screw plates with tops (for general use) No. 6.

No. 790, dated 11th October 1856, from Major Hill, Commanding Sappers and Miners, to Principal Commissary of Ordnance, Bombay.

Requests that four store lascars may be attached to the Engineer Park, and that a fence of rope and posts sufficiently large to enclose a space 40 feet square may be packed with the Park.

No. 3170, dated 22nd October 1856, from the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

Informs him that the Governor in Council is pleased to sanction the entertainment of a bhistie and a bullock puckallie for the use of the Engineer Park, staff sergeants and artificers of the corps of Sappers and Miners.

No. 2293, dated 29th October 1856, from Quarter Master General, to Inspector General of Ordnance.

States that it appears to His Excellency that a supply of portable forges had better be prepared to send hereafter in case of movement.

No. 1453, dated 28th February 1857, from the Inspector General of Ordnance, to the Quarter Master General.

Intimates that there are no pontoons or pontoon equipage in the Grand Arsenal; nor it is believed in any of the minor arsenals, and that there are no means of supplying pontoon carts but constructing them in the gun carriage manufactory, and this would be a work of considerable time owing to the existing press of business in that department.

No. 1076, dated 16th September 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department.

Recommends that the Chief Engineer in Sind may be instructed to entertain half the number, or more if possible, of goundies and carpenters sanctioned for the force, from among the Katch artificers at Karáchi who are much hardier and more able bodied than any procurable in Bombay, and adds that during the cold weather at the siege of Múltan, Major Hill found that the Bombay artificers were almost useless.

No. 3559, dated 8th November 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department.

Requests sanction of Government to Major Hill's application for two of the principal men now employed in the preparation of the field hospitals under Major Tremeneheere, to be sent up in charge of the materials at salaries of Rs. 50 a month. Adds that it appears to the Commander-in-Chief of the greatest importance to the speedy erection of these buildings, that the persons required by Major Hill should be sent.

No. 73, dated 20th December 1856, from the Commanding Engineer, to the Assistant Quarter Master General, Persian Field Force.

Forwards plan of temporary barrack for the accommodation of a company of 100 Europeans and 4 sergeants, and states that the design is of a very temporary nature, but more durable buildings cannot be erected in time to shelter the men during the forthcoming hot season, and in support of this statement points out that the hospitals for the force ordered to be prepared at Bombay in September last have not yet arrived.

Requests that if the design be approved it may be sent to the Bombay Government with a request that the following building materials may at once be shipped for Bushire:

20,000 ordinary teak rafters 1st and 2nd sorts.  
7,000 straight salki rafters 20' in length and from 3½" to 4" in diameter at the small end, for posts, tie beams, &c.  
2,000 bundles of whole bamboos, of 25 bamboos per bundle.

Suggests that measures be taken to select sites for the barracks, and that large parties of Europeans be employed daily to build their own barracks in conjunction with the artificers of the Engineer Department.

Remarks that as regards the sepoys, it will probably be found the cheapest plan to give them hutting money and allow them to hut themselves.

*P. S.*—Adds that since writing the above he has ascertained that double hutting money would not cover the expense of the materials requisite for a sepoy hut, therefore the above suggestion could not be carried out without entailing loss on the sepoys.

#### Specification of Proposed Barrack Rooms.

The foundations, and the walls connecting the foundations of verandah to be built of stone and mud; lime being used if procurable.

The posts of main room and verandahs to be of soulkie rafters, nine feet apart from centre to centre.

The uprights for the main walls to be 13 feet in height above the ground. Those of the verandah to be 9' 6" in height above the ground.

The trusses to be of soulkie rafters. The pole plates, purlins, ridge-pole and post plates to be 1st sort rafters, date battens on the rafters covered over with a single layer of common date matting, then a layer of date leaves, and over this a second single layer of date matting.

The walls of the room to be made of wattle and dab, to be built down to within 3' of the flooring. Openings for the doors to be left, three on each side of the building, and also in the verandah walls.

The verandah walls to be also built of wattle and dab, built down to within four feet of the flooring; the remainder to be left open. These openings can be filled up in the cold weather, but in the hot weather they will let much air into the rooms. The floors to be filled up to a level with the top of the foundations or 1' 6" above the ground; and to consist of earth and stones well rammed.

C. J. HILL, Major,

*Commanding Engineer, Persian Field Force.*

BUSHIRE.

20th December 1855.

Memorandum dated 21st December 1856, containing items of approximate information for guidance of Major Hill, Commanding Engineer.

1. Forty thousand date mats of the length and breadth required could be procured if the people were friendly. They are chiefly made up in Dashti and Tangistán. Were it made known to the people of these tribes that date mats were in great requisition, and would be paid for to suppliers, I should imagine that 40,000 mats could be procured in 4 or 5 months from this date.

2. Date sticks to the number required could easily be procured in a space of 2 months, were notice sent forth by parties commissioned to buy, to Kutref, Bahrain, Bassorah, Ahram, Tangistán and the borders of Dashtí, that there was a demand for such articles.

Fresh date leaves could be obtained in greatest abundance from Bassorah Kutref and Bahrain. The requisite quantity could be collected, it is imagined, without any difficulty in 2 months' time.

3. Rafters of the length named can be obtained to any amount from Zanzibar, and the Súweil, but this would entail considerable delay. Small quantities are mostly procurable in Mascat, but nothing approaching to a sufficiency for the requirements of this force.

4. I do not think rafters 20 feet long by 4" in diameter at the small end can be obtained, save from Bombay and Cochin.



5. No timber procurable save in very small quantities from a few ports in the Gulf, considerably distant from each other, and this is imported there from India.

6. Nails of sorts, screws, and other articles noted in form must all be procured from Bombay.

7. From Mascat, Bahrain, Sinjat, Kowait and Bushire itself, perhaps in two or three months' time, from two hundred to three hundred very rough carpenters could be collected. It is doubtful however if they could be got to serve us without great trouble.

Mascat and Bahrain carpenters most numerous and best workmen.

Many masons to be had from Kazrán, and north of Kazrán to Shíráz, in these parts but few. Perhaps they would secretly flock in from the North, did they know their services were required.

Commencing at Borasján, and travelling downwards to Dashtí, Tangistán and Bushire, some four or five hundred donkeys could be probably collected for employment in three or four months.

500 or 600 Bhisties and Biggaries could be brought together from different places in 2 or 3 months.

8. It is requested to be borne in mind that the above information is merely approximative, much, very much too, must depend upon the temper of the people towards us.

(Sd.) W. DISBROWE,

*Assistant Political Agent, Persian Field Force.*

No. 9, dated 2nd January 1857, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department.

Requests Government may be informed that the building materials for huts and barracks now in course of preparation for the first Division of the Persian Force, exclusive of those for Hospitals, cannot be completed in less than 6 months' time, and will require about fifteen thousand tons of shipping to convey them to Bushire.

Letter dated Bombay, 23rd January 1857, from Brigadier Major C. F. North Engineers, to the Adjutant General.

State that he is employed in selecting and packing portion of an Engineer Park for the Force, and is desirous of having the whole of the stores packed for coach carriage; but is informed at the arsenal that this will involve great difficult and delay. Therefore enquires whether there is any objection, in order to save time, to the stores being packed in boxes that are too large and too heavy for camel carriage?

No. 2186, dated 13th July 1857, from Superintending Engineer in Sind, to the Military Department.

States that 100 labourers were despatched to Bushire and 85 of them

Biggarees. were sent back without intimation of any kind—but a letter was afterwards received from Major Hill on the subject, and with reference thereto remarks that it was not apparently understood that Major Hill laid particular stress on the laborers being natives of Sind. Considers that the men sent came up to a fair average.

Major Hill states in his letter that the men sent out were utterly useless people from Bombay and Hindústán, instead of Sindis.

Lieutenant Thomson, Acting Executive Engineer, Karáchi, who despatched the men, states that he was not aware that Major Hill required natives of Sind, and further he considers that the men despatched were well suited to the work.

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No. 2566, dated 30th April 1857, from Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

With reference to report by Major Hill, relative to the state of the framework of the field hospitals, forwarded from Bombay to Bushire, states that the Governor in Council can find no fault with the Engineer Department at Bombay, which appears to have carried out orders with zeal and efficiency, and further points out that the skilled artificers called for by Major Hill cannot be spared.

Adds that, although there are no doubt great difficulties in the construction of substantial cover for so large a force, the Engineers do not appear to have exhibited any marked energy or power of resource to aid themselves.

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Report by Chief Engineer of Public Works.

Points out that the materials for the hospitals were prepared with the greatest care, and that they have probably been mixed together after being unpacked, thus accounting for Major Hill's carpenters being unable again to put together what had been once fitted.

Considers that Major Hill is taking credit for exertions which he does not appear to have made, and throwing blame on those who have done their best to make up for his want of preparation.

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Report by Garrison Engineer.

Intimates the manner in which he carried out the preparation of the materials. The tenons and mortices of the posts and on the under side of the beams were not cut to the proper size lest from rough treatment en route the tenons might be broken off and the posts rendered useless. With this single exception everything possible was done.

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## APPENDIX K.

### ABSTRACT OF CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO HOSPITALS AND THE CARRIAGE OF THE SICK.

No. 2498, dated 29th September 1856, from Secretary, Medical Board, Bombay, to the Quarter Master General of the Army.

States that at this favorable season of the year a small space for the use of the sick in each vessel will be sufficient, but that on arrival in the Persian Gulf it would be advisable to have a Hospital Ship fitted up for the reception of European sick.

No. 1924, dated 6th October 1856, from the Quarter Master General of the Army, to the Secretary, Medical Board.

Regarding sick carriage for use on the shores of the Persian Gulf, states Surgeon Mackenzie considers that doolies and carts on springs will be the most useful carriage, but that in the interior mule litters or kajawas will be required, and the Board recommend a supply of wooden kajawas of Lieutenant-Colonel Manghan's pattern in lieu of the iron pattern invented by Major Shaw and previously recommended by them. Points out that a difference of opinion exists in regard to the value of sick carts on the shores of the Gulf. Surgeon McAlister, Residency Surgeon, Bushire, recommends a mule litter as quicker in movement and more comfortable to the wounded and sick, but as mules may not be procurable, and as only 50 doolies are at present provided, the Commander-in-Chief will cause some sick carts to be sent with the force.

States that a recent committee on kajawas remarked as follows:

The Committee proceed to examine the three kajawas submitted, and have to report as follows:

"That they are unanimously of opinion that the iron kajawas submitted for report by Captain Shaw, Assistant Commissary General, are greatly superior to the wooden ones that have been used in the field. They find that the chains give as much ease, security and comfort as can be hoped for from any mode of conveyance where a camel is employed.

"The Committee are of opinion that there is very little risk of the animal becoming sore-backed, as is so much the case with any pattern of wooden-kajawa they have yet seen.

"The iron kajawa is found to weigh 125lbs., which it would appear from official reports submitted by Captain Shaw is much lighter than some of the wooden ones.

"The Committee is further of opinion that the iron kajawa (assuming good metal and workmanship to be employed) is sufficiently strong to stand the rough usage of field service without material injury, and that it may therefore be viewed as indestructible by the wear and tear of even a long period."

Assistant Surgeon McAlister, remarking on the "Crimean mule litter" (which seems to be nearly the iron chair of Major Shaw's pattern), points out that experience has convinced the French and English armies that the mule



litter is quicker, easier attended, and more comfortable to the wounded and sick than ambulances or stretchers. It has also the following additional advantages:

1st.—A mule costs less than a horse.

2nd.—It is supported at less expense, is more durable, and will live on less and coarser food than a horse.

3rd.—It will carry two men and then not be overladen.

It will pass over streams and rivers, along tracts and narrow winding paths, &c., in all of which places ambulances would be more than useless, for they would only encumber the movement of an army.

States that the mule litter which he saw in the Crimea consisted in a light manageable jointed frame of iron, with a strong canvas stretcher, suspended from a neat pack saddle from each side of a mule and capable of being regulated by means of a screw in any way to suit the convenience of its occupant, who in addition gains additional comfort through avoiding the crowding and impure air inseparable from an ambulance.

Further, the mules can travel and do their work efficiently where ambulance carts could not stir. Two men are sufficient to assist a wounded man into the litter, and finally the mule litters can go with or follow an army into action.

Adds that the Commander-in-Chief considers that a pattern of the Crimean mule litter should be obtained, and Government will be moved to procure one from England, but in the meantime he apprehends that the Board will concur with him that the best plan to follow is to provide some doolies, sick carts, and iron kajawas, and of these it is proposed to send with the force the following supply *viz*:—Sick carts 10, Doolies 50, Kajawas, pairs 50.

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No. 2651, dated 14th October 1856, from Secretary, Medical Board, to the Quarter Master General of the Army.

States that in consideration of the opinions of the committee, mentioned in letter No. 1924, and of experiments made by the Medical Officer, of the 24th May, &c., they are of opinion that the invention of Major Shaw may be considered the best suited for probable requirements in Persia.

Remarks that they entertained fears regarding its usefulness, chiefly on account of its weight, having learned that of eight of those kajawas in the arsenal, the lightest weighed 139 lbs., the others varying from this to 159 lbs, as shown in the margin, but these specimens are seemingly of heavier construction than those now under preparation, the weight of which is specified to be only 104 lbs.

1 to 156 lbs.
2 to 152 "
3 to 159 "
4 to 139 "
5 to 156 "
6 to 150 "
7 to 152 "
8 to 146 "

States that on perusal of the description of the Crimean litter and on inspection of Major Shaw's kajawa, the two are considered almost identical, with the exception of the screw for lowering and elevating the litter, but this latter is considered a disadvantage as it is very liable to get out of order on service, and Major Shaw's kajawas are of two kinds, one for a sitting and the other for recumbent posture by which means all the advantages of the screw system are obtained. With regard to the kajawa invented by Colonel Manghan, the Board state that they did not intend to recommend its substitution for the iron one, but from their belief that it was lighter and of easier construction and from the experience of the Physician General (who approved of it from actual observation in the last Punjab Campaign), they deemed it advisable to recommend that 50 should

be prepared and sent for trial, and as they appeared to be easily made up, the material was recommended to be sent with the force and the kajawas constructed on the spot.

Recommends the despatch of some light wood for this purpose.

Adds that the Board concur in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief as to the number of carts, doolies and kajawas necessary to accompany the force, and which with local carriage and the material for the construction of Colonel Manghan's will be commensurate to any emergency, while if the iron kajawa is found as effective as it is believed to be, a supply might be forwarded before the troops engage in active operations in the interior.

From the Quarter Master General of the Army, to the Inspector General of Ordnance, No. 2024, dated 13th October 1856.

20 pairs of mule harness were ordered to be provided for ten sick carts.

From the Inspector-General of Ordnance, to the Military Department, No. 431, dated 17th January 1857.

Intimates that the Agent for gun carriages states that swingle bars and a driving seat can be attached to the sick carts to admit of a pair of horses being driven abreast, but that the cost will be very considerable. Recommends therefore that the carts be adapted for bullock draft. This was approved and bullock harness provided for the 10 sick carts.

From the Secretary, Medical Board, to the Quarter Master-General of the Army, No. 2734, dated 16th October 1856.

States that in the absence of any other arrangement to provide carriage for medicines, which will be required if the troops march into the highlands of Persia, the Board would recommend that each regiment and detachment should have embarked with it, the regulated number of medicine coolies.

From the Quarter Master General, to the Inspector General of Ordnance, No. 2124, dated 18th October 1856.

Informs him that Government have sanctioned the construction of a few sets of mule litters, and requests him to order their construction in lieu of such number of sanctioned camel kajawas as have not yet been completed.

From the Commissary General, to the Quarter Master General, No. 2418, dated 18th October 1856.

Reports that he has ordered two camel kajawahs of Colonel Manghan's pattern to be made up and despatched with the force to Persia with the necessary materials for preparing kajawahs in the Persian Gulf.

From the Superintending Surgeon, Persian Field Force, to the Quarter Master General, Persian Field Force, No. 6, dated 17th January 1857.

Recommends that one at least of the Hospitals sent from Bombay may be erected at Kháraj. Proposes to establish a field hospital equal to the accommodation of at least 300 men, near the Residency, but outside the walls, of Bushire.

Points out that Chágádak would be preferable to either Kháraj or Bushire in a sanitary point of view, but it is some thirteen miles distant and it might be difficult to convey materials as well as men to and from it, while it might be found inconvenient to afford it the necessary protection.

From Inspector-General of Ordnance, to the Quarter Master General, No. 656, dated 26th January 1857.

States that Dr. Vaughan who had considerable experience in the Crimea, recommended that all of the Field Hospital stretchers which are supplied for service in Persia should have the canvas well painted before despatch in order that it may be cleaned after use; but Colonel Willoughby suggested that the canvas be prepared with yellow ochre which makes it waterproof and washes better than paint, and this has accordingly been authorised.

From the Secretary, Medical Board, to the Quarter Master General, No. 369, dated 2nd February 1857.

Suggests that (owing to the imperfect knowledge of the kind of animal likely to be procured for sick carriage in Persia) any kajawas remaining to be made up should be adapted for mules, as it is easier to alter them for camels than *vice versa*.

The same number to be prepared for mule as for camel carriage.

From Secretary, Medical Board, to the Quarter Master General, No. 438, dated 7th February 1857.

Recommends that Dr. Vaughan's suggestion be acted on, and that the Commander-in-Chief be pleased to move Government to procure specimens of the mule chairs and saddle cacolets and reclining chairs and stretchers as well as mule panniers, although the Medical Storekeeper has, under Dr. Vaughan's directions, made up one set of the latter, and the medical board have sanctioned others to be furnished for their Department of the same pattern.



## Weekly State of the 2nd Division Eastern Frontier Force.

	Officers.	Lieutenant-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets and ensigns.	REGIMENTAL STAFF.						Native Officers.	Sergants and Havildars.	Drummers and Buglers, &c.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Guns.		
							Surgeon.	Assistant Surgeon.	Veterinary Surgeon.	Adjutants.	Quarter-masters.	Paymasters.						6-pounders field pieces.	12-pounder Howitzers.	Mortars.
Cavalry Brigade	14th K. L. Dragoons { Present Sick	...	...	1	3	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	5	1	70	89	...	...	...
	8th Irregular Horse { Present Sick	...	...	1	6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	9	30	4	226	284	...	...	...
Artillery Brigade.	3rd Troop H. B. Artillery { Present Sick	...	...	1	4	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	10	2	143	150	4	2	...
	1st Company 2nd Battalion. { Present Sick	...	...	1	3	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	6	2	100	130	4	2	...
1st Infantry Brigade.	Reserve and No. 1 { Present Mountain train B. { Sick	...	...	1	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	1	46	...	...	2	4
	2nd Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners. { Present Sick	...	...	...	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	3	2	98	...	...	...	...
2nd Infantry Brigade.	78th Highlanders. { Present Sick	...	1	8	12	1	1	1	...	1	1	1	...	46	25	758	...	...	...	...
	26th Regiment Native Infantry. { Present Sick	...	...	3	6	1	...	1	...	1	1	...	16	42	19	620	...	...	...	...
2nd Infantry Brigade.	64th Regiment. { Present Sick	...	...	2	5	1	1	1	...	1	1	1	...	22	8	468	...	...	...	...
	23rd Regiment Native Light Infantry. { Present Sick	...	1	4	8	1	...	1	...	1	1	...	12	43	19	500	...	...	...	...
2nd Infantry Brigade.	Light Battalion. { Present Sick	...	1	7	18	2	...	3	...	...	1	...	20	50	16	811	...	...	...	...
	Madras Sappers and Miners. { Present Sick	...	...	2	2	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	2	3	2	101	...	...	...	...
Total		...	5	31	74	7	2	11	1	...	5	2	63	271	100	4,355	677	8	6	4

Camp near Muhammerah, 3rd April 1857.

## Weekly Report of Sick in Hospital 2nd Division, Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

CORPS.		Captains.	Lieutenants.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Gunners.	Private.	Total.	CORPS.					Lieutenants.	Subadars.	Havildars.	Dattadars.	Nalks.	Fifers and Buglers.	Privates.	Sowars.	Total.	
Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	2	...	...	...	19	22
	...	...	3	1	1	...	22	27	23rd Regiment Native Light Infantry	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	1	26	...	54	
	...	...	1	...	...	...	33	35	26th Regiment Native Infantry	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	13	...	13	
	...	...	...	...	...	4	...	4	Light Battalion	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	2	...	...	23	...	27	
Horse Artillery	...	...	...	...	...	6	...	6	Bombay Sappers	...	...	1	...	...	1	...	...	...	6	...	8		
Foot	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	Madras Sappers	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	2	...	17	...	20		
Total	1	3	2	1	10	56	73	Total	...	3	1	6	1	...	...	1	8	1	85	19	124		

Muhammerah, 3rd March 1857.

The general state of health of the Division continues satisfactory. Intermittent fever, bowel complaints and rheumatism have been the prevailing diseases, attributable, no doubt, to a certain extent to the fatigue and exposure to which the men have been subjected, but hitherto they have nearly all been of a mild nature and readily amenable to treatment.

No. 1239, dated 21st April 1857, from the Medical Board, to the Adjutant General.

States that under date 10th instant, the Superintending Surgeon, 1st Division, writes "the health of the 2nd European Regiment Light Infantry and of the 4th Rifles continues steadily to improve and the health of the remainder of the troops is excellent."

No. 1375, dated Bombay, 7th May 1857; from the Medical Board, to the Adjutant General.

States that the Superintending Surgeon, 1st Division Persian Field Force, reports that with the exception of the 4th Rifles, the health of the troops in his division continues excellent.

The European troops are supplied with fresh meat, bread and vegetables.

The sick of the 2nd European Regiment were about to occupy one of the hospitals lately erected, and in a few days those for the other Europeans would be ready.

No. 138, dated 12th May 1857, from the Adjutant General, Bombay, to the General Officer Commanding Persian Expeditionary Force.

Calls for report of the cause of the great and unusual sickness which has prevailed in the 4th Regiment Native Infantry while on service.

From General Officer Commanding at Bushire, to the Adjutant General, Bombay, No. 258, dated Bushire, 8th June 1857.

In reply to the above, forwards Proceedings of Committee and records his own opinion that the 4th Native Infantry suffered chiefly from light clothing and from the excessive drilling to which the men were subjected before their arrival in Persia.

Proceedings of a Committee ordered to assemble by Brigadier General J. Jacob, C. B., in Field Force Orders of 3rd June 1857, to report on the cause of the sickness which has prevailed in the 4th Regiment Native Infantry during the time it has been on service; in accordance with instructions from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

President ... The Superintending Surgeon, Persian Field Force.  
Members { The Field Surgeon, Persian Field Force.  
              { The Staff Surgeon, Persian Field Force.

The Committee having assembled at the hospital of the 4th Regiment, Native Infantry, (Rifles) on 4th June 1857, and having examined the hospital records, and having made full enquiry into all circumstances bearing on the subject in question, and having availed themselves of the opinions and the information given by the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, as well as by the Adjutant, the Medical Officer recently in charge, and the Subadar Major beg to make the following report as the result of their enquiry:

1. It appears that the Regiment was stationed three years at Púnah, previous to marching for Bombay *en route* to Persia on 3rd November last. Although the Púnah Division of the Army is, with the sole exception of the Southern, the most healthy one for Native Troops, the average percentage of treated to strength being only 93·7; the hospital records of the Regiment show that the percentage of treated to strength was as high as:

107·70 in 1854-55 and 156·13 in 1855-56.

The records further show that in six of the twelve months of 1854-55, the monthly admissions were above a hundred, and that in the month of May they rose to 148, the diseases being chiefly intermittent fever.



3. In 1855-56 the Regiment was still less healthy, the admissions in eight months rising above a hundred, the highest number being 134 in December, the prevailing disease being still intermittent fever.

4. During the first eight months of 1856-57 the Regiment was becoming more healthy, the admissions in only one of these months having risen above a hundred.

5. It thus appears that during the greater portion of the time the regiment was stationed at Púnah, it could scarcely be considered in a healthy state, and that just as its health was beginning to improve, the regiment proceeded on service.

6. The regiment embarked from Bombay on 12th November, and landed in Hillilah Bay on 6th December. This long residence on board ship was to the greater proportion of the men,—to use the expression of the Commanding Officer, and Subadar Major—"a lengthened starvation"—the great majority of the men being Hindus and consequently non-cooking men as shown thus:

Hindus	...	...	...	...	659
Musulmans	...	...	...	...	66
Jews	...	...	...	...	14
Christians	...	...	...	...	13
Purwaris	...	...	...	...	164
Total...					916

7. This residence on board ship was followed by a continuous period of exposure, hard work, and fatigue, throughout the months of December, January, and February.

There were heavy working parties by day and out-lying pickets by night, and during a portion of this time, these pickets do not appear to have been provided with tents. The men consequently slept on the ground (which was often wet) without cover and they got only two nights and a half in bed during the week.

8. As it may be said that the whole force was subjected to the same state of matters, it may be well to bear in mind that during the greater part of these three months, there were only two other Regiments of Native Infantry at Bushire the 20th and the 2nd Balúch Battalion and to allude briefly to the different circumstances in which they were placed.

9. The 20th Regiment garrisoned to town, where the duties were much lighter. They had no daily working parties and no nightly outlying pickets. They were consequently much less exposed to fatigue and to the inclement weather.

10. It is true the 2nd Balúch Battalion had duties to perform equal to the 4th Rifles, and were subjected to the same amount of exposure and fatigue but being Mussulmans, and living on more substantial food their constitutions were better able to bear up against the exposure and fatigue.

Being Mussulmans too, they lived on better food while on board ship.

11. The hospital records show that the admissions during the last six months were as follows:

119	...	December.	134	...	March.
182	...	January.	139	...	April.
326	...	February.	160	...	May.

It will thus be seen that there was a rapid and great increase in the number of sick during the first three months, and that by far the largest number

was in February the month during which the regiment was subjected to great fatigue and exposure to inclement weather during the expedition to Burasjan.

With the mild weather of March and April there was a considerable diminution in the amount of sickness. During last month however there was a slight increase again. This might be partly owing to the change of season.

12. The most prevalent diseases during these six months were fever, bowel-complaints, and diseases of the chest, and in the following relative numbers:

Fevers	...	...	...	...	...	448
Bowel complaints	...	...	...	...	...	12
Diseases of chest	...	...	...	...	...	122

The fevers were chiefly intermittent being of the same kind which prevailed in the regiment at Púnah.

13. There was nothing particular with reference to the ages of the sick, their average age with all diseases during the last six months being 29.38.

14. On viewing all the circumstances bearing on the question, the committee are of opinion that the causes of the sickness are to be traced—

1st, to the somewhat sickly state of the regiment while at Púnah;

2ndly, to the predisposition to disease in consequence of the inefficient strength of the men, resulting from this state and from want of sufficient food while on boardship; and

3rdly, to heavy work, and exposure to inclement weather before the strength of the men had been recovered.

15. The Committee, however, are of opinion that a gradual improvement in the health of the regiment is taking place. The number in hospital is considerable less than it was some weeks ago; and both the Adjutant and Subadar Major stated that the health of the men in the lines was decidedly improving.

*Number of sick on 29th May 1857.*

4th troop horse artillery	...	...	...	16
1st Company 1st battalion artillery	...	...	...	9
4th " " " "	...	...	...	10
3rd " " 2nd " "	...	...	...	2
4th " " 3rd " "	...	...	...	18
4th " " 4th " "	...	...	...	10
3rd Light Cavalry	...	...	...	41
Punah Horse	...	...	...	21
Sind Horse	...	...	...	76
Sappers and Miners	...	...	...	7
4th Native Infantry	...	...	...	98
20th " "	...	...	...	81
23rd " "	...	...	...	69
26th " "	...	...	...	26
2nd Baluch Battalion	...	...	...	67

From the Medical Board, to the Adjutant General, No. 1608 of 29th May 1857.

States that under date 14th instant the Superintending Surgeon, 1st Division, reports that the 2nd European regiment has embarked for Karáchi in about the usual state of health; and adds: "The Europeans now remaining here are the artillery, consisting of the 4th Troop Horse Artillery, the 1st and 4th companies 1st Battalion, and the 3rd Company 2nd Battalion, about 400 in number. They are at present in tolerably good health, and are accommodated in four of the Hospitals to be used as Barracks. Unless an order should be

sent from India for their return to Bombay, I fear they will be detained during the hot season.

The native troops are in good health with the exception of the 4th Rifles and 20th Native Infantry, the former of which has 100 and the latter 65 in Hospital.

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From the Medical Board, to the Adjutant General, No. 1619, dated 5th June 1857.

Superintending Surgeon reports under date 22nd May "that the health of the European Artillery continues tolerably good; and of the Native Cavalry excellent," but that the Native Infantry Regiments particularly the 4th and 20th are not in a satisfactory state of health, the former having 100 and the latter 72 men in hospital chiefly from bowel complaints, intermittent fever, and scurvy

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From the Superintending Surgeon, Persian Field Force, to the Medical Board, No. 118, dated 5th June 1857.

Intimates that the health of the European and Native Artillery, of the Native Cavalry, and of the 26th Regiment Native Infantry is very satisfactory, and that the health of the 23rd Regiment is improving.

The 4th and 20th Native Infantry continue in a sickly state, the prevailing diseases being fever, bowel complaints and scurvy.

Number of sick as follows :—

1st Company	1st Battalion Artillery	...	...	...	7
4th "	1st "	...	...	...	7
4th "	4th "	...	...	...	12
3rd Light Cavalry	...	...	...	...	47
Punah Horse	...	...	...	...	19
Sind Horse	...	...	...	...	75
Sappers and Miners	...	...	...	...	9
4th Regiment Native Infantry	...	...	...	...	97
20th	"	...	...	...	99
23rd	"	...	...	...	73
26th	"	...	...	...	22
2nd Baluch Battalion	...	...	...	...	60

---

From the Superintending Surgeon, Persian Field Force, to the Medical Board, No. 126, dated 31st June 1857.

States that the health of the European and Native Artillery continues very satisfactory, as well as of the 3rd Light Cavalry, the Punah Horse and the 26th Regiment Native Infantry. The 4th and 20th Regiments continue somewhat sickly the number of scurvy cases in the former being 29 and in the latter 51. There are also 8 cases in the 2nd Baluch Battalion, 2 in the 23rd Native Infantry and 2 in the 3rd Cavalry.

The majority of the cases, however, are slight, and in some there is decided amendment.

23rd Regiment and the Sind Horse not quite so healthy as could be desired, but there is no scurvy in the latter.

Numbers of sick are as follows :

1st Company	1st Battalion Artillery	...	...	...	11
4th "	1st "	...	...	...	7
4th "	4th "	...	...	...	11
3rd Regiment Light Cavalry	...	...	...	...	53
Punah Irregular Horse	...	...	...	...	17



1st Regiment Sind Irregular Horse	...	...	...	70
Sappers and Miners	...	...	...	9
4th Regiment Native Infantry (Rifles)	...	...	...	96
20th Regiment Native Infantry	...	...	...	93
23rd     ,,     Native Light Infantry	...	...	...	66
26th     ,,     Native Infantry	...	...	...	21
2nd Baluch Battalion	...	...	...	56

Weather becoming hotter. Thermometer at 100° in the hospitals; nights becoming close and oppressive.

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No. 2075, dated 22nd July 1857, from the Medical Board, to the Adjutant General.

Superintending Surgeon under date 27th ultimo reports very favorably both of Europeans and Natives and particularly of the improved health of the 4th Rifles and 20th Regiment Native Infantry and that they are all provided with ample hospital accommodation.

## APPENDIX L.

### ABSTRACT OF CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO THE SUPPLY OF NECESSARIES AND PROVISIONS TO THE FORCE.

From the Accountant General, to the Military Department, No. 3937, dated 25th August 1856.

Requests that the allowances to be granted to the native troops, may be notified without delay, and that they may be fixed at the same rates as those granted for the campaign in Afghanistan, the native troops having to face a long sea voyage, and subsequently a severe winter season.

Letter from the Military Auditor General, to the Adjutant General, dated 31st August 1856.

States that in addition to the ordinary pay and full batta of the several grades of the army, the native troops serving in Afghanistan in 1839, received money rations only.

For instance, a 4th class private received—

Pay	...	...	...	...	...	7	0	0
Batta	...	...	...	...	...	1	8	0
Money ration	...	...	...	...	...	3	8	0
						12 0 0		

And when rations were issued to them from the public stores, the value was deducted from the money ration and credited to Government.

If the cost exceeded the money ration, the expense was borne by the State. This was the only extra allowance issued to the native soldiery. Personal appointments were issued gratis, and native troops now proceeding on Foreign Service, would be entitled to the same.

From the Military Auditor General, to the Adjutant General, No. 3, dated 2nd September 1856.

Points out that when rations are issued in kind from the Commissariat Stores to the native soldier on Foreign Service, the money ration is fixed at the rates laid down in page 70, Jameson's Code, and there can consequently be no balance left to the soldier. In cases where provisions are purchased from the Bazar, the actual cost of the several articles composing the ration is determined by a monthly committee, and the amount of the money ration fixed accordingly, so that in any case, the soldier receives his ration gratis, and is fed at the expense of the State.

In cases where any of the articles of consumption are not or cannot be issued by the Commissariat, he receives compensation for short issues at the fixed rates.

From Military Department, to the Quarter Master General, No. 2474, dated 2nd September 1856.

Forwards extracts of letter from the Commissary-General, and states that the Governor-in-Council has intimated his approval of the propositions

contained in the 3rd paragraph, and has authorised preparations on a corresponding scale; on the subject of the 7th, 8th, 10th and 11th paragraphs he requests the communication of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's opinion.

Remarks that the field bakery mentioned in the 12th paragraph is a matter of great importance, and states that the Commissary-General has been authorised to commence it at once. States that the supply of water bags is of importance, and it is understood that they are under preparation in the arsenal.

Adds that the suggestion contained in the last paragraph will be brought under the attention of the Commander-in-Chief, Indian Navy.

Extracts from a letter from the Commissary General, No. 1737, dated 29th August 1856.

3. In communication with the Indian Naval authorities, every care shall be taken to have the troops, followers, horses and cattle fully rationed to Bushire; and although it is understood that provisions of all kinds are readily procurable in the Persian Gulf, yet, to guard against all contingencies, I propose sending on the troopships a supply of one month's shore rations for all arms, and to follow up supply with further consignments of stock at the earliest possible period.

7. A bazar is a simple and economical means of supplying an army with many wants, and if judiciously worked and superintended may become an important source for obtaining supplies of all kinds. I would therefore submit, for the consideration of Government, the expediency of appointing, at an early date, an officer in every way qualified by his knowledge of the Persian language, to the situation of Superintendent of Bazars to the force.

8. In the event of extended operations being required, which would involve the march of our troops into the interior of Persia, I would, in such a contingency, respectfully submit whether it would not be desirable to withdraw the management and control of the baggage animals with the force from the officers of the Commissariat and form them into a land transport corps, with officers to be specially appointed for this purpose. I make this observation from what has come under my own notice when employed on service in Afghánistán.

10. On landing, the army should have some available means of transport for moving the tentage, stores, provisions, &c., from the landing place to the encampment. I would therefore recommend that 200 or 300 draught bullock with a sufficient number of carts be embarked with the troops.

The cattle so required may be withdrawn from the several divisions of the army, and replaced either by purchase or hire.

11. Although I observe that it is the wish of Government to dispense with the dooly bearers, who have hitherto accompanied our armies, yet I would respectfully beg to observe from my past experience on foreign service, that I consider a small levy, say from 200 to 300 men, would be found most valuable on landing. From the establishment now kept up in Sind, such a levy would with ease be obtained, and of men who are daily employed on all kinds of outdoor work. Major Salmon could either replace them on the spot or they could be sent from hence on his requisition.

12. I have also to recommend that a field bakery for the supply of fresh bread to the European troops be at once formed at the Presidency and sent



from hence with the force. I have every reason to believe that such a measure can be carried into effect at no great expense to the State.

13. From the difficulty of obtaining good drinking water at Bushire I would venture to propose, for the consideration of Government, the expediency of making every regiment proceeding on service take their full complement of bhisties and bullocks, and further that an ample supply of camel and bullock pucksals and chaguls be purchased by the Commissariat and sent to the Gulf.

14. As many sea transports will be required in the Persian Gulf for the service of the Commissariat, it appears to me to be very desirable that clear and distinct rules should be established for ensuring that the vessels so employed are applied with method and skill; and perhaps if all such vessels are placed under the orders of the Naval authorities, much confusion and annoyance will be avoided.

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From the Adjutant General, to the Military Department, No. 4069, dated 4th September 1856.

Forwards copy of Military Auditor General's letter of 31st August, and requests that the regulations quoted may be especially made applicable in every particular to the Balúch Battalion, and that the Púnah Irregular Horse be especially allowed, the benefits of the regulations relative to personal equipment and warm clothing (General Order 955 of 12th December 1855).

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From the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General, No. 2801, dated 24th September 1856.

States that the Púnah Horse have been assimilated to the Bengal Irregular Cavalry, and will therefore draw the allowances laid down in the regulations of the Bengal Presidency.

In addition, free passage will be given to men and horses, but when rationed by the Commissariat, the rations must be paid for according to their actual cost, but limited in the case of the man's ration to Rs. 3-8 per mensem, and in that of the horse to such amount as the Commander-in-Chief shall deem just and proper.

Personal equipments and warm clothing are to be provided for the men and followers, and tents and doolies furnished in the same proportion as authorised for regular cavalry.

The Commanding Officer to make up the chaguls, and submit a contingent bill through the usual channel.

The Local Infantry (Balúch Battalion) should be treated and considered precisely as the men of the Line Regiments.

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Report by the Auditor General, No. 3, dated 6th September 1856.

The Púnah Horse were ordered to be assimilated in point of establishment and pay with the Bengal Irregular Cavalry.

The Bengal regulations are specific that the extra allowance of one-third of their pay to Irregular Cavalry proceeding on Foreign Service, is inclusive of all additional charge on their account. I quote from the revised Code now under preparation.

"When under circumstances not entitling to the extra allowance for 'Foreign Service' corps, or detachments of Irregular Cavalry may be actually employed on active field service against an enemy, they will, in lieu of all

extra allowance, be passed compensation to the extent of excess of the actual price of grain over the scarcity price of 25 seers, the rupee reckoned on the daily consumption of 5 seers per horse. The amount is to be drawn in a contingent bill duly attested, and supported by certificates from the officer commanding the division or detachment specifying the actual price of grain during the time charged in the bill, and that the men for the same period, were employed on actual service against the enemy."

The extra allowance above\* mentioned was originally granted, it appears

*Article 23, page 534, Bengal Code 1845.*

\* The Governor General in Council is pleased on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, to direct that from the date of the 2nd and 3rd Regiments of Local Cavalry crossing the Megna or Burram-pooter (*sic*) River, or passing the station of Goalpara for service on the Eastern Frontier (a) the following extra allowances shall be made for them in abstract under the head of extra charges, *viz.* :

Ranks.	Pay.	Ranks.	Pay.
Ressaldar ... ..	50	Sowar ... ..	7
Ressaldar ... ..	27	Woordie Major...	35
Naib Ressaldar ... ..	17	Nakeeb ... ..	7
Jemadar ... ..	15	Vakeel ... ..	7
Kote Duffadar ... ..	12	English writer ...	10
Duffadar ... ..	10	Persian „ ...	10
Nishanchee ... ..	10	Native doctor ...	7
Nagarchee, &c. ... ..	9	Extra „ ...	7

The Púnah Horse in these ranks receive Rs. 6 more than in Bengal consequently their 3rd pay is Rs. 7.

and generally to the establishments as fixed by regulation, an advance of Rs. 1-3 under the same head and denomination. These allowances to continue while they are employed on the Eastern Frontier during the present war.

Their horses will necessarily be transported at the public charge and

In reply to Secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Wood's letter No. 3340 of 26th instant, I have the honour to state that Rs. 15 per mensem each horse would, I conceive, be a suitable deduction from the men of the auxiliary horse for the grain and forage that may be issued to their horses whilst on the passage hence to the northward.

rationed during the voyage at the expense of the men (as in the case of the same horse when ordered to Afghanistan, and the deduction was at the rate of Rs. 15 per mensem for grain and forage) including the officers horses, for the rations of which the owners must likewise pay.

If the men of the Púnah Horse are rationed on board ship, or on shore by the Commissariat, they should pay the same rate for the same ration as the men of the line.

to Irregular Cavalry employed on the Eastern Frontier of Bengal and beyond sea.

The Irregular Cavalry are clothed and accoutred at their own expense, the grant to them of personal equipment as recommended by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will be an infraction of the rule, and unprecedented as far as I am aware.

If the Púnah Horse is to be foraged after landing by the Commissariat until the men can provide forage for themselves, I am of opinion that the amount should be paid for by the men.

From the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department, No. 964, dated 5th September 1856.

In reply to 2474, states that the Commander-in-Chief's views on the subject of the bazar will be communicated by the Adjutant-General.

*Blankets.*

Europe blankets 6½' by 5' were not procurable in sufficient numbers in markets of Calcutta or Bombay.

*Boots.*

European boots ran short.

Six thousand pairs of boots of good material tendered to be made up in Calcutta at Rs. 6 per pair.

No. 1771 of 25th September 1856, from the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department.

With regard to a pattern tin canteen submitted by the Commissary General, observes that it has the following defects:

1. Noise in marching.
2. Glittering of the bright tin vessel.
3. Corrosion of the metal and foul condition, caused by the action of spirits used by European soldiers.

Adds that soda-water bottles were used in the Punjáb campaigns and answered admirably, and recommends their adoption.

States that the Officer Commanding 64th Regiment has made some up at a cost of 4 annas each, and the Commander-in-Chief recommends his being allowed to complete his regiment with them, and that about 1,500 more may be prepared for the 2nd European Light Infantry, Foot Artillery, &c.; the tin canteens to be cased with leather or canvas and served out to the native troops.

From the Quarter Master General, to the Inspector General of Ordnance, No. 2016, dated 13th October 1856.

Requests him to cause a sufficient number of wooden canteens to be prepared for the native infantry, sappers, and gun lascars, proceeding from the Dekkan and Southern Mahratta country; those for the 20th Native Infantry to be put on board the transports, and those for the gun lascars, the 4th Rifles and sappers to be served out on their arrival in Bombay.

Soda-water bottles covered with leather were in request, as superior to those of wood or tin canteens, which were also issued covered with leather. Chaguls were issued to Cavalry and Artillery.

Extract from a letter from the Officer Commanding 4th Regiment, Native Infantry Rifle Corps, to the Adjutant General, No. 60, dated 3rd September 1856.

If an addition of the following articles to the warm clothing issued gratis by Government to the troops proceeding on foreign service were made on the present occasion, it would conduce considerably to the comfort and health of the men, namely, two pairs of coarse woollen socks, two pairs of woollen



mittens, a woollen neck comforter, and a coarse woollen night cap, such as the boatmen wear in Bombay.

It would be further considered a great boon by the troops if the Government were to supply strong canvas bags for their kits, to be considered Government property, and to be borne on the strength of the returns as such. The regiment is in possession of bags of the regulation dimensions, but they are of different kinds of cheap cloth and not likely to last long, and canvas bags are almost too expensive to be made an article of stoppage from their pay.

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Endorsed by Quarter Master General,—No. 992 of 8th September 1856.

Forwards extract from letter by Officer Commanding Sappers and Miners.

"New strong painted canvas bags to be supplied to the men going on service at the Government expense, those obtained by the men not being sufficiently strong for protracted service."

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From the Quarter Master General, to the Inspector General of Ordnance, No. 962, dated 4th September 1856.

By direction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, requests him to have a few of the havresacks sanctioned for the force painted, so as to keep their contents dry in wet weather, and if it be found to answer, requests him to have the whole of them painted.

---

From the Quarter Master General, to the Commissary General, No. 959, dated 4th September 1856.

States that Government have, at the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation, sanctioned the issue of havresacks and canteens to all troops, European and native, for the expedition.

Remarks that the Commander-in-Chief does not consider hammocks or oil skin capes necessary on the voyage to the Persian Gulf, and one canvas frock per man will suffice. His Excellency is further of opinion that a supply of great coats and blankets, and flannel banians and socks should be provided by the Commissariat. Adds that the usual bedding of the men will suffice for the voyage.

---

From the Quarter Master General of the Army, to the Inspector General of Ordnance, No. 990, dated 8th September 1856.

States that His Excellency does not consider corn sacks necessary for the mounted corps proceeding to Persia. As the orders now stand there are—

230	Horse Artillery	...	...	...	} Horses.
250	{ Foot "	...	...	...	
	{ Horse Batteries	...	...	...	
300	Punah Horse	...	...	...	

and should a necessity arise in the course of service for the troops to carry one or two days' grain, this may, if necessary, be carried in sand bags, or sacks made up on the spot.

Adds that the Commander-in-Chief considers that the building artificers should be attached to the Engineer corps with the force.

From the Commissary General, to the Quarter Master General, No. 1824, dated 8th September 1856.

Reports having ordered the undermentioned articles to be prepared as stock for the troops:

Canvas frocks	...	...	1,304	To be issued to the men previous to embarkation.
Great coats	...	...	700	
Socks	...	...	8,000	pairs.
Woollen Guernsey frocks	...	...	7,617	

As the troops will take their own great coats, the above number is thought sufficient.

States that the Guernsey frocks are intended for issue instead of the flannel, banians usually supplied, and though more expensive they are much more serviceable.

Adds that only 200 blankets are procurable; these will be forwarded and a further supply will follow.

From the Commissary General, to the Quarter Master General, No. 1884, dated 13th September 1856.

In reply to 1003, states that canvas frocks will be issued to the European troops on embarkation, according to the scale laid down in No. 959 and that the great coats, socks, and Guernsey frocks, will be sent as stock for issue to the troops in Persia in addition to what they are entitled to gratuitously on embarkation. Reports that he has succeeded in obtaining 1,400 Europe blankets  $6\frac{1}{2} \times 5$ , and that he will address Government relative to a further supply being procured from the Cape of Good Hope.

With regard to Europe boots, states that he has only succeeded in obtaining 80 pairs, and that he has written to the army accoutrement contractor, Mr. Tanner, to ascertain on what terms a supply could be got out from England.

Remarks that if Europe boots cannot be obtained, country ones will have to be made up: this is being done in the case of the shoes for the native troops.

Adds that the only description of blankets procurable are those called *cumbles*, and that if these are found unsuitable for Persia, rugs purchased in Persia should be issued to the troops.

Encloses a list of articles of personal equipment for which corps should indent on the Commissariat Department:

*Personal Equipment.*

Europeans.			
Canvas frocks	...	...	} To be issued to the soldiers on embarkation.
Tin pots	...	...	
Great coats	...	...	
Blankets, Europe	...	...	} For issue in Persia.
Guernsey frocks	...	...	
Boots	...	...	
Socks	...	...	
	...	...	
Natives.			
Flannel banians	...	...	} To be issued to the men on embarkation.
" drawers	...	...	
Shoes	...	...	
Country blankets	...	...	} For issue in Persia.
Great coats	...	...	
Socks	...	...	
Guernsey frocks	...	...	

From the Commissary General, to the Military Department, No. 1917, dated 15th September 1856.

Reports that the substitution of numdas for *cumblies* or country blankets would be unadvisable, as they are very heavy and bulky, and would add much to the weight of the baggage of the army.

States that a muster quilt (*ruzaee*) made of country blanket has been prepared, dimensions 6' 8" x 4' and weighing 5½ lbs., and recommends its submission to the Quarter Master General in order to ascertain if it would be a suitable substitute for *cumblies* for the native troops.

From the Quarter Master General, to the Commissary General, No. 1066, dated 15th September 1856.

States that His Excellency does not consider country boots in any way fitted for issue to the troops owing to their inability to withstand rain, &c.

From the Commissary-General, to the Quarter Master General, No. 1960, dated 17th September 1856.

States that the articles noted in the margin are intended for gratuitous issue to the troops, while Guernsey frocks, boots and socks are to be paid for at reduced rates. Intimates that Europe leather for boots is not procurable in the markets, and that the Officers Commanding 14th Light Dragoons, 78th Highlanders and 3rd Bombay Europeans state that they have no stock of boots in the regimental stores; and forwards a letter from Messrs. Tanner, Army contractors, in which they offer to make up boots of country material at Rs. 4-8 each, at the rate of four hundred monthly.

Europeans.  
Tin pots.  
Canvas frocks.  
Native Troops.  
Flannel banians,  
" drawers.  
Shoes.  
Country blankets.  
Great coats and blankets  
to Europeans, and great  
coats to natives.

Extract from a letter from the Quarter Master General, to the Commissary General.

Doolies and dooly bearers and medicine coolies are not to be shipped with the troops. Puckaulies are to be embarked with their bullocks.—See Appendix A, page

In regard to warm clothing and personal equipment, I am directed to beg that indents may at once be sent in to the Deputy Commissary General at the Presidency, these articles will be allowed as follows, and the Commissariat Officer should be requested to have them shipped on the transports in Bombay:

*Europeans*.—Each man, 1 tin pot, 1 canvas frock, 1 havresack, 1 canteen.

*Natives*.—Each man, 2 flannel banians, 2 pairs flannel drawers, 1 pair shoes, 1 country blanket, 1 canteen, 1 havresack.

*Public Followers*.—Each man, 2 looie or country flannel banians, 1 cumblie.

From the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General, No. 2859 of 27th September 1856.

States that the issue of two blankets to each European soldier is unnecessary, as each soldier carries his regimental blanket with him, and the commissariat will have a stock of 1,500 or 2,000 blankets in store. Moreover, the required number could not be procured in time. Adds that if the force marches into the interior in winter, warm clothing will be sent out from England, and the resources of the country will be applied by the Commanding Officer upon the spot.



From the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department, No. 1699 of 22nd September 1856.

With regard to the *ruzace* or quilt proposed as a substitute for *cumbles* by the Commissary General, observes that, in the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, the *ruzace*, although a very good covering in cold dry weather appears unsuitable for a Persian winter, as, if once wetted, it would be very heavy, and could hardly be dried again, save under great heat.

States that the Commander in-Chief considers that two of the common black Dekkan *cumbles* well quilted together without any cotton would be the best covering that could be furnished.

From the Officer Commanding 1st Bombay Fusiliers, to the Commissary General, No. 107, dated 22nd September 1856.

States that there are no ammunition boots in stores, but that the master-shoemaker is prepared to turn out boots made of Europe materials at Rs. 3 per pair, and engages to furnish 300 per month made up by Europeans.

From Quarter Master General, to Commissary-General, No. 1816, dated 27th September 1856.

Inform him that the Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that the above offer should be accepted, as it is highly desirable to send as large a proportion of Europe boots as can be obtained.

From the Quarter Master General, to the Commissary General, No. 1700, dated 22nd September 1856.

In reply to 1960, states that the specimen boots of country leather made by Messrs. Tanner appear to be superior to the ordinary kind, but as the Commander-in-Chief doubts the leather standing marching in wet weather, he recommends only a partial supply being sent until a good supply can be procured from Europe. Remarks that these boots should be made as high as possible in the quarters, so as not to admit water. Adds that the 64th Regiment is very well supplied with boots and shoes.

From the Quarter Master General, to the Commissary General, No. 1744, dated 23rd September 1856.

Intimates that although the Commander-in-Chief does not require hammocks and bedding to be issued for use on boardship, he is of opinion that one extra blanket is necessary.

Karachi	{ 4th Company 1st Battalion Artillery.
	{ 2nd European Light Infantry. Baluch Battalion.
Vingorla	{ Her Majesty's 64th Regiment.
Porebunder.	{ 20th N. Infantry. 2nd squadron 3rd Light Cavalry.

The Commander-in-Chief further recommends that the warm clothing and personal equipments of troops embarking from Vingorla, Karachi, and Porebunder shall be made up in bales by the Commissariat Department and handed over to the Commissariat Officers at the ports of embarkation.

Statement of sick in the Hospital of the 1st Division, Persian Field Force, on Friday, 13th February 1857.

[illegible]

CAMP BUSHIRE,  
The 13th February 1857.

(Sd.) M. STOVELL, *Superintending Surgeon,*  
*1st Division Persian Field Force.*

The 4th Regiment (Rifles) continue very sickly, and the number of sick in the 3rd Cavalry is much above the average, but the health of the remainder of the troops may be considered satisfactory.

Weekly Report of the number of sick in the 2nd Division Persian Expeditionary Field Force, Camp near Bushire, 13th February 1857.

Regiment.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Corporals.	Privates.	Total.	Regiment.	Subadars.	Jumadars.	Harildars.	Naiks.	Drummers.	Privates.	Total.
Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders.	1	2	3	53	62	26th Native Infantry	3	1	6	6	1	47	64

Since the return of Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders, from the expedition to Boraojan numbers of cases have been admitted with rheumatism and sore feet, but there is no particular disease prevailing and the general state of health of the Regiment is satisfactory.

Of the 26th Native Infantry the number of sick previous to the expedition to Borasjan was 12, it is now 64; but the diseases are generally slight, being cases of rheumatism, intermittent fever, colds, and sore feet which are likely soon to get well. Since the action on the 8th instant, there have been two casualties from gun shot wounds in the 26th Regiment.

(Sd.) J. MACKENZIE,

*Superintending Surgeon, 2nd Division.*

From the Quarter Master General, to the Secretary, Medical Board, No. 1213, dated 13th February 1857.

States that the Agent for gun carriages reports that a kajawah in any way suited for a mule could not be converted into one for a camel as the latter must have a very high centre part, connecting and in one piece with the two chairs, and this centre portion has no existence on a mule kajawah.

Extract No. 36, dated Bushire, 16th February 1857, from the Superintending Surgeon, 1st Division, to the Deputy Adjutant General, Persian Field Force.

Reports as follows on the state of health of the 2nd European Light Infantry.

The general appearance of the men was considerably more healthy than could have been expected after suffering so much from fever in Sind. I ascertained that out of the entire strength of the Regiment consisting of 858 fighting men, 395 had never been admitted into hospital since the arrival of the Regiment in Persia, and that of the remaining 463 men, a large proportion, about two-thirds, had only been admitted once.

I was assisted in the inspection by the Surgeon of the Regiment, Dr. Wright, who stated that the health of the men had very considerably improved since their arrival at Bushire, and that it was still improving.

From the facts now stated the health of the Regiment may be pronounced very satisfactory.



From the Chief of the Staff, to the Deputy Commissary General, Expeditionary Field Force, No. 14, dated Camp near Bushire, 2nd March 1857.

Is directed by the Lieutenant-General Commanding to state that the ambulances have proved so useless, owing to their weight and unwieldy construction, the Lieutenant-General considers it would be useless sending any more from Bombay.

Remarks that from the report of those who have used them, it was deemed unadvisable to take them on the late expedition to Borasjân and Sir J. Outram is of opinion that they are quite unsuited to the country, for the purposes for which they were intended.

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From the Deputy Commissary General, Persian Field Force, to the Commissary General, Bombay, No. 72, dated 2nd March 1857.

Forwards copy of letter from Chief of the Staff, from which it will be seen that the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Force does not consider that the ambulances adverted to can be made available in Persia.

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Above letter from Chief of Staff was in reply to one from the Deputy Commissary General in which he pointed out that if the ambulances were merely required on the line of march bullocks would be suitable, but if required to move quickly, horses would be necessary.

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From the Secretary, Medical Board, to the Adjutant General No. 819 of 12th March 1857.

Small-pox having appeared amongst the troops at Bushire recommends the immediate despatch of a few recently vaccinated children (with their mother) to introduce vaccination and arrest the epidemic.

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From the Adjutant General to the Medical Board, No. 1958 of 14th March 1857.

Conveys the Commander-in-Chief's sanction to the above proposal.

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From the Medical Board, to the Adjutant General, No. 825, dated 12th March 1857.

States that Supernumerary Surgeon Stovell, 1st Division, reports on 26th February 1857 that, with the solitary exception of the 4th Rifles, the health of the troops in my Division is most satisfactory. The two companies of European Artillery have this day only seven men in hospital. The Company of Golundauze only five.

Her Majesty's 64th only twenty-six, and even the 2nd European Light Infantry which was so sickly have only sixty-one. The 3rd Light Cavalry which had sixty in hospital after the recent expedition to Borasjân have this day only thirty-eight. The 20th Regiment Native Infantry thirty-four and the 2nd Balûch Battalion sixty-one. The Pûnah Horse and detail of Sind Irregulars only eight. The 4th rifles, however, continue very sickly. Their number in Hospital this day is one hundred and ninety-nine. Yesterday it was two hundred and seven. Fever in a mild form and diarrhoea are their chief complaints.

As the severity of the cold season, however, is now, I presume drawing to a close, it may reasonably be expected that the health of the Regiment will improve with the approach of milder weather.

The proportionate sickness to strength for the week was only 841 or omitting the Rifles 678.

Table showing the proportionate sickness of European and Native Troops, Persian Field Force, for four weeks, during the month of February 1887.

	Weeks ending February.	4	
		22nd.	
		Average abstract.	
Bushire.	European.	{ 3rd Troop Horse Brigade ...	4.5
		{ 1st Company 1st Battalion Artillery ...	5.6
		{ 4th ditto ...	4.3
		{ Her Majesty's 64th Regiment ...	3.0
		{ 2nd European Regiment Light Infantry ...	7.1
	Natives.	{ 3rd Regiment Light Cavalry ...	10.7
		{ Pūnah Irregular Horse ...	4.6
		{ 2nd Balūch Battalion ...	5.9
		{ 4th Regiment Rifles ...	16.8
		{ 20th Regiment Native Infantry ...	5.9
		{ Sappers and Miners ...	7.2
	Average ...	6.9	

Report on the state of the Military Hospitals in the 1st Division of the Persian Field Force.

*Hospitals of the Brigade of Artillery.*

The Brigade of Artillery consists at present of the 4th Troop Horse Artillery, the 1st and 4th Companies of the 1st Battalion, the 3rd Company 2nd Battalion, and 4th Company 4th Battalion. The troop as well as each Company has a separate Hospital tent, or tents of its own, but as the whole Brigade is in charge of one medical officer, and as the general arrangements are uniform throughout, it will, I think be desirable to report on the several hospitals of the Brigade as a whole, rather than on each separately for in the latter case there would necessarily be much tedious repetition

General observations.

2. The hospitals consist of as many double-pole tents as are required from time to time, and they are matted throughout. They are consequently as comfortable as tents can possibly be made on field service.

3. The sick are visited with great regularity and punctuality always twice a day, and of course oftener if the state of the patients requires it. The hospital tents are perfectly clean, the bedding and clothing in good order, and the patients are arranged in double rows, their names and diseases being docketed in the same manner as in fixed hospitals. There were no complaints from the patients, and they appear to be treated with equal kindness and judgment. The average number of patients for the year terminating on 31st ultimo

was 11.8 in the troop, 7.49 in the 1st Company 1st Battalion, and 7.08 in the 4th Company 1st Battalion.

The 3rd Company 2nd Battalion and 4th Company 4th Battalion have no records which show the average. The former only joined the forces on 26th ultimo, the latter on 15th February.

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*Hospital of the 3rd Regiment Light Cavalry.*

General observations.

9. The hospital consists at present of three double-pole tents, matted throughout. The sick are visited with regularity and punctuality, always twice a day, and as much oftener as may be required. The Hospital tents are perfectly clean, the clothing in good order and the patients arranged in double rows. Their names and diseases are not docketed the Regiment being on field service. There were no complaints from the patients who appear to be treated with great kindness. Their average number for the year ending 31st ultimo was 16.60.

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*Hospital of the Pınar Irregular Horse.*

General observations.

15. The Hospital consists of one double-pole tent, which is matted. The sick are visited with regularity and punctuality. The Hospital tent is perfectly clean. Being an Irregular corps there is no Hospital clothing. The patients are arranged in double rows. Their names and diseases are not docketed the Regiment being on active service. There were no complaints from the patients, who appear to be treated with marked kindness.

Their average number for the year ending 31st ultimo was only 4.70.

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*Hospital of 2nd European Light Infantry.*

General observations.

21. The hospital consists at present of seven double-poled tents, matted throughout.

The sick are visited with regularity and punctuality always twice a day, and as much oftener as may be required. The hospital tents are perfectly clean. The bedding and clothing in good order, and the patients arranged in double rows. Their names and diseases are not docketed, the regiment being on active service. There have been no complaints from the patients who appear to be treated with great kindness. Their average number for the year was 77.66.

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*Hospital of the 4th Regiment Native Infantry (Rifles).*

General observations.

27. The 4th Regiment Native Infantry being quartered in the town of Bushire, accommodation for the hospital is provided in a building which belonged to the late Persian Governor. As a temporary arrangement, it answers exceedingly well. It is kept perfectly clean. The clothing is in good order.



The sick are visited with regularity and punctuality. The patients are arranged in double rows. Their names and diseases are not docketed. There have been no complaints from the patients who appear to be treated with great kindness. Their average number for the year was 60.08.

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*Hospital of the 20th Regiment Native Infantry.*  
General observations.

33. The hospital consists at present of two double-poled tents, which are matted.

They are perfectly clean. The sick are visited with regularity and punctuality. The clothing is in good order.

The patients are arranged in double rows. Their names and diseases are not docketed, the regiment being on active service. There have been no complaints from the patients who appear to be treated with kindness. Their average number for the year ending 31st ultimo was 19.75.

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*Hospital of the 2nd Baluch Battalion.*  
General observations.

39. The hospital consists of two double-poled tents, completely matted. They are perfectly clean. The sick appear to be visited with regularity and punctuality. The clothing is in good order. The patients are arranged in double rows. Their names and diseases are not docketed, the Regiment being on active service. There have been no complaints from the patients who appear to be treated with great kindness. Their average number for the year was 14.13.

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From the Medical Board, to the Adjutant General, No. 1019, dated 28th March 1857.

States that the Superintending Surgeon, 1st Division, reports, under date 4th instant, the improving and improved state of health of the troops generally, and of the 4th Rifles in particular, who had 20 less in hospital at that date, than on the last occasion of report; still however amounting to the large number of 179.

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From the Quartermaster General, Bombay, to Chief of Staff, Persian Field Force, No. 2422, dated 3rd April 1857.

States that under the circumstances set forth by the Deputy Commissary General, Persian Field Force, sick carts may be sent back to Bombay by the first opportunity with the exception of one, if required for camp purposes at Bushire.

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From Major Hill, Commanding Engineers, to the Chief of the Staff, No. 165, dated 27th April 1857.

Reports that the erection of the hospitals at Bushire was commenced on 17th February 1857, and on 19th April, when the charge of these buildings was made over to Major North, four hospitals were ready for occupation and four were in progress. States that all the artificers were engaged for a length of time in landing the hospital materials, &c., also that he made repeated applications to Major General Stalker to have the sites for the barracks and hospitals marked out, but he deferred the question for Sir J. Outram.

States that when sufficient material had been collected, the construction of the hospitals was commenced, but owing to the framework being incomplete it was found they would take a long time to erect unless plenty of skilled labour were available. This he applied for repeatedly, but it was not sent. In addition to this, the artificers were for some time engaged on the defences of Bushire, itself a work of primary importance.

Adds that the hospitals were planned to contain 48 men each, but by slightly deviating from the plan they hold 100 men each, and the construction is much expedited.

From the Medical Board, to the Adjutant General, No. 1156, dated 11th April 1857.

States that the Superintending Surgeon, 1st Division, reports under date 28th ultimo the health of the Troops at Bushire continues most satisfactory. Dr. Stovell states under the influence of bright clear mild weather the health of the men of the 4th Rifles has much improved, the number of sick in Hospital being 92 instead of as formerly 210. He further reports that the health of the 2nd European Regiment is steadily improving, and adds in conclusion that the Hospitals and troops are daily supplied with fresh *meat, bread, and vegetables*.

Table showing the proportionate sickness of European and Native Troops 1st Division, Persian Field Force, for five (5) weeks from 1st to 29th March 1857.

		Average Abstract.	
EUROPEANS.	{	1st Company 1st Battalion Artillery	...
		1st	... 9.7
		3 Companies, Her Majesty's 64th Regiment	... 6.6
		2nd European Regiment, Light Infantry	... 5.3
		4 Companies 4th Battalion Artillery	... 5.9
		3rd Regiment Light Cavalry	... 4.6
NATIVES.	{	Punah Irregular Horse	... 9.7
		Aden Troop	... 2.9
		4th Regiment Native Infantry (Rifles)	... 6.3
		20th Regiment Native Infantry	... 16.4
		Sappers and Miners	... 3.9
		2nd Baluch Battalion	... 9.1
		Details	... 6.5
			...
Average		...	6.9

From the Medical Board, to the Adjutant General, No. 1214, dated 17th April 1857.

Forwards Extracts from a report of the proceedings before Muhammerah by Dr. Mackenzie, Superintending Surgeon, 2nd Division.

"The general health of the Force continues very good, a state no doubt greatly contributed to by the sick having been left behind at Bushire. The number borne on the several sick reports this morning was 126, pretty equally distributed among the several regiments. Of these all the important cases are on board the ship *Kingston*."

"But this favorable state in respect to the health of the troops can hardly be expected long to continue, the fatigue and exposure to which the men are subjected will, in all human probability, prove injurious, the more so as the weather is now hot in the middle of the day."

"The locality of Muhammerah is low, influenced by the tides which at spring tides and during southerly winds rise considerably higher than under ordinary circumstances, and leave the shelving banks covered with slime and dead and decaying vegetable and animal matter. It is besides partially surrounded by date trees which are twice a day watered by the rising of the tide, and into the

canals by which water flows all the withered leaves fall and rot. Among these the men have had to work during the day, and to encamp in close vicinity at night."

"The camp is now being moved a short distance inland, about a mile and a half from the banks of the river, and about three-quarters of a mile from the date groves, to somewhat higher, drier, and better ground, but still low and level, in common with the whole plain in the vicinity of Muhammerah. I am, however, credibly informed that far more suitable ground is to be found a few miles higher up, and on the banks of the river Karun, and I am in hopes that circumstances will admit of the force being moved thither at an early date. At present even if there were no military considerations in respect to protecting the town, &c., the want of transport presents a most serious obstacle to any movement, but probably a sufficient quantity can in a moderate time be procured, to admit, in conjunction with the small steamers, of an advance for the short distance required."



From the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General, No. 2818 of 25th September 1856.

With reference to the correspondence regarding *ruzaacs*, &c., states that it appears to Government advisable, instead of furnishing a double supply of *cumbles* which would add greatly to the weight of equipment, to issue the regulation single country blanket. Remarks that it is only in the event of an advance into Persia during winter the warmer clothing is likely to be required, and it could then be supplied by the Commissariat Department from the stock placed in dépôt.

From the Quarter Master General, to the Commissary General, No. 1810, dated 27th September 1856.

Intimates that Government have been requested to sanction the gratuitous issue of one blanket to each European soldier.

From the Commissary General, to the Quarter Master General, No. 2115, dated 29th September 1856.

Intimates that a portion only of the banians and drawers required for the force can be supplied of Europe flannel, in consequence of a sufficient supply of good worsted flannel not being procurable in the market at present.

Recommends that the banians and drawers required to complete the supply for the native troops be made up of *looie*, as also those for the followers.

From the Quarter Master General, to the Commissary General, No. 1881 of 2nd October 1856.

In reply states that when the best material sanctioned cannot be procured, the only alternative is to have recourse to the best procurable, and in this case *looie* must be substituted for flannel.

From Secretary, Medical Board, Bombay, to the Quarter Master General of the Army, No. 2497 of 29th September 1856.

Conveys the recommendation of the Medical Board that coarse Europe blankets be substituted for *cumbles*, or, if that be found impossible, that two *cumbles* may be supplied to each native.

From the Quarter Master General, to the Commissary General, No. 1851, dated 30th September 1856.

States that the Commander-in-Chief fully concurs in the Commissary General's recommendation that every regiment should take its full complement of Bhisties and bullocks, and has directed regiments to be prepared accordingly.

From Secretary, Medical Board, Bombay, to the Quarter Master General of the Army, No. 2529, dated 2nd October 1856.

Recommends that, in addition to one Europe blanket, each European soldier should be supplied with a gingham quilt, lined with a soft country blanket  $7' \times 4\frac{1}{2}'$  such as is used in hospitals.

From the Commandant of Artillery, to the Quarter Master General, No. 809, dated 4th October 1856.

States that neither the brigade of horse artillery nor 1st battalion of artillery are supplied with Europe boots, but are however well supplied with those of country make of good quality.

From the Quarter Master General, to the Commandant, Artillery, No. 1939, dated 17th October 1856.

States that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief fears that country leather boots will be of little use in wet weather, and desires that Europe boots may be supplied to the men.

From the Commandant of Artillery, to the Quarter Master General, No. 841 of 20th October 1856.

States that the men of the 4th company 1st battalion artillery have not been in the habit of wearing boots or shoes of Europe make, but that the officer commanding is endeavouring to make arrangements to effect that object and also to keep up the supply while on service.

From Quarter Master General, to the Commissary General, 2217 of 24th October 1856.

States that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has ascertained that the force will arrive in the Persian Gulf during the winter rains, and he is therefore of opinion that waterproof capes should be prepared and put on board, 20 per cent. of such capes to be provided.

From the Commissary General, to the Quarter Master General, No. 2543 of 27th October 1856.

States that only four waterproof capes are available for issue from the clothing agent's store, and no more are procurable in the market.

From the D. A. C. General in charge, Bombay, to the Commissary General, No. 1024 of 26th January 1857.

States that the whole number of tobras, hay nets, &c., required for the horses proceeding to Persia on board the "*Ocean Monarch*," have been shipped on that vessel.

Intimates that the whole of the slings, made expressly very strong for the purpose of slinging horses, were supplied to the department by the Indian Naval storekeeper, and appeared to be of the very best quality and manufacture, but that he will bring to the notice of the storekeeper the report that the slings were unsafe and of bad materials.

From the D. A. C. General, Bombay, to the Commissary General, No. 1034 of 26th January 1857.

States that he is aware that the tobras supplied to the transports are very slightly inferior to the muster, but he and his assistants being of opinion that they were sufficiently good and strong for the voyage, they were shipped in consideration of there being no time to supply others.

Letter dated 2nd February 1857, from the Officer Commanding the Light Battalion, to the Quarter Master General, Bombay.

Reports that warm clothing has been received for all entitled to it except for the light companies of the 28th and 29th regiments, and that the clothing appears of good quality and has given satisfaction to the men.

Remarks that the shoes are of inferior quality and generally too small for the Battalion, in consequence of which the light companies of the 2nd and 3rd embarked without them, having tried ineffectually to get fitted; and the officer commanding that of the 5th reported just before going on board that several

of those he had received were found too small, but no time was left to exchange them. The 8th, 11th and 22nd are in a similar predicament and the Commissariat decline to take back the shoes as they were slightly soiled in trying them. The 28th and 29th have not yet received shoes, but every effort is being made to expedite their supply.

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From the Adjutant General, to the Officer Commanding Southern Mahratta Horse,  
Sattara, No. 927, dated 4th February 1857.

States that 300 of his Regiment united to the Aden Troop have been ordered for service in Persia and that they will be given the same allowances and enjoy precisely the same advantages as have been granted to the Púnah Horse.

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From the Adjutant General, to the Military Department, No. 958, dated 4th February  
1857.

Recommends that the Detachment, Southern Mahratta Horse be granted the same allowances with regard to Staff Establishment, &c., as an irregular regiment.



Field Force Orders, dated Bushire, 17th February 1887.

The following amended scale of rations for European and native troops, public and private followers, horses and bullocks on board ship, is on the recommendations of the Deputy Commissary General sanctioned, in lieu of that laid down in separate General Order, 11th September 1856 :

	Bread.		Flour.	Raisins, Suet and Ghee.	Peas or Dal.	Sugar.	Tea.	Arrack 24° below London Proof.	Malt Liqueur.	Vinegar.	Mustard.	VEGE-TABLES.		Salt Beef.	Salt Pork.	Fire Wood.	Water.	HORSES.				BULLOCKS.												
	lb.	lb.										Potatoes.	Onions.					oz.	lb.	lb.	Gal.	lb.	lb.	Gal.	Gram, raw.	Pepper, black.	Hay.	Water.	Gram.	Hay.	Water.			
Sunday	...	...	...	2 ozs. raisins and 1 oz. suet or ghee	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	8	8	...	...	7½	3	4	...	...	...	2	10	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Monday	...	...	...	2 ozs. raisins and 1 oz. suet or ghee	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	8	8	...	...	1½	3	4	...	...	...	2	10	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Tuesday	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	8	8	...	...	1½	3	4	...	...	...	2	10	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Wednesday	...	...	...	2 ozs. raisins and 1 oz. suet or ghee	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	8	8	...	...	1½	3	4	...	...	...	2	10	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Thursday	...	...	...	...	...	1 lb. per week.	...	...	1	1	...	...	8	8	...	...	1½	3	4	...	...	...	2	10	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Friday	...	...	...	9 oz. raisins and 1 oz. suet or ghee	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	8	8	...	...	1½	3	4	...	...	...	2	10	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Saturday	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	8	8	...	...	1½	3	4	...	...	...	2	10	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...

Amended table of daily rations to be issued to Native Troops.

				Fighting men.				Public followers.				Private followers.			
				Cooking.		Not cooking.		Cooking.		Not cooking.		Cooking.		Not cooking.	
				lb.	oz.	lb.	oz.	lb.	oz.	lb.	oz.	lb.	oz.	lb.	oz.
Rice Mangalore, 1st sort	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	1	8	...	...	1	...	...	...
Salt	...	...	...	...	$\frac{3}{4}$	...	...	...	$\frac{3}{4}$	...	...	...	$\frac{3}{4}$	...	...
Sugar	...	...	...	...	...	4	...	...	...	4	...	...	...	...	...
Wood	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1	...	...	...
Dhal	...	...	...	...	4	...	...	...	4	...	...	...	4	...	...
Ghee	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	2	...	...
Gram parched	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	12	...	...	...	...	8
Powa	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	12	...	...	...	...	8
Water	...	...	...	1 gall.	...	1 gall.	...	1 gall.	...	1 gall.	...	1 gall.	...	1 gall.	...

Letter dated 24th February 1857, from Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm, Commanding Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse, to the Adjutant General.

Submits for sanction table of establishments which appear absolutely necessary for efficiency, regiment consists of 400 sabres, but has nevertheless to be organised as a regiment up to its full strength.

States that the rates shown are what appear to him necessary to ensure good order before marching, but that, should it hereafter appear that the grades draw higher pay in the Sind Horse, the same indulgence may be extended to the Southern Mahratta Horse.

Table of Staff Establishment, Contingencies, and Forge Establishment required for the service Troops Southern Mahratta Horse under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm proceeding on Field service to Persia.

No.	Denomination.	Pay.	Increase for service or Batta.	Total of each	Remarks.
<i>Staff.</i>					
		R. A. P.	R. A. P.	R. A. P.	
1	Woodie Major ...	140 0 0	35 0 0	175 0 0	These individuals might be furnished from the Medical Department on the usual service rates, receiving horse allowance in addition. 1st Native Doctor should be permanently attached. The 2nd class Doctor should also receive batta, but I cannot ascertain exact amount.
1	Nukeeb ...	80 0 0	7 0 0	37 0 0	
3	Wakeels or Pay Duffadars ...	6 0 0	...	6 0 0	
1	English Writer ...	54 0 0	10 0 0	64 0 0	
1	Persian „ ...	40 0 0	10 0 0	50 0 0	
1	1st Native Doctor ...	30 0 0	7 0 0	37 0 0	
1	2nd Class „ ...	20 0 0	...	20 0 0	
1	Trumpet Major ...	6 10 8	...	6 10 8	
<i>Establishments.</i>					
8	Lascars ...	6 10 8	1 10 8	8 5 4	This number is required on service.
3	Bhisties ...	6 0 0	1 8 0	7 8 0	
1	Chowdry ...	14 10 8	3 10 8	18 5 4	
1	Mookhusuddee ...	6 10 8	1 10 8	8 5 4	
3	Flagmen ...	6 0 0	...	6 0 0	
<i>Contingencies.</i>					
	Stationery ...	30 0 0	...	30 0 0	Allowance for a Regiment is necessary.
	Carbine allowance at As. 1-6 per sowar R. and F. ...	...	...	...	
	Horse allowance to Native Doctors each. ...	10 0 0	...	10 0 0	
<i>Forge Establishment.</i>					
1	Maistry Smith ...	16 10 8	...	...	I cannot ascertain the extra pay given to this establishment. An efficient forge Establishment cannot be maintained or entertained for this amount. It is recommended that a contingent bill be sanctioned to be drawn to make up the extra cost absolutely required.
1	Gun stocker ...	10 10 8	...	...	
1	Fireman ...	9 5 4	...	...	
1	Hammerman ...	8 0 0	...	...	
	Bellows Boy ...	8 0 0	...	...	
	Allowance for steel and charcoal ...	26 10 8	...	...	



No. 1406, dated 9th March 1857, from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General.  
Sanctions the proposed Establishment, for the Southern Mahratta Horse with the following exceptions:

No necessity for extending the rates of pay granted to the Woordie Major and Nukeeb of the Sind Horse. The Native Doctors are presumed to be Native Hospital Assistants on the regular establishment, and have no claim to Horse allowance, which is not drawn by same subordinates attached to regular regiments. They will receive—

1st Hospital Assistant	...	...	...	...	25
Batta	...	...	...	...	5
2nd Hospital Assistant	...	...	...	...	30
Batta	...	...	...	...	20
				...	5

The Regiment is to be assimilated to the Punah Horse, and nothing is to be allowed to it that has not been granted to the latter.

No. 1849, dated 28th March 1857, from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General.

Sanctions the extra allowances recommended to the followers of the Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse, and states that the Hospital assistant is not entitled to any extra allowance beyond the additional half batta of his rank, and money rations, not Horse allowance.

Extract No. 7A, dated Camp Bushire, 26th February 1857, from General Outram, to the Adjutant General.

On the recent expedition to Borasjan the greater portion of the troops either lost or destroyed their boots and shoes owing to the constant rain.

I therefore directed the Commandant to issue a pair of boots or shoes from the Government stores, gratis to every soldier who had performed the march. The number required for the native troops exceeded the amount in store.

I am given to understand that the 26th Regiment Native Infantry were not supplied in Bombay before they embarked as they ought to have been, and that the balance due to the Regiment on that occasion, was included in the present indent.

I trust however that an ample supply may be sent without delay both for Europeans and Natives.

From Assistant Surgeon Wilmot, Horse Artillery, Kárachi, to the Officer Commanding 4th Troop H. B., No. 9 of 8th February 1857.

Recommends the issue (to the men of the 4th Troop H. B.) of a waterproof sheet about 7' x 3½' as it can be easily carried and would materially promote the health of the men, who would otherwise suffer during the rains.

From the Deputy Commissary General, Persian F. F., to the Commissary General, Bombay, No. 25, dated 17th February 1857.

Reports that great inconvenience is experienced in consequence of none of the Commissariat Officers or establishments attached to the second division having come with the troops, and further that none of the transports which arrived have brought invoices of the stores sent with the divisions, thus leaving him in ignorance of what has been supplied, besides presenting an opening for fraud: adds that great confusion of accounts will be caused by the fact that

quantities of stores have been transhipped, thus rendering it impossible to ascertain the amount of stores originally placed on each vessel.

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From the Commissary General, to the Military Department, No. 1275 of 16th March 1857.

In reply to report that lists of stores shipped on transports proceeding to Persia are neither given to masters of the ships nor forwarded to the consignee, states that the commanders of transports have invariably been furnished with detailed lists of all stores embarked, and that similar documents have also been forwarded to the Commissariat officers in Persia.

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From the Commissary General, to the Military Department, No. 1004 of 3rd March 1857.

Explains that the reported inferior quality of many of the articles supplied to the troops by the Commissariat Department is mainly due to the fact that all the superior kinds have been exhausted in the markets, thus rendering the despatch of the description complained of, unavoidable: intimates that in the case of inferior tea brought to notice, a strict enquiry is being made; and adds that in every case where a contractor has been found to be in fault, the contract penalties have been levied.

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From the Quarter Master General, to the Military Department, No. 99 of 14th May 1857.

Conveys the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation that mosquito curtains should be issued to the Troops at Muhammarah with the least possible delay.

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From the Commissary General, to the Quarter Master General, No. 6286 of 16th October 1856.

In reply states that orders have been issued for the supply at Bushire of one month's fuel for the voyage and one month's stock for issue on shore. Fuel is scarce at Bushire.

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From the Commissary General, to the Military Department, No. 2497 of 24th October 1856.

Recommends that from the great want of forage about Bushire one month's supply of screwed hay for the use of the force may be sent in native boats to that place.

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From the Military Department, to the Commissary General, No. 3402, dated 3rd November 1856.

Conveys sanction of Government to above proposal, and intimates that the boats should be directed to make for Basidu, where they will receive orders for their further voyage.

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From the Commissary General, to the Quarter Master General, No. 2538 of 27th October 1856.

Reports that nearly the whole of the Transports have been completed with provisions, water, and dead stock; excepting parched, gram powa hay, and clothing now in course of shipment, and which will be completed by the end of the month or earlier.

States that the supply of provisions for the force has been prepared for 50 days, 30 of which are shipped on the transports, the other 20 days will be embarked on the store ships, and adds that all the surplus stock will be landed and be available for shore rations.

From the Quartermaster General, to the Military Department, No. 236, dated 9th January 1857.

Brings forward for decision a question raised by the Commissariat Department that the Transport Department should purchase food for the cattle.

Points out that if both Departments purchase food in the same market the inevitable consequence of the competition will be a rise of price, and as the Transport Department relieves the Commissariat Department of some of its most arduous duties it would be impolitic to overwork the former by imposing on it a duty which is clearly the special business of the latter. Adds that the purchase of food by the transport subordinates affords an opportunity for fraud which they would not be slow to seize, the cattle would be starved by them in order to enrich themselves.

From Lieutenant General Outram, to the Quarter Master General, Bombay, No. 10, dated 10th March 1857.

Reports that there will be a deficiency of forage if the shipments in the manner heretofore pursued be stopped, and states that the matter is of the utmost importance. Therefore requests the Commander-in-Chief to urge upon Government the absolute necessity of shipping hay bales on transports without delay.

From the Acting Deputy Commissary General, to the Commissary General, No. 3185, dated Bombay, 14th March 1857.

Reports that the utmost difficulty has been experienced in obtaining shoes for the corps on service, which has been enhanced by the fact of there being no contract for the supply of these articles, but by dint of great exertion the whole of the troops were supplied with the exception of a portion due to the 26th Regiment Native Infantry, two companies of the Light Battalion, and the 4th Company 4th Battalion Artillery for whom the number required is ready, and will be immediately despatched.

From the Adjutant General, to the Officer Commanding 25th Native Infantry, Ahmedabad, No. 2024, dated 18th March 1857.

Communicates the Commander-in-Chief's desire, that he will be cautious to see that the men previous to embarkation are fully provided with shoes.

Calcutta and Madras were both indented upon for fodder. The hay was shipped in bales of one maund each (for convenience of carriage). Its average price was Rs. 2-15-0 a maund, delivered on board ship at Calcutta.

Extract from a letter No. 316, dated 7th April 1857, from the Commissary General, to Government of India, Military Department.

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Meanwhile I may be permitted to suggest that the attention of the authorities at Bombay be invited to the new method of preparing field forage introduced last year by an officer of the Queen's Commissariat, which, besides its advantage in other respects, is likely to prove of much importance in facilitating the mobilization of the army. He mixes up the hay, bruised oats, and bran or whatever other descriptions of food are considered desirable, in certain proportions, and then subjects the whole mass to so enormous a pressure as to get a ton weight into fifty cubic feet of space. It then becomes so solid that it can be cut like wood by a circular saw into square blocks of a given size



without any trouble; each block contains half a day's ration for a horse, and not only is an immense economy in freight and land transport effected, but being at once fit for use, it does away with all the waste and inconvenience attendant on the old system.

As no dependence could be placed upon the Indian market to supply preserved meats, biscuits, and vegetables, it was recommended that these should be obtained from England.

Extra No. 4460, dated 11th August 1857, from the Military Department, to the Adjutant General.

Sanctions same rate of foreign service batta to the Detachments of both the Sind and Púnah Irregular Horse, for the period they have been in Persia.

From the Officer Commanding Púnah Horse, to the Assistant Adjutant General, P. D. A., Púnah, No. 259, dated 14th November 1857,

Requests that ration money at the same rates as was granted to the Public Followers may be sanctioned for the syces of the corps who served in Persia, these men only received Rs. 5-4-0 per mensem (and those who deserted easily obtained places worth 10 per mensem) and it was only with their assistance that he was enabled to procure rations for the horses without any help from the Commissariat.

From the Military Department, to the Adjutant General, No. 7378, dated 26th December 1857.

Regrets that the claim on behalf of the syces cannot be recognised. The Persian Writer and 4 Regimental Bhisties, having received Foreign Service pay have no claim to money rations in addition.

Claims on account of syces, Persian Writers, and Bhisties, are disallowed. Remarks that no claim for rations has been preferred on account of the Sind Horse, and that if the present application were acceded to the Púnah Horse would be placed on a better footing, as they have received the same Foreign Service allowance.

From the Military Department, to the Quarter Master General, No. 2088, dated 9th April 1857.

With reference to Report by Lieutenant Colonel Pope, regarding supply of hay, states that he has mistaken the purport of the Government resolution on the subject. Government merely decided not to send hay in the *holds* of transports *conveying troops*, but it was never contemplated to interfere with the loading of it in store ships, or even the stowing it in any open part of any transport; adds that 12,000 bales of 1 cwt. each have recently been despatched and as much more will follow.

## APPENDIX M.

### ABSTRACT OF CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE SUPPLY OF ORDNANCE STORES, AND THE ORDNANCE CAPTURED.

No. 2761, dated 27th October 1856, from Principal Commissary of Ordnance, to Inspector General of Ordnance.

Reports that the whole of the heavy ordnance and stores have been shipped, as also the whole of the general park and engineer stores.

2-8" Iron Mortars.	
2-8" " Howitzers.	
2-18 pr. Iron Ordnance.	
Rifle	160,000 10 rounds.
Musket	600,000 "
Fuzil	50,000 "
	<hr/> 810,000 "

Also that the whole of the ball ammunition as per margin has been shipped, weighing 43 tons.

States that the powder is ready for shipment, the sick carts, doolies, and camp equipage have been shipped.

Remarks that 10,000 rounds of ammunition for the new rifle can be prepared by the 8th proximo, 20,000 rounds are daily expected from England, and the Commissary of Ordnance, Púnah, has been ordered to send all he has in store, about 5,000 rounds.

Adds that he has placed one of his best armourers at the disposal of the Field Commissary of Ordnance, to make any repairs that may be required to the new musket rifle.

No. 726 of 8th October 1856, from the Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines, to the Military Department.

The Principal Commissary of Ordnance wrote on 29th ultimo recommending the addition to the siege train of a couple of 8" mortars, stating that the train was incomplete without ordnance of this description. In reply it was observed that the heavy ordnance to accompany a force must depend on the nature of its operations, and that this must have guided the authorities concerned, in determining to take two 18-pr. guns and two 8" gun howitzers, and the selection of these guns (which are not siege train guns) would appear to show that siege operations in Persia are not contemplated.

It was further pointed out that the difficulty in providing and maintaining transport in sufficient numbers, added to the reasons already stated, combined to limit the amount and nature of the heavy ordnance selected. Two 8" mortars weigh 16 cwt., their beds 24 cwt., and the latter cannot be carried on carts, but must be accompanied with two ponderous sling carriages.

It was pointed out however, that there could be no objection to the provision of wooden beds for the two 8" gun howitzers, if there were any in store, to admit of its being fixed, as a substitute for a mortar.

In reply, Commissary of Ordnance states that he concurs in the view of the case expressed, but it still appears to him desirable to despatch the mortars for the following reasons.

The expense of sending two 8" mortars with their beds and travelling appurtenance, ammunition, &c., to be landed at the base of operations, will

be so insignificant as to be unworthy of a thought, even if the force returns without disembarking. But should the Force advance and meet with a hill fort or stockade, the absence of means of vertical fire would be felt, and if it should be necessary to despatch the mortars subsequently to the rest of the armament, the expense would be fabulous.

Adds that as he knows nothing of the nature of the country he leaves the consideration of the subject to those who are able to arrive at a correct decision.

In conclusion states that there are no wooden beds in the Grand Arsenal adapted to the 8" howitzers.

Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines states that not being instructed in the probable operations of the Force, he is unable to form an opinion, and therefore forwards correspondence for consideration of Government.

No. 657 of 26th January 1857, from the Inspector General of Ordnance, to the Quarter Master General.

States that the Principal Commissary of Ordnance reports that the first battery of the Mountain Train for service in Persia, consisting of 13 pieces of ordnance equipped for conveyance by hand, or for bullock draft, or mule draft, with the exception of harness has been shipped for transmission, and requests that an officer may be appointed to take charge of No. 2 Mountain Battery which is equipped in every respect like No. 1.

No. 2199, dated 31st March 1857, from the Inspector General of Ordnance, to the Quarter Master General.

"Intimates that the following pieces of ordnance have been despatched to Persia from the Grand Arsenal since 1st January :

Ordnance Brass Howitzer 12-pr. Mountain Train	...	...	10
" " Mountain 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	"	"	8
" " Mortar 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	"	"	4
" " " 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	"	"	4
" Iron Gun 12-pr. heavy	...	...	6
" " Howitzers 8" G. M.	...	...	2
" " Mortars 8"	...	...	2

States that the field battery composed of four 9-pr. and two 24-pr. howitzers sent from Fort St. George along with the 3rd Company 2nd Battalion Artillery is not included in the above statement, which exhibits only the ordnance actually supplied from the Grand Arsenal, and not any of that which was in regimental batteries prior to despatch to Persia.

Secret Despatch from the Directors, H. E. I. C., dated London, 23rd June 1857.

Requests that measures may be taken to remove all the captured cannon to India, as Her Majesty's Government deem it of the utmost importance that those tokens of victory should not be restored to the Shah's officers, because they would in that case be exhibited as proofs that the Persian army remained victors in the contest.

No. 101, dated Camp Hyderabad, 4th May 1856, from Officer Commanding 2nd European Light Infantry, to the Assistant Adjutant General, S.D.A., Karachi.

Intimates that the muskets in charge of his regiment have become enlarged in the bore from use—so much so, that if the musket be turned down the bullet



falls out. This is due to the fact, that while at Aden, the sentries on the Turkish wall loaded at night and had to draw the charge in the morning; also to the age of the arms, which have nearly served the prescribed period, *viz.*, 15 years:

The muskets are uncertain at 80 yards. Also complains that many of the bayonets when fixed, are very loose and entirely cover the sight.

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From the Officer Commanding 4th Bombay Rifles, to the Adjutant General of the Army, No. 60, dated Púnah, 3rd September 1856.

Brings to notice the defective state of the rifles, which have been in use since 1842. Also intimates that the knapsacks have been in wear 6 years and months longer than the period prescribed by the regulations, and are so rotten that they can scarcely be kept together by constant repairs.

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From the Deputy Adjutant General, to the Inspector General of Ordnance, No. 4143, dated 8th September 1856.

Forwards proceedings of a Committee assembled to inspect the accoutrements of the 4th Rifles, and requests him to arrange for providing that corps with an entire new equipment of accoutrements to the extent of its full establishment, it being the Commander-in-Chief's intention to complete the regiment to its full strength of 750 privates and to 800 if possible.

The 4th Native Infantry were armed with the 2 groove muzzle loading rifle joining a belted ball.

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From the Inspector General of Ordnance, to the Adjutant General, No. 131, dated 10th September 1856.

In reply to letter about the supply of ammunition to the 4th Rifles, states that he had proposed that a supply of two hundred rounds per man should proceed with the park, or as much of that proportion as might be ready, but as there is likely to be a difficulty with regard to the quality of the ammunition, the Officer Commanding the Regiment should be placed in communication with the Commissary of Ordnance at Púnah, with the view of having the ammunition in store at that station tested and reported upon. States he has every reason to suppose that the rifle bullet moulds now in the Púnah Arsenal, are the accurate ones made up in the gun carriage manufactory in 1852, and suggests that a few balls should be cast from each of these moulds and tried at the same time with the ammunition in store and if it is found that they are the identical moulds supposed, they can be forwarded to the presidency and as many balls cast from them for the present service, as time will admit.

Adds that there are upwards of three lakhs of rifle balls in the Grand Arsenal cast from ordinary moulds, before the new moulds were made, and that whatever exertion may be made, it will be requisite to use at least a portion of these balls on the present occasion.

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From the Commandant of Artillery, to the Adjutant General, dated 14th October 1856.

States that 3 of the second wagons with No. 3 Light Field Battery are not only of an obsolete pattern, but are too old to be sent on service. The date of manufacture is obliterated but the initials show that they were made by Captain Monson, and carriages of the pattern not having been made since 1834 they must be 20 years old.

Adds that the whole of the rest of No. 3 Light Field Battery carriages, are of the Indian pattern, of which there are four in the Arsenal formerly

belonging to Major Blake's troop, recommends that three of these be given in exchange for the old ones.

No. 1264, dated 31st October 1856, from the Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines, to the Adjutant General.

Intimates that 41 Fuzils and 667 muskets were issued to the 1st fusiliers on 15th February and that the Commissary of Ordnance Karáchi has been instructed to take measures for completing the 1st Fusiliers with a new equipment of arms.

Points out that the equipment of the 2nd European Regiment Light Infantry if effected throughout, may interfere with the complete arming of the Fusiliers. Therefore suggests that instructions be sent to the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Regiment to make over to the Fusiliers any number of the new arms that may be required, taking them from the companies of his regiment which are not to proceed on service.

Adds that 50 new percussion fuzils and 500 new muskets are under preparation for despatch from the presidency to Káráchi, to supply deficiencies if any exist.

From the Inspector General of Ordnance to the Adjutant General, No. 1365, dated 6th November 1856.

States that the 61 rifles rejected by the 4th Native Infantry, although not strictly speaking "new," were perfectly serviceable; and that the Principal Commissary of Ordnance considered he was best consulting the public interests in sending them.

Adds that these 61 rifles were issued afterwards to the Sappers and Miners, and were readily accepted by them.

From the Military Department, to the Adjutant General, No. 3544, dated 11th November 1856.

Sanctions the purchase of four of Jacob's Rifles complete, with a supply of iron pointed balls and shells; the rifles to be placed at the disposal of Major-General Stalker, C.B.

Supplementary Return of Ordnance found in the Fortress of Bushire, after its surrender on 10th December 1856.

No.	Description.	Marks.	Country.	Vent.	Calibre or weight or ball.	Length.	Remarks.
59	Brass Gun.	Pers. Fus.	Persian.	Enlarged.	18 pounder.	4'10	
60	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.	Good.	12 pounder.	6'2	With dolphins slightly scored. Has a good elevating screw.
61	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.	6'2	With dolphins honeycombed.
62	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.	6'2	Metal spongy with dolphins.
63	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.	6'2	
64	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.	18 feet.	4'10	Honeycombed.
65	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.	9 feet.	6'0	Threaded at the muzzle.
66	Iron gun.	No marks.	...	Bad.	18 feet.	7'6	Mounted on garrison carriages is a ravelin gun pointed to the outside of the gate to defend its entrance.
67	Ditto.	Ditto.	...	Ditto.	Ditto.	6'6	
68	Ditto.	Ditto.	...	Ditto.	Ditto.	6'6	
69	Ditto.	Ditto.	...	Ditto.	Ditto.	6'6	

From Captain Finnimore, Field Commissary of Ordnance, to the Brigade-Major of Artillery, Persian Expeditionary Force, No. 31, dated 11th December 1856.

I have the honor to forward a statement of the guns and carriages found in the fort of Bushire, and to report for Colonel Trevelyan's information, that the whole are unserviceable with the exception of one 5½ inch mortar. I mean according to the rules of our service, although many might be used as guns of position. The 5½ inch mortar is of thinner metal than those used by us. The bores of all the ordnance are enlarged and scored, this may be attributable to their having been loaded with unusually heavy charges and to the shot being fixed to wooden bottoms by tin bands.

Six of these guns were ranged in a semi-circle round the entrance gate, and two of them I found loaded with grape shot, these I fancy must have been the guns which were on the redoubt and in the battery adjoining the sea front of the fort, and were only removed therefrom shortly before our arrival.

Ten were in position on some raised open ground near the Governor's house most of these were loaded.

Three were placed in a strong passive battery at a corner of the fortress near the residency, these appear to have been recently fired from.

There are large quantities of ammunition in boxes near all the guns. I also found a large quantity in the battery adjoining the sea face of the fort (from which the guns had been removed) the whole of which on the withdrawal of the detachment of the troops therefrom, I had destroyed. In many of the limber boxes were tubes for firing the guns, I hear that a complete troop of Horse Artillery and other guns left the fortress just immediately before our troops arrived in front of it.

Return of ordnance captured on the morning of the 8th instant.

Bivouac Khúsháb, 8th February 1857.

No.	Description.	Marks.	Vent.	Calibre or weight of ball.	Length.	Bore.	Remarks.
1.	Brass gun	Persian	Good	9-pounder	6 feet	4'2	Of Persian manufactures.
2.	Do.	Inscription	Spiked	9-pounder	6 feet	4'2	

These guns are in good travelling order, mounted on travelling field carriages, each timber fitted with a limber box to contain about 30 rounds of ammunition. One gun was taken with three horses, harness, &c., complete.

The carriages are of block trail construction, the checks of one require to be replaced.

Eighteen rounds of ammunition and some food were in the limber boxes.

Besides the above were 262 rounds of gun ammunition, which I destroyed before leaving the bivouac on Sunday evening. The mules eight in number which carried it, I have brought into camp.

I have 350 stand of arms, and I think fully treble that number must have been taken by camp followers and others.

One gun was spiked by our Horse Artillery, as they had to leave it when following on in pursuit. I have since removed the spike.

(Sd.) J. K. FINNIMORE, Captain,  
Field Commissary of Ordnance, Persian Expeditionary Field Force.



## C.

Return of Ordnance stores found in the enemy's entrenched position at Borasján on the 5th instant.

Bivouac Khúsháb, 8th February 1857.

No.	Description.	How disposed of.
3,500	Gun cartridges attached to 12-6-3, and 1½ per shot.	Cartridges broken up and exploded in the mine, 7th instant. Shot scattered.
* 600,000	Musket ball cartridges ... ..	{ 15,000 broken up and balls brought on by Ordnance Department, remainder destroyed by mine, 7th instant.
10	Casks of fults (English) ... ..	Given to the troops.
5,000	Fuzes ... ..	Exploded by the mine, 7th instant.
20	Quick Match ... ..	" "
400	Slow Matches yards ... ..	" "
1,000	Portfires ... ..	" "
4,000	Tubes for priming ... ..	" "
3	Trumpets ... ..	Given to the Troops.
1	Drum ... ..	" "
20	Tents ... ..	{ Given to the troops part were brought away the remainder destroyed.
12	Wheels ... ..	Given to the Troops for firewood.
A large quantity, in bags. Exact amount not known.	Sulphur ... ..	Destroyed by the mines, 7th instant.
	Indigo ... ..	" "
	Saltpetre ... ..	" "
	Tar ... ..	" "
	Charcoal ... ..	Given to the troops for cooking.
	Rope ... ..	Destroyed by the mines, on 7th instant.
	Dragrope ... ..	" "
	Wood ... ..	Given to the troops for cooking.
2,000	Loose shot ... ..	Scattered.
1,000	Loose shell ... ..	Burst and destroyed.
74	Pigs of lead ... ..	Brought into camp by Ordnance Department.
7	Axle trees ... ..	" "
7	Brass Naire boxes ... ..	" "
10,000	Gunpowder lbs. ... ..	Exploded in the mines, 7th instant.
A large quantity.	Iron ... ..	Distributed to Batteries and Troops.
	Red Orpimeal ... ..	Destroyed by the mines, 7th instant.

\* Cartridges and powder. Exploded in the mines. Amount together to about 40,000 lbs.

(Sd.) J. M. FINNIMORE, *Captain,*

*Field Commissary of Ordnance.*

From the Commissary of Ordnance, Persian Expeditionary Force, to the Inspector General of Ordnance, Bombay, No. 131 of 23rd February 1857.

Forwards indents for harness for No. 2 Light Field Battery and 4th Troop B. H. A :

4th Troop	...	{	Harness leading double seats	...	16
			Harness wheel " "	...	8
No. 2 Light Field Battery and	{		Harness leading double sets	...	29
for stores.			" wheel " "	...	9
			Harness leading double sets	...	20
			" wheel " "	...	10

States that on the arrival of the 4th Troop there will be with the force 2 six-pounder and 3 nine-pounder batteries. Recommends despatch of reserve battery of either calibre from Bombay to replace casualties. Also requests to be supplied with sponges and handspikes for the captured guns, also twenty sets of arms and accoutrements for men of every arm to replace losses.

No. 120 of 14th March 1857, from Commandant of Artillery, to the Inspector General of Ordnance.

Requests that orders may be sent to the Ordnance Department at Bhuj to modify the store carts of No. 8 Light Field Battery for Horse draught in the same way as those for No. 2 Light Field Battery were by the gun carriage department.

No. 1873, dated 18th March 1857, from the Inspector General of Ordnance, to the Military Department.

\* \* \* \* \*

I beg to state that on the 10th instant I received a letter direct from Captain Finnimore, and that I proceeded at once to issue such orders as appeared to me to be necessary, intimating to that officer my views on each of his requisitions and the measures which had been directed.

The full foreign establishment of harness for the 4th Troop Horse Artillery has been shipped from Karachi, and a similar establishment for No. 2 Light Field Battery from Bombay, and a proportion of harness for reserve and store has been transmitted or is now under despatch with the Ordnance Park of the second division.

I regret to say that a reserve Field Battery could not well be spared from the Grand Arsenal at the present time, and it does not appear to me to be requisite to supply one for store at Bushire. The provision of spare axle trees, wheels, half wrougths, &c., with the park of each division has been liberal, and it is now very probable that the spare or reserve wagons of each battery will be left behind in case of an advance into the interior, and the spare ammunition conveyed on pack cattle; a measure which will greatly reduce the number of carriages on the line of march.

An additional supply of sponges and handspikes has been ordered.

Buff hides, musketry, stocks, lock furniture, spare ramrods, and spare bayonets have been ordered for the Ordnance Park of the second division, but agreeably to Captain Finnimore's request, I have directed the despatch of twenty stands of arms, and as many sets of accoutrements for each arm of the force.

The 12-pounder brass field piece having long been disused in the Indian service, there are no carriages in store for that gun, and there are no spare carriages at present available for the 9-pounder field gun. I have therefore recommended Captain Finnimore to continue to fit up the captured guns in the best manner that his resources will admit.

Return showing the number and description of Ordnance stores abandoned by the enemy at Muhammerah on 16th instant.

No.	Description.	REMARKS.
16 guns and 1 Mortar.	1 12-pounder Brass gun, Russian ...	Requires bouching.
	1 12-pounder " " Persia ...	In good order.
	1 12-pounder " ...	Spiked.
	1 9-pounder " ...	
	1 9-pounder " ...	
	1 9-pounder " ...	In good order.
	4 Brass Guns 6-pounders ...	Taken by the navy from Southern Fort.
	2 Ditto ...	Calibre not known being buried in the mud, but apparently 18-pounders.
	1 8-inch Brass Mortar ...	Unserviceable mounted of platform cart.
	2 9-pounder iron guns ...	There are old ship carronaders and are mounted on ship truck carriages, apparently made here. They are unserviceable.
	2 6-pounder " ...	
	132 Tents of different sizes ...	30 of these were found in the Upper or Khanber Meerza Camp, 80 in the Lower or Ebrahim Mirza's Camp, 22 in the Camp of the Northern battery. They have all been distributed among the troops.
	16 Gun wheels (spare) ...	Found in the enemy's Magazine.
	13 Gun axletrees ...	
	Some old iron work for guns ...	
	Some incomplete sets of harness ...	
100	Cartridges attached to shot and shell ...	
300	Boxes containing 36,000 of fixed or gun ammunition 3,600 loose shot or shell and 14,400lb of powder.	
4,000	Loose shot or shell ...	These are being collected and brought in.
144,000	Powder ...	Destroyed by explosion.
14,400	" ...	Captured.

J. M. FINNIMORE, *Captain,*

*Field Commissary of Ordnance.*



Return showing the number and description of the Ordnance captured during the Persian War.

Description.	Num-ber.	Marks.	Where Manufactured.	Calibre or weight of ball.	Length.	
					Feet.	Inches.
<i>Bushire.</i>						
Brass Gun ...	...	E. I. C. 1805...	England	12-pounder	3	...
" " ...	...	Persian Inscrption.	Persia	12	6	2
" " ...	...	" "	"	1½	4	...
" " ...	...	No mark	"	6	3	1
" Mortar...	...	Persian Inscrption.	"	8-inch	...	22
" " ...	...	" "	"	5½	...	17
" Gun ...	3	" "	"	6-pounder	4	...
" " ...	...	" "	"	12	6	...
" " ...	...	" "	"	18	4	10
" " ...	4	" "	"	12	6	2
" " ...	...	" "	"	18	4	10
" " ...	...	" "	"	9	6	...
Iron " ...	2	Erased	India	18	8	7
" " ...	...	No mark	Persia	9	3	7
" " ...	2	" "	"	18	8	7
" " ...	...	Persian Inscrption.	"	12	3	6
" " ...	...	No mark	Foreign, Europe	9	3	7
" " ...	...	" "	"	12	3	6
" " ...	...	" "	"	12	8	...
" " ...	...	" "	"	12	7	...
" " ...	...	" "	"	12	7	3
" " ...	...	Erased	"	24	9	...
" " ...	5	" "	"	18	8	7
" " ...	12	" "	England	12	5	8
" " ...	10	" "	"	9	5	7
" " ...	2	" "	"	6	6	4
" " ...	2	" "	"	3	6	...
" " ...	2	" "	"	5-inch	8	...
" " ...	2	" "	"	4	7	...
" " ...	...	" "	"	½	3	6
" " ...	...	No marks	"	18-pounder	7	6
" " ...	...	" "	"	18	5	6
" " ...	2	" "	"	18	6	6
<i>Khushdō.</i>						
Brass Gun ...	2	Persian Inscrption.	Persia	9	6	...

Return showing the number and description of the Ordnance captured during the Persian War—*contd.*

Description.	No.	Marks.	Where Manufactured.	Calibre or weight of ball.	Length.	
					Feet.	Inches.
Muhammerah.						
Brass Gun	...	Russian and Persian ins- cription.	Russia	14-pounder	6	4
"  "  "	2	"	Persia	14	...	...
"  "  "	3	"	"	9	...	...
"  "  "	...	"	"	6	...	...
"  "  "	...	"	England	6	...	...
"  "  "	2	"	Persia	14	...	...
"  Mortar	...	"	"	8	...	...
Iron Carronade	2	No mark	England	9	...	...
"  "  "	6	"	"	6	...	...
Iron Gun	...	Description not stated.				

## APPENDIX N.

### ABSTRACT OF CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE RETURN OF THE TROOPS TO INDIA.

No. 2055 of 7th April 1857, from Military Department, to the Quarter Master General.

States that orders have been received from England under which it is necessary to suspend for the present, the despatch of any more troops or followers to Persia, but there is to be no relaxation in the endeavour to supply the troops now in Persia or on the voyage with everything needful for their support during the next few months. Intimates that the ponies, &c., collected for transport should be at once sold off, and the followers who are still in India discharged, compensation being paid if necessary.

No. 110 of 4th May 1857, from Lieutenant-General Outram, to the Military Department.

Intimates that, availing himself of a discretionary power granted by Government, he proposes to send back to India, as soon as he receives due notice of the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, the whole of the European Infantry and a portion of the European Artillery and Madras Sappers. The remaining troops he proposes forming into one division and locating it at Bushire.

Adds that as the 64th Foot is destined for Belgaum, and as there would be great difficulty in landing them at Vingorla if longer delayed, he intends despatching the regiment as soon as the men can be embarked in the *Earl of Clare*, *Bride of the Seas*, and the H. C.'s Steam Frigate *Punjab*.

Extract No. 15-Q. of 4th May 1857, from Chief of the Staff, to the Quarter Master General, Bombay.

States that the Lieutenant-General Commanding has decided on sending back the Light Battalion in preference to any other native infantry regiment in consequence of the many regiments now in India which he conceives must be inconvenienced to a certain degree by the removal of their flank companies, also in consequence of the large number of European officers present with the battalion, who would be exposed to the trying climate.

The Light Battalion arrived in Bombay on the 30th May.

B. Company Madras Sappers and Miners arrived in Bombay on the 6th June.

Detachments of Mahratta Horse, and the Aden troop, arrived in Bombay on the 9th June.

Telegraphic Message from the Governor General to Lord Elphinstone, dated 26th May 1857.

Tell Sir James Outram by the earliest opportunity that I have received his official despatch of the 2nd and his private letter of the 3rd instant, that I wish him to return to India at once, and that Brigadier General Jacob is also to return to Sind without delay.

Every good man must be at his post. Probably Brigadier Hale or Brigadier Honner should command at Bushire, but you will determine this.

The duty of the force at Bushire will be simply to hold its ground should any new difference arise with Persia.



No. 31A., dated Camp Muhammerah, 13th May 1857, from Chief of the Staff, Persian Expeditionary Force, to the Adjutant General, Madras.

In reporting to you the departure this day in the transport *Hiberian* bound for Bombay of the B Company Sappers and Miners, I am instructed by Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram to state that the conduct of the men has been exemplary since they joined this force, and that they have rendered the most efficient service on the expedition against Muhammerah, and during its occupation.

2. The peculiar features of the country afforded them ample employment, and the skill and wonderful rapidity, and cheerful alacrity with which they constructed roads through the extensive date groves, bridged the canals, and formed piers for disembarking troops and stores from the vessels on the Shat-ul-Arab river, were the admiration of the whole army.

3. I am commanded to request you will be so good as to lay before His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir Patrick Grant, this record of Sir James Outram appreciation of the services performed by the Sappers, and that you will permit me to convey through you to the officer commanding (Brigadier Major Boileau) and to all ranks composing the company and an expression of the Lieutenant-General's best thanks for the very efficient service they have rendered.

(Sd.) EDWARD LUGARD, *Brigadier General,*  
*Chief of the Staff, P. F. F.*

F. F. Orders by Brigadier-General Jacob, c. b., Bushire, 14th May 1857.

5. The accompanying Field Force Orders by Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, dated 9th, 11th and 12th May 1857, consequent on the cessation of hostilities and organising the troops to be stationed at Bushire, are published.

6. Consequent on the arrangements above ordered for the troops remaining in Persia, Lieutenant-Colonel Younghusband, D.A. G. of the Expeditionary Persian Field Force, returns to his appointment in India, and Brigadier General John Jacob thinks the present to be a fitting occasion to express to this excellent Officer his grateful thanks for the hearty and most efficient aid which he has while in command of the troops at Bushire, invariably received from him.

The experience, method, and readiness which this officer so eminently possesses have been applied to the performance of the important duties entrusted to him with a cordial and untiring zeal which has made them doubly effective; and the Brigadier General feels it to be no less a gratification than a duty, now publicly to record his high estimation of the value of the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Younghusband as D. A. G. of the Field Force.

From the Adjutant General, to the Military Department, No. 305, dated 28th May 1857.

With reference to the foregoing order points out that the force proposed to be left in Persia is much in excess of requirements, remarks as follows:

The Cavalry Brigade may be stated in round numbers at 1,770 sabres; the artillery consists of a troop and two companies of Europeans, and a company of Golandauze, attached to four Batteries of 6 guns each, together with a European and a native company in reserve.

The infantry comprises five regiments of Native Infantry including the 2nd Baluch Regiment, but exclusive of two companies of Sappers and Miners and may be stated at 3,500 bayonets; altogether comprising a force superior in numbers to that engaged in the reduction of Bushire.

Adds that the Commander-in-Chief desires to record his opinion that this force may be very greatly decreased, and would urge upon the attention of Government, the objection which exists against retaining in such a climate a valuable body of European Artillery which must become disorganised by the great heat, and be lost to the service, while the native troops must suffer in proportion.

In conclusion His Excellency hopes that his views may meet with the concurrence of the Government owing to the present exigency.

No. 3085, dated 2nd June 1857, from the Military Department, to Lieutenant-General Outram.

Communicates the above opinion of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, endorsed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, and strongly urges the necessity of a portion at least of the force being sent to India where troops, especially Europeans, are most urgently needed.

All troops except the Sind Horse to be sent to Bombay rather than to Karáchi.

From Sir J. Outram, to the Military Department, No. 133, dated Bushire, 16th June 1857.

In reply to the above states that he is aware of the necessity which exists for troops, and that he has already despatched one troop of European and one company of Native Artillery with their batteries attached and a reserve Company of European Artillery to Karáchi and that the Fūnah Horse are about to embark for Bombay.

4th Troop	Horse	
Artillery.		
3rd Company	2nd	
Battalion.		
4th Company	3rd	
Battalion.		

Points out however, that the present crisis in India may tempt the Persians to renew hostilities, and rather than reduce the garri-son of Bushire, he would advise withdrawing it altogether and establishing the resident at Kharaj with a garrison of one regiment of Native Infantry and one Golundauze Foot Battery (or even half that force) with the aid of a sloop of war and armed steamer.

Does not think it prudent for above reasons, to reduce the force any further.

From Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., to the Adjutant General, Bombay, No. 40 A, dated Bushire, 16th June 1857.

States his intention of leaving Bushire on evening of 17th instant for Bombay, calling at Karáchi accompanied by Brigadier General Ingham, Major Barr, Deputy Paymaster, and Captain Harvey, Acting Private Secretary.

Staff Officers arrived in India in May and June 1857, and subsequently they rejoined their former appointments.

Extracts from a despatch, addressed by the Hon'ble C. A. Murray, C.B., to Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., dated Baghdad, 6th May 1857.

Para. 2. As I have before had the honor of suggesting to you the probability that Her Majesty's Government will deem it necessary to send a Commissioner, one or more, to Herat, to see that the conditions of the treaty regarding it are properly carried out, and as it is obviously advisable that such Commissioner, or Commissioners should be of the Military profession, I



hope you will be able to send up to me here; without delay such Officers as you may think competent for that service, and for incidental purposes connected with it.

I understand that several Officers have expressed a wish to accompany me on my return to Tehran, and as a complimentary mission from Prince Barialinsky, consisting of 16 or 17 military men, lately entered that city, it could not excite observation and remark, if I were to be attended by one half of that number. Those who are not destined for service at Herat, might collect at and near Tehran, useful information for the Indian Government, and might then return by different routes, each keeping a journal describing accurately the distances and difficulties of the road, as well as the nature and resources of the neighbouring localities.

If you coincide with these views, I hope you will send up to Baghdad, as soon as possible, the officers selected, together with the tents and other articles which may be requisite for their travelling equipage, for owing to the daily increasing heat to which we shall be exposed on the journey, I ought to move the mission northward as soon as may be practicable after the arrival of the Officer who brings the letters from the Persian Government which are indicated in the treaty of peace.

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No. 33A, dated Baghdad, 27th May 1857, from Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram, to the Adjutant General, Bombay.

Reports that on a requisition from the Hon'ble C. A. Murray, C.B., he has attached the following Officers to the Persian mission with a view to their accompanying it to Tehran :

Captain M. Green ...	... 16th Regiment Native Infantry, Military Secretary.
" M. Wray ...	... Deputy Quarter Master General.
Lieutenant C. Clerk ...	... Madras Cavalry.
" Hardy ...	... Artillery.
" Watson ...	... 2nd European Light Infantry.
" Willoughby ...	... 10th Native Infantry.
	Assistant Surgeon Wood.

Intimates that should the Home Government concur in the advisability of the measure, Captain M. Green and Lieutenant Clerk are to proceed on to Herat with Major Taylor, 18th Regiment Native Infantry, as joint Commissioners (with Dr. Wood as medical attendant) to see that the conditions of the treaty regarding it are properly carried out, and that the other Officers are to return by different routes as Mr. Murray may be able to arrange, each keeping a journal describing accurately the road, and collecting such information as may hereafter prove useful to the Indian Government.

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F. F. Orders, dated Baghdad 30th May, 1857.

1. The services of the following Officer are placed at the disposal of the Hon'ble C. A. Murray, C.B., Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at the court of Persia, for special duty as extra attaché to Her Majesty's mission, from the 1st proximo, without prejudice to his present appointment in the Expeditionary Field Force :—Major R. L. Taylor, 18th Regiment Native Infantry, Political Secretary and Persian Interpreter to Sir James Outram.



From Government of India, Military Department, to Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram,  
No. 180, dated 30th June 1857.

*Commissioners.*

Major R. L. Taylor, 8th  
Bombay Native Infantry.

Captain Malcolm Green,  
16th Bombay Native Infantry.

Lieutenant Claude Clerk,  
2nd Madras Cavalry.

Physician, Assistant Sur-  
geon W. G. Wood, Bom-  
bay Army.

Captain J. Wray, 24th  
Native Infantry.

Lieutenant Hardy, Bom-  
bay Artillery.

Lieutenant Watson, 2nd  
European Native Infantry.

Lieutenant Willoughby,  
10th Bombay Native Infan-  
try.

Approves of his having selected the Officers noted in the margin to be deputed to Herat as commis-  
sioners also of his having placed the Officers enumer-  
ated on the margin at the disposal of the Hon'ble Mr.  
Murray to accompany him to Tehran for the purpose  
mentioned in the General's despatch, and intimates  
that these Officers while employed on detached service,  
will retain the Staff and regimental allowances they  
at present enjoy, and receive in addition a travelling  
allowance at the rate of Rs. 10 per diem the same to  
be debited to general charges of the war.

Adds that Major Taylor as the head of the Herat  
commission will receive a table allowance of Rs. 500  
per mensem, from the date of its departure from Teh-  
ran.

No. 3875, dated 22nd July 1857, from the Quarter Master General, to the General Transport  
Agent, Bombay.

States that the withdrawal of the British Forces from Persia has been  
resolved upon and that orders go by first steamer to General Jacob to tell off  
a native régiment and if he thinks fit a company of Golundauze without  
horsed battery for the occupation of Kháraj.

Intimates that the troops to return are—

Two companies European Artillery, 2 companies Sappers, 3rd Light  
Cavalry, Sind Horse, 4th Native Infantry (Rifles), 20th Native Infantry,  
26th Native Infantry. Land Transport Corps, and that they are to return to  
Bombay en route to the Púnah Division, also that it is of the utmost importance  
that the Artillery and Cavalry arrive first and it has been so ordered.

Requests that as much European camp equipage as possible may be sent,  
as there are not enough tents for the reinforcements expected from England,  
and that the probable length of the voyage may be named as a guide to the  
naval officer who conducts the transport duty at Bushire, as many horses  
have been lost from want of enough water and forage for the voyage to  
India.

Field Force Orders, Head Quarters, Camp Bushire, Saturday, 1st August 1857, by Brigadier-  
General Jacob, C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Force, Evacuation of Bushire.

1. Captain Lightfoot with the company of Golundauze under his com-  
mand will proceed to Kháraj to form part of the garrison of that place.

The present armament of the camp redoubt is to be removed wholly to  
Kháraj, together with all the ammunition and stores belonging to the pieces  
forming the armament now in the ordnance stores at Bushire.

2. The 23rd Native Infantry will be held in readiness to embark for  
the Island of Kháraj to form with the company of Golundauze above mentioned,  
the garrison of that place.

Brigadier Honner, under instructions from His Excellency the Commander-  
in-Chief and Government, is appointed to command at Kháraj as Brigadier

of the first class, and will proceed to the island at once and assume the command of the garrison.

Brigadier Honner is requested at once to send in the name of an Officer he would wish to recommend to be his Major of Brigade.

On the arrival of the 23rd Regiment Native Light Infantry at Kháraj, the detachment of the Balúch Regiment now on the Island is to return at once to Bushire.

3. The Commanding Engineer will be good enough to cause lines hospitals, &c., to be erected at Kháraj for the accommodation of the garrison, and an engineer officer with a proper establishment will be placed on the island as a part of its garrison.

4. The Assistant Commissary General will be good enough to detach to Kháraj an officer of his department with an adequate establishment, and to cause provisions for the garrison for at least six months, immediately to be stored on the island.

7. Store or platform carts are to be sent to Kháraj for general commissariat purposes.

Thirty pairs of draught bullocks are also to be posted on the island, complete with drivers, yokes, chains, &c., for the purpose of enabling the guns to be removed if necessary.

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Field Force Orders, 3rd August 1857.

The following arrangements are ordered for the garrison of Kháraj. To be attached to the Artillery under Captain Lightfoot :

1 Store and Park Corporal.	1 Under Mistry Carpenter.
1 Laboratory man.	4 Carpenters.
1 Second Tindal.	1 Under Mistry Smith.
12 Store Lascars.	2 Smiths.
	2 Hammermen.
	2 Bellows boys.

The Commissariat Department to arrange for the supply of rations, porter and arrack, to the two Europeans at Kháraj.

The Assistant Commissary General will be pleased to store a sufficiency of hay and grain on the island for the supply of twenty officer's horses for six months, in addition to that stored for government cattle.

---

Field Force Orders, 4th August 1857.

On the withdrawal of the British Forces from Bushire, the Political Resident Captain Jones, will be the chief civil and political authority in the Persian Gulf, and on the departure of the Brigadier General, the Brigadier Commanding at Kháraj is accordingly directed to attend and comply with all requisitions and instructions which he may receive from the Resident.

Captain Rigby, at present Superintendent of Police and Bazars in the Town of Bushire, will on the evacuation of that place by the British, proceed to Kháraj and remain there on the staff of the Brigadier Commanding as Persian Interpreter and Superintendent of Bazars and Police on the island.

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Letter from Brigadier-General J. Jacob, C.B., to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, dated 4th August 1857.

Reports that he has caused Kháraj to be occupied by the 23rd Native Infantry and a company of Golundauze, and has placed the garrison of the island under the command of Brigadier Honner. Forwards copies of the orders

issued on the subject which will show all details, and which he trusts will be approved of and confirmed by government, and states that the company Golundauze had no battery belonging to it, and he has not a single field piece of any kind with the troop under his command, with the exception of those of the two European field batteries.

States that he has therefore transferred to Kharáj the armament of the only redoubt which he had retained for the defence of the position at Bushire, which armament consists of the pieces detailed in the margin.

2 8" iron howitzers.  
2 18 pounder guns.  
2 5½" iron mortars.

Intimates that these guns have been embarked and were despatched to Kharáj on 3rd instant with 250 rounds of ammunition per gun, with platforms and the usual stores, and such establishment as he thought necessary to complete, and begs to call the attention of Government to the admirable manner in which the duty of removing and embarking this heavy battery has been performed by Captain Lightfoot and his company of Golundauze.

States that he has ordered provisions for least six months to be stored on the island for the use of the garrison, and that building materials had already been sent there (in anticipation of shelter being required) to be erected for troops, and that an Engineer officer with a proper establishment of artificers and laborers has now proceeded to the island to complete the work.

Reports that Captain Hatch's battery has been embarked on the *Sultana* and will leave on the 8th, towed by the steamer *Chusan* to the mouth of the Gulf, whence the transport will proceed to Bombay, and the steamer, to Karáchi, conveying orders for the Head Quarters of the Sind Irregular Horse to proceed without delay to Bombay.

States that a Division of Captain Gibbon's battery will also be embarked on the *Result* and proceed to Bombay immediately and adds that after the departure of these vessels there will not be sufficient tonnage for the remaining troops, stores, forage, &c., &c., and requests that a large number of transports may be sent for this purpose.

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From the Military Department, to the Adjutant General, No. 4546, dated 15th August 1857.

States that by General Order No. 40652, of 8th ultimo, issued by desire of General Outram, the undermentioned officers were withdrawn from special duty with the Persian mission:

Captain J. Wray.  
" M. Green.

| Lieutenant R. G. Watson.  
" E. Willoughby.

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Field Force Orders by Brigadier-General John Jacob, C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Force, dated Bushire, 1st October 1857.

No. 1. The Brigadier General is about to embark to-day to proceed to India. Bushire has been restored to the Persian Government, and after the departure of Brigadier General Jacob, Captain Jones, political resident, &c., will become the chief British authority in the Persian Gulf.

Brigadier Honner will remain in command of the garrison of Kharáj and will communicate on military subjects generally with army head quarters. With respect to all political, civil and local proceedings he will be guided by the instructions and information which he may receive from the political resident.

*Land Transport*

Captain Taylor of the ~~Light Infantry~~ Corps will remain at Bushire until the camels belonging to the corps shall have been sold; when these animals



have been disposed of he will proceed to Kháraj, there to superintend the embarkation of the cattle belonging to the Land Transport Corps now on that island which are to be sent to Bombay. On the completion of this duty Captain Taylor with his establishment will proceed to the presidency by the first convenient opportunity.

Captain Dunsterville, Superintendent of Police will embark for India with the Brigadier General.

Despatch dated 2nd October 1857 from General Jacob, to Lord Clarendon.

I have the honor to report for Your Lordship's information that the last portion of the Persian Expeditionary Force under my command remaining at Bushire has embarked this day, and that I am now myself on the point of departure with these troops en route to Bombay.

On the 24th September I addressed a letter to the Persian Commander-in-Chief requesting him to direct proper officers to proceed to Bushire to receive charge of the place on its evacuation by the British forces, and accordingly on the first instant a Persian officer of rank, by name Khanler Khán, deputed for the purpose, arrived and was placed in possession of the town of Bushire on behalf of His Majesty the Sháh of Persia.

\* \* \* \* \*

The troops both at Bushire and at Kháraj have continued to be wonderfully healthy.

The inhabitants of the town of Bushire have lately been considerably alarmed at the approach of the cholera which has been prevalent at Shíráz, and from which the people of Bihbahán, Kazrán and other places nearer to Bushire are now reported to be still suffering severely.

No cases of the disease have however appeared here, and it does not appear to have approached Bushire nearer than to the town of Borasjân, at which place many deaths are reported to be taking place from this disease.

Nothing could have been more satisfactory than has been the conduct of the Persian authorities, without any exception, throughout the whole of the business of the evacuation of Bushire, &c., now brought to a close.

Whosoever their aid has been required they have afforded it most readily and cordially, while there has not been a single instance of the least attempt at plundering or annoyance of any kind, on the part of the neighbouring tribes, or of any person whatever.

The people of the country and of the hills adjoining the *Garmsir* have been perfectly well disposed towards us; laborers and such supplies as the country afforded have been abundantly procurable. There has not been the slightest quarrel or disturbance of any kind.

Indeed nothing could have been more friendly than has been the conduct of all parties towards us on the occasion of our departure from this country, which all alike seem deeply to regret.

